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By 1800 slavery and cotton had become the chief means of socio-
economic mobility in Alabama. However, from territorial days white Ala-
bamians expressed apprehension about an ever-increasing slave population
and slave insurrections. Attacks by bondsmen on owners, overseers, and
drivers exacerbated white fears. In the 1820's and 1840's colonization
of former slaves and checks against the domestic slave trade were encour-
aged, and the Alabama slave-code was continuously revised in attempts
to control bondspeople.
Alabama's cottom kingdom was centered in the ten counties running
through middle Alabama— the Black Belt. In some of these counties slaves
were more than 66 percent of the population. However the great planter
made huge profits from the slave-cotton nexus and did not consider abo-
lishing the plantation system. But the rise of immediate abolitionism
and "free-soilism" in the north aggravated racial fears, and many Black
Belt whites felt slavery had to spread into the territories.
Because of its geography, Alabama was divided over resistance to
northern attempts to restrict slavery from the territories. North Ala-
bamians lived in regions where soil was not conducive to cotton and
slavery. Consequently, they were not as threatened as south Alabamians.
Moreover, upstate yeomanry were national Democratic Party loyalists
and many were unionists. Furthermore, north and south Alabama Democrats
fought over control of high offices in the State. Each section demanded
equal representation for their region.
Downstate the Democrats and Whigs were fragmented. Both parties
had extreme southern-rights cliques--political outsiders--who agitated
the slavery in the territories issue. Some of these men owned fev; slaves
and aspired to become great planters.
Many of these firebrands were from east-central Alabama where
they found their socio-economic mobility blocked by the monopolizing
tendencies of the planters. By the 1850' s the large plantation owners
controlled the best cotton lands, and the ultras turned to politics as
the best means of enhancing their careers. These opportunistic lawyer-
politicians demanded a territorial slave code and the re-opening of the
African slave trade. They used the slavery issue in attacking the moder-
ates and conservatives who controlled both political parties. In their
pursuit of high office many of these radicals shifted from party to party
and from secessionism to unionism depending on public sentiment.
Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick ran the state's most powerful poli-
tical factlon-the "Montgomery Regency." He and his followers
were loyal
to the national Democratic Party and dispensed patronage.
William L.
Yancey yearned to replace Fitzpatrick as leader of the
Alabama Democracy.
Yancey and other southern chauvinists accused Fitzpatrick
of being "soft
on southernir™. 11
The only significant unionist bloc In south
Alabama was the Whig
Party, controlled by conservative planters.
However, by the late 1850's
because of Democratic gerrymandering and the
death of the national Whig
vi
Party there was no union structure left in south Alabama. Alabama was
a one party State. But the Democrats were still fragmented between up-
state unionists and moderate southernists and lowland moderate and ultra
southern nationalists.
John Brown's raid gave the firebrands the issue they needed to
challenge Alabama's moderate-conservative leadership. The ultras poli-
ticized racial fears by equating a Republican victory in 1860 with slave
rebellions and racial amalgamation. The State's Democratic Party was
split. The party-regulars supported Stephan A. Douglas. The firebrands
backed John Breckenridge . They hoped to throw the presidential election
into Congress where they could bargain their votes for a federal terri-
torial slave code and recognition of their power in Alabama. After Lincoln
triumph, Alabama's ultras struck for separate state secession, hoping
for political advancement in a southern Confederacy. Thus, chronic
racial anxieties were exploited by politicians who provoked Alabama into
sucession
.
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INTRODUCTION
Many Civil War historians, in trying to determine the War's causes,
have emphasized the growing alienation between two different cultures.
According to their analysis, an industrialized, aggressive, and politi-
cally and socially mobile north confronted a stratified slave society
in which planters exerted unchallenged political control. The presence
of slavery based on race supposedly created a ^"Herrenvolk democracy."
Class conflict among whites was largely absent, and all whites were equal
2
regardless of their relative wealth. Although these beliefs were held
by the entire South, they were evidenced more in slave dense central-
south Alabama than in the hilly northern counties where slaves were re-
latively few.
Much of Alabama's political ferment was based largely upon dif-
ferences in slaveholding and geography. Consequently, like other regions
of Jacksonian America the state's ante-bellum politics defies reductionism.
The fertile far northern counties of the Tennessee Valley were charac-
terized by small plantations and small farms, and by 1860 was largely
white. The mountain and hill counties just south of the Valley were
not fit for large-scale cotton plantations. Here, in an area overwhelmingly
white, the yeoman farmers held sway. By 1860 blacks were less than 20
percent of the population, and in some counties no more than 10 percent.
Largely because of the small farm economy, the upcountry was isolated
from the rest of Alabama, and its parochialism, heightened by an ineffec-
tive transportation system, made for a special regional consciousness
and pride.
4
Its farmers deeply resented the statewide political control
Xexerted by the political chieftains downstate in Montgomery. Further-
more, Jacksonian nationalism shaped upcountry yeomanry into national
Democratic party loyalists.
A piedmont area separated northern Alabama from the Black Belt.
The upper piedmont was much like the mountainous hilly counties in geo-
graphy, economic and population. 5 The lower piedmont by 1860, with its
considerable flat cotton lands, was merging into the Black Belt. 6
The State's "cotton kingdom" was in the ten counties of central
Alabama, with their rich black silt soil. Slaves comprised two-thirds
of the population of these counties and even three-fourths in some of
them. It was in this fertile Black Belt, at the state capital in Mont-
gomery, that Alabama's political leadership centered.^ Farther south,
in the pine woods and wiregrass districts--there was little farming,
especially in south-western Alabama. In many of these counties the popu-
g
lation was almost evenly divided between blacks and whites.
These regional differences had the effect of making the State almost
a political microcosm of the whole nation. In central and south Alabama,
where more than half of Alabama's slaves toiled, southern chauvinism gen-
erally prevailed, while, as indicated above, pro-unionism characterized
the highlands. Thus, it is erroneous to describe ante-bellum Alabama
as politically quiescent, managed without challenge by great slaveholders.
Party politics embodied inherent intrastate conflict and searing factional
struggles.
Factions, particularly southern-rights Democrats and Whigs, clashed
over elective and appointive offices. Outsiders sought by any means to
wrest control from Alabama's political establishment. Their
opportunism
xi
included capricious party loyalty as well as erratic political commit-
ments, and expediency often masqueraded as principle. By the late 1850's,
with the expiration of the Whig Party and with the plantation system
increasingly dominated by the big operator, politics became one of the
few means of upward mobility left to the "man on the make."
The protection of slavery in the South and in the territories
became important political issues in Alabama. Southern rights, which
embodied these issues, became a rallying cry for those ambitious lawyer-
politicians frustrated by Montgomery's Democratic Party loyalists who
ran the State machine. William L. Yancey typified these status-seeking
politicians insofar as he used the Southern-rights issue as a level by
which to gain power. To men like Yancey, the "soft on southernism" ac-
cusation proved politically advantageous against conservative Democrats.
One issue bound together most white Alabamians, particularly those
residing in the heavily slave populated south-central counties, namely
that the State must remain a white man's country. Racism had always
been common among white Alabamians. However, with the growth of the
black population Alabamians developed a cohesive doctrine of white su-
premacy. Throughout the history of Alabama any hint of black resistance
was especially traumatic in slave dense south-central Alabama.
These racial anxieties were intensified by the rise of immediate
abolitionism and territorial restrictionism in the north. Such develop-
ments inspired Alabama's office seekers to politicize negrophobia for
their own ambitions. Henceforth, any Alabama politician who consorted
with the "abolitionized" north could not be trusted. The national Demo-
cratic Party, it followed, had to be "southernized
.
" What the political
xll
climbers needed in order to vault themselves into power was a "northern
outrage" against southern institutions. They had this outrage in 1859
with the great slave-uprising scare engendered by John Brown's raid,
and they capitalized on it, attempting to take over the State Dcmocrati
organization and to turn the national Party into a vehicle for their
own and slavery's interests. After living with periodic slave-insurrec
tion scares for generations, lowland Alabamians of all political persua
sions were convinced that racial mastery had to be maintained at all
costs. After Lincoln's election, the majority of Alabamians chose a
southern Confederacy. This study will describe the convoluted history
of Alabama's political battles and the chronic racial fears that even-
tually shaped the decision for disunion.
CHAPTER I
THE ALABAMA SLAVE: A SPECTER HAUNTLNG THE LAND
Alabama's defense of slavery was based not only on political and
economic arguments but also on racial fear. White Alabamians were terri-
fied by the specter of the rebellious savage. Fear of the African
—
particularly dread of the imminent consequences of emancipation- -animated
tensions throughout the state's slave history^ Moreover, numerous slaves
resisted bondage--individually and collectively--and by defying slavery
bondspeople exacerbated the deep fright that provoked so many whites.
Of course many uprising scares were imaginary, but they were nonetheless
vexing. The overwhelming majority of slaves resided in central Alabama
--the Black Belt—Alabama's "cotton kingdom," where consternation over
slave conduct was chronic.
This perpetual fear often led to attempts to restrict slave im-
portations. Such apprehensions, often came into conflict with the desire
of large slave-owners to maintain or increase their social and economic
hegemony. At different times, as we shall see in this chapter, this
conflict was resolved in different ways. Nevertheless, the general
trend was to resort to ever stricter control of the activities of blacks
—both slave and free. Since neither the restriction of domestic slave
importations nor the colonization in Africa of the slave population was
a feasible solution for those who held political and economic power,
stricter codes came to be used to provide protection from insurrections y
activity. Thus, slavery was not only a labor system which brought huge
profits to a few but also a means of racial control, a way of keeping
2in subordination a population viewed by white southerners as hostile,
alien, and a threat, to the very fabric of their civilization. By 1861
many white Alabamians were ready to die to maintain Alabama's peculiar
1institution.
In 1785, before Alabama entered the Union, alarm was expressed
by whites over the growing number of slaves and their insubordinate be-
havior. For example, one shocked slaveholder learning that his bonds-
men were implicated in an insurrectionary plot, declared: "Judge my
surprise, of what avail is kindness and good usage when rewarded by such
ingratitude; tis true indeed that they are kept in due subordination
and obliged to do their duty...but two of the three [slaves] had behaved
so well that they had never once received the whip." An investigation
revealed that one rebel committed suicide rather than be executed by
his captors. The other conspirators were tried and three of them were
hanged less than ten days after the discovery of the planned slave up-
rising scheme.^
Five years before statehood Mobile, in 1814, was the first city
to establish a slave curfew law. It required slaves to retire to their
dwellings before eight p.m. Huntsville, Montgomery, Tuscaloosa, Selma,
3
and smaller towns followed suit. In 1818, David Holmes, the territorial
Governor, never questioned the demands of white settlers for slaves, yet
he felt that the influx of Africans would increase danger, particularly
in regions where blacks outnumbered whites. In a letter to James Wilkinson,
the Governor General of the territorial militia, Holmes insisted on the
need for more armed security for the territory:
3Of the slaves who compose so large a portion of
our population, I entertain much stronger appre-
hension. Scarcely a day passes without my re-
ceiving some information relative to the designs
of those people to insurrect. It is true that
no clear or positive evidence of their intensions
has been communicated; but certain facts, and
expressions of their views have justly excited
considerable alarm amongst the citizens. For
my own part I am impressed with the belief that
real danger exists, and that it is my duty to
lose no time in procuring arms for the defense
of the country.
^
Holmes and other Alabama whites were manifesting the chronic fears that
Western Hemispheric slavemasters had of servile insurrections. In point
of fact, in 1793, the French slavocracy on the island of Santo Domingo
had been overthrown by a slave revolt. Many Alabamians were keenly aware
of the Caribbean uprising as well as of periodic slave rebellion scares
both real and imagined in the upper South.
As a result of these apprehensions as well as of a desire to fix
the legal status of the slave, codes were established to control the
behavior of bondspeople. From 1798 to 1817, while Alabama was part of
the Mississippi Territory, legislation was enacted to govern slaves and
free blacks within the territory. After Alabama became a state, the
General Assembly passed slave provisions which were incorporated in the
Constitution of 1819. According to the first state slave code, bonds-
people might be freed by their owners with the consent of the legislature,
or the lawmakers might take the initiative in liberating blacks provided
the consent of their owners had been obtained, or compensation made.
Slaves were not to be deprived of trial in capital cases, though not,
of course, juries of their peers. Acts were passed forbidding slaves
to sell any articles except "simple things made with their own hands."
4Passes were required of bondsmen who wished to visit other plantations
in order to prevent them from wandering around the countryside or holding
unauthorized meetings "where dangerous doctrines might be inculcated."
A slave patrol system was inaugurated and military districts were esta-
blished; all able-bodied men were required to serve in the militia, and
the Captain of each company was required to detail patrols whose duty
it was to enforce the slave law. 5
From the beginning of statehood, slave-masters insisted that they
treated their bondsmen with kindness and humanity. James B. Sellers,
author of Slavery in Alabama, emphasizes that planters went to great
lengths to care for the needs of their slaves. "As we look at the early
beginnings of Alabama," Sellers affirms, "master and slave stand out as
necessary co-partners in the great task of winning a new region from
the wilderness...." In one section descriptive of plantation life, en-
titled "Bonds of Affection," Sellers stresses the love between master
and slave. Although admitting that some overseers could be brutal, he
nonetheless declares that overseers in general followed the humanitarian
advice of the owners. Another historian of Alabama slavery has indicated
that where sentiment was lacking, business prudence inclined the master
to a policy of good treatment. Without question there were owners who
treated slaves with solicitude. Thus, most of the early written record
of slavery in Alabama expresses dismay at the belligerent reaction of
so many bondspecple to servitude. Sellers and likeminded southernists
attributed slave recalcitrance to their "infantile" nature, a reflection
of the white attitude that all blacks were inherently inferior.
Despite the "bonds of affection" approach to slavery, the reality
5of the situation was somewhat different, m fact, slavery in early Ala-
bama had a brutally distinctive side. The plantation routine was well
set by the early twenties. Work began at dawn and lasted until sunset.
The overseer usually blew a horn to summon the hands from the shacks.
In order to prevent any loitering, James Tait, a plantation owner of
the 1820's stated, "I make them get off quickly after the horn is blown,
I always whip the last one out." As they prepared for a day's toil,
bondspeople on some Alabama plantations were often fed a sparse diet.
For breakfast a piece of cornbread and for dinner boiled vegetables such
as peas and beans and occasionally some meat. Small wonder then that
7 percent of a sample of more than 8500 slaves above the age of fifteen
were either physically impaired or chronically ill. In addition to being
undernourished, slaves were also poorly housed. The earliest slave cabins,
small and filthy, were germ infested. A newly arrived planter noted in
1822 that a disease known as ship's fever had repeatedly occurred among
his bondsmen, and he was convinced it was caused by conditions in the
slave quarters.^
There were some planters in the 1820 's who candidly admitted that
bondage was a harsh experience. However, they were concerned with the
brutality of their overseers rather than with the brutality of slavery
itself. In 1825 a plantation owner discovered that he had found no solu-
tion even when employing a relative as overseer. "I want you to distinctly
understand me without your rushing and whipping and lashing for I will
not stand it any longer." Alabama social critic D. R. Hudley, remember-
ing the early days of slavery in Alabama, maintained that slaves were
badly treated on some estates. Masters were sometimes unconcerned about
6s on
so re-
it: "He must be a very bold man who will deny that the overseer
many plantations are cruel and unmercifully severe." Hudley all
called that he was repulsed as a young man the first time he saw a slave
sale: "In order to force them to bring as much money as possible the
cold blooded villain deliberately sold man and wife, parents and child
in separate lots. In view of such outrages, I do not wonder at those
g
who are anti-slavery." After visiting Alabama in the late 1820 's,
Harriet Martineau, a British essayist, confided that "slavery is nowhere
more hopeless and helpless than in Alabama. The richness of the soil
and the paucity of inhabitants make the slave labourer a most valuable
possession; while his distance from any free state .. .makes the attempt
9
to escape desperate."
But no matter how hazardous Alabama slaves fought bondage and
contributed to the constant trepidation that whites harbored for the
enslaved African. In the twenties slave owners expressed continual
anxiety about their bondspeople. In the twenties slave owners in Tuscombia,
central Alabama, complained, "We observe for some time past slaves of
the neighboring plantations roam about in large parties with impunity
on the Sabbath day; the result of which must be, the pilfering of our
village .... If not speedily prevented by a well regulated and steady pa-
trol. "^ Tuscaloosa newspapers around time time carried advertisements about
runaway slaves or reported that blacks were unmanageable and dangerous.
A Tuscaloosa slave was stopped and accused of stealing merchandise.
He was about to be whipped when he drew a knife and killed his accusor.
"The sable culprit was captured, " reported the Tuscaloosa Observer, "and
was led to a tree, tied to it... and burned to ashes.
"^
7In south Alabama in 1827 a group of runaways was attacked and
several were captured after a bloody encounter. Three were shot and
the others escaped. "Some of these negroes have been runaways several
years and have committed many depredations on the local plantations...
a great number of negroes in secret were to join them, and it is thought
that in that event they could not be taken without bringing cannon to
12bear upon them." Escaping slaves often camped in groups and lived
by stealing food and provisions. One band of fugitives outside Montgomery
was typical. Well organized and daring, it even attacked some plantations
13
at noontime. Alabama's first decade as a slave state, therefore, saw
some bondspeople—individually and collectively-manifesting resistance
to bondage which would aid in causing whites to re-examine their commit-
ment to slavery.
A depressive cotton market resulting from the panic of 1825 also
inspired doubt respecting bondage, and in 1826 a measure was enacted that
prohibited the importation of slaves. The measure was passed both be-
cause of fear of a massively growing black population and because many
planters felt that the increasing number of slaves would result in over-
14
production. However, before the end of the decade the act was abrogated.
Other Alabama whites expressed their uncertainty by aligning themselves
with newly formed anti-slavery colonization societies. In 1824, for
example, the Tuscaloosa Mirror advertised that subscriptions to Benjamin
Lundy's Genius of Universal Emancipation would be received at the of fie.
of the paper.
15
Reacting mildly to a memorial from the Ohio legislature
which advocated general emancipation, the governor of Alabama in 1825
16
said that an offer of government remuneration might some day be opportune.
8The icathgra Advocate in the same year published an editorial critical
of the slave trade."'
In 1826 Jcmes Birney began his activities as a colonization ad-
vocate. Birney, a Princeton graduate and member of the Kentucky planter
aristocracy, practiced law and operated a cotton plantation with slave
labor in Huntsville. He later entered politics and was elected mayor
of the city. In 1826 Birney became attorney for the Cherokee Nation
vhich at that time occupied the northeastern part of Alabama and he
joined the American Colonization Society for the Southwestern district
about the same tise. Writing to a collaborator in 1827, Birney confided
skepticism as to the future success of the Society in the State: "The
society in chis place [Huntsville] considered by me one of the most im-
portant in this whole region, has been recently in rather languid con-
dition...." By 1832 Birney had returned to Kentucky. He freed his slaves
in 1834 and, a year later, was condemned by a Montgomery public meeting
18for being a threat to the stability of Alabama. An even earlier sign
of growing rigidity about slavery came in 1827 when the Alabama Assembly
tried to pass an act forbidding the teaching of slaves by free persons.
This measure received its heaviest support from the emerging Black Belt
19
region and south Alabama.
Another incident that alerted Alabama officials to the necessity of a
slave anti-sedition measure was the case of Jacob Cowan. Governor John Gayle
received a communication from David Crawford, solicitor of the first Judicial
Circuit Court of Mobile, in which he was informed that one Jacob Cowan, a slave
formerly of Wilmington, North Carolina, had served a jail sentence there for
distributing, it was rumored and reported, two-hundred copies
9of David Walker's Appeal to bondsmen. (In 1829 David Walker, a black
tailor from Boston, Massachusetts, had written and paid for the printing
of a tract calling for a slave uprising in the south. Some copies had
found their way into Dixie and caused great apprehension.) At the time
of Cowan's arrest in 1830 no law existed which covered the dispensing
of seditious literature in North Carolina. After Cowan left North Caro-
lina the North Carolina legislature passed an anti sedition law and seven
Wilmington slaves were arrested for conspiracy originally instigated
by Cowan's activities. Crawford called Gayle's attention to the fact
that Alabama still had no law covering distribution of insurrectionary
pamphlets. Jacob Cowan, he asserted, "can be identified without any
difficulty and he should be at once removed from this state, if this
can be done without injuring the rights of the owner." But Crawford
feared it could not be done without a slave sedition ordinance. Then
he reminded Governor Gayle of the slaves recently convicted in Monroe
County of conspiring against the white inhabitants of that county. Little-
ton, one of the three convicted, had declared that a letter had been re-
ceived from Mobile stating that there would be war soon between whites
and blacks. "Tis possible that this fellow Jacob Cowan communicated
this intelligence and that he had secretly excited and encouraged the
Monroe County conspiracy...." Crawford concluding, called for speedier
trials and "more immediate punishments of slaves guilty of treasonable
conspiracy" in order to "increase the sec*-ity of society and to the
20
interest of the slave holder."
Slavemasters throughout the 1820 's indicated dismay about acts
of slave resistance, but Nat Turner's Virginia rebellion in 1831 alarmed
10
>urrec
and frightened them to the extreme. As a result of Turner's inst
tion, the Alabama legislature passed a revised slave ordinance which
made it a crime for any black, free or slave, to receive instruction
in reading or writing. White Alabamians were well aware that the leader
of the Virginia uprising was literate and used his knowledge to incite
rebelliousness among other bondsmen. Another law was passed making any
meeting of more than five male slaves with or without passes, not on
the owner's plantation, unlawful. It became the duty of the slave patrol
to disperse all congregated slaves, and the patrol might give each slave
ten lashes without the permission of the slaveowner. A slave caught
strolling without a pass was subject to fifteen stripes; the death penalty
was proscribed for anyone who should distribute, circulate, or publish
any seditious papers, pamphlets, or writing tending to produce conspiracy
or insurrection among the blacks, slaves or free. The same act made
it unlawful for free blacks to associate with slaves in the kitchen,
outhouse, or slave cabin without the written permission of the master.
Those violating this act were to receive fifteen lashes for the first
offense and thirty for every one thereafter. Finally, the General Assembly
made an unsuccessful attempt to control the number of slaves brought into
21
the state for sale.
Mounting apprehension over slave obstinacy was intensified in
October 1831 by an Indian-assisted slave revolt in eastern Alabama.
'*The infection is pretty general with the negroes," it was reported,
22
"and many of uhem were arrested." On November 5, 1831, the Southern
Advocate editorially attacked existing patrol laws. It called them
"very lame" in spite of the revised code passed as a result of the Nat
11
Turner tremor. The Advocate noted that many citizens had been critical
of the policing system. "If the patrol lers are not clothed with powers
to severely correct negroes who have insulted them/' it advised, "they
had as well remain at home...."23
By the end of 1831 Alabama achieved consensus on slavery and the
doubts of the mid 1820«s had vanished. Moreover, the gnawing uneasiness
about a potentially menacing slave population combined in the early thirties
with a resentment toward the emergence of immediate abolitionism in the
north. In 1831, for example, at the request of the legislature, Governor
Gayle sought the cooperation of other southern governors in an effort
to halt the publication of abolitionist literature in the north. Gayle
felt that southern states should extradite northern abolitionists for
publishing and distributing pronouncements encouraging rebellion among
southern bondsmen. 2^
Acting on Governor Gayle's recommendation, the Tuscaloosa Grand
Jury on October 14, 1835, returned an indictment against Robert G. Williams,
New York editor of the Emancipator for circulating "within our State,
pamphlets and papers of a seditious and incendiary character," and making
"illicit appeals to the passions, to excite to insurrection and murder
our slave population." An editorial in The Huntsville Democrat called
upon the Governor of New York to extradite Williams to Alabama to stand
trial. Governor Gayle in a letter to Governor William Marcy of New York
demanded that Williams be sent to Alabama "for attempting to produce in-
surrection and rebellion among our slave population." Later, in his
annual message to the Legislature, Gayle declared that incendiary pub-
lications are "the readiest way to introduce the bloody scenes...
12
deliberated p iotted £or our ruln .„ ^ ^ ^ ^
centious... publications of William and the infuriated demons associated
with him."25
That same month a group of Wilcox County planters resolved that
"Our right of property in slaves is fixed and guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution and we regard the acts of the anti-slavery societies at
the North as treason against the Union." Another public meeting in Mont-
gomery offered a $5000 reward for the capture and delivery of William
Lloyd Garrison to state authorities. The Grand Jury of Montgomery pre-
sented "to the condemnation of the world Arthur Tappen, William Lloyd
Garrison, James Birney, George Thompson, the Reverend British emissary,
and all their associates as offenders against the peace and dignity of
the state of Alabama."26
Dread of Garrisonian Abolitionism continued to engender anxieties.
Would not the Emancipator help light the fuse for an Alabama "Southampton"
insurrection? Regardless of stricter slave codes, slave resistance per-
sisted. In Wilcox County, in 1833, one bondsman was charged with killing
his mistress and the court sentenced him to death. The following year,
in the same County, five slaves conspired in the murder of their master.
They were tried before the County Court and three of them were found
2 7guilty by the Jury, which sentenced them to death. Again some white
Alabamians traced the cause of these outbreaks to northern anti-slavery
publications which were flooding the deep South. The Southern Advocate
was now among the foremost critics of abolitionist activities. "If the
North continues to disregard the voice of reason, patriotism and humanity,"
it editorialized, "we must obey the law of self-preservation--throw ourselves
13
upon our committer of vigilance and hang up all slaves suspected of
being infected with the abolitionist virus."28 Henry Watson, a trans-
planted Connecticut Yankee living in the Black Belt, wrote his brother
that copies of the f^nc^a^ ^ xe found in nearby Greensboro
^
%^9±m
passionate mobs to arise searching the countryside for abolitionist
emissaries." But Watson was not alarmed: "I would as freely sleep with
my door wide open now as ever, and here as in Connecticut." He observed,
however, that Greene County residents were extremely prone to uprising
scares which were "frightening distant communities as well."29
The events of the thirites led Alabamians to conclude that unre-
strained manumission would produce massive numbers of potential black
abolitionist revolutionaries. These fears were acted on by the Legislature.
The lawmakers prohibited any free person of color from settling within
the limits of Alabama and if any free black migrated to the State he had
to leave within thirty days or face thirty lashes. Police powers were
given to any white person to arrest any freedman suspected of conspiracy.
Moreover, it was illegal for free-blacks to trade with slaves, aid run-
aways, visit plantations without the owner's permission, preach without
a license, forge a plantation pass, or retail liquor to slaves. Before
1834 manumission was possible only by a general or special act of the
legislature. Now a new law stated that a slave who was freed by his
master must move outside the state within twelve months; complete freedom
would not take place until such removal. If the freedman should return
3
1
he could be sold back into bondage. In 186 0, during a period of severe
32
rebellion panics, a law was passed halting the emancipation of all slaves.
By the end of the 1830' s the total number of slaves in Alabama
14
had risen to 253,532. Major planters, with 56,736 slaves, possessed
22.38 percent of this total, though they were only one-fifth of one
percent of the white population. The individual large planter held an
average of 79.6 slaves by the end of the decade. 33 The massive increase
in the slave population would, naturally affect the slaveowner's sense
of security.
Notwithstanding new slave codes and heightened concern, individual
bondsmen continued to resist as the 1840 's unfolded. In March 1840,
one Charles was charged with murdering his master in Limestone County;
he was convicted and hanged. Protracted black resistance inspired
further conspiratorial fears, some groundless and others real. A slave
assembly around the Huntsville market place was producing tensions, and
a local statute prohibited slaves from coming "to that place unless they
35had a written pass from their owner." Eighteen forty also witnessed
a severe rebellion panic in the Black Belt where more than 2/3 of the
slave population resided.
The tremendous excitement of the 1840 presidential campaign with
each party accusing the other of being "abolitionists," roused "dangerous"
hopes among the slaves of Perry County in central Alabama. Many believed
they were to be freed. One bondsman, for example, claimed that Martin
Van Buren was in the area of Montgomery with a 2000-man army of libera-
36
tion. Peter Still, ex-slave and abolitionist, recalled that in the
summer of 1840, when the political "hoopla" of "Tippecanoe and Tyler
too" spread throughout one Black Eelt County, it fashioned an unexpected
response. Speeches were made by local Democrats and Whigs using slogans
such as "liberty" and "freedom." The slaves, Still said, did not remain
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indifferent listeners; some interpreted such talk literally and imagined
the dawn of liberty had arrived. The whites, they observed, were already
free, and if liberty was to become universal—and both political parties
insisted it would become so— "then the black folks too would soon enjoy
its blessings." Talk of liberty, Still reported, spread from the town
to the plantation slaves; the news was at first whispered about but, he
observed, "as they became more certain that their hopes were well grounded,
they gradually grew bolder, soon they were discussing the subject in
their religious meetings." The slaveholders learning of these discus-
sions and seeking the identity of the plotters created an espionage sys-
tem. Black preachers were silenced, slave meetings forbidden, patrols
strengthened. "Every Negro, free and bond, who were met by the patrol
was searched; the plantation pass was meaningless." Panic pervaded the
white community, and it was whispered, "the Negroes intended to rise!"
Old stories of black rebellions were revived, and even the most faithful
servants were now suspect. The fear soon abated, but Still nonetheless
contended that this incident showed the slaves that slaveholders' con-
37fidence could easily be shaken.
Slave plots, increased abolitionist activity in the north, the
introduction of anti-slavery petitions in Congress and Congressional
debates over the "gag rule" were a deeply troubling combination of events.
They prompted Governor Bagby in 1840 to speculate whether Alabamians could
live much longer with Abolitionists in the same Union. "Fervent attach-
ment to the Union of the states," he told the General Assembly, was being
weakened by criticism of slavery. "There is a point in public, as well
as private affairs, beyond which forbearance ceases to be a virtue," he
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asserted. Moreover, "it was time to waken from the state of fancied
security in which we have hitherto reposed ... for the rude tide of inno-
vation and fanaticism is constantly lashing us." Bagby ended with a
call upon southerners to act immediately "or their weight and importance
in the scale of national existence will be lost, and their safety en-
3 8dangered forever."
Symbolic of slaveholder fear of these years was a special local
patrol law passed in Baldwin County in 1841. White southerners in each
precinct were divided into four patrol groups, each under the control
of a deputy marshal. Each person liable to military duty would serve
one year out of every three and violators were to be fined fifty dollars
The Black Belt town of Wetumpka, in 1842, organized a municipal patrol
under the command of the town marshal. All slaveholders residing within
the limits of the town were required to serve.^ Demands were made in
north Alabama, a region of low slave density, to strengthen the patrol
system there: "We must have a patrol, a regular efficient patrol at
all hazards and upon any terms," demanded the Huntsville Democrat . "It
41
is madness to remain longer without it."
But augmented slave patrols could not prevent further slave re-
taliation. In Limestone County two slaves, belonging to William Parham
42
were jointly charged with murder of their overseer and executed. In
December 1844 near Huntsville, a slavemaster was slain by a bondsman
and he was hanged until, the press emphasized, "he was dead, dead, dead
Two transplanted Alabamians living in Mississippi recalled the conster-
nation of white southerners: "Where I used to live [Alabama] I remember
they built pens in the woods where they could hide, and Christmas time
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they went and got into them »fraid the niggers was rising."44
Into the mid forties Alabamians continued to attack the "aboli-
tionist menace." The Jacksonville Republican had been moderate on the
subject of abolitionism in the 1830's, minimizing it as a threat to
"Southern customs." But by 1844 two years before the Wilmot Proviso,
it demanded Texas annexation and an end to northern criticism of slavery.
"The course pursued by the Abolitionists," it declared, "seems likely
ere long to present distinctly to the country the alternative of aboli-
tion of slavery and all its horrible evils or the dissolution of the
Union. When the choice is forced upon us we are fully prepared for a
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separation." " By the mid forties then the strains created by slave
reprisals, insurrectionary panics, and abolitionist criticism provoked
a major debate in Alabama regarding the future importation of slaves.
In 1845 some important planter-politicians called for an end to
slave importation. Dr. P. W. Kittrell, a Whig legislator from the Black
Belt, introduced a restriction bill. It was presented too late in the
session and nothing was done about it. Colonel A. J. Pickett, a prominent
literary figure and a Democrat, urged Kittrell to reintroduce the bill
at the next legislative session. Public opinion, he said, was turning
against the slave trade. Pickett cited a statement made by the Perry
County grand jury: "Perry is a great mart for slaves. Perry County
has suffered much from the introduction of that species of property
among us." Pickett cited statistics to the effect that during the de-
cade Alabama's slave increase was greater than that of any other slave
state. In thirteen counties of southern Alabama, he claimed, the slave
population already exceeded the white population by 23,500. This total
18
was deduced from the 1840 census and, he was sure, "conditions were much
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worse now."
At the next General Assembly meeting Kittrell chaired a special
committee appointed to investigate slave restriction. The slave popu-
lation, reported the committee, was becoming too large for the interest
and security of Alabamians. Kittrell »a committee observed that nonresident
planters exported their slaves into Alabama but took out the proceeds
of slave labor. Many of these slaves of absentee owners, it was charged,
were of poor character— from the jails of other slave states. "The in-
troduction of such criminals to Alabama could only create a spirit of
unrest and insubordination among the slaves already here." Marengo
County's slave population was double that of the white in 1846. At that
rate, the legislators warned, in another decade the state would have a
black population more than double the white. The Committee report con-
cluded with what was by then a familiar observation--the mounting possi-
bility of a servile revolt. Such a possibility would certainly increase,
if the black population continued to grow. It had already necessitated
many of the petitions to the legislature urging prompt measures that
would halt the domestic slave trade. Finally the. Committee recommended
. • - ,
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passage of a restriction ordinance.
Publication of the Kittrell proposals provoked dispute. J. J.
Hooper, eidtor of the Wetumpka Whig, agreed that "such a law would in
a great measure prevent the contact of our slave population with portic...,
of the slave populations of states fast preparing for emancipation, which
contact is dangerous and every day becoming more so .... Half the negro
villainy of Alabama... is perpetrated by slaves of recent importation.
19
They have ideas and a degree of intelligence [that]
.. .should [not] be
communicated to the black population of the South West." HooPer insisted
that Alabama had "to close one of the easiest roads by which fanaticism
can reach us, we must shut our doors against infected importations."48
One of the most vociferous protests against the Kittrell suggestion came
from a newspaper in north Alabama, an area with a modest slave population.
The Huntsville Democrat, owned and operated by the Clays, a planter-
politician family, asserted that far from being too numerous, the slave
population was the foundation of all the wealth in Alabama. "Individuals,"
the editor J. Withers Clay contended, "were the best judges of their own
investments. When the people of Alabama found investment in negroes
unprofitable, they would stop buying them." If a restriction law were
passed, Clay warned, whites would evade it. A9 He need not have been
so anxious. Kittrell's bill failed to pass. In 1846 and 1847, however,
in an attempt to limit and discourage the slave trade the General Assembly
passed new levies on slave traders: they had to pay license fees amount-
ing to ten dollars on each slave offered for sale."*
0
The passage of the slave trade tax did not, however, end the debate
over slave importations. One of the most controversial statements made
in opposition was issued by Soloman A. Heydenfeldt. Born in Charleston,
South Carolina, in 1816 of German-Jewish extraction, his family had been
identified with the Jewish community there for generations. Upon becoming
a lawyer, he went to Alabama in 1837, had a successful practice, was a
judge in Tallapossa county, and settled in Russell county on the eastern
end of the Black Belt."'* On January 31, 1849, he aroused a storm with
an open letter in the Huntsville Democrat
,
addressed to Governor Reuben
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Chapman. The address called upon the Governor to utilize his constitu-
tional powers and recommend a slave-import curb to the legislature.
Heydenfeldt advocated a far reaching measure. It would block all future
immigration for any purpose. Many of the border states, he observed,
were looking to unload their slave population; and this practice could
cause the Gulf states to become the "Santo Domingo of the north American
continent and rush the South into a war of extermination with its black
population.
"
There was another equally ominous reason for action against slaver
in Alabama. Many Alabamians wanted more populous white communities not
just because of their fear of slavery insurrection; some regarded slave
52labor as their rival labor force. This fear of competing black labor
had substance. Many Alabama bondsmen were skilled bricklayers, black-
smiths, clerks in stores, carpenters, gardeners, and cooks. Sawmills
employed them as laborers and sawyers. A notice in a Huntsville paper
asked for blacks for work in a flour mill. Moreover, large groups of
53
slaves were used by railroads on construction jobs. A well known
architect in the southern part of the state was a slave. His most notabl
achievement for 1845 was a bridge in Columbus, Mississippi, for which
54
he served as the chief architect.
In addition to pointing out the slave's competition in the labor
market, Heydenfeldt also challenged the planters' obsession with cotton.
In 1845 cotton was selling at 5.63 cents a pound—a new low for the 1840'
Thus, at the current price, cotton was scarcely paying expenses of cul-
tivation. Money was being made only in the western Black Belt. Slave
immigration into these areas was increasing so rapidly that production
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and consumption could not keep pace with it. Heydenfeldt stressed that
cotton investment had retarded Alabama's economic growth. If the slave
trade were halted, he concluded, a healthy white population would soon
begin to migrate into counties now mainly black. 55
Heydenfeldt was almost immediately the target of criticism. One
Black Belt editor deplored the fact that the issue had been raised. The
question \«>uld solve itself. No one would suffer if slave markets were
opened in every town in Alabama. Men of moderate means could then become
slave-owners. If Heydenfeldt 's proposals should become law, "the prospects
of the poor man would be forever marred; exclude the slaves for sale and
a Negroid owning Aristocracy would be created." The fear that a planter
elite would control a major portion of the slave population was already
a reality. The 1850 census revealed that since 1840 the slave population
had enlarged to 342,844, an increase of 89,312 from the 1840 figure.
Moreover, the major planter, by the end of the forties, owned 96,106
bondspeople or 28.03 percent of the 1850 total. The wealthy planter
57had increased his average holdings to 83.13 slaves.
Another critic of Heydenfeldt ' s recommendations, a rabid pro-slavery
newspaper located in Barbour county (which would become the leading "fire-
eating" county in the state), questioned Heydenfeldt 's loyalty to the
south. The goals sought by slave restrictionists were essentially those
of the abolitionists, the editorial declared, and It accused the restric-
tionists of wanting Alabama to do what the abolitionists urged on Congress.
If the blacks were confined to their present limits, the editor predicted,
the time would soon come when there would be an inevitable conflict between
the "Southern white man and the black and not for one moment would hardy,
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enterprising Americana ourrender their glorious South to lazy, idle and
careless Africans." If curtailment was ever successful then it would
mean "the extermination of the negro race in the United States. The
people of the South, as the only true friends of the slave, owed it to
him and to themselves to silence the wild fanatics of both north and
58
south." The Huntsville Democrat likewise raised doubts about Heyden-
feldt's loyalty and insisted that the subject should never have been
raised: Restriction will "not be called for in our day and generation."59
While Alabamians disputed the issue of domestic slave importations,
bondsmen were providing additional support for the restrictionist posi-
tion. A slave in Jefferson County insulted and threatened the slave
patrol. The patrollers went after him and one was wounded by the knife-
wielding fugitive. Another white prusuer attempted to subdue him and
was "so miserably lacerated" that he died before help could reach him.
Then the slave returned to his owner's home and took his own life.^
Another slave residing in Coosa County was charged with the murder of
his master, tried, and sentenced to the gallows.^ * In a third incident
in Chambers County, on the fringe of the Black Belt, Dr. F. McCantz, a
highly respected physician, was shot in his home. One of his "trusted"
servants was accused after it had been learned he had previously made
t
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an unsuccessful attempt on his owner s life.
Such incidents of resistance angered Alabamians. In 1849, the
town council of Eufaula, Barbour County, enacted legislation in regard
to the slaves of their community. This legislation restricted the move-
ment of slaves and free blacks. Furthermore, the town marshal had the
responsibility of whipping slaves if they were disorderly or profane.
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At the same time, the town council revised the patrol ordinances for
the tov/n by calling for five man patrols with one of the five acting
as captain. Failure to patrol was punishable by a fine of three dollars.
The patrol had to inspect all streets and alleys for slaves and free
blacks who had to be off the streets by nine p.m. Strengthening and
enforcing the patrols was not only inspired by the acts of violence
occurring in neighboring communities but by the assumption that many
of the "recent fires in and around the town" were caused by slaves who
were in the community after hours. To combat this, the town council
authorized the marshal to appoint four men to act as night watchmen;
they were to patrol in pairs on alternate nights. During this same
period, there was an attempt to restrict the practice of slaves hiring
their own time or otherwise going at large within the community.
Whites residing in other regions of the state deemed slave in-
subordination the result of abolitionists' teachings. For example, the
citizens of New Market in Madison County were outraged by the activities
of an alleged "abolitionist emissary" who had attempted to distribute
anti-slavery pamphlets. The local post-office refused to circulate them
and the "agitator" was removed from the village. "No one can for a
moment doubt," said the Huntsville Democrat, "that the incendiary's
principle object was to produce agitations and discontent among our
black population, as it is known that many of them read, and as these
documents have been circulated so profusely through the County, there
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could be no difficulty in their obtaining them." Auburn in Russell
County similarly experienced an abolitionist scare and also forced a
suspected "abolitionist who had been acting the Missionary" to leave town,
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Abolitionist literature even found its way to Governor Henry Collier.
He was sent an impassioned unsigned anti-slavery appeal. "You exclude
our persons from you," it declared, "and deny the right to speak against
the sin at your own doors... know that by the same principles by which
you enslave others you may be enslaved... I beseech you do not procasti-
nate but... seek some way of setting yourself free from sin and your
bondsmen free from oppression. 1,66
As a result of these incidents the' General Assembly in 1849
strengthened the slave codes. A bill was passed to "more effectively
suppress the practice of trading with slaves." This measure was intended
to prevent communication between bondspeople and anyone attempting to
"instruct them in abolitionist doctrines."67 The legislature also con-
sidered an act to compel black seamen coming into the port of Mobile
to be removed and confined to jail while their ships were anchored. It
was feared that "alien blacks" could spread emancipationist plots among
Mobile slaves. But some thirty-five Mobile merchants sent a petition
to Governor Henry Collier protesting the proposed ordinance for they
feared that commercial ships would be reluctant to use Mobile if the
law were passed.
Forebodings about slave conduct and about whites who seemed "soft
on Southernism" continued to create tensions in some heavily black popu-
lated counties. Slaveowners in Autauga County were convinced that bonds-
people were in "a disorganized state, and that danger may be apprehended."
At a meeting of slave-holding families a series of resolutions were passed,
They called for tighter security on the part of the patrols, and leaders
were "to enquire what white men are in the habit of visiting certain
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negro quarters": they also urged an investigation of those "mysterious
individuals who had been shooting guns on Sundays near the plantations."69
Forced confessions, after severe whippings by a vigilance committee of
Triana (Madison County), elicited testimony from slaves of a "hellish
insurrectionary plot." The patrol executed several blacks, including
a preacher, notwithstanding his owner's plea that his life be spared;
and two white men suspected of "tampering with the slaves'* were imprisoned
to await further action. One white man who had been "too friendly" toward
bondsmen was given until Christmas to settle his affairs and leave the
County.
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The citizens of Eufaula were active again when they organized
vigilante committees to ensure that all whites shared the same sentiments.
The local committee drove an elderly man, Captain Elisha Betts, out of
town because he subscribed to "abolition papers," circulated anti-slavery
opinions in the community, and corresponded to "abolition" journals.
Petitioning to return to Eufaula, the Captain signed a written agreement
that he would not offend the community again. When three of his neighbors
guaranteed him, he was allowed because of his advanced age to resume his
residence in the town. 7
Fear of servile rebellion and emancipation was grist for Alabama
politicians who, from 1846 to 1851, agitated the pro-slavery defense.
Future Supreme Court Justice John A. Campbell, a Mobile lawyer, and
Democrat, wrote his mentor John C. Calhoun that the south must demand
termination of the slavery debate for the "slaves' temper had been excited. 1
"They begin to understand," Campbell warned, "that society is being moved
72
on their account." Similar forebodings came from H. W. Conner who
also wrote to Calhoun and observed that people were despondent, believing
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slavery to be doomed. Most important, the slaves, recognizing these
fears, grew "arrogant and troublesome."73
In January 1849 the Southern Congressional caucus composed an
"Address to the Southern People," with four of Alabama's seven Congress-
men signing the statement. Both Alabama Senators endorsed the appeal.
Interestingly, two of the Alabama representatives who did not sign the
address came from north Alabama--a region of low slave density. The
third was a Whig who refused to sign for partisan reasons. Like many
southern Whigs he strongly opposed exacerbating sectional tensions.
The address was authored by John C. Calhoun. Appearing in a host of
Alabama newspapers, Calhoun's appeal was virulently negrophobic. It
asserted that if abolition succeeded then "the horrors of black domina-
tion would befall the South." The two races could not live together in
peace and harmony. "Emancipation would be but prelude to a host of black
evils." It also predicted a new political coalition of newly freed blacks
and northern voters for the purpose of suppressing the white south.
Then these blacks and "profligate whites" would gain federal patronage,
and vault themselves into a higher socio-economic position than white
southerners. "We would in a word, change conditions with them--a degra-
dation greater than has ever yet fallen to the lot of a free and enlightened
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people. . .should emancipation take place." These predictions portended
evil for every white Alabamian, slaveholder and nonslaveholder alike.
Consequently, the people of Alabama of every rank had an interest in
preserving slavery and foiling the antislavery menace.
Also raising the specter of racial conflict was state representative
Percy Walker, a Whig from Mobile. He urged passage of a series of
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resolutions confirming slavery's rights in the territories and predicted
that confining slavery to its present limits would "result in completely
breaking up the relations of master and slave ... .Because a growing black
population would either force the whites to emigrate or provoke fi<
and bloody conflicts over the lands." Unless Alabama forcefully
Lerce
corn-
batted northern attacks, he cautioned, southern civilization would col-
lapse.
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Governor Reuben Chapman concurred. He warned that if souther-
ners yielded to northern assaults, then "no eye can penetrate the dark
future that is before us, no tongue can describe the degraded condition
to which we shall be reduced—serfs where we were equals, and equals
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only with our serfs."
William L. Yancey utilized the same racial appeal in numerous
stump speeches. Time and again he warned his listeners of the prospect
of black equality imposed by the north. For example, he opposed Senator
Lewis Cass's view that slavery in the New Mexico territory was moot since
most of the territorial population was colored and would not consent to
slavery. '*The only comment," Yancey exclaimed, "which I will present
on this to you, a slaveholding population, is that...we the people of
the South have been accustomed to think that in legislating for the States
or territories, the whites should not ask the consent or permit of the
colored race to regulate our internal concerns." Yancey viewed black
political equality as calamitous and declared: "If General Cass is elected
how will the South have opportunities to move into territories where this
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colored race whom General Cass holds are our beloved fellow citizens.
As a result of these heightened racial concerns, a movement got
under way in late 1851 to resurrect the Colonization Society. It was
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reorganized for the purpose of colonizing free blacks to Liberia. Ini-
tial support came from the Weekly Alabama .Tourn.il
r
a Whig organ which
maintained that freedmen were "instruments of insubordination and dis-
order." "Many of them live by vicious means," it continued, and are
"medians between the slave and dishonest traders"; together they "plunder
the masters." But most decisive, the editorial concluded, the presence
of manumitted blacks served as a "constant source of discontent and in-
subordination to the slaves." Their removal would "tend materially to
the good order and security of the slave population. 1,78 Another news-
paper published an announcement asking for support of the Society. The
appeal was signed by several prominent planters and lawyers both Whigs
and Democrats. 7 ^
Some free blacks also championed colonization. Among them S.
Wesley Jones, a free black merchant from Tuscaloosa, who worked actively
for emigration. From 1848 to 1851 Jones corresponded with William McClain
of the American Colonization Society, He wrote, in June 1848, that many
Alabama freedmen desired to remove to Liberia. Furthermore, if he had
the financial backing, he could "raise a company of a hundred or more."
He would soon canvass the north Alabama free black community, he declared,
claiming that there were some twenty-five freedmen in the vicinity "that
manifest such anxiety to leave here." He lamented, in 1849, "there are
too many [free blacks] who listen to the well invented tales of the
enemies of colonization." Most freedmen would not consider immigrating
without first hand knowledge of Liberia. Nevertheless, several blacks
in north Alabama looked forward to departure in the spring of 1850; and
others from the eastern part of the state also desired to colonize.
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Mcclain's letters expressed uneasiness about the possibility that his
correspondence with Jones would be opened and censored with resultant
trouble for free blacks. Jones reassured him: "you need not entertain
any fears as to what you write me doing harm, write freely upon any sub-
ject for your letters come safely and none see them but myself." In
late 1850 Jones reported that many whites now urged the removal of freed-
men: "All classes speak of it in the highest terms and seem to be very
anxious that it be carried out." According to- him funds were the only
obstacle for a mass migration of Alabama free-blacks. 80
By December 1851 Jones had noted the formation of the Alabama
Colonization Society and predicted that "there will be an uprising of
the free people of color--not only in Alabama—not only in the much per-
secuted South, where it is said by the fanatics that we are sorely op-
pressed and inhumanly treated...." The national society offered Jones
free passage to Liberia, but he asked for a few months delay until some
business matters were cleaned up. He recommended that Alabama's 2000
freedmen donate twenty-five cents apiece so two delegates could be sent
to Liberia. "Let national pride be kindled," he eloquently concluded,
"and go to and make us a great nation of our own, build our own cities
and towns, make our own laws, collect our revenues, elect our own gover-
nors and law makers, have our own schools and colleges, lawyers, doctors,
8
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in a word, cease to be hewers of wood and drawers of water and be men."
No evidence exists as to whether Jones ever went to Liberia.
Meanwhile the plight of Alabama free blacks worsened during the
1850 's. At various times the General Assembly considered resolutions
to re-enslave all manumitted blacks. Statutes were passed that almost
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completely curtailed the few liberties possessed by the freedmen. Further-
more, the early optimism expressed by the newly formed colonization society
in Alabama proved to be a chimera. Nothing was done to put colonization
into operation.
By 1852 nonimportation and colonization, therefore, were rejected
as a means of quieting fears. Some politicians suggested secession as
the only security. But having repudiated disunion in 1851, Alabamians
turned instead to the slave code; and the 1852- legislature both codified
and augmented it. The patrol system was a prime concern. All white
male slave holders under sixty as well as whites between eighteen and
forty-five were now subject to duty--which meant a minimum of one night
a week and more often when the Justice of the Peace deemed it necessary,
e.g., when evidence of "insubordination, threatened outbreak, or any
contemplated unlawful assembly of slaves or free-negroes came to light."
Patrols were authorized to investigate any plantation and check all passes
of visiting bondspeople. Any slave caught without a pass would receive
thirty stripes. Any white who refused to perform patrol obligations would
82be subject to fine unless good cause could be given.
Under the new code slave movement was circumscribed as never before,
reflecting the deep uneasiness of slave holders. Henceforth no bondsman
could hire himself out. Not more than five slaves could visit any plan-
tation at the time except for church services or funerals. Possession
of a weapon by a slave, always meriting a penalty, was now punished by
thirty-nine stripes "on the bare back, " rather than by the twenty of the
earlier penalty. Any slave found hunting at night "must be given thirty-
nine lashes" and the owner fined fifty dollars if the bondsman had his
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permission. No casual assembly could exceed five slaves vith ten lashes
for all if that maximum was violated. 83
Almost all communication between freedman and slaves was halted.
Free blacks entering the state were given thirty days to leave and were
subject to two years imprisonment if they did not. Any free black found
at an unlawful gathering would be fined twenty-five dollars or jailed
for sixty days. If any freedman wrote a pass for a slave or aided slaves
to escape, he would be liable to seven years imprisonment. Once out of
jail, a free black was given a month to leave Alabama or face a five-year
jail sentence. Freedmen also had to get an owner's permission in order
to visit slaves.
The revised code called upon masters to treat bondspeople with
humanity, giving them proper food, clothing, and care. However, no pen-
alty awaited those who disregarded these provisions. Masters were still
given the option of manumission with the approval of a probate iudge.
But the freedman then had to leave Alabama within six months or face
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re -ens lavement for life. There was, of course, a wide gap between
literal enforcement and actual practice. Nevertheless, these regulations
reflected Alabamian concern and fear of living among a growing slave
population
.
Equally illustrative of the consternation that Alabamians revealed
toward bondspeople was the evolution of their pro-slavery argument.
Some historians maintain that the pro-slavery defense was elaborated
specifically for southerners who knew slavery was immoral and had to
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rationalize their culpability. But there is little evidence in Alabama
of guilt -ridden slaveowners. There is, however, evidence of a fabric
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of fear which many whites manifested toward blacks-slave and free-and
which motivated them to justify slavery and to insist upon its necessity
for economic and social stability.
Slaveholders and nonslaveholders alike joined in constructing
Alabama's slavery defense. Frederick Law Olmsted while traveling through
the state in 1853 recounted a conversation with a nonslaveholding yeo-
man. Olmsted inquired how Alabamians would react to emancipation:
Well 1*11 tell you what I think on^it, I'd like
it if we could get rid on 'em to youst I wouldn't
like to hev 'em freed if they was gwine to 'hang
round. They ought to get some country and put
'em war they could be by themselves. It wouldn't
do no good to free 'em and let 'em hand 'round,
because they is so monsterous lazy; if they hadn't
got nobody to take keer on 'em, you see they
wouldn't do nothin' but laze round, and steal,
and pilfer, and no man couldn't live, you see,
war they was--free no couldn't live. And then,
I've two objections; thats one on 'em—no man
couldn't live and this ere's the other: now sup-
pose they was free. Now just suppose you had a
family of children, now would you like to hev a
nigger feeling just as good as a white man? How'd
you like to hev a nigger steppin up to your darter. 8 7
Blacks, the farmer told Olmsted, must be kept in bondage because they
are lazy and larcenous. Moreover, once freed they would compete with
whites for status. Thus, Africans as slaves are lazy and as freedmen
aggressive! Law and order would be severely tested by emancipation.
However, the sexual threat posed by abolition was foremost among this
yeoman's concerns. He was obsessed about "a nigger steppin up to his
darter.
"
Nonslaveholder misgivings about potential black economic compe-
tition were apparent in a letter by Robert C. Tharin, who tried to es-
tablish a newspaper, The Non-Slaveholder, in the late 1850's. Before
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Tharin could begin publication he was expelled from the state. The paper
purported to support the economic interests of the "poor white" and
attack the planter class for existing difficulties. Tharin said in a
letter that he had seen the rich man's slave "come in contact with the
poor white blacksmith, bricklayer, wheelwright and farmer." Preference
traditionally "has gone to the planter's negroes in all such trades.
Poor whites of the south fear the coming of negro equality" which Tharin
blamed on the "rich planters." White mechanics in Mobile, Montgomery,
and Wetumpka had told him of their fear of black emancipation. "Have not
the planter for years condemned every mechanic in the South to negro
equality" one asked. "My dislike of them [planters] arose from.
. .their
daily usurpations of power and privileges at variance with my rights
and the rights of my class." Meanwhile plantation Negroes accustomed
to observing and identifying themselves with their masters "harbored
a deep contempt for white people of small property and no social dis-
. . . , „88
tmet ion.
"
Tharin 's observation that numerous Alabama slaves had acquired
mechanical talents has been noted earlier. Because of their increasing
skills, it is easy to see why white artisans felt threatened especially
in the regions of dense-slave concentration—the Black Belt. Through
the 1850's bondsmen were extensively employed in the state's infant in-
dustry in central Alabama. Scores of expert slave machinists worked
in Danial Pratt's cotton gin factory in Prattville, Autauga County. An
associate of Danial Pratt stated that "white hands had to be trained....
These [whites] were brought up from the piney woods [south Alabama] many
of them with no sort of training to any kind of labor; in fact they had
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to learn everything, and in learning many made mistakes and blunders
which were fatal to success." One Mobile bakery had sixteen black bakers.
A cotton mill, according to a New York Tribune reporter who visited Ala-
bama in 1858, included "black operatives who were quite skilled at their
business." A black foreman was in charge. "Branch was a fine intelli-
gent fellow He made all the machinery belts, covered the rollers,
weighed out all the yards, thread and waste on the floor, kept a journal,
and rendered an account to his employer." Robert Jemison, the Tuscaloosa
planter- industrialist, computed that slaves were 26 percent cheaper to
employ than white laborers and by 1859 46 percent less expensive than
whites. Some slaves developed creative talents beyond the functional.
For example, the west Alabama Agricultural Society awarded a silver cup
to Page, a Mobile slave, for his portrait of Francis F. Lyon, a former
Alabama Congressman. Portrait painting was a natural gift with Page,
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concluded the account.
A slave mechanic keeping a kiln in the town of Marion prompted
this statement in the Marion Commonwealth ; "Common safety required the
end of all slave shops... for if it is not done consequences may result
which will prove disastarous to the peace and quietude of the town."
In 1858 the state legislature was urged to pass a law preventing bonds-
men from being trained as mechanics. Black men should only "do rough
and ready work which is unsuited to the white man." The new statute
must "fix the slave to the plantation and then all industrious white
mechanics" would be able to take jobs occupied by black craftsmen. With
the passage of such an act, slaves "would not be half so hard to manage."
The new law would also diminish "a large amount of thieving carried on
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by negro mechanics...."90 The fears expressed by the Marion Commonwealth
again mirror the conflicting image that white Alabamians had of blacks.
Belief in inherent black inferiority, as previously noted, implied per-
manent inability to compete with whites. But paradoxically if bondsmen
were allowed to develop any skills they would become a challenge to white
labor. As common field hands they were doing work befitting their sup-
posed talents. But the cotton toiler was also considered a potential
insurrectionist and must always be watched. The slave artisan, then,
was a double threat: an economic menace and a potential rebel.
Although white farmers and mechanics in south Alabama were clearly
at a socio-economic disadvantage, they never made any attempt to disrupt
the Alabama social structure and did not pose the threat that blacks did.
Many of these white farmers aspired to be planters. However, in north
Alabama the independent yeomen were hostile to the economic control of
the large planter. Their interests were represented by W. R. W. Cobb.
Cobb from north Alabama's sixth district, an area of slight slave density,
successfully campaigned for Congress with a class appeal of yeoman versus
planter. He held office from 1847 to 1861 and was the most convinced
Unionist in Alabama.
Upper-class planters were never at a loss to remind nonslaveholders
what they had to lose by abolition. A host of well-placed Alabamians
wrote tracts, delivered sermons, and made speeches claiming that slavery
elevated the white man, making him proud of his race and liberty. Ala-
bama's pro-slavery polemic reflected what one recent historian has called
'*Herrenvolk" democracy, a society based on the "natural distinctions of
race." Educated, upper-class Alabamians expended much effort persuading
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deprived whites that they were as priviledged as anybody, if not
so. If slaves were freed, then poor-whites would forfeit their status
and identity. 91 Poverty, it was asserted, was not only less prevalent
under slavery than in the north, it also constituted less of a stigma,
since race, not money, conferred honor. The bitter struggle between
capital and labor in northern industrial society was unfavorably com-
pared with the spirit of humanity and co-operation between planter and
92
slave in the south.
Newspapers consistently played on the poor-man
' s-stake-in-slavery
theme. If freedom came to blacks, editor J. Withers Clay affirmed, then
poor whites would become "degraded to the condition of blacks who would
become their equals in society. Indolent free negroes would thrust them-
selves into their society and make proposals of marriage with their sons
and daughters"; and all distinctions of color would disappear. One Black
Belt paper editorially asserted, "As it is now in the South, the white
man, whether rich or poor, occupies an elevated position. He is inde-
pendent and has the proud satisfaction of feeling himself to be equal
93in all respects to his wealthy neighbor." Another argument used by
slave defenders was that of Mobile physician Josiah Clark Nott, who at-
tained a national reputation with a series of articles and lectures on
the "natural inferiority of the African race." Blacks and whites, Nott
tried to prove, did not belong to the same species. Nott listed the
benefits he derived from writing on slavery and race. They were, in order,
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"popularity, money, and professional repuuat ion, " These benefits would
also induce other ambitious Alabamians to enter into the slavery debate
and defense.
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In the midst of this mounting defense of slaveholding in the 1850' s
came recurrent slave unrest and violent slave reprisals. At Mount Meigs
in Montgomery County in the fall of 1854 Dr. James McDonald punished
a bondsman for disobedience and was himself clubbed to death. The slave
charged with the murder was captured and jailed; a group of McDonald's
friends gathered, and with the Sheriff's co-operation took the prisoner
and burned him to death. The Huntsville Democrat advised, "in matters
involving the control of that class of the population, we hold that the
law of self protection, which abrogates all other law, must necessarily
find its exponent in the action of the majority of those immediately
95interested. The following week in Montgomery County a slave master,
trying to punish a slave, was assaulted by him. The slave was tried,
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convicted, and executed. The following month Henry T. Gates, a Black
Belt overseer, was killed. One or more slaves were involved according
97to a newspaper account. Another overseer was severely wounded in
Butler County, when a reputatedly vicious slave suddenly struck him.
The slave, the account reported, professed indifference to death and
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only regretted that he had not killed his victim.
The testimony of former slaves, as recorded by the W. P. A. slave
narrative project of the 1930 's, also confirms the mounting rebellious-
ness of Black Belt Alabama bondspeople. Mingo White, born in Montgomery
County around 1848, recalled that in the 1850 's bondsmen would run away
and "lots of times when de pattrollers would get after de slaves dey
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would have de worse fight and sometimes dt pattrollers would get killed."
Martha Bradley, who labored in the mid fifties on a Montgomery plantation,
remembered: "On day I wuz workin in de field and de overseer he come
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'round and say sumpin' to me he had no bizness sayin. I took my hoe
and knocked him plum down." Amy Chapman, born in 1843 on a Wilcox County
estate, related a gruesome incident. The overseer whipped another bonds-
woman "near 'bout to death. She got so mad at him dat she tuk his baby
chile what was playin 'round de yard... an th'owed it in a pot of lye dat
she was usen' to wash wid." 100 Thus while blacks were oppressed and
exploited, they fought back in a constant struggle using all available
means
.
However, such deeds of defiance brought retaliation. Butler County
slaveowners were furious when a slave charged with stealing a piece of
chewing tobacco worth twenty-five cents was found guilty and hanged.
Slaveholders confronted a dilemma: they could not wantonly hang and
chastise every slave suspected of being rebellious. After all, bondsmen
were a major financial investment that had to be protected. Beyond
tightening slave codes, patrol systems, and punishing actual acts of
insubordination, whites for the most part could only deplore suspected
misdeeds of their retainers. Alabamians living with massive numbers
of blacks had to constantly restrain themselves from indiscriminately
destroying their valuable property as the Butler county citizens had
done when they hung a bondsman for allegedly stealing a piece of tobacco.
However, sometimes they could not curb their frustration and immediate
punishment was forthcoming.
This was the case in July 1855 when Sumter County experienced a
devastating response of white terror. A eiave was charged with allegedly
raping and killing a planter's daughter. Over a thousand persons assembled
at the supposed site of the trial only to learn that the judicial proceedings
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would be held in another part of the fcunty. They then passed a series
of resolutions sustaining each other in their actions, proceeded to the
jail, tied the slave to a pole and burned him. A local editor observed
that slavemasters brought their "negroes with them for the example made
of this wretch [would have] a salutory effect upon the two thousand
slaves who witnessed the execution. 101 Again, about ten days later in
the same County and despite "object lessons," two bondsmen were executed
for killing their owners. 102 One Black Belt slaveowner, by the end of
1855, was so distressed over potential slave rebelliousness that he wrote
Governor John A. Winston informing him that "there are a very great number
of slaves in our midsts and but few white people to keep them in subju-
gation." The planter complained about a "liquor shop, at which it is
believed our negroes can buy whiskey... by which they are greatly demora-
lized and made fearfully insubordinate." He called upon the Governor
to use his influence to urge the legislature to pass a law that would
prohibit the sale of alcoholic "spirits entirely, in any quantity by
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any person of any calling whatsoever . " This plea is especially in-
teresting because of its implication that slave rebelliousness could
only be attributed to alien forces--abolitionist propaganda or whiskey.
A commonly held assumption among slaveowners was that the slave left
alone loved his master and was compliant. But this belief was shattered
by many examples of servile resistance not caused by outside elements
and Alabatoians were prepared to take new potion.
By the mid 1850's persistent slave violence coupled with tradi-
tional white apprehension created a garrison psychology in Alabama.
W. J. Cash and John Hope Franklin have cogently described one of the
40
"side effects" of slavery, namely, a defensiveness that displayed itself
in a love of military posturing. 104 Alabama was proud to be leading
the deep south, in the fifties, in military academies. While not es-
tablishing a state military institute, Alabama co-operated with private
military schools. In many instances the legislature exempted such schools
from taxation and occasionally authorized governors to supply "as many
arms as shall be sufficient for its purposes." Significantly, two mili-
tary academies which received full state support were located in two
counties whose black population far exceeded the white--the Eufaula Military
Institute in Barbour County and the Tuskeegee Military Institute in Macon
„ 105County. Even m the early fifties the martial spirit was aglow in
Alabama. Volunteer military groups were springing up in the heavily
slave concentrated Black Belt. In 1852, the General Assembly authorized
the organization of such bands as the "Pike County Rangers" and the
"Montgomery County Rough and Ready Invincibles . " The president of the
University of Alabama in the same year suggested that his board of trustees
might explore the question of instituting military training and disci-
pline at the University. Also in 1852 the legislature authorized the
governor to secure arms for four schools in the Black Belt that were
interested in providing military training. In 1860 the Assembly authorized
106
the establishment of a Black Belt military academy at Wetumpka.
Notwithstanding this state-sponsored and state-encouraged military
umbrella, fear of bondspeople continued to be a daily reality for many
communities. In the north-east town of Jacksonville in Calhoun County,
with a slave density under 25 percent, the town council met and passed
a series of revised slave ordinances which provided that a bell would
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sound at 9:00 p.m., and all slaves and freedmen found wandering were
liable to arrest. Bondsmen were not allowed to visit free-blacks and
the latter were not to have dealings with slaves. Violation of this
regulation would bring twenty-five lashes and imprisonment. Nobody,
white or black, was permitted to sell or trade liquor with slaves, sub-
ject again to fine and imprisonment. 107 Reflecting a similar concern,
the General Assembly passed a law stating that not more than six blacks
could reside on any plantation unless the owner, overseer, or white agent
remained in the same place with them or within a distance of one mile.
Any violation of this law subjected the owner to a fine of $100. Accord-
ing to a legislative source, "this statute performed the double function
of keeping the negroes in order and preventing undesirable persons from
loitering around."10^
At the same time that more laws were being passed to promote firmer
mastery over bondspeople, an "abolitionist" panic broke out in Mobile.
One of the cities oldest booksellers, Strickland and Company, was accused
of "vending incendiary books causing for the past few days the citizens
...great vexation." A town meeting set up a committee to investigate
this matter. The Committee decided that the owners would be given five
days to leave Mobile.
10 ^
The reactions of Mobilians to suspected "subversives" typified
the increasing sensitivity of Black Belt and south Alabamians to rumored
slave and abolitionist conspiracies in mid and late 1856. For example,
in Coosa County, on the edge of the Black Belt, the citizens were numbed
by "a conspiracy among the negroes." At a meeting of planters and con-
cerned farmers, it was disclosed that several slaves, interrogated by
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patrollers, confessed that bondsmen in the vicinity were planning an
insurrection. A committee was elected and passed a series of resolu-
tions. Enough evidence was available, it was determined, to confirm
that some slaves had been holding "incendiary meetings
... involving the
safety of whites." All whites-slaveholders and nonslaveholders-had
the same goal, the resolutions continued, namely, the preservation of
order, and slaveowners should not arbitrarily suspect nonslaveholders
of tampering with slaves. However, "the blacks have been encouraged,
if not instigated by abolitionists in our midst." Thus, all those not
known by the community, the resolution maintained, should be suspected
and questioned by the sheriff. Furthermore, all patrol laws were to be
strictly enforced and gatherings of blacks for social purposes no longer
permitted. Finally, reflecting the heightened agitation of the community,
one resolution called for the registration of all male slaves in the
county with local magistrates and stipulated that their names be turned
over to county patrol leaders.
110
After these resolutions had passed,
an act was approved by the Wetumpka town council which made it unlawful
for black preachers to sermonize among their people unless five slave-
holders were present. 111 In September, closely following these events,
in neighboring Montgomery County, two bondsmen were hanged for killing
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their owners. Several weeks later a Montgomery newspaper alerted
its readers to guard against children's books entitled, Twilight Stories,
for they were "stuffed with rank abolition ... for the purpose of poisoning
113
the minds of Alabama children.
The slave unrest continued. In Henry County, in December 1856,
a slave was accused of raping his master's wife and then killing the
A3
master himself. He successfully avoided capture. "We are as a general
thing opposed to lynch law," an editorial commented, "but in this in-
stance, if the darkey is caught, we should think burning would be too
good for him."1U Alabama newspapers reported insurrectionary plots
all over the south. Harvey Wish argues that the rebellion fright of
December 1856 can be attributed to a number of factors: the heated sec-
tional debates over Kansas, the Republican presidential campaign of that
year, the Sumner-Brooks affair, and the impending Dred Scott decision. 115
All these factors, no doubt, tended to irritate the south's sense of
security. Wish does not, however, cite the age old and often unfounded
fear that slaveholders held for their bond Speople--at least in Alabama.
Whites living in south-central Alabama feared being overwhelmed by an
ever-increasing black population.
Black Belt newspapers warned their readers to keep a watchful
eye for signs of discontent. 116 The Dallas Gazette warned the male popu-
lation of Dallas county to perform patrol duty through all holidays.
Young men, the editorial advised, ought to consider forming a "detective
police" to ascertain if any "vile emissaries have been tampering with
our slaves. Patrols should be out all the time--at every hour day and
night." Officials were told to enforce strictly all patrol statutes. 117
These injunctions, similar to the one noted earlier prohibiting slaves
from buying whiskey, reflected that recurrent and general southern view
that attributed all slave dissension, whether real or imagined, to ou( -
siders, to abolitionist incendiaries tampering with bondsmen. S lavemasters,
it seems, could not admit that slaves might possess the intelligence and
determination to struggle against their condition. To admit as much
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openly would be confNation of the Garrisonian attack upon the "southern
way of life." Therefore, the ideology of the slave south-the positive
good of slavery for whites and blacks-was based on a necessary self-
deception.
Throughout December 1856, conspiracy panics continued to rock
central Alabama. A planter in Autauga County declared that one local
plot involved "many hundreds of negroes," and that "the instigators of
the insurrection were found to be "northern incendiaries." The Montgomery
Advertiser of December 13 claimed, "We have found out a deep laid plan
among the negroes, it is general all over the County." J. J. Hooper,
editor of the Montgomery Mail, believed the numerous reports of rebellion
schemes extending over such a wide area which "indicated that these plots
had been instigated by an organized band of Abolitionist emissaries. 1,118
The Tuskeegee Republican, in the eastern Black Belt, called upon the
General Assembly to implement the following recommendations: a complete
abolition of "negro preaching; prohibition upon blacks slave or free
from engaging in any and all business transactions; prohibition on blacks
119living alone without supervision." Slavemasters, one could say, pro-
bably felt that they had a "tiger by the tail" which they dared not let
go of.
Sumter County suffered a severe rebellion fright at this time.
In the central county the patrol interrogated a female slave who described
a massive plot against whites during Christmas 1856. After a series of
investigations, about thirty bondsmen were arrested and upon questioning
--so it was alleged--conf irmed that a general outbreak involving five
to six hundred slaves was planned for Christmas day. Every white in the
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area was to be executed. Bugle blasts would signal the start; guns would
be provided, and slaves in other parts of the county were also implicated.
Slave patrols were then alerted throughout the county, and suspected
slave ringleaders were jailed. A search of their cabins revealed "eight
or ten pistols." Moreover, a loaded pistol was found on the "person
of one of them who denied to the last bitter end" that he was involved.
The patrollers were praised for their diligency by the county newspaper
which editorialized, "there is now a large patrol force in active service
throughout the county and every man is on his guard."120
Because of these threats, some newspaper editors again called for
prudence concerning slave importations. A resolution to reopen the African
slave trade, it was noted, had been rejected in Congress with southerners
supporting the rejection. Recent events proved, the Tuskeegee Republican
declared, "that it is not considered safe to increase our slaves faster
121than they will increase by natural means." However, because of the
Kansas agitation and the continual rise in the popularity of restrictionism
in the north, as well as the persistent concentration of the ownership
of slaves in a few hands, some Black Belt editors, by 1858, came out for
the reopening of the African slave trade.
After the December 1856 scares the Black Belt and adjoining counties
demanded that slave patrols examine all strangers in the community. In
Clarke County the patrollers caught a bondsman without a pass. They were
about to kill him when the fugitive produced a knife, stabbed two members
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of the patrol, and then made his escape. The consternation of some
militiamen was demonstrated in another part of the Black Belt when they
came upon a runaway who also bolted. But one of the patrollers, without
46
a warning, "gave him a mortal wound with his rifle."123 Another Black
Belt escapee, allegedly enticed into absconding by a "northern man,"
was seized and confined. Before his owner arrived, the bondsman hung
himself. Blame was placed upon "the northern man who well deserves the
fate of the negro." Then, the account cautioned, "Southern masters cannot
be too much on the alert when these slippery gentry are in the vicinity.
...Too much vigilance cannot be exercised to prevent the recurrence of
such crimes.
In Washington County, in the summer of 1857 a slave patrol pursued
two runaways into the swamps of adjoining Clarke County. A fierce fight
took place— "Guns, pistols, knives, and clubs were freely used on both
sides," before the rebels were overpowered. The Clarke county Democra t
acidly concluded "Considering the high audacity of these runaways we
almost wish they had all been killed in the battle."125
While such acts of defiance were occurring, Coosa County's press
campaigned against "negro preaching" in the region. The Wetumpka
Spectator wanted all black ministers outlawed because they excited "the
nature of the congregation, the whole mass soon moved by the devil rather
than the prince of peace." The specter of Nat Turner was summoned up as
a contemptible example of black sermonizing. Potentially dangerous,
as well, was the habit of "those negro crowds assembling around the meeting
126
house doors sabbath evening, they should be dispersed by the Marshal."
Conversely, the Wetumpka Dispatch declared it was through Christianity
that blacks learned submissiveness . Black preachers should be encouraged
to "bring in the vicious class of negroes." W. H. Henson, editor of
the Dispatch, asked slaveowners to "give our negroes gospel light and
strengthen the influence of the good and they will thwart the purposes
of the bad."127 The Spectator replied that in the Black Belt "negro
preachers were the principles in insurrectionary movements among the
slaves." Editor E. L. Mason called "negro preaching in our community
an evil," and citizens in the County agreed with him: "Let white masters
administer to slaves and halt all negro preaching." At one meeting of
the County's planters and farmers, a resolution was passed that instructed
their state representative to introduce a bill prohibiting all black
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ministering in Alabama.
These fears of Black Belt whites concerning "Negro preaching" are
confirmed by Alabama ex-slaves who recounted their impressions of bondage
for the W. P. A. Slr.ve Narratives
. For example, Sidney Bonner, a former
slave who toiled on a Dallas County plantation, recalled "Some of de
niggers want to have dere own meetings .. .dem niggers get happy and get
to shoutin 'all over de meadow.
. .Mas sa John quick put a stop to dat fearful
we was risen." Cato Carter, who lived on a Montgomery County estate in
the 1850's, told how the slaves' religion was often prohibited and prac-
ticed secretly. This, in turn, increased the apprehension of slavemasters
who usually grew more fearful when bondspeople exhibited cohesion. Slave-
owner anxiety as to what transpired at private black religious meetings
was well founded. The prayers of slaves were focused upon freedom.
Alice Sewell, born on a Black Belt plantation in 1850, remembered that
"we used to slip off in de woods... on Sur.^.y evening way down in de swamps
....We prayed for dis day of freedom. We prayed together to God dat if
we don't live to see it, please let our chillen live to see a better
day and be free." Mary Ella Grandsberry, born in 1846, told how irritated
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her owner would get when bondspeople came together. "Iffen we was caught
prayin to go to de free states... you got one of the worst whippins of
your life." Late at night in the cabins the slaves would pray "for de
Lord to free dem like he did de chillen of Israel/' recalled Mingo White
who spent his youth on a Wilcox County plantation. If 'de marse or de
driver heard 'em de would come and start the whippin."129 Thus, testi-
mony of former bondspeople verifies the suspicions of the Weturapka
Spectator
: religious practices of slaves did serve as yet another form
of black resistance.
Pike County in October 1857 was shocked by a mass poisoning on
a plantation. Thirty-seven people--family and friends—had been poisoned,
six fatally, by the Negro cook who was estranged from her master. The
cook and a collaborator were taken from jail in collusion with the local
constable and burned alive. Bruceville, where the incident took place,
was in turmoil for days, with town authorities examining all blacks about
130the availability of poison in the slave community.
At about the same time Richard E. Stewart, a Sumter County planter,
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was slain by five of his slaves. A few weeks later, while tensions
were still high in the same County, two alleged agents of the underground
railroad were captured "in the very act of persuading some negroes to
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leave for a free state." ~ In early 1858 the Sumter County town of
Livingston found that a representative of De Bows Register and the New
Orleans Picayune held anti-slavery opinions. "Grant his right to his
views, " J. J. Hooper, editor of the Montgomery Mail asserted, "however
we deny the right of such sentiments here." Hooper demanded that the
New Orleans papers recall "this agent and in the future, employ trusted
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southern men to collect fro. slaveholders." In reporting the affair,
Hooper reminded his readers to be constantly on the "lookout for abo-
litionists in disguise."133 Similarly the town of Selma in Dallas County
uncovered an "abolitionist" home economics teacher who "on one or more
occasions...held conversations with slaves well calculated to create a
spirit of insubordination and rebellion." She was forced to leave the
county and other communities were forewarned about her. 134 These liber-
tarian infringements like the ones recounted earlier in Barbour, Mont-
gomery, and Mobile counties are another indication that by the 1850'
a
Alabama had become a closed society. Even before John Brown's raid, white
Alabamians responded to slave rebellion scares by tightening their grip on bonds
men and reinforcing their faith in the institution of slavery.
The Assembly, bestirring itself, saw a remedy in closing all exits
to manumission. A bill was introduced making it unlawful to liberate
slaves by last will and testament, and declared all clauses or parts of
a will freeing slaves null and void; and it also voided any provision
providing for the removal of the slave of the deceased to a state or
country where slavery did not exist. The proposition was tabled 135 but
was later enacted on the eve of the Civil War.
Before 1858 the response of many Alabamians to slave importation
was that they might be overwhelmed by massive numbers of b]acks. In
the 1850 's as observed earlier, important groups favored some kind of
slave trade restriction. By the late 1350's, however, violent and heated
arguments in favor of resurrecting the African slave trade were heard.
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These arguments were most frequently aired at the annual meetings of
the Southern Commercial Convention. In 1857, for example, Alabama's
delegates at the Knoxville gathering voted with six other southern
state delegations to ask their Congressional representatives to abrogate
the 1808 prohibition of the African trade. In May 1858 the Convention
met in Montgomery, Alabama. The debates there revealed the growing im-
patience of the fire-eaters, those who favored secessionist views, with
the non-secessionist attitudes in Alabama, and in the south generally,
on the issue of southern rights.
In 1857 Judge Z. L. Nabers introduced a resolution in the Alabama
legislature emphasizing the need and advantages of reopening the slave
trade, not the least of which was building a consensus for secession. 136
William L. Yancey, Alabama's best known agitator, had been silent on the
issue prior to the Montgomery convention. But in 1858 Yancey led the
campaign that favored resumption of the international slave trade and
captained the Alabama delegation to the 1858 Southern Commercial Convention,
The Montgomery Confederation, a unionist paper, observed as the
convention got under way: "Every form and shape of political malcontent
was there present, ready to assent in any project having for its end a
137dissolution of the union, immediate, unconditional, final." This
assessment is not entirely accurate. It is true a band of disunionists
was present. They were determined to agitate all issues to embarrass
southern unionists and moderates in the Democratic party. But to say
that the entire conclave was a disunionist scheme misses the mark. From
Alabama only Yancey, Percey Walker, and F. B. Shepart (the latter two of
Mobile) talked of secession. Walker, like other opportunistic lawyer-
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politicians in the state, was a small slaveowner and changed his party
affiliation often. He was a Whig, then a Know-Nothing, and, by 1859,
a Democrat. F. B. Shepard's party loyalty was equally capricious. 138
L. W. Spratt of South Carolina was the chief advocate of a revival
of the African trade at the Montgomery Convention and presented a reso-
lution in its favor. Yancey rose in support and indicated that the im-
portation of hundreds of thousands of Africans would offset the flow of
labor from Europe to the North. Such an increase would make slavery
more secure in the southern states and augment their voting strength
in Congress. A large increase in the number of slaves, Yancy said, would
mean a decline in price and more people could enjoy the "blessings" de-
rived from bondage. "If you increase the number of slave owners you
increase the basis of the institution." Why should he pay Virginia
slavetraders $1500 for a slave, Yancey asked, when he could get them
in Cuba for $600 or from West Africa for one-sixth that sum. Finally,
he emphasized, before passage of a law in 1808 the Constitution guaranteed
slavery by forbidding Congress to interfere with it. The 1808 law was
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unconstitutional because it discriminated against the south.
Yancey was countered by Roger A. Pryor, editor of the Richmond
Enquirer, and by two Alabama delegates. Robert G. Scott, a national
Democrat from Madison County, an Alabama area of moderate slave density,
held that the ordinance prohibiting the slave trade was constitutional.
It derived from the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign
nations: "Such had been the opinion of the framers of the constitution
...and also of John C. Calhoun who was a member of Monroe's cabinet when
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the act of 1820 was passed declaring the slave trade to be piracy."
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Former Whig party leader Henry W. Hilliard, from Montgomery county, took
the same position. From the beginning of the controversy over slavery,
Billiard had been Yancey's most ardent antagonist. Since 1846 they had
engaged in numerous and bitter encounters at times almost bordering on
violence. Now, at the Commercial Convention, Hilliard asserted that
Congress had the power to halt the African slave trade through the com-
merce clause. Gazing at Yancey, he predicted that if Spratt's pro-trade
recommendation were adopted, it would be an invitation to every fanatic,
to everyone opposed to the institutions of the south, to agitate with a
view to overthrowing those institutions. Furthermore, Hilliard, an
ordained Methodist minister, still had a great respect for the opinions
of the Christian world and rejected a measure that would "outrage the
moral sentiment of Christendom upon an impracticability." The Spratt
resolve itself was finally tabled.
1/4
1
A month after the convention Yancey began to vacillate on the
slave-trade issue. A reading of his remarks, he explained in one letter
to a supporter, would show that he did not call for a reopening: "What
I did recommend was simply the repeal of the laws of Congress making the
foreign trade in slaves piracy." He confirmed his real intention which
1/9
was "to strip the Southern ship of state for battle." f Yancey had
taken the most controversial issue and used it to force Alabamians, indeed
all southerners, to choose sides. His purpose was not to assail the
north but to harass those in his section who were "soft on slavery."
Moreover, as in the late forties and early fifties, he was again making
a "grab" at controlling the state's Democratic party.
It is difficult to discern how much support there was statewide
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for the reopening issue. In Lawrence County in the highlands, with a
moderate slave population, the Moulton Democrat came out in favor of
resumption, insisting that abolitionists were forcing the issue. The
Mobile Mercury, was a lowland circulation, also desired renewal. J. j.
Hooper's Montgomery Mail, in the heart of the slave dense Black Belt,
agreed. The Dallas Gazette called upon slaveholders to disregard all
federal laws prohibiting the slave trade and to commence importing slaves
from Africa. This approach, said editor C. E.^Haynes, would unite all
the southern states. But the Montgomery Confederation condemned the
whole project, calling it a fantasy devised by demagogues. The Clarke
county Democrat also criticized the Southern Commercial Convention as
"a political debating club." The trade would be resumed only at the ex-
pense of the union, it declared, and "the convention was not called to
dissolve the union, and we regard it as irrelevant, impolitic and even
unfortunate to discuss questions which can result in no good to the
143South in the union." The Tuskeegee Republican by 1859 had reversed
its position on the slave trade. Seeing the issue in class terms, this
Black Belt paper complained that slave ownership was getting to be a
monopoly of the large planters. Wealthy planters, an editorial complained,
opposed reopening because it would "reduce the value of their negroes."
If this situation continued, it warned, then the future of the south would
be in doubt, because there "will no longer by any hope of a laboring man
ever possessing a slave.... The very existence of the South depends upon
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the reopening of the slave trade."
The Republican 's assessment of the concentration of slave ownership
was correct. Alabama, according to the 1860 census, had 435,080 slaves;
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126,833 or 29 percent were owned by big planters who by 1859 avera8ed
84 slaves apiece. Nor more than 25 percent of Alabama's white popula-
tion in 1860 held slaves. Moreover, throughout the 1850's the price
of slaves rose. In northwest Alabama male slaves ranged from $1035 to
$1450; women from $1250 to $1550. In the Black Belt field hands brought
from $1600 to $1800. This caused one editor to remark that "negroes
will sell beyond any other property." In Clarke County the "average"
slave under 45 was selling for more than $1100,-1^ 5
Not only did the planter class have a greater percentage of the
slaves but also much of the best land. In the Black Belt counties two-
thirds of all acreage was held by 17 percent of the cultivators and was
incorporated into plantations of 500 acres or more. The planter possessed
not merely more valuable land. A study of some of the most productive
counties shows that the land of those owning 50 acres or less was worth
$7.20 an acre, while that of planters who owned more than 2000 acres
was worth $29.50 per acre. Furthermore, in a more recent study of the
Black Belt, it was found that the land of plantation owners was consider-
ably more valuable because, by virtue of slave labor, it was better cul-
tivated. By the end of the 1850's however, there was a shift in the
wealth distribution of the Black Belt in favor of the "upper-middle deciles
at the expense [relatively] of both the richest and poorest groups."
Accordingly, the shift "seems to have had more to do with slaves and
slave value than with ownership of land... .The slave cotton regime in
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Alabama was a highly unequal distribution of wealth." Interestingly,
it would be the "middle class" planter who owned 20 to 50 slaves who
avidly supported secession. They deemed a Southern Confederacy as the
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only means of acquiring more land and slaves.
According to the 1860 census, the total wealth of Alabama was
$792,274,199 and the total wealth of large planters was $222,600,997.
By the end of the fifties, the great planters-those owning more than
50 slaves-possessed 28.19 percent of the declared wealth of the state
—$140,371.51 per large planter. Per capita wealth of major planter
families was $26,927, while the per capita wealth of the average white
Alabamian in 1859 was $1,497. Thus, the big planters held 30 percent
of the state's slaves and owned more than 30 percent of the real estate.
They commanded 28.1 percent of the total wealth of Alabama, while com-
prising less than one-third of one percent of the state's total white
147population. The graph below indicates the growth of slaveholding,
especially of large planters from 1850-1860. The white population of
1 L9,
Alabama in 1860 was 964,041.
Number of Slaves
100-200 200-300 400-500 Total Slaveholders
Owners 1850 216 16 2 29,295
Owners 1860 312 24 10 33,730
According to the 1860 census, Alabama ranked third in slave popu-
lation in the cotton south. By then 44 percent of the state's population
was black. Slaves were concentrated in a few counties of the northwest
and the Tennessee Valley and the vast majority were in the Black Belt
--75 percent lived in ten Black Belt counties. The number of slaves
in several Black Belt counties far exceeded the white population. Eleven
of these counties in I860 produced 590,544 bales or six-tenths of the
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state's cotton crop. 149 Some of these counties vere hotbeds of southern
nationalism during the crisis of 1860.
By mid 1859 some Alabamians began to engage in the African slave
trade. A correspondent saw "twenty-five or thirty Africans pass through
Montgomery on their way down river." The reporter defiantly added that
the bondsmen had been introduced into this country "in spite of the cruisers
of both Uncle Sam and John Bull." He had no doubt "that more will follow
suit.... This is a practical reopening of the slave trade in spite of
Greeley and Co."150 Several months later the Mobile Mercury cheerfully
passed on a bit of gossip: "We heard a gentleman who is up to snuff say
that another cargo of Africans had been landed upon our Gulf Coast."151
Those who favored restriction of slave importations were now silent,
but this did not signify that the chronic fears Alabamians had of bonds-
people had abated.
Many whites, especially those living in the east-central regions
of Alabama, felt that slavery had to expand. Slaveowners should be able
to move their "property" westward and southward. Few slavemasters,
moreover, wanted a growing black population confined to the narrow cen-
tral slave belt in Alabama. Slavery had to have room to spread if racial
control was to be maintained.
Thus, with a slave population approaching a half-million and the
Republican party demanding that slavery be confined to "its present limits,"
Alabama moved again to prevent the erosion of racial domination. Between
1857 and 1859 the General Assembly acted to strengthen old slave codes
and approve new ones. A statute was passed to prevent "unauthorized
individuals" from associating and illegally trafficking with slaves.
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A new law prohibited the slae of liquor to slaves by river boatmen.
Hoping to prevent the congregation of bondspeople during leisure hours,
another new measure made gambling illegal. 152 Anxious to manage their
slaves, finding black unrest frightening and inexplicable, whites once
more focused upon the perennial "trouble maker," the free-black.
It was inconsistent for the south to oppose abolition and at the
same time to permit free-b lacks-there were only 2690 freedmen in Alabama
in 1859-to remain in the state. Thus a new viewpoint emerged. The
Independent Monitor of Tuscaloosa stated that freed men should be forced
to leave Alabama or become re-enslaved, "it was true that some of them
behaved well," admitted an editorial, "but even the best of them were
in a constant, danger; because they could read and write they were In a
position to poison the ears of slaves with the teachings of abolitionists."153
Sumter County's Gainsville Independent insisted that free blacks were
an easy prey for "abolitionist emissaries": to permit them to remain
in a slave state was nothing more "than sickly sentimentality."154 The
Southern Advocate called free blacks "not only a nuisance but a loath-
some pest." An editorial asked the legislature to take severe measures
to check the "morbid growth of free niggerdom." All freedmen were to
be forced to leave Alabama. If all the slave states did this, then the
north would be overrun with blacks, much to their disgust. "We suggest
that the Alabama legislature at its next session pass a law forbidding
the residence of free negroes in the state... all other cotton states
will soon fo) low. . . .By this course the South will add negro paupers to
the whites of the north, and thus inflict an everlasting curse upon all
intermeddlers with Southern slavery." 155
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At its 1859 meeting the General Assembly did not go as far as
The Southern Advocate desired. It passed two measures: One declared
void all wills which emancipated slaves either directly or indirectly
and it also prohibited the removal of slaves from Alabama for the pur-
pose of freeing them. It further provided that any freedman might volun-
tarily select a master and return to the status of slave
.
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On the eve of John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry, an event that
would deepen southern fear of blacks as never before, Alabama was still
wrestling with the chronic problem of slave control. From Brown's "trauma"
through Lincoln's election the question of slave conduct and white do-
mination would become inextricably joined with the politics of southern
rights.
seces-
CHAPTER II
PARTY POLITICS IN ALABAMA, 1819-1845: AN OVERVIEW
Fear of black rebellion was not the only factor determining
sion sentiment. Political factionalism and opportunism also contributed
to disunionism. Politics was another avenue of mobility for the aspir-
ing lawyer-planter who came to direct the state's destiny. Those who
ran for office would either wait for issues to arise or manufacture them
-even at the expense of party unity. In this respect there was a vast
turnover in office on the local level. For example, many who were elected
to the legislature from 1850 to 1860 served only one term. 1 This rota-
tion in office reflects a developing society of restless status-seeking
opportunists. Of course, there were those who claimed to stand on the
high ground of principle, i.e., southern rights, never wavering regard-
less of shifting political winds. However, many Alabama politicians
habitually readjusted their southernism to changing public sentiment.
When the slogan of southern rights was in ascendency, they would be among
the most volatile southern nationalists, until unionist feeling predo-
minated. Moreover, many of these aspiring lawyer-politicians changed
their political affiliations with regularity. Comprehension of the
history of party politics in Alabama will, it follows, illustrate an
important aspect of the secession movement.
Alabama achieved statehood in 1819. Her constitution gave poli-
tical control of both state and county government to white males of
Alabama. All adult white males who met a residence requirement of one
year in the state could vote or hold office; all property, tax-paying,
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and militia requirements were abolished, with the exception of the
judiciary, state and county offices were made elective, and until 1842
the federal three-fifths ratio was used for representation in the state
legislature. Elections and sessions of the legislature were to be held
annually. Members of the House of Representatives served one-year terms,
and members of the Senate served for three years. By 1830 elections
and sessions were made biennial; Congressmen served two-year terns and
Senators by 1845 served a four-year tenure. No property or tax qualifi-
cations for holding office existed. Both Senators and Representatives
were required to be white males, citizens of the United States, and resi-
dents of the state for two years and of the county or district for one
year. Representatives had to be at least twenty-one years old and Senators
twenty-seven. The Constitution required periodic reapportionment of
2
the legislature.
The powers of the governor were limited. Although he was given
the authority to grant pardons and reprieves, to issue proclamations,
to make interim appointments, and to command the militia, many of the
powers normally associated with the executive were in the hands of the
legislature. Appointment of the Secretary of State, State Treasurer,
Comptroller of Public Accounts, and high-ranking militia officers was
reserved for the Assembly. The governor was given the power to hold
up unfavorable legislation, but his veto was merely suspensive; the
legislature could override him by a simple majority of both Houses.
All of Alabama's governors, except Joshua Martin (1845-1847) and Reuben
3
Chapman (1847-1849), served second terms.
The majority of local officials were popularly elected. Alabama's
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constitution provided that the commissioners of revenue and roads,
sheriffs, county clerks, justices of the peace, and constables be chosen
by the electorate rather than by elected officials. County judges were
elected by the legislature until 1850. Because of the diffusion of po-
litical power, some chroniclers of ante-bellum Alabama contended that
the masses of yeomanry had sufficient strength to prevent passage of
legislation hostile to their interests.^
Although these nonslaveholders had such power, they did little
to improve their socio-economic position. In point of fact, most of
the nonslaveholding farmers in the Black Belt Owned the less fertile,
less valuable plots. The reason they never used their numbers politi-
cally to ease their lot was two-fold. Nonslaveholding whites were per-
suaded that although they were of low status they still shared with their
betters the high rank of color--beneath them were black bondspeople.
Any movement which attacked economic arrangements could possibly destroy
slavery, thereby making poor whites and blacks socio-economic equals.
White Alabamians had a stake in maintaining the slave color line. South
Alabama yeomen themselves dreamed of becoming slaveowners, the symbol
of upward mobility. Nevertheless, it was always politically shrewd to
express anti-aristocratic sentiments and to show an acceptably egalitarian
spirit no matter what one's economic and social inclinations.
Willis Brewer cites the 1845 congressional contest between E. S.
Dargen and William D. Dunn as an outstanding example of the political
application of the "egalitarian spirit." i'he two candidates had reached
Washington county in their stumping tour. When the public addresses
were over, a Colonel Prince, the wealthiest man in the vicinity, spoke
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to Dunn. •'You are going to be beaten," he remarked. Ws that?"
asked Dunn; "didn't you write me that I was the strongest man in the
district and haven't we a majority in it?" "i know that," replied Prince,
looking furtively around, "but here you are walking off to dinner with
me, the richest man in the county, and there sits Dargen in that crowd
of one-gallows fellows, pjLcJcing, the ticks off his legs, " As predicted,
Dargen. was elected. 5
The history of party politics in Alabama begins with two organi-
zations confronting each other in 1819. There was "the Georgia Machine,"
made up of a number of transplanted Georgia planters and farmers who,
according to the Huntsville Democrat, "evinced a determination to mono-
polize all power and to fill every office with their own creatures."
They were challenged by the "North Carolina Machine." Israel Pickens of
North Carolina, formerly of the Georgia faction, led migrated North
Carolinians and others seeking power at the expense of the Georgians.
Both cliques fought over patronage, bank charters, and elective offices.
By 1825 the Pickens group controlled the state. 6
Most Alabamians supported Andrew Jackson in 1824. Only three coun-
ties voted against him. During the Jackson period political leadership
fell to planter- lawyer types like William R. King of Dallas County.
Becoming one of Alabama's first federal Senators, King held office from
1819 until 1844, when he was appointed minister to France. Returning
in 1849, he was again selected for a four-year term. He was the vice-
presidential nominee on the Pierce ticket in 1852 but died before offi-
cially taking office. King always strove for a balance between southern-
rights and unionist opinion. Considered Mr. Establishment by local and
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national party men, he owned two plantations, covering over 1100 acres
of land, and 16 7 slaves at the time of his death. 7
King's chief rival within the Democratic party was Dixon Hall
Lewis. In 1826 Lewis was elected to represent Montgomery city in the
state legislature. He served three years and in 1829 ran successfully
for Congress from the Black-Belt third district. Remaining a Congress-
man for fourteen years, until 1844, he was then appointed by Governor
Benjamin Fitzpatrick, his brother-in-law, to fill out the unexpired term
of William R. King. 8
Another important Democratic leader was Hugh McVay a Party manager
from North Alabama. He sat in the Alabama territorial legislature from
1811 to 1818 and was then elected in 1820-1825 to the lower House of
the Assembly from Madison county, serving for five years. After 1825
he served nineteen years in the state senate. McVay controlled much
of the state patronage funneled into the hill counties of the Tennessee
9
Valley, and belonged to that inner-circle of party regulars who con-
trolled the federal senate seats.
James Abercrombie, a planter- lawyer from central Alabama, wielded
influence in his region. He took up residence in Montgomery County in
1819, he represented his district in the Assembly from 1820 to 1822, and
was elected to the state Senate in 1825, 1828, and 1831. In 1834 he re-
moved to Russell County where he won election to the state House of Re-
presentatives. He broke with the Democratic party two years later over
the candidacy of Martin Van Buren and allied himself with the Whigs.
Russell County had a heavy Whig plurality by 1836, which no doubt helped
determine Abercrombie 1 s decision. At times he dominated the Black Belt's
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Whigs. Between 1851 and 1855 he won terms to the federal Congress. 10
Established planter
-lawyer politicians-men familiar to state
voters from territorial days-did not exert complete control over the
state. Throughout Alabama's formative period, "new men" came and
settled. Having little economic substance, many arrived as youthful
attorneys and ran for political office after establishing residence.
Some attained both financial and political success and challenged the
authority of the party leaders, or they co-operated and became part of
the stewardship. Clement Comer Clay exemplified this group. After
achieving some success as a planter and publisher, he became a signifi-
cant figure in the Democratic party in north Alabama. He was selected
by party bosses in the legislature to the federal Senate in 1837 after
having served two terms in Congress. Another, Reuben Chapman, moved
to north Alabama, became a lawyer and then a politician. He was elected
to Congress from the upcountry sixth district and in the mid-forties
became governor. Before his forced political retirement, he had become
a prominent real estate investor. Then there were those who never at-
tained much welath but won some important political positions. Gabriel
Moore was one. He became governor in the mid-thirties. John McKinley,
a federal Senator, was also prominent in this category.
11
Before the
early thirties, then, those who entered politics were not initially divided
along ideological or party lines. Most were opportunists who saw politics
as a means of enhancing their status or e?ne, like King's group, sought
and were used to preserve the status quo.
In the late 1820's Alabama's first major sectional dispute occurred.
It involved slavery and it fragmented the state. North Alabama, an area
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of slight slave concentration (only a few counties had soil conducive
to cotton cultivation), voted in favor of an 1826 referendum to prohibit
the importation of slaves. Most of the cotton counties of the Black
Belt and southern Alabama balloted in favor of retaining the trade. 12
Henceforth, state sectionalism became a central feature of Alabama poli-
tics. This division was based on differences in geography, topography,
and modes of agriculture: the highland counties were more inclined to
small subsistence farming, while central Alabama was an area of "black
silt" plantation agriculture. The upper valley after 1824 could also be
counted on to give massive pluralities for the Democratic party. Several
upcountry regions became known as the "avalanche counties" because of
their monolithic majorities for the Jacksonians. Central and southern
Alabama, however, after the formation of the Whig party, was almost evenly
divided between Democrats and Whigs.
Stirrings of discontent with Jackson's party appeared in 1828.
An electoral ticket favorable to John Quincy Adams made its appearance.
Most of those on the ballot came from the Black Belt and the cotton coun-
ties in the Valley. Planter-lawyer James Del let of Monroe County headed
the slate. He would be a leader of Alabama Whiggery during its early
years and would serve two terms in Congress. Other prominent men on
the list were Anderson Crenshaw, a planter from Butler County in south
Alabama who became a Whig manager in the south-central cotton areas,
and future anti-slavery advocate James G. "irney of Madison County.
Birney was elected mayor of Huntsville in the early 1820 's but had to
leave the state because of his colonizing activities before the Whig
. .
13
party organized.
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National issue, began to intrude upon local questions after Jack-
son's initial victory. Manv in the state opposed the doctrine of nulli-
fication advocated by John C. Calhoun and the state of South Carolina.
Gabriel Moore, who supported the 1828 tariff, was elected governor in
1829 without a contest. A resolution which passed 46-16 in the lower
House denounced the nullification ordinance. Jackson then was supported
in his contest with South Carolina nullifies by Alabama Democrats; but
the state party nevertheless had fragmented on the issue. Planter Demo-
crats, and there wa« a considerable planter element in the Jackson party
in the Black Belt, were apprehensive about the President's nationalism.
Indeed, there was a general uneasiness with the "central Government's
federalizing tendencies across middle Alabama." 14
A faction of Calhoun Democrats emerged, initially led by James
A. Calhoun of Dallas County, a nephew of the South Carolina nulllfier.
Born in Abbeville district of South Caroline, James Calhoun graduated
from South Caroliiia College in 1826, came to Alabama in the following
year, and had a long career in the state legislature. Like his uncle,
he would appear as a nemesis to party regulars. 15 Boiling Mall, a planter
from Autauga County in the heart of the Black Belt, was also considered
16
an influential member of the states-rights splinter group; so too was
Dixon Hall Lewis who came to dominate this faction.
Lewis, from Montgomery County, was aware that important opinion
in his Black Belt district was hostile to Tnckson and to party managers
like William R. King and conversely, that nullification feeling was
strong. Throughout Lewis' bailiwick, claimed the Mobile Register, there
was scarcely a village that had not been visited by some "emigrant from
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cause
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South Carolina inculcating the heresy of nullification with the zeal
of a fanatic and the perseverance of a missionary." A nullification
meeting in Montgomery city proposed the organization of a "states Rights
and Free Trade Association." Lewis himself attended an anti-Jack*
gathering there and insisted that South Carolina's cause" is "the
of the whole South. Her defeat would prove a death blow to South,
liberty." In 1829 he announced his candidacy for Congress not as a
Jacksonian Democrat but as a nullification states-rights Democrat. He
carried his County by almost eighty percent, defeating an opponent sup-
ported by the party regulars. 17
Significantly the most vocal protest against the tariff came from
Black Belt areas of high slave density. William Freehling found a similar
development in South Carolina. Behind the nullification movement, he
discovered, was the fear that federal power, if unchecked, could one
day be employed to end slavery. South Carolinian slave masters feared
that freed bondsmen would then turn the Palmetto state into another Haiti. 18
Alabamians living in similar surroundings may have been expressing the
same anxieties in their anti-tariff struggle.
During the nullification dispute, Alabama's Congressional dele-
gation was apprehensive over other forms of possible federal interference
with slavery. When Kentucky's Henry Clay introduced his 1832 Land Dis-
tribution Bill, the public land committee, chaired by William R. King,
attacked the feature of Clay's measure providing that funds derived from
the sale of public lands be used to underwrite colonization. King main-
tained that colonization was a "delicate question connected indissolubly
with the slave question." He added that it was sure to rekindle the
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"fires of the extinguished conflagration which lately blazed in the
Missouri question." When the bill came before the House, Clement Clay,
King's Alabama colleague, predicted that those who accepted colonization
would eventually accept abolition and all its "evils as necessary, nay
indispensable, to the general welfare."19
While Alabama Democrats were colliding over nullification, an
opposition party, the Whigs, emerged to compound their difficulties.
As Charles S. Sydnor has observed about the pre-Civil War south, "ambi-
tious politicians were calculating their chances of advancement and were
throwing their influence to the party that held out the better prospects."20
Consequently, some of these Alabama Whigs--especially those in east-central
Alabama--were not as interested in the Whig principles embodied by Henry
Clay's American system as they were in winning office and suppressing
anti-slavery agitation in the national Whig party. Interestingly, many
of these eastern Black Belt Whigs were natives of South Carolina and
had been raised on the nullification doctrines so popular in the Palmetto
state.
Similarly, Democrats who lived in regions of Whig concentration,
such as west-central Alabama, where loyalty to the national Whig party
predominated, also trimmed their sails at the expense of national Demo-
cratic party principle. Throughout slave dense east-central Alabama
there was little ideological distinction between the two parties. Both
were anti-Jackson. Witness, for example, the political ascent of Dixon
Hall Lewis. He was keenly aware of the hostility to federal power among
his slave-holding east-central constituents and these Black Belt Whigs
and Democrats united to elect him to Congress for four successive terms,
beginning in 1829. William L. Yancey, a rising young lavyer-pub Usher
and Democrat from Levis' district, considered Lewis as much a Whig as
a Democrat.
21
Governor John Gayle, a Democrat campaigning for re-elec-
tion in 1833, made a states-rights appeal to east-central Black Belt
Whigs and Democrats (while privately supporting Jackson in his struggle
against South Carolina) and won a resounding victory. A resident of
Greene County, a Black Belt constituency, he was soon disputing the
federal government over the Creek Indian issue in east-central Alabama.
He insisted on their absolute removal and found that much of his support
came from states-rights Whigs of east-central Alabama. Gayle later de-
22fected to the Whigs.
The Whigs were a minority party during the 1830's. Consequently,
coalition with disaffected Democrats became a standard tactic. In 1835
a union of estranged Democrats and Whigs from south-east Alabama brought
election-day success to former Democrat Francis S. Lyon of Mobile in
his congressional campaign against the regular Democratic nominee. 23
A year later Senator Gabriel Moore, who sought a second term, did the
unforgivable and challenged William R. King for his seat. Upheld by
the states-rights clique, he barely lost to King. Smarting from the
rejection, he then joined the Whigs. Regular Democrats were now under
intense pressure. They held a slight majority in the General Assembly,
but found it difficult to enact their legislative program. Indeed, the
states-rights Whig-Democratic combination of state lawmakers was strong
enough to force through a resolution endorsing Hugh Lawson White for
24
president over Martin Van Buren.
After 1837 the Democratic leadership, fearful of losing its
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leverage, began efforts to win apostates back to the fold. King, a
friend of Van Buren, used this relationship effectively. He persuaded
the President to placate Dixon Hall Lewis and James A. Calhoun, and both
agreed to cooperate with party regulars. But there was still a residue
of eastern Black Belt Democrats who remained loyal to neighboring Whigs.
To appease them the party leaders came out for strict states rights. 25
By the end of the 1830' s, then, the Democratic party had consummated an
uneasy alliance and confronted a formidable Whig antagonist.
Who were the Alabama Whigs? Between 1836 and 1852, there was a
common saying there that where one found rich black soil, there one could
find a slave; where one found a slave, there one would find a bale of
cotton; and where one found a bale of cotton, there one would find a Whig.
Like many generalizations there was some truth to the observation. How-
ever, recent scholarship has qualified the traditional notions of Alabama
Whiggery
.
To be sure, Whigs were powerful in the Black Belt; yet they had
"muscle" in other areas, indeed in every county. Some of the largest
majorities given Whigs were polled in counties where there were few slaves
and conversely some of the heaviest pluralities gained by Democrats were
in regions of high slave density. Therefore, previous scholarship not-
withstanding, Whig support was not based ;?lely on large-scale planters.
Covington and Madison counties illustrate this unexpected mix. Covington,
with a slave population well under 50 percent, registered Whig majorities
in every presidential election except one. Madison, in the highlands,
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had a slave density over 50 percent and gave Democrats huge victories
in every election. Central Alabama occasionally divided between the
two parties. However, counties with a slave population over fifty per-
cent of the total elected more Whigs than Democrats to the legislature,
while more Democrats were elected from counties whose slave populations
were less than 50 percent of the total. 27
Current research has also applied economic growth theories to
voting behavior and party allegiance in ante-bellum Alabama. Thomas
B. Alexander has concluded that in the economically more developed coun-
ties, those with the greater cash crop and the more eastern commercial
contacts with the outside world, in short those counties more nearly in
the main streams of the national and world economy, Whig party appeals
were more attractive to all types of voters regardless of their personal
economic status. It is not that a planter with many slaves or an affluent
merchant was more likely to be a Whig than was a carpenter, or small
farmer or blacksmith; it is simply, Alexander asserts, that all these
men were more likely to be Whigs if they lived in well developed economic
communities rather than in frontier, or isolated, or more nearly self-
28
sufficient communities.
Alexander's economic determinist argument for Whig partiality is
too simplistic. He gives the impression that Alabama's ante-bellum
economy was dynamic, but a recent study by Robert Fogel and Stanley
Engerman offers a more realistic appraisal of the political economy of
the plantation south. Although not specifically dealing with voting
motivation, both Fogel and Engerman conclude that the slave south de-
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veloped a highly capitalistic for, of agriculture, and its economic be-
havior was as strongly motivated by the profit motive as that of the north.
But cotton counties which had economic intercourse with the outside world
were not similar to the progressive diversified western economies of the
first half of the nineteenth century. All profits were plowed back into
slaves and cotton, and there was little, if any, economic variation. 29
By 1860 in Alabama there were 7,889 workers in 1,459 manufacturing plants
(most of them no more than shops) which together had a capital invest-
ment of nine million dollars. The average "factory" had no more than
, 30, 31
rxve employees.
A key factor for Whig support, unmentioned by Alexander, was oppor-
tunism. Many Alabamians became Whigs because they felt their political
or economic ambitions were hindered by a Democratic Party top heavy with
chiefs and aspiring, restless subordinates. The Whigs welcomed frustrated
Democrats and political neophytes into their ranks. Significantly, the
Black Belt, a newly settled area, showed greater Whig influence. North
Alabama, which was colonized first, had long been controlled by the Demo-
cratic party. Its leaders were not about the share party leadership
with late comers from the south. The mere longevity of the Democratic
party invited the suspicion that its members had become corrupted by
one-party rule. Whigs effectively used this issue in their campaigns.
Moreover to many who voted for the Whigs in the eastern Black Belt the
Democrats were not sufficiently dogmatic on slavery. It was thought that
most upstate Democratic counties having srall black populations would
not stand firm on all questions involving slavery. Understandably, then,
there were more southern-rights Whigs in east-central Alabama. However,
73
by the early 1840's many west-central Alabamians came to support the
nationalist principles of the Whig party. They formed a significant
Unionist faction when the slavery-territorial debate peaked in 1846.
A modern statistical analysis of the status of Whigs and Democrats
in the 1840's has also modified the orthodox view of Alabama Whiggery.
Occupationally, the same percentage of identified Whigs and Democrats
were artisans and farmers or planters. Indeed, there was a slightly
higher percentage of lawyers among the Democrats, and a higher percentage
of farmers and planters among the Whigs. More Whigs than Democrats were
merchants in those Black Belt counties that were studied; while Democrats
held a small edge among the professional and 'white-collar" classes.
In terms of real estate, through the 1840's both parties shared equally.
In the highest category, $20,000 and above, 21 percent of the Whigs and
27 percent of the Democrats were found. But in the $10,000 to $20,000
level, Whigs made up 20 percent and Democrats 16 percent. Slave owner-
ship, based on the census of 1840, also reflects these figures:
Whigs and Democrats Slaveholding : For Autauga,
Greene, Jefferson, Lowndes, Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa Counties 32
Number of Slaves Owned
100
50-99
20-49
10-19
1-9
None
Percentage of Party Group
Whigs (268) Democrats (407)
3
12
27
21
28
9
7
11
22
16
23
21
Whig leadership came from every geographic region. Two important
bellweather leaders, Arthur F. Hopkins and Nicholas Davis, were from
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north Alabama. Hopkins, a Madison County attorney, served two terms
in the legislature and in 1837 was elected by the Assembly to the United
States Senate, reflecting the state's anti-Van Buren feeling in both
parties. Hopkins' colleague, Nicholas Davis, a planter-lawyer from
Limestone County, was elected consistently in the 1840' s and fifties
to the state senate and served as president of the senate five times. 33
In central and south Alabama, Whig management was in the hands of James
Dellet of Monroe County. Born in Pennsylvania, he moved to Alabama in
1819, was elected to the legislature four times and represented the first
Congressional district in Washington in 1839 and 1843. 34 c. C. Langdon
of Mobile, editor of the Mobile Advertiser, was also a power among Whigs
in the southern part: of Alabama, having migrated there from Connecticut
in 1825. He was elected mayor of Mobile in 1849 and, except for one
35term, succeeded himself until 1855. Another important Whig manager
was lawyer and Methodist minister Henry Hilliard. In 1845 he became
the first Whig to be elected to Congress from the Montgomery district,
and in the late 1840 's and early fifties he became spokesman for planter
Whig conservatism in the central Black Belt.
The Congressional elections of 1839 saw the Whigs dispute the
Democrats in most districts. Both parties in the late 1830 's fought
over state banks and money problems. These were prime issues in the
1839 state elections. A focal point of the debate was the specie issue.
Whigs condemned Democratic financial policies which required collection
36
of all public monies in coin. The Democrats did not stump against
Reuben Chapman from the "avalanche" sixth district. Dixon Hall Lewis
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also received a "free ride." Lewis was still popular with Black Belt
Whigs in the eastern part of his "fief," and also had sufficient strength
in the central Democratic counties. 37 Nevertheless, Alabama experienced
its first major clash of parties in this year. The Whigs von Tuscaloosa-
Greensboro and Mobile districts, the fourth and first, respectively, as
George W. Crabb and James Dellet defeated their Democratic opponents
by close margins. Crabb' s victory in no small measure was due to Whig
pluralities in the Black Belt counties of his section. Dellet's success
confirmed most opinion that the "first" would go Whig. 38 The Democrats
won in the two northern districts and the Whigs in the two south-central
regions. Thus, on the eve of the 1840 presidential campaign, Whig strength
was established in the Mobile and Tuscaloosa districts and steadily in-
creasing in the Montgomery precincts of Dixon Hall Lewis.
After 1839 Montgomery district Whigs were piqued at Lewis for
his open support of Van Buren and were planning to run a candidate against
him in 1841. In 1840, however, in state and local elections, a more
immediate test of political power was forthcoming. The composition of
the General Assembly was at stake, and it was the key to future Whig
success. If Whigs could capture a majority in the state legislature,
then Whiggery would control spoils and patronage for at least two years.
And if they could carry Alabama for William H. Harrison, then they would
39
have a mandate to take the "sacred" senate seat of William R. King.
Virginian John Tyler, Harrison's running mate, was especially popular
because of his reputation as a states-rights advocate and his long public
defense of slavery.
^
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Each party charged the other with being "soft on slavery" during
the presidential canvass. A Democratic paper claimed that Harrison had
favored "the whole of the surplus revenue appropriated for emancipation"
and that he could see "no constitutional objection to its being thus applied.
Harrison was also accused of "playing a double game to catch the votes
of the abolitionists of the north and the slaveholders of the south. 1,41
Harrison's alleged association with abolitionists cost him ballots in
/ 2
*"
—
some Black Belt precincts.
East-central WW. g newspapers insisted that Van Buren opposed the
extension of slavery into new states or territories, and that he stood
with the "Missouri restrictionists in 1819." Van Buren, one editorial
asserted, believed Congress had the constitutional authority to abolish
slavery in the District of Columbia. Both parties proclaimed themselves
to be Alabama's only bulwark against the "abolitionist reptile."
By the spring of 1840 the press campaign had almost become a shoot-
ing war. Whig editor Charles C. Langdon of the Mobile Advertiser was
so disturbed over the mysterious death of a fellow Whig that he and a
large number of his followers charged into the office of the Democratic
Mobile Register and threatened to destroy the building. The acting edi-
tor of the Register, H. Ballantyne, pulled out a pistol and forced langdon
44
and his crowd to leave the office.
The Assembly election results in early August raised Whig expec-
tations. Democrats retained a majority of only eight seats in the House
45
and seven in the Senate. These figures encouraged the Whigs because
they had reduced the opposition's combined majority from forty-seven In
the previous legislature to fifteen. "The Whigs of Alabama have done
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nobly in this election/' wrote the Alabama Journal and "will give a good
account of themselves at the great battle in November."46 The post-elec-
tion meeting of Democrats in Tuscaloosa resolved to appoint a vigilance
committee to watch the ballot boxes of every precinct in November. 47
Although the Democrats held a plurality in the Assembly, some party members
felt that the Whigs had used fraud to manipulate the returns. Mobile
district Democrats were especially agitated. After the Whigs had carried
the "first" by a small majority, the Mobile Register declared that the
"Democrats have done all that men could do against packed judges, false
tickets, powerful exertions and a free flow of money."48
In the November election Van Buren garnered over sixty percent of
the vote in nineteen counties carrying the entire area above central
Alabama. He compiled a majority of 5,711 out of 62,279 votes cast. Most
counties of southern Alabama were strongly against Van Buren, except
Henry County which gave him a plurality of sixty-six; Washington County
gave Van Buren a miniscule majority of thirteen and Clarke County only
49
a 366 margin. It was the "avalanch" counties of the north, particularly
those of the north east, which gave him the state. The northern hill
precincts were recognized by Democrats in the south as having determined
the outcome. "All hail we say to north Alabama!" exclaimed the Democratic
Alabama Beacon . "She has again spoken from her vallies [sic] and moun-
tains, to the friends of Democracy in the South...we say--well done thou
good and faithful servant.
"^^
Fradulent voting practices were also discovered in this election.
Six counties had a total vote surpassing the number of eligible voters,
and the voter turnout percentage, ranging from 88 to 99 percent, was
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high enough to arouse suspicion in twelve counties. Of the six counties
with obvious irregularities, five were carried by Whigs, and in the case
of the twelve suspect counties, eight had a Democratic majority. The
clearly fraudulent counties were Lawrence, Barbour, Greene, Marengo,
Shelby, and Tuscaloosa; and except Lawrence they were carried by Harri-
51
son.
The Democratic leadership was well aware that its state-wide ma-
jority had been reduced to less than 55 percent. 52 After 1840 the Whigs
prevailed in the first and fourth districts. Democrats feared that Mont-
gomery—the third district—would also become a Whig bastion. Harrison,
after all, took 65 percent of the third district vote. Consequently,
a Dixon Hall Lewis defeat in 1841 would tip Alabama's Congressional balance
to the Whigs (three Whigs to two Democrats). Lewis, however, seemed rather
reflective and calculating about his future. In a letter to Benjamin
Fitzpatrick, he poked fun at his colleague Senator Clement Clay whose term
was also up in 1841: "The Judge [Clay] appears to be in a feeling of
intense anxiety in relation to the political prospects of the Democratic
Party in Alabama. I imagine his apprehension of Legislative instructions
flit before him in dreams by night and thus unsettle his nerves by day...."
Clay, he further stated, looked forward to Fitzpatrick's gubernatorial
election because it would give "a strong spoke to the Democratic wheel
in the southern part of the state, which could roll him through a long
period of Senatorial service...." Realistically assessing his prospects,
Lewis believed his Whig -Democratic coalition might be in jeopardy, and
that he might "prefer to back out and quit a life of continued turmoil
and agitation." He would "suffer as much as Clay appears now to suffer
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until August only for the Presidency" and he cautiously added, "I shall
without committing myself keep the game in my own hands." Returning
to Clement Clay, his favorite foil, Lewis exposed cynical disregard for
national party principle by ridiculing Clay as the "only rabid Democrat
we have here and that not because he has been bitten but because he fears
he may_. He thinks the Whig maddog is snapping close to his heels in
Alabama land " Concluding, he advised Fitzpatrick on the art of po-
litical survival: "an opposition party ought to be [an] uncommitted
party, and thus to draw in the strength of every disaffected faction."53
These judgments guided him not only in 1840-41, but all during his sin-
gular quest for high political office.
Alabama Democrats began to make "arrangements" to forestall the
dreaded Whig Congressional victories. In the closing days of the 1840
legislative session the Democratic majority devised a plan of electing
representatives to Congress on a general ticket: Congressional contests
would take place on a general state-wide ballot instead of by districts.
This scheme was the creation of William L. Yancey, among others. Writing
in the Wetumka Argu s , he urged action that would enable Alabama to pre-
sent a united front, one which would uphold "the rights of the southern
states and of southern institutions against the fury of fanatics and the
federalizing tendencies of the times." Yancey's home was in Coosa county
on the edge of the Black Belt, and he recognized what impact such a general
ticket would have on his neighborhood: "In three districts out of five
[all Black Belt and southern counties] the Whigs have the power of elect-
ing a majority of Congressional representatives while actually a minority
in the State. Thus, the State is misrepresented." He meant, of course,
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that offices controlled by the Whigs in south-central Alabama would be-
come Democratic after the general ticket passed. 5* Another rationali-
zation for this obvious violation of the Federal constitution was that
it could be used as a device to expose those who were not inclined to
defending slavery.
Democratic editors insisted that the times were ominous for the
south, since the nationalist and abolitionist strength of the next Congress
was of "great magnitude." They urged southerners to elect only candi-
dates who would be firm in defense of southern institutions. Governor
Bagby invoked similar arguments in recommending passage of the general
ticket in his annual message to the legislature in the fall 1840. 55
The state, senate passed the bill by a party vote of nineteen to
twelve. Only one Democrat --from Wilcox County, which was a Black Belt
Whig const ituency--voted against the act. 56 House debate was intense,
with the Whigs using every parliamentary tactic that was available.
They even left the chamber when the question was called, and the Demo-
cratic whip then ordered two Whigs who were officially ill-at-home brought
to the hall, thus obtaining a quorum and forcing a ballot. Whig repre-
sentatives rushed back to their desks at this point, but the measure
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was passed. "Outrage," cried the Whigs! George W. Crabb, the Whig
congressional representative from the Tuscaloosa district whose seat
was now doomed, characterized the general ticket as a "specie [sic] of
modern ostracism concocted and recommended more with a view to serve the
selfish ends of a clique of would be party leaders. . .than to promote the
58
welfare of the state.... John C. Calhoun, on a visit to Montgomery,
59
also condemned the ordinance.
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Three southern congressional districts were carried by the Whigs
in 1841, but Alabama sent not two but five Democrats to Congress. Dixon
Hall Lewis decided, after the passage of the general ticket, to "chance
a canvass." His opponent Henry W. Hilliard outpolled him by a wide mar-
gin, but Lewis was returned to Washington. On December 17, 1841, however,
six months before the federal apportionment act of June 25, 1842 (which
provided that every state populous enough to be entitled to more than
one representative must be divided by state legislatures into districts),
the Alabama general ticket scheme was abandoned. Inspiration for nulli-
fying the general ticket was motivated by a fear of federal intervention. 60
The Democrats then turned to another stratagem on the advice of
Benjamin Fitzpatrick, Democratic chief from Autauga County. The Democra-
tic majority in the legislature proposed to reconstruct the Congressional
districts following the 1840 census on the basis of the white population
only. Characteristically, William L. Yancey, while making his maiden
effort to obtain a legislative seat, favored the "white basis." He in-
sisted that he represented the "great mass of the people versus the aris-
tocracy" and that the federal ratio had committed to "the hands of a slave-
holding minority [the Whigs in the Black Belt] the whole power of the
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state. Yancey was thus launching his political career by attacking
the "slaveocracy, " the same class whose interests a few years later he
would defend with unparalleled vigor.
North Alabama would dominate the south-central sections under
this new scheme. To prevent it, the Whigs hoped for support from Black
Belt Democrats, who would no longer be allowed to count three-fifths
of their slaves when representation was apportioned. Despite what they
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would lose if the "white basis" went into effect, the Democrats of
southern Alabama remained loyal to their upcountry partisans. They
preferred a weakened Whiggery to equality of representation with the
highland Democracy. According to one unsubstantiated source, an arrange-
ment was made between Black Belt Democrats and party leaders in north
Alabama. The former would furnish the guidance and the north would pro-
vide the numbers, thereby giving the Democrats control of the state. 63
The "white basis" bill divided Alabama into seven congressional districts
according to the white population, with each district having one repre-
sentative. To make the arrangement even more effective, many Whig coun-
ties were gerrymandered into two Congressional districts. The remaining
Whig counties were merged into the other five districts to give additional
advantage to the Democrats. 6 ^
In seeking popular support for the "white basis," Democrats used
what had become their most persistent argument, namely, that the Whigs
were aristocrats and far too moderate on the slavery question. Democratic
editors implied and avowed that the "Democracy is the only reliable de-
fender of southern institutions." Whigs were reduced to a defense of
their "southernism, " a defensive position that hurt them until their
expiration in 1853.
The "white basis" won House approval by a vote of forty-six to
thirty-eight. Almost every northern county representative voted for it;
the opposition included all the Whigs and six Black Belt Democrats who
had significant Whig constituencies. Voting was along sectional-party
lines in the upper house when it balloted fifteen to thirteen in favor
of the measure.
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A Whig committee in the House formally protested: The "white
basis" was in violation of the provisions of the federal constitution.
Moreover, though not intending it, they charged that the ordinance aided
and abetted abolitionism by reducing the political leverage of the slave
holding regions. Now, the petition exclaimed, south Alabama would be
forever under the control of the northern districts. 67 Their protest
made no impression. In 1853, after several Whig victories in the Black
Belt in 1851, the Democrats again moved against the Whigs. Under a new
gerrymander law, Montgomery, always a stronghold of Whiggery despite
the "white basis," was shifted along with two other Whig citadels, the
town of Wetumpka in Coosa County and Talladega County--from the second
into the third Congressional district. This shift absolutely neutralized
the Montgomery Whigs. The effects of this law upon state Whiggery, to-
gether with the fragmentation of the national Whig party, encouraged many
Alabama Whigs to join other political movements, primarily the Know-Nothings,
in an effort to challenge the almost singular power of the Democrats.
The slave issue crippled Alabama Whigs since it discouraged them from
seeking a reversal in the federal courts: Bringing the "white basis"
to judicial attention might have reopened another national slavery debate,
a prospect that neither section of the Union desired. 68
From 1843 to 1860, with the Whigs functionally impaired in Alabama,
the most notable political struggles occurred within the Democratic party.
Factionalism ^ad existed since the 1820's. Dixon Hall Lewis, had until
1841, been a fusion congressman in the Montgomery district. It was common
knowledge that he also coveted William R. King's senatorial seat. Mean-
while, William L. Yancey, who fancied Lewis's congressional chair,
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habitually accused him of being a Whig, m addition, in the late thirit: e!
and early forties, some Democrats residing in Whig precincts saw that
political survival required a change of party or catering to local Whig
sentiment
.
While wrangling over the "white basis" continued, another contro-
versy further splintered the Democrats. The State Bank had come under
attack during the late 1830's. It was charged with favoritism and graft.
Bank funds had been loaned to Whigs and Democrats alike without adequate
security. In addition to favoritism, assembly investigations also re-
vealed sloppy business methods. One of the Bank's leading critics was
the eager William L. Yancey still editor of the Wetumpka Argus . 69
Yancey was joined by three other ambitious politicians: John
Erwin, a lawyer-planter from Greene County; attorney John A. Campbell
of Mobile; and youthful firebrand John Cochrane of Benton County. These
Bank reformers supported Benjamin Fitzpatrick for Governor in 1841, and
Fitzpatrick identified himself with the anti-Bank forces. Conversely,
a representative group of Democrats felt that the anti-Bank charges were
exaggerated. They collaborated with the Whig party in 1841, supporting
Fitzpatrick' s opponent, former Democrat James W. McLung. Interestingly,
these pro-Bank Democrats were led by Dixon Hall Lewis and Nathaniel Terry
of Limestone County. Lewis, seeking to resurrect his former Whig-Democrat
coalition, joined Terry in calling upon Democrats to bolt and to support
McLung, the "independent Whig candidate . "^
Fitzpatrick defeated McLung decisvely and Yancey, Campbell, Erwin,
and Cochrane won election to the lower House. The Bank reformers gained
control of the House. They made Erwin speaker and appointed Campbell
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chairman of the committee on Banks. Bank debates dominated the General
Assembly for the next three years. It was, as well, a contest between
John Cochrane and William Yancey as to who would lead the radical force
among the Bank redeemers. Cochrane went so far as to condemn all banks
as "commercial volcanoes, constantly casting out their damning contents
--sweeping prosperity from our land and desolating it of virtue itself." 71
Whigs and pro-Bank Democrats opposed liquidation of the State Bank
on the grounds that it would destroy business in Alabama. More to the
point, however, Terry and many of his friends had made several loans from
the Bank over the years. Likewise, some of the Bank's enemies incurred
Bank debts. Yancey, for example, owed the Bank $599.00, and he was known
72to be distressed financially. As Democrats fought among themselves,
Fitzpatrick and some of the more moderate reformers became acutely aware
that continual friction could create an unbridgeable gap in the party.
Nevertheless, before Fitzpatrick left office, the branch banks were put
in liquidation; and the parent Bank's charter, which expired on January
1, 1845, was not renewed. But pro-Bank men succeeded in passing a reso-
73lution in favor of nonliquidat ion before Fitzpatrick's term ended.
Democrats in 1845 met in Tuscaloosa to choose a gubernatorial
nominee. While anti-Bank delegates from the western counties were tem-
porarily delayed in Mobile because of flooding there, pro-Bank represen-
tatives controlled the convention and nominated Nathaniel Terry. After
the convention, anti-Bank Democrats refused to accept Terry and supported
former Congressman Joshua L. Martin who had announced himself as a Bank
reform candidate.
Elated by this further victory against the Democrats, the Whigs
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did not nominate an opponent. Terry, author of the infamous general
ticket, was considered anathema to some. But most Whigs "held their
noses" and voted for Terry and the Bank. Martin triumphed, however,
compiling a 5000 plurality. He won in the upcountry counties; while
most precincts south of the Valley stood by Terry. Pro-Bank Democrats
never forgave Martin for his opposition and he served only one term. 74
Meanwhile, Dixon Hall Lewis realized a cherished goal when he was
appointed to William R. King's Senate seat. The post became vacant when
John Tyler appointed King minister to France. Governor Fitzpatrick did
not let the inner party machinations of his brother-in-law--Dixon Hall
Lewis—disturb him when he designated Lewis to King's post. This appoint-
ment caused John Quincy Adams to record in his diary: "twenty score of
flesh have been transferred from slumber in the House to sleep in the
Senate. He takes the place of William R. King, a gentle slavemonger,
called by [Andrew] Jackson 'Miss Nancy'..."75 Selected by the third
district Democratic Convention, Yancey campaigned and was elected to
replace Lewis. According to a charge made years later, Yancey was selected
by securing the admission of unauthorized convention delegates committed
to him.
Alabama politics were in disarray on the eve of the Mexican War.
The Whigs had been eliminated as a serioi,c- threat to Democratic hegemony;
yet discord governed the Democrats. Highland and south-central Democrats,
seeking representation for their respective regions, pugnaciously con-
tested for high state and federal offices. Furthermore, southern-rights
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sentient predominated In the south-central Democracy. It. most
.tri-
dent spokesmen were in the Black Belt. Lewis deftly led the ultras-
the Montgomery Chivalry-but even before his death in 1M8 his leader-
ship „as being challenged by Yancey, the political outsider oca outsider.
Extreme southern rights became the ralson d'e'tre of Yancey and
the other estranged "pols" who llved outsldc ^ p(!rlmetcrs of
mise. To Yancey, party regulars wore "mere puppets in the show, made
to wheel and dance as the party organists chooso to grind the music,
while others of ample ability and individuality are absorbed in their
personal advancement, which invariably requires a compromise of Southern
77issues." Yancey's condemnation of party loyalty was the judgment of
a chronic political outsider who dreamed of becoming Alabama's chief
party boss. He and other "hotspurs" accused the party faithfuls of being
"soft on southernism" as they opportunistically sought high office.
The Democratic yeomanry of the upper valley were more loyal to
the national party; their fidelity, in part, was anchored in an agricul-
tural economy that was not dependent on slavery. They were, it follows,
somewhat hesitant to stretch their "southernism" to the point of secession,
There also were Democratic clusters of moderation in south-central Alabama
led by King, Fitzpatrick, and John Forsyth, the former minister to Mexico
and editor of the Mobile Register .
Mr. Uilmot's resolution triggered a state-wide struggle. Demo-
cratic regulars would spend the next fourteen years on the defensive,
as disruptionists sought to wreck an already brittle polity.
CHAPTER III
OF MR. WILLIAM L. YANCEY AND THE WILMOT PROVISO : HUNKER VS. CHIVALRY
irn es-
The Mexican War produced the Wilmot Proviso, which in tu
calated the national slavery debate to proportions that threatened the
cohesion of the major parties. This proviso, which declared that slavery
was to be prohibited in the whole territory to be acquired from Mexico,
passed the House of Representatives. Thus the lower House indicated
its readiness to approve a program which the south deemed intolerable;
and it was only prevented from becoming law by the failure of the senate
to act.
Already tested by state sectionalism, the bank controversy, and
the sheer opportunism of its politicians, Alabama's Democratic party
was in disarray when it confronted the restriction issue. Moreover,
the territorial question vaulted into national prominence a gadfly-
William L. Yancey—whose career would be devoted to using the slavery
issue as a means of gaining power for himself. According to his contem-
poraries William L. Yancey's role in the southern-rights movement was
pivotal. For example, the South Carolina Unionist Benjamin F. Perry
observed that "Yancey was the arch fiend in breaking up the .. .union. 1,1
For generations, William L. Yancey has been portrayed as the per-
sonification of secessionism in Alabama, although, as we shall see, there
were Alabamians more consistent in their disunionism. Narratives about
"the young Demosthenes" generally note how he towers above most fire-
eaters. Woodrow Wilson declared in 1902 that Yancey "split the ranks
of the Democratic Party at Charleston, made the election of Douglas
89
impossible, and brought Lincoln in." Calhoun has boon called the logician
of secession; Yancey, "the voice of emotion." Or, as Joseph Hergesheimer
remarked, Yancey was "the pillar of words. 1 *2
It is difficult to explain Yancey's behavior or to assess his
motivation. Was it only principle-the rights of slavery in the terri-
tories? Fredrick Jackson Turner attributed his responses to the frontier,
to the climate of the deep South, and to "the hot blood of its sons."
Ulrich B. Phillips asserted that Yancey's South Carolina origins deter-
mined his behavior. W. J. Cash saw him as an archtype Southerner: "the
whole story of Southern politics from Andrew Jackson down—through the
Yanceys..." to the "Klan...has been one of consistent demogoguerery
. .
.
of the South in full gallop against the Yankee, and even more, the Negro."
To other southern writers, however, Yancey reacted to an overbearing
north; he was defending an oppressive and exploited south. 3 It may be
rewarding to probe Yancey's early years in order to glean what prompted
so many seemingly diverse evaluations.
William Lowndes Yancey was born in his grandfather's home "The
Aviary," in Warren County, Georgia. His mother, a Pennsylvanian had
moved to Georgia with his father in 1796. His father, Benjamin Yancey,
an attorney from Abbeville, South Carolina, was a contemporary and con-
fidant of John C. Calhoun. He died in August 1817, leaving his widow
with the three-year old William and a baby, Benjamin Cudworth. Mrs.
Caroline Yancey was not only known for her good looks but, like her
4husband and her own mother for a bad temper as well. Mrs. Yancey left
"The Aviary" and settled in Hancock County, Georgia. Young William was
enrolled in nearby Mount Zion Academy and came under the tutelege of
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Nathen Sidney Beman, a teacher who had migrated from the north in 1812.
He is reported to have been a strict disciplinarian who did not hesitate
to inflict corporal punishment. Part of the second great awakening,
Beman was known for his arrogantly pious religious harangues as well
as for intellectual eloquence.'5
Enchanted with Caroline Yancey's beauty, Beman commenced a court-
ship of the widow which in 1821 culminated in marriage. By a complex
set of circumstances, Beman gained control of the Yancey inheritance
and years later was accused of spending all the money on himself and his
children of an earlier marriage. In 1822 after selling three slaves
for $700--it can not be determined whether the bondsmen were owned by
him or by Mrs. Yancey- -he made preparations to move his family north.
Years later, the Yanceys would accuse Beman of being an abolitionist
who had once sold slaves. After accepting a Ministry at the First Pres-
byterian Church in Troy, New York, Beman was converted to anti-slavery
by Charles Grand ison Finney and became a friend of Theodore Dwight Weld,
Lewis Tappan, and Joshua Leavitt.
What effect these changes had on nine-year old William Yancey
is unknown. A different climate from Georgia, a stepfather of stern
manner, life in a growing industrial city, rather than rural, slave-
dominated south--these events and forces must have affected him. Un-
fortunately, however, most of Yancey's personal correspondence disappeared
at the turn of the century so one may only surmise about the effect of
this move northward.
Caroline Yancey Beman, we do know, carried her volatile tempera-
ment with her. The hired girls at her Troy home were particularly upsetting.
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Her anger at them would prompt Beman's intervention, producing husband-
wife encounters. Her two children by Beman also became objects of her
wrath in moments of distress. These outbreaks invariably led to more
hostility between husband and wife. Beman, during these "bad times,"
would become "cold, arrogant, and sarcastic," and proclaim that Caroline
was mad or lacked virtue. Sometimes he would threaten divorce. 7 Thus,
William Yancey's formative years were spent in an unsettled and strained
household. That household also throbbed with revivalist religious doc-
trines, and Yancey later admitted the influence of his stepfather's
missionary zeal.
Yancey was a devoted son and was not in the least ambivalent about
his love for his mother. Beman provided him with a good education.
He attended some of the best academies, and entered Williams College
at sixteen. While at college, Yancey co-edited a literary magazine,
became a member of the school's oratorical club, and studied with the
renowned rhetorician Mark Hopkins before entering his senior year. 10
For a variety of reasons, including Beman's financial difficulties, Yancey
left Williams in 1833. Hostility between Yancey's mother and stepfather
continued to grow, and it almost brought about a separation in 1833. 11
Rather than return to Troy, Yancey settled with his father's rela-
tives in South Carolina. At about this time Nathan Beman was emerging
as a major anti-slavery advocate in western New York. He held biracial
services in his church and started a primly school for blacks in the
church basement. In point of fact, he played a pivotal role in driving
12
a wedge in the Presbyterian church nationally over slavery. His in-
creasing abolitionist sentiments only fueled the fires of resentment
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between husband and wife.
Both parties agreed that a brief separation might be beneficial.
Yancey's mother left for a visit to South Carolina and while there wrote
a bitter indictment of abolitionism to her husband. 13 Caroline also
sent William all of Beman's letters while she sojourned in the South.
She even admitted that Beman beat her, but later denied it. 14 After
his mother returned to Troy, William Yancey entered the fray and, accord-
ing to her, he wrote to Beman "so dreadful a letter that I had to burn
it and not let [Beman] see it."
William Yancey and his brother Ben, infuriated at Beman's treat-
ment of their mother mailed him a provocative pro-slavery broadside.
They were also incensed that the abolitionist Beman had formerly sold
three slaves. Preparing to publish the evidence in a Troy, New York,
newspaper, they even obtained a copy of the bill of sale. 15
The intrusion of the slavery issue into the Beman marriage pro-
bably hardened William Yancey against his stepfather. His attacks on
abolitionists, especially after 1846, became more vicious than those
of most fellow southerners; and his hatred of them was in part a mani-
festation of his deep resentment for Nathan Beman.
In 1834 in South Carolina Yancey became a law apprentice to Benjamin
F. Perry, one of his father's old cronies. Perry had become a staunch
Unionist during the nullification debate. His student, no doubt influenced
by him, entered the struggle on the Union side. Yancey, becoming editor
of the Greenville Mountaineer, editorially attacked the nullification
movement and John C. Calhoun. The controversy aroused passions on both
sides--and these were transmitted to Yancey. On one occasion he and a
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fellow law apprentice ended a heated disagreement over the tariff by
drawing their pistols. Only Perry's intervention blocked a duel. 16
Perhaps it is no coincidence that Yancey's Unionism began to wane about
the same time his relationship with his abolitionist stepfather grew
bitter.
On August 13, 1835, Yancey married Sarah Caroline Earle, the
daughter of a wealthy Greenville planter. He moved to Dallas County,
Alabama, to take up cotton planting there in 1836. Two years later,
while visiting Greenville, he killed his wife's uncle R. M. Earle during
a scuffle. Sentenced to a one year jail term, and fined $1500, he served
only three months when Governor Patrick Noble commuted his sentence and
17
two-thirds of his fine.
Back in Alabama, Yancey rented a plantation near Cahaba, and,
with his brother, bought the Wetumpka Argus in 1839. Yancey also bought
a farm near Wetumpka but had to suspend planting when most of his slaves
18
were mysteriously poisoned. (A neighboring plantation manager who
had had an altercation with Yancey's overseer was suspected of committing
the deed.) He then left planting, opened up a law office, and began to
make public speeches on both local and national issues. Almost immediately
he won recognition as a "spellbinder." Yancey's frontier listeners were
enthralled with his eloquent rhetoric. His oratorical ability and camp-
meeting methods now gave him a chance to be something more than an ordinary
lawyer-politician. It is difficult to determine to what extent this
skill stemmed from having been brought up in a household dominated by
evangelical Christianity.
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During the "Hard Cider" canvass of 1840, Yancey spoke at barb,
and public gatherings for Martin Van Buren. Elected to Alabama's lower
Rouse in 1841 and to the upper House in 1843, he gained public notoriety
by supporting liberal reforms. He came out for free public education,
fair legal rights for married women, representation apportioned on the '
basis of the White population only, and bank and prison reform. 19
In 1844 he was elected to Congress to fill the unexpired term
of Dixon Hall Lewis, the leading Calhounite in Alabama. Reelected in
1845, Yancey served until September 1846 when he resigned. His first
debate in Congress over Texas annexation was with Thomas Clingman, a
Whig representative from North Carolina. Yancey's vicious personal attack
on Clingman led to a bloodless duel. 20 This was the first of numerous
instances of Yancey's ungovernable temper and emotional harangues trig-
gering a passionate clash. Alexander H. Stephens, the distinguished
Whig representative from Georgia, fell victim to one of Yancey's forays.
In May 1846, Stephens criticized the Administration's war policy. In an
editorial appearing in the Congressional Globe. Yancey, the self-appointed
advocate of Polk, placed Stephens among the "horde of abolitionists who
infest this Hall, condemning the cause of his own country." Yancey had
earlier opposed war over Oregon; now, however, anyone who opposed war
with Mexico was a traitor. After Stephens read Yancey's pol emic, the
two southern Congressmen had a heated exchange in Congress, and only
2
1
the intervention of two other Congressmen prevented a duel.
Yancey did nothing in Congress to inspire a positive assessment.
He helped to widen the gulf between southern Congressmen and those in
the north and west. He was a continual source of annoyance. He had
scant knowledge of parliamentary procedure and he was forever making
errors in form. Nor were his proposals ever enacted. James Polk never
included him among those Congressmen with whom he discussed party policy
In sum Yancey's stature derived from his insistance upon southern rights
though according to Alabama Whig Henry Hilliard, the Calhounites were
foolish and shortsighted to put so much trust in him. 22
When Yancey resigned his Congressional post, he explained his
reasons in a letter to his constituents: financial distress and press-
ing family responsibilities determined his decision. These factors un-
questionably did play a role, but so did great disenchantment with the
political process, especially as it affected southern delegates. For
in his explanation Yancey insisted that northern Democrats got the spoil
and southern Democrats were duped into paying for them. He deplored
the compromises that Congressmen were always forced to make. Thus, he
lamented that few southern Congressmen would adhere to principles--"the
only criteria of an honest politician." Yancey's address was seen by
John A. Winston, an upcountry Democrat and perennial Yancy antagonist,
as a call for destroying the Democratic party and creating in its stead,
a purely southern-rights party. Yancey admitted that there were some
northern Democrats who did "hold the right views." David Wilmot was
one; and Yancey told how he fought the entire Pennsylvania delegation
23
with that one "brilliant exception." This judgment preceded Wilmot 's
proviso.
Before giving up his Congressional seat, Yancey had begun colla-
borating with Dixon Hall Lewis. Moreover, after championing southern
rights while in Congress, Yancey had won the esteem of John C. Calhoun.
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The South Carolina nullifier recommended to the Lewis-led bloc of southe
extremists in Montgomery~"the Chivalry "-that they procure for Yancey
the editorship of the Mobile Register, an anti-Calhoun paper. It was
edited and owned by Thaddeus Sanford, a Democratic party regular and
antagonist of Dixon Hall Lewis and his Montgomery faction. This faction
agreed with Lewis 4 estimate: "it is a most corrupt and unsound sheet,
deeply inimical to every sound man in the party."24
But the Alabama Calhounites were unsuccessful and Yancey returned
to the law. He moved his family to Montgomery and went into partner-
ship with John A. Elmore, whose family, together with Robert Barnwell
Rhett, led an extremist states-rights clique in South Carolina. 25 Thus,
by 1846 Yancey had become thoroughly identified with Alabama's southern-
rights ultras. And there was no better place to begin his anti-party
campaign than Montgomery, home of the "Chivalry." The country wagons
that always filled Montgomery's main square brought the two products
that embodied the forthcoming fire-eaters' crusade: the cotton bale
and the slave sitting on top of it.
David Donald has attempted to define fire-eating motives. Accord-
ing to him, Yancey was typical of rabid proslavery ideologues. They
were unhappy men with severe emotional problems catalyzed by their es-
trangement from the established southern social structure. Though ambi-
tious and hardworking, all failed in the careers normally open to enter-
prising southerners: namely, planting, the law, and politics. Few of
them, Donald asserts, had any large personal stake in the system they
defended. Most looked back with longing to an earlier day when their
26
ancestors, men like themselves, had been leaders in the south. Yancey,
rn
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then, van alienated because he could not find a niche in southern life
commensurate with the elite status of his ancestors. Clearly, Yancey's
life reflects some of the tensions that Donald describes. His grand-
fathers had fought in the Revolutionary War. His mother's father had
helped establish the first ironworks in Georgia. Yancey's own father
was a law-partner of John C. Calhoun and wielded some political influence
in western South Carolina. 27 Yancey tried planting, newspaper publishing,
politics, and the law. But Yancey's "status anxiety" was not unique in
a frontier society in which men relentlessly sought fame and fortune.
Yancey's experiences of adolescence also were of great consequence in
establishing his later conduct. His formative years, spent in the vola-
tile household of a short-tempered mother and a stern stepfather, surely
had an effect on him not recognized by Donald.
When William L. Yancey returned to Montgomery, he found state
Democrats bitterly divided over state and National issues. As the pre-
ceding chapter indicated, the Alabama Democracy was split into two warring
factions. The Hunker segment—national party loyalists— followed the
lead of Senator William R. King and other Democratic regulars residing
in south and north Alabama. The upcountry yeomen provided the numbers,
and loyalists like King contributed the leadership. Jacksonian nationalism
was the hallmark of this faction and they looked to the national Demo-
cratic party for guidance. The upstate Democratic fanners lived in
regions where slavery and the plantation system were relatively weak.
Thus extreme southern rights never flourished in the hill country. These
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party regulars held the power in the state party and controlled federal
patronage and spoils. When the territorial question appeared, their
policy, not always successful, was to avoid fragmentation.
The other clique--"the Chivalry "--was led by Congressman Dixon
Hall Lewis. The center of their activity was Montgomery, located in
the eastern Black Belt, and Mobile. Most members of the "Chivalry" were
devotees of John C. Calhoun, and many of them were natives of South
Carolina. Like the South Carolina nullifier, "they defined southern
rights as the preservation of racial domination at home and slavery's
expansion westward. By the late 1830's, for Calhoun and his followers,
states rights had come to mean southern rights exclusively. Moreover,
similar to Calhoun, many Chivalry men desired to turn the national Demo-
cratic party into a vehicle only for the interests of slavery. In this
respect they supported Calhoun's attempts to convert planter Whigs to
the southern-rights Democratic standard and thus elevate the South Caro-
linian to the Presidency. Most of the Chivalry were men of second-rank
in Alabama politics. Some, like Calhoun, had yeoman origins and became
spokesmen for aristocratic landowners. The vast majority were young
lawyers, minimal slaveholders, and persistent office-seekers who capi-
talized on southern rights in their assault on the Hunker leadership
in the state. Many of these ultras were men of flexible principle who
would shift from extreme to moderate "southernism" depending upon the
public mood.
Not long after his return came Yancey's first act of disloyalty
to the Democratic party. With his resignation as representative in
Washington, the Congressional district was without representation. A
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special run-off election was called for, and both the Whigs and Democrats
nominated candidates. The Democrats under Hunker control selected at-
torney James L. Cottrell, a state senator, from 1838 to 1841; the Whigs
chose Samuel Beman, half brother of William Yancey. Samuel Beman had
left Troy for Alabama because of an unhappy relationship with his father.
He considered himself a pro-slavery Whig and joined the east-central
Whig nullifies, an extreme southern-rights faction In the Alabama Whig
Party. Opportunistic Montgomery Whig managers hoped some of Yancey's
popularity with eastern Black Belt voters would rub off on his half
brother. Yancey campaigned vigorously for Beman, but Cottrell won by
28
a scant thirty-eight votes.
The Democrats took no reprisals against Yancey for his brief
apostacy because they were too preoccupied with other issues, especially
the nominee for Governor in 1847. Party papers from both northern and
southern Alabama expressed a desire to dump the incumbent, Governor Joshua
Martin, because of his success as an independent running against Nathaniel
Terry, the party convention's nominee in 1845. "We go in for a Democratic
State Convention sometime in the spring of 1847," announced the Hunts-
ville Democrat organ of the influential Clay family, "But when the can-
didate is fairly chosen, we will support him. We care not whether he be
from north or south Alabama, we care not whether he may be considered
one of 'the Chivalry' or an 'old Hunker.'" Editor J. Withers Clay in-
sisted upon an open convention controlled by the "People (not a few sel-
fish deraogugues), " and he referred to Martin as one of those "disappointed
29politicians who would sacrifice their party to elevate themselves...."
From central Alabama came a call for party unity by "extinguishing finally
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and forever, this Martin and Terry feud by selecting a candidate, one
not closely identified with it."30 Black Belt Democrats expressed dis-
may at the control exerted by upstate "hunkers" over the party. Crawford
Jackson, a planter- lawyer from Autauga County (which he represented in
the state legislature), queried, "Who must beat Martin? We [south
Alabama] have yielded to north Alabama once... are we now under any obli-
gation to give them the candidate again, when we have so many worthys
31
...in the South?" "it is an extraordinary fact," grumbled Thaddeus
Sanford, "that with a majority .. .and a triumphant accomplishment of all
our great measures, we are torn into gragments and seriously threatened
to be fragmented by a want of confidence and trust in each other or in
32the powers that be " Alabama's majority party then was still trying
to mend its wounds from the 1845 campaign debacle at the time that the
dispute over territorial expansion increased in bitterness.
It was the Texas question that led to the impending territorial
imbroglio. Opposition to annexation appeared at once, especially in
the north. It was based on an objection to the extension of slavery
westward. Many northerners complained that the economically backward,
feudalistic south dominated the national government. Southern votes
had hindered the nation's economic growth, and an increasing number of
northerners wanted to keep the territories of the south-west and far-
west free for white labor. Thus, the growing popularity of restrict ionism
had intensified northern criticism of slc-V^ry. Consequently, many slave-
holders were outraged at the growing opinion in the north that southern
"property" be excluded from the national territory. Ironically, certain
southern Democrats and Whigs also opposed Texas inclusion because they
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knew what the slavery issue would do to national party unity. Likewise,
some Whig planters believed that excessive southern agitation of the
territorial question could ultimately cause the creation of a monolithic
northern party dedicated to the destruction of slavery in the south.
In view of this feeling, immediate annexation was not attempted, and
Presidents Van Buren and Harrison avoided the explosive issue. However,
a complete reversal of policy came about when Abel P. Upshur replaced
Daniel Webster as Secretary of State in the Tyler Administration. Pro-
slavery expansionism became the driving force of the State Department
and John Tyler's replacement, Tennessian James K. Polk, was a determined
expansionist
.
Even before 1846 Alabama favored slavery expansion. To many in
both parties, Texas seemed indispensable for maintaining the balance
of political power between the free and slave states. For example, the
Southern Advocate, a strong Whig paper, asked: "Would there be more danger
to the Union by remaining as we are, the South to become at no distant
day a prey to the iron and steady encroachments of Northern bigotry and
fanaticism, or by adding to our territory to secure ourselves such a
balance of power as will teach moderation to our persecutors and disarm
a false philanthropy of its incendiary effects?" The Democratic Jack-
sonville Republican claimed that "if Texas were annexed to the Union,
the wealth, the power, the respectability and the glory of our country
and her free institutions would be greatly increased ... .The South would
acquire the strength to put their domestic institutions beyond the reach
33
of all assailments . " Secessionist talk was expressed during the Texas
debates. Ultras demanded annexation as a sine qua non of the south's
102
remaining in the Union. Lawrence County residents resolved in a meeting
that "the possession of Texas is infinitely more important to us of this
section of the Union than a longer connection and friendship with the
Northern states...." But in neighboring Franklin County a gathering
of the Henry Clay Association, while favoring annexation concluded "that
the sentiment 'Texas or Disunion' is revolutionary in its tendency, and
destructive of the principles of our government"; and it decried such
34
sentiment
.
David Wilmot introduced his proviso in August 1846. The resolu-
tion passed the House but was rejected by the Senate. The Wilmot Proviso
served notice on the south that northerners intended to halt the spread
of slavery; southerners regarded it as an attack on slavery itself.
The Proviso's doctrine was reintroduced in Congress whenever the terri-
torial question emerged. In 1849, for example, the House voted to or-
ganize the territories of New Mexico and California on the Wilmot basis;
and again the Senate prevented slavery restriction from becoming law.
Alabama newspapers were so filled with news of the Mexican War
that they gave the Wilmot Proviso scant notice. When the press finally
turned its attention to the Proviso, it responded in moderate tones.
"The Wilmot Proviso is an amendment struck by the Northern democracy
at the South," asserted a Whig paper, "a blow from the hands of those
who were said to be her 'natural allies' upon whom she could rely for
assistance and protection." The editorial predicted eventual defeat of
the measure."
5
"* North Alabama's weighty Huntsville Democrat recommended
a return to the "spirit of compromise between north and south." Editor
J. W. Clay requested that both sections recognize "a fundamental difference
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between their social organizations, which is acknowledged by the federal
constitution, so neither of these societies ought to claim wholly to
exclude the other by Federal legis lat ion ... from a common acquisition
gained by common sacrifice and burden."36
But feelings hardened by the end of September. A group of ultras
in Russelville, Franklin County, denounced the Proviso. Their meeting
was of consequence in that one of its key resolves became part of the
1848 "Alabama Platform." (Although the Alabama Platform has been attri-
buted to William L. Yancey, neither he nor his collaborators ever acknow-
ledged their debt to the Russelville ultras.) This resolution made can-
didacy for high office such as the presidency, contingent on a pledge
to uphold southern rights. Failing to take the pledge would deprive
the candidate of southern support and votes. 37 Of further significance
was the composition of the Russelville resolution committee: The chair-
man, George W. Lane, later became conspicuous as an uncompromising Unionist,
while two members of the group, David Hubbard and Leroy Pope Walker,
led the north Alabama southern-rights radicals in the late 1850*s.
38
The Russelville meeting had political as well as historical import.
It took place in the fifth congressional district and was directed against
the anti-Calhounite representative of that district, George S. Houston.
Sectional agitation, then, became a device to question Houston's "southern-
ism." To be sure, Houston had voted against the Proviso while in Congress,
but he consistently rejected the leadership of Calhoun and his followers.
Hubbard and L. P. Walker were notorious Calhounites, and the former also
had a reputation as a "sly political opportunist." Beaten by Houston
in 1845, Hubbard raised the Proviso issue in preparation for another
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try at Houston's seat in 1847. 39 Almost from its inception, therefore,
the territorial question became another scheme for ambitious politicians.
Houston, meanwhile, seriously considered elevating his sights by running
for the governorship or for the United States Senate.
In the early spring of 1847 both parties prepared for the forth-
corning local elections. At stake were local legislative and federal
congressional seats, the governorship, and both senatorial posts. Be-
cause the electoral power of Alabama Whigs was in the densely populated
slave counties of central Alabama, they were crippled by the "white basis"
which had destroyed the foundation of their control. Consequently, the
Whigs were divided over running a gubernatorial candidate. "The elec-
tion of a Whig Governor is clearly impossible at present," claimed the
Eutaw Whig
.
But other Whig papers, calling for a convention, maintained
that Democratic factionalism could mean a Whig victory. An east-central
Alabama journal recommended that Whigs reject a convention "and let the
Democrats have the field to themselves. They claim to be 'Harmonious'
and we long for the Music to while away the dullness of summer. The
Whigs did not hold a convention but in the late spring announced (dis-
trict by district) support for Nicholas Davis, a planter- lawyer from
41
north Alabama, for Governor.
As Whigs made preparations for the summer canvass, the Democrats
planned to meet in Montgomery in May to select their gubenatorial nominee.
A party majority had decided not to endorse Governor Joshua Martin.
In 1845, he ran on a Bank reform platform against the convention's choice-
Nathaniel Terry, a pro-Bank candidate. Most delegates expected a titanic
struggle between the two major cliques: the "Chivalry"--the Calhounites
led by Dixon Hall Lewis--and the "Hunkers "--national Democratic Party
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loyalists led by William R. King. The "Chivalry" by the mid-1840« s had
broadened its base. These ultra "southernists, " operating out of Mont-
gomery, now included John A. Campbell, Joseph Lesesne, and Percy Walker,
all "new Men" from Mobile. 42 Many of these Calhounites were interested
in furthering their careers. They were young lawyers, and becoming part
of a factional movement could provide a means of political advancement.
Moreover, knowing John C. Calhoun and Dixon Hall Lewis was politically
useful.
On May 3, 1847, these two factions came together in Montgomery
to choose a gubernatorial candidate and respond to the slavery restric-
tionists. The "Chivalry" wanted to take an unequivocal position against
Wilmot, but they knew that in order to get their way some fence-mending
was required. Moreover, Senator Lewis's sights were fixed on the Decem-
ber 1847 General Assembly nomination for United States Senator and any
trading in May could improve his chances later.
"Chivalry" tactics became apparent at the opening session when
James Belser of Montgomery introduced a resolution calling for the no-
mination of William R. King as the presiding officer of the convention.
King was elected by acclamation. The "Chivalry" had purposed selected
King, hoping to placate the "Hunkers," but a majority of the latter felt
obligated to their 1845 gubernatorial choice of Nathaniel Terry. Then
William L. Yancey, acting for the "Chivalry," proposed Reuben Chapman
43 i
of Marshall county as the gubernatorial candidate. Despite the Hunkers
44
attempts, Chapman won after nineteen ballots. The convention turned
next to the territorial issue. Yancey helped write the resolutions which
demanded that all Democrats withhold their vote from any presidential
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candidate "who shall not, previous to the election [1848] distinctly,
unequivocally, and publicly avow his opposition to federal interfere,
with the question of slavery in the territories." Opposition to mea-
sures like the Wiltnot Proviso, the resolve further declared, was the
duty of every slaveholding state. The delegates also approved the "ad-
vanced position" set forth in the Russelville meeting of the previous
September. All these items received unanimous endorsement. 45 After
adjournment and even before the Democrats returned home, opposition to
the party's gubernatorial selection developed.
Governor Joshua Martin, who did not attend the convention, declared
that "in order to secure my defeat a convention is attempted to be re-
sorted to, although uncalled for... by the people." Martin said two-thirds
of the county representatives were not there and threatened to run again
--"once more against the 'King Caucus* nominee." But, by 1847 Martin
had become a victim of the "new harmony" between the party factions,
and so he lost most if not all the renegade, south-Alabama support he
had commanded in 1845.
Party harmony, however, faded within a month. It fractured on
the issue of whether the Democratic 1848 presidential aspirant would be
acceptable to the "Chivalry." Martin Van Buren, frequently mentioned
as the Democratic candidate, was still supported by Alabama Senator A.
P. Bagby. Among most of the contenders for the 1848 Democratic presi-
dential nomination there was a desire to eive the Wilmot Proviso the
"go by." All the Democratic hopefuls, except Van Buren and Calhoun,
wanted to neutralize the slavery issue. However, hostility to the ex-
tension of slavery into the territories was widespread among northern
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Democrats in 1847. New Yorker Van Buren, for example, was disqualified
from running because Democrats from his state took a rigid pro-Wilmot
Proviso stand. To Alabamians most of the Democratic party hopefuls--
James Buchanan, Lewis Cass, and Levi Woodbury-
-seemed too uncertain on
slavery.
Congressman Franklin Bowden from the Fourth District assessed
the chances of some of the Democrats mentioned and also examined the
perennial Whig challenger Henry Clay. The Whig party in 1847 was splin-
tered into an anti-slavery conscience wing and a southern cotton faction.
The leaders of the Party sought a man with no political record or poli-
tical views on the territorial question. Democrat Bowden claimed that
Henry Clay "is against Polk, against the War, against territory, against
further extension of slavery and for anything and everything that by
any manner of means may lift him into the Presidential seat. But I think
he will .. .stagger and fall as he did in 1844. Mr. Van Buren...on the
slavery question is rather too mum. His political days are numbered."
Bowden predicted the forthcoming storm by noting "the young democracy
(the ferraentors of the masses) [the Chivalry] will want a younger and
more racey leader--either Woodbury, Dallas or Buchanan." He did not
47
object to any of them if they were "right on the slavery question."
By June some Alabama Calhounites began flirting with the idea
of endorsing Zachary Taylor. A nonpartisan meeting for him was held
in Mobile. Resolutions applauding Taylor as the people's candidate for
the presidency were passed unanimously amid "thunders of approval."
John A. Campbell of the "Chivalry" addressed the delegates and denounced
party loyalty. He called on the people to take the matter of electing
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their rulers into their own hands. "No man can view the present con-
dition of relations between the northern and southern states without
apprehension for the safety of our government." Admitting that he knew
nothing of Taylor's opinions on expansion, Campbell, nonetheless, sum-
moned Alabamians to support him for the Presidency as a means of suppres-
sing the sectional conflict. Taylor, Campbell emphasized, was a southerner,
a planter, and a war hero, three positive qualities. 48
Like Campbell, Yancey showed party disloyalty by speaking at a
pro-Taylor gathering outside Montgomery in the following month. He con-
demned "this foul spell of party which.
. .binds and divides and distracts
the South." He asked, "Who could lead the South out of Party loyalism?
If he shall be, as I fondly hope, Zachary Taylor, honored be his name!"49
In the spring of 1847, Dixon Hall Lewis parted with Calhoun on the Mexi-
can War and soon toyed with the possibility of supporting Taylor. Writing
to Balie Peyton, former Tennessee Congressman and friend of Taylor, "in
regard to certain questions in which the States-Rights party [has] a
deep interest," he expressed a hope that Taylor would take a public stand
against the Wilmot Proviso. Peyton replied evasively. Lewis was dismayed,
and when news of his Taylorism leaked out, he publicly criticized Taylor."^
Taylor and slavery in the territories obviously played a signifi-
cant role in the gubernatorial campaign. Whig managers tried to use
Taylor and the Proviso to exploit the hostilities of the "Chivalry" toward
the "Hunkers." They believed that the Democratic ultras could be lured
into Taylor's camp. Whig gubernatorial candidate Nicholas Davis came
out for Taylor, and accused Reuben Chapman, his Democratic opponent, of
being anti-Taylor. In fact, during his Congressional tenure, Chapman
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had voted to uphold Polk in his clash with Zachary Taylor and Winfield
Scott. Davis equated support of Taylor with southern loyalty, stress-
ing Taylor's Louisiana background and his ownership of slaves. But Taylor
was publicly silent, not even declaring party preference, which caused
one upstate Democratic party regular to proclaim "I am not one of the
number willing to vote for old Taylor without knowing anything of his
principles/ 1 He praised Taylor's generalship, "but I am not disposed
...to make him President without at least knowledge of the principles
which would control his administration...."52
During the campaign, a new extreme southern-rights clique made
its appearance in the eastern Black Belt. It held an initial, non-
partisan, meeting on June 19, 1847. Thus was born the "Eufaula Regency"
of Barbour County. Those who attended later became some of Alabama's
most consistent southern-rights agitators. They passed a series of re-
solves urging presidential candidates of both parties to uphold slave-
53holders' rights in the territories.
Meanwhile, two bitter congressional battles were taking place in
the upcountry as election day August 2 approached. Calhoun Democrats
and southern rights in the territories were involved in each. In the
highland fifth district, ultra David Hubbard contested Hunker incumbant
George Houston. Because Houston's district was an area of few slaves
and subsistance forming, Union sentiment tended to predominate. Hubbard
demanded an explanation for Houston's vote to exclude slavery from Oregc^.
At the time of the 1845 Oregon vote all of Alabama's Congressmen, in-
cluding William L. Yancey, voted to restrict slavery in Oregon along
lines specified by the Missouri Compromise. In point of fact, in 1845,
110
before the territorial dispute became central, Robert Barnwell Rhett,
Yancey, and Houston had voted for a bill which would have organized
Oregon without slavery and without the 36-30 principle. 54 Unlike other
southerners, Houston-representing the views of his yeomen constituency
-voted for a more flexible public land policy. His support of cheap
land and his nationalist policies won substantial acclaim in his dis-
trict. Thus Hubbard was not able to gain enough votes with allegations
of Houston's deficient "southernism.
"
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In the other Congressional race in the upcountry seventh district,
"Hunker" Williamson R. W. Cobb defeated a Calhounite. One of the few
Alabama politicians who forthrightly used class appeals in his campaigns,
Cobb would open his speeches with a song, "Uncle Sam is rich enough to
give us all a farm." He attacked the "Planter Aristocracy" and promised
to introduce a bill which would secure indigent whites from foreclosures
for debt. Understandably, given his district's yeomen and low slave con-
centration composition, his adversary's attempts to raise the slavery
—
southern-rights issue did not carry comparable appeal. 5^
The Democrats took the five Congressional districts in north and
west-central Alabama, and the Whigs took the Montgomery and Mobile dis-
tricts of east -central and south Alabama. Two of those who were among
the Democrats elected—Sampson W. Harris from the slave dense Black Belt
third district and Samual W. Inge of the plantation fourth district which
overlapped the Black Belt—stumped as radical southern nationalists.
Reuben Chapman defeated Whig Nicholas Davis by a wide margin for
the governorship. Moreover, the Democrats carried the state senate and
the lower House by a plurality of thirty seats.
57
During the fall and
Ill
winter session of the legislature preparations were made for the sena-
torial elections. Rut the questions as to who would he the Democratic
1848 presidential nominee still caused factional disputes.
Governor-elect Chapman privately confessed his willingness to
support Taylor if "his principles were sound."58 in so declaring Chap-
man voiced the feeling of many Democrats in Alabama and across the south.
They would vote for a Whig if he was sound on slavery. Chivalry members,
for example, lamented party loyalty and talked of fracturing the national
59parties for thwarting southern unity. "The South has no hope in any
DiiTly.' • • t
U one ultra pronounced. "The sooner our people learn this, the
sooner they will find themselves standing on firm ground." ° In November
A nonpartisan gathering convened in Montgomery for the purpose of con-
structing a Taylor electoral ticket. Both William L. Yancey and Whig
Congressman Henry Milliard sat on the platform. Taylor, Hilliard de-
clared, "is the only southern man who could be elected" and, he predicted
Taylor would run as a Whig/1 *
By mid-November all attention focused on the upcoming Senate elec-
tion. One Democratic party paper alleged "a conspiracy between Whigs and
a portion of the democracy, for the immediate benefit of one of the pre-
sent candidates, and for the ultimate purpose of securing a Whig Senator
in 1849"; and Dixon Hall Lewis was singled out as the "wire puller."
The plot, claimed the editor, was concocted by the Whigs only to sow
"distrust, dissatisfaction, dissension, division among democrats....
This is the sum total of Whig tactics in this state, here is the maxim--
"We cannot beat the democrats in solid phalanx, let us undermine their
confidence in their best leaders, and we beat them in detail. More
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charges appeared as the legislative caucus approached. Yancey was accused,
by a Whig editor, of hypocrisy for denouncing party conventions when he
resigned his Congressional seat but "we still see him drawing kindly
in the administration harness. Nay, he and other gentlemen of the Lewis
clique were prominant in saddling us with Governor Chapman." The editor
predicted that Lewis would be re-elected for six years. He stated that
Lewis had gained favors by his alliance with the Polk administration:
"observe the number of offices [federal jobs] held now by the Lewis con-
nexion [sic] in this State... can anyone give the exact amount of public
money that has gone into their pockets recently? Hadn't we better give
6 3them titles and pensions at once?"
Stories persisted that Lewis and his bloc had "arranged things"
with the Whigs. A Hunker correspondent said, "I was told that the friends
of Mr. Lewis had, intimated that they would not object to seeing the
Hon. Arthur F. Hopkins [a Whig candidate for Senator] the colleague of
Mr. Lewis..." in 1849 when the other Senate seat would be vacant. The
highlander concluded by saying "For myself I have not for a moment since
64doubted the intended treachery of the Whigs, or the Chivalry Democrats."
Many of the party regulars were hostile to Lewis because of his
"confounded disloyalty"; that is, his suspected "Taylorism" and machina-
tions with the Whigs. They turned to their leader, former Senator William
R. King to oppose Lewis. Lewis had originally been appointed to King's
Senate seat when King accepted a ministerial position to France. In 1847
King returned and wanted his "old job" back. William Bibb Figures, an
"old school Whig" and editor of the Southern Advocate, shrewdly assessed
the operations of the fragmented Democrats on election eve. Within the
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State, he observed, were cliques composed of "prominent, ambitious, and
office-loving men, who have banded themselves together for mutual aid
and assistance. They divide offices among themselves and then strive
for the common cause—assist each other and oppose all intruders or
poachers upon what they conceive to be their private and exclusive right
Look for instance at the list of the clique of the Lewis 'family'
who have been quartered upon the State by means of a combination to se-
cure office.
Dixon Hall Lewis confronted an enormous task in his quest for
re-election. King had the backing of upstate Hunker Democrats and, one
source contended, he "is the choice of three fourths of the democracy
of the State."
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Both candidates also faced a third contender, Whig
strategist Arthur F. Hopkins. Some weeks before the election, Lewis,
in a new maneuver, asked his supporters to follow national Democratic
party policy. One upcountry Hunker, seeing deceit in this latest tactic,
observed
:
I have fears of the result of the Senatorial
election now pending between Mr. Lewis and Col.
King. Many of the Calhoun men (Mr. John A.
Campbell for instance) who. . .repudiated all
party ties are now trying to cousin our plain
members (at the request of Mr. Lewis) into the
support of Lewis--they say now our party--our
cause--our administration—when they care no-
thing for us and our cause and are as much sold
to John C. Calhoun as ever a sorcerer was to the
devil.... The most strenuous efforts are now being
made by the Chivalry to break down our democratic
standard....! am afraid we are too late to save
Col. King. 67
"The election for United States Senator is creating a vast deal of excite-
ment. Col. King, Mr. Lewis... are here [Montgomery] making desperate
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efforts/' reported one onlooker, "what the result will be time can only
tell." A Montgomery eyewitness observed "unless there be concessions of
some kind, a wider breach will be created ... the knowing ones seem to
think King will be elected with ease."68 Lewis led after one day of
balloting but could not achieve a majority. T. B. Cooper, a Whig legis-
lator, describes the factional manipulations:
The King men stand at twenty five to twenty seven
in number and will not yield, the Whigs vote for
Hopkins and while this state of things goes on an
election will never be made; both [cliques] want
the Whig votes, the King men bid high for it, one
proposition was to elect Hopkins if the Whigs would
help elect Bagby [Senator whose term expired in
1849] and let King withdraw—that trade could not
be effected some of the Whigs would not vote for
Hopkins. McClung [a Whig] is figuring to be made
Senator in Bagby 's place and holds to the Lewis
faction, the feeling is getting pretty high, every
other election is lost sight of, and somebody is
going to be sacrificed in this race, it may be me,
God only knows, the friends of King bid high for
help--but the Chivalry is the strongest clique here,
Lewis and King are both here, the wires are contin-
ually moving.... If the Whigs and Hunkers unite I do
not know what will be the result. ^9
While reported deals were whispered about, Hunker Thaddeus Sanford spread
tumors that Polk himself favored King. ^ And party regulars prepared a
questionnaire asking if all Democrats endorsed the Administration's war
program, favored Calhoun for the Presidency, and pledged themselves in
advance to support the nominees of the Democratic national convention
to be held in the spring of 1848.^
Now under pressure, Lewis came to an agreement with the Hunkers.
He publicly rejected his mentor John C. Calhoun for the Presidency, pledg-
ing to back the Democratic party nominee for President in 1848. He even
promised to endorse a northern Democrat. Actually Lewis' agreement to
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support a northerner was not spontaneous, since he had already considered
backing Federal Supreme Court Justice Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire.
Woodbury, a northerner with "southern principles," had privately made
known his opposition to the Wilmot Proviso. Lewis also promised to
uphold Polk's war policies regardless of Calhoun's position. 72 Such
measures brought nomination to Lewis, as he defeated King for the Senate
post
.
Hunkers were elated with the bargain. T,We have a precious docu-
ment on file from the pen of our friend Dick," [Dixon Hall Lewis] exclaimed
73James E. Saunders. Another humorously confided that "a certain dis-
tinguished Senator of enormous propostions has agreed to a position perhaps
a little thorny to himself."74 Displeasure in the ranks of the Chivalry
soon became evident. "Mr. Lewis...has made pledges which will greatly
embarrass him and estrange his friends in this section," John A. Campbell
wrote to Calhoun: "He pledged himself, I learn, to abide a National con-
vention for the selection of a candidate preferring a northern man."75
Campbell later complained of highland Alabama's political power which
forced south Alabama to "perpetual surrender." 7^ Yancey also adopted
Lewis' compromising stratagem, and also like Lewis, Yancey appeared to
be over his "Taylor fever." He claimed to be disillusioned by Whig guile
--using Taylor as a standard bearer to attract Democratic support for
the Whig party. Yancey's anti-Whig stand hardened when he discovered
that Whig Congressmen Henry Hilliard and John Gayle, who ran on a "no-
party" platform in 1847, helped elect Robert C. Winthrop, a Massachusetts
Whig of "abolitionist sympathies," as speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives. 77
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In December 1847, while speculation persisted as to who would
be the Democratic presidential candidate, the Alabama General Assembly
debated a series of resolutions introduced by Calhounite Percy Walker
of Mobile. These resolutions maintained Alabama's slavery rights in
the territories and her unwillingness to vote for any candidate from
any party who would not uphold those rights. During the debates Tusca-
loosa Whig Robert Jemison offered an amendment that Alabama not act with
delegates in any caucus or convention to elevate any President or Vice-
President, unless the delegates took an oath to uphold noninterference
with slavery in the territories and to use their influence to get com-
pliance on this principle from their respective state legislatures as
veil as from Congress. This amendment passed both Houses in February
1848. 78
Meanwhile, Democratic leaders met in Montgomery on January 3.
Yancey introduced several propositions which sought to heal the wounds
opened by the senatorial clash of December and to lay the groundwork
for the February 14 state Democratic nominating convention. This con-
vention would choose delegates to the national Democratic Convention
meeting in Baltimore to select a presidential ticket.
The list of Democratic hopefuls being considered at the Conven-
tion was long, and included both a vice-President and former President.
Van Buren, who had served as President from 1836-1840, was in disfavor
with party regulars from his own state because of their adherence to
the Wilmot Proviso. George Dallas, from Pennsylvania and vice-President
under Polk, was vying with James Buchanan, also from Pennsylvania and
Secretary of State in Polk's cabinet. Lewis Cass, Senator from Michigan
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who had been extreme in demanding the Oregon territory, also sought the
Presidency. The favorite of the Lewis-Yancey
.'chivalry., faction in Ala-
bama was Levi Woodbury. Woodbury had been a Senator from New Hampshire
before Polk appointed him to the Supreme Court in 1848.
Yancey's main address at the Convention praised Polk's Adminis-
tration, "our democratic allies of the north," George Dallas, and James
Buchanan. "There is no reason why Democrats should abandon their party
organization, but on the contrary as strong a Reason as ever they should
abide by the time honored usages of party," Yancey declared. Ke denounced
the Wilruot Proviso and urged "all Southerners to oppose it at all haz-
ards and the last extremity." The delegates, in the same spirit, agreed
not to support any candidate who would not, "previous to the election
distinctly, unequivocally, and publicly avow his opposition" to the Wil-
79
mot Proviso.
Yancey's role as peacemaker had an ulterior purpose. He was trying,
with Lewis' approval, to build southern support for Levi Woodbury. He
and Lewis corresponded with Woodbury, in an effort to get him to publicly
oppose the Wilmot Proviso. Woodbury, of course, confronted a northern
constituency who deemed slavery restriction fundamental to their interests.
Thus, Justice Woodbury was extremely circumspect in making public pro-
nouncements on the territorial issue.
Referring to the Alabama Chivalry Calhoun could only lament what
seemed to be the "defection of the southern rights faction in and about
Montgomery." His depression deepened when he noted a favorite student,
Dixon Hall Lewis, led the betrayal which 'Tias been the cause of much
grief to me. I had hoped... our friends at Mobile and Montgomery would
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ultimately p!ace our principles and policy in the ascendancy in the State.
Calhoon believed that Lewis "appears ashamed of his course, as he ought
to be; but I do not see how he can ever disentangle himself from his
new association or how he can ever recover the confidence of those he
has forsaken."80 The o!d "nullifier" had no knowiedge of the new scheme
--the Woodbury move-or of the resourceful Lewis-Yancey combination.
Although Calhoun had been their ideological mentor, both Alabamians were
bypassing him in their attempt to play "kingmaker" within the Democratic
pai-ty.
The brief lull between the factional storms would end on the eve
of February 14 with news of the free soil position taken by many northern
Democrats. Buchanan and Cass, John Campbell claimed, had gone over to
restriction of slavery in the territories. Percy Walker informed Ala-
bamians that New York's Hunkers adopted a resolution declaring slaves
would be prevented from going into the territories both by local law
and by geographical conditions which were not conducive to slavery. 81
However, Alabama Hunkers still favored Buchanan owing to his public state-
ment against the Wilmot Proviso and his long friendship with William
CO
R. King whom party men wanted to make Vice President. The position
of Lewis, Yancey, and Campbell by now had matured. They were determined
to get an Alabama delegation elected that was committed to nomination of
Justice Woodbury.
The Democratic state convention got under way on February 14.
Immediately a struggle ensued. "By a trick at the outset," James E.
Saunders reported, "we [the Hunkers] lost the inside track. The arrange-
ment amongst our fr iends . . .was to make [Nathaniel Terry] chairman which
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vould have secured the nomination of electors and delegates of the purest
water!" By a clever parliamentary tactic the Chivalry defeated Terry,
replacing him with one of their own. But the Party faithful-the
"Hunkers"
-won on two issues: Most of the delegates would be selected by Con-
gressional districts rather than by the convention itself (despite some
grumbling from the "Chivalry")and William R, King was unanimously recom-
mended for the Vice Presidency. 83
The delegates next turned to the platform, and the instructions
to those it would send to the Baltimore Convention. Despite the reluc-
tance of some party loyalists, they accepted Senator Bagby's suggestion
that Alabama Democrats not support anyone who was for the Proviso. 84
While the delegates debated, the Montgomery-Mobile ultras were
preparing a coup. Yancey and Campbell collaborated in putting together
a series of six resolutions, "The Alabama Platform." It demanded that
slavery be positively and legally guaranteed either by a statement in
the forthcoming Mexican treaty or by Congressional fiat. 85 Two planks
pledged Alabama's delegation to the Baltimore Convention not to support
for the "pffices of President and Vice President" anyone who was in favor
of excluding slavery from the territories. The concluding resolution
called upon the convention to accept the Platform "as instructions to
our delegates to the Baltimore Convention...." But there was no reso-
lution passed demanding that the delegates bolt the Baltimore Convention
if the "Alabama Platform" was rejected.
Yancey introduced these resolutions to the state Convention at
an opportune time—at a late hour, just before the Convention adjourned,
while many representatives slumbered and others were out for a "scent
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of air." He also claimed to have a letter from Levi Woodbury (given
to him by Dixon Hall Lewis), excerpts of which seemed to sustain the
principles of the "Alabama Platform." The Woodbury letter gave the
Chivalry a mechanism to discredit Buchanan, Dallas, and Cass. Only
Buchanan had spoken out on the territorial question recommending the
extension of the 36-30 line to the Pacific. 87
The weary Democrats, a majority of whom were mesmerized by Yancey's
oratorical flourish, unanimously endorsed the Alabama Platform. Party
regulars accepted it because they desired the continued backing of the
Chivalry in order to get King nominated as Vice President. Many Hunkers
felt that it was "nothing more than an expansion of opposition to the
Wilmot Proviso and a declaration against General Cass and Mr. Dallas."88
But another eyewitness to the events saw a more diabolical intent. "I
have now talked with Yancey about the resolutions"; Governor Reuben
Chapman suggested that Yancey was attempting to take over the party
leadership: "His object was no doubt to instruct our delegation (in
effect) to vote for Woodbury but in that he did much more .. .mischief
than that. The resolutions must help him [Yancey]." Chapman, moreover,
found that the resolutions on Congressional authority over slavery in
the territories were contradictory. An upstate Democrat knew a cabal
was being hatched: "I am of the opinion that the Calhounites are deter-
mined to rule the State and let nothing be done that does not stop them."89
A Whig, H. B. Jones, saw clearly the conflicting constitutional prin-
ciples of the Alabama Platform: "You will discern in their resolutions
a beautiful 'consistency' in one they declare that Congress has no
authority whatever over the subject of slavery in the territories."
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On the other hand, they insisted that because Congress had treating
powers it could devise a slave code for the territories. "Wouldn't that
be a valuable clause if they have no authority whatsoever in the matter?"90
Hunker James Saunders, after giving the resolutions a close reading,
doubted "whether Mr. Yancey himself would now insist upon the South pur-
suing the suicidal course of writing resolutions. Were I a member of
the Senate or the House I should disregard them as fatal to policy or
91principle."
A sober account of the state Convention came from Felix Grundy
Norman, a party regular, who insisted, "the resolutions are all things
to all people..." and Yancey "has unwittingly sanctioned a principle
he does not believe correct and one he never dreamed of advocating."
Norman said the whole design "was to shut the door against Buchanan,
Dallas, and Cass" thus boosting the Presidential ambitions of Levi Wood-
bury. Of all the presidential contenders, Woodbury came closest to Cal-
houn. "The convention was strongly scented with Calhoun vagaries which
accounted for the Woodbury groundswell. If Woodbury and his adherents
are successful his administration would contain ... that peculiar clap
Of political non-descripts, [who] hope to foist themselves into office.
In fact, with Woodbury in office the Calhounites hope to play the part
Clay had played in 1841 before Harrison's death "The power behind the
thrown, greater than the thrown itself." Norman concluded by emphasizing
that "nobody in Alabama does believe or will admit" the federal govern-
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tnent's "authority over slavery." Clearly, Yancey was using the "Ala-
bama Platform" as a device not only to play "kingmaker" in the national
Democratic party but also harness the Alabama Democracy to his design.
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Id
in all this it is difficult to discern what role Dixon Hall Levis wou
Play. Except for giving Yancey the alleged Woodbury letter which he
read at the State convention, Lewis was typically silent. Although the
Senator was pro-Woodbury, it was not clear at that time whether or not
he would take a back seat to Yancey.
Yancey claimed sole authorship of the "Alabama Platform." But
those close to the Convention attributed it to "a slippery politician
93
of Mobile."
«1 wrote the resolutions offered by Mr. Yancey to the
Montgomery Convention," disclosed John A. Campbell. He then pointed
out that Congress did have the authority to prevent slavery from the
territories. He told Calhoun that the Northwest Ordinace of 1787, the
Missouri Compromise of 1819, and the admission of Texas with slavery
restricted above 36-30 offered enough constitutional precedent. The
Constitution, Campbell also asserted, did not specify that slaveholders
were to be shielded in the territories. 94 Campbell never made public
his position on the legality of the "Alabama Platform." Later, when a
member of the Supreme Court, he would use it as the basis of his Dred
Scott brief. How does one account for such intentional deception? A
recent analysis finds the answer outside the framework of legal theory:
Sheer ambition guided him. In 1848 Campbell's sights were on the Supreme
Court. He needed support from southern senators for the appointment,
95
and his course was obvious.
Speculation among Democrats centered on how Zachary Taylor would
react to the issue of slavery expansion. "General Taylor is popular,"
a north Alabama Democrat noted, "but all parties seem to be some-what
uncertain as to his real sentiments touching the great questions....
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If he can get a no-part^ nomination he will be very hard to beat."96
Before the warring Democrats left for their convention, a further
issue divided them. Senator A. P. Bagby, a south Alabamian, announced
his retirement to accept a foreign mission; and many highland Democrats
argued that the vacancy belonged to them. However, party men in the
hill country suspected that Governor Reuben Chapman had been co-opted
by the Montgomery Chivalry. Chapman tried to avoid a confrontation by
appointing Hunker manager William Refus King to Bagby's seat. King,
Chapman surmised, would be acceptable to north Alabama, and south Ala-
bama could not complain because King resided there.
But the choice of King produced more distrust. Some Democrats
believed that King had made a deal with the Chivalry which obligated him
to them. Others believed that Governor Chapman needed the approval of
the Montgomery clique before selecting King. 97 All this was conjecture.
Obviously King's selection did nothing for party harmony. Baltimore
would fragment it further.
Yancey still could not get a public commitment from Woodbury on
his position on slavery extension. He had talked freely--at the time
that the Alabama delegation arrived in Washington (on May 19)--of having
& letter confirming Woodbury's support of the "Alabama Platform." One
delegate disclosed that he would only reveal it to those who pledged to
keep the contents confidential. Other Alabama delegates said that Yancey
had no letter, that it was just a ruse. a. Solomon, an extreme southern-
rights advocate, affirmed reading the Woodbury letter and found it un-
acceptable. The delegates caucused upon arriving in Baltimore: nine
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voted for Buchanan and six, led by Yancey, for Woodbury.
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In the Convention Cass and popular sovereignty triumphed over-
whelmingly, but Yancey tried to get the Convention to veto
..local con-
trol" over slave extension with a minority resolution to the party plat-
form. Yancey urged the delegates to sustain southern rights in the ter-
ritories; otherwise, he declared he would not work for the ticket. His
minority report was buried by a 216 to thirty-six vote. Then, obeying
what he conceived as the dictates of the "Alabama Platform," Yancey bolted
--but only one Alabama delegate followed."
Yancey stopped in Charleston, South Carolina, on his way home
and delivered a bitter indictment of the southern delegates at Baltimore.
He called upon "Southrons" to construct an independent movement built
upon the principles of the "Alabama Platform." Summoning them to meet
in convention and select a southern President and Vice President, he
then qualified this most extreme suggestion by noting that it might still
be premature. After his address, the Charlestonians passed a resolution
denouncing Cass and popular sovereignty. 100
Even before Yancey returned to Montgomery, he came under fire.
Party loyalist A. C. Mathews had only scorn for Yancey's "non sensical
resolutions," which made a "John Donkey" of him. "He was trying to make
himself conspicuous by his gabbing A few more conventions for him to
figure in, will make him so ridiculous as to render him perfectly harm-
i ,,101 „less. One Montgomery party paper castigated fellow Democrats for
not stopping Yancey at the state Convention in February. "Yancey can
always insist that he was obeying the instructions of the Convention
thus giving him his only vantage ground in defending his course at the
Baltimore Convention." Nevertheless, it "only remains now to sing
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Yancey's requiem and write his epitaph." 102 A large Montg0mery raUy
for Cass and Butler denounced Yancey's
"anti-democratic, antagonistic"
103
activities.
Yancey spoke before a Democratic gathering in Montgomery on June
19, 1843. He condemned the Alabama delegation for violating their commit
ment to the "Alabama Platform" and disregarding southern interests.
Furthermore, he added, "popular sovereignty is [a] more objectionable
form of the free-soil doctrine than the Proviso itself, since it gave
the 'Mexican negroes' presently living in the territories the right to
decide the slavery question." Concluding, he proclaimed his loyalty
to the Alabama delegation's instructions and, therefore, he could not
"support General Cass for the Presidency." 104 Yancey's listeners did
not endorse his bolt at the Convention. However, the next evening, Mont-
gomery Democrats met again and praised him for consistency, but also
decried those who sought to "misrepresent Cass's opinions and disorganize
the party."105 Yancey confronted more criticism at a Wctumpka meeting.
Democrats there listened to his appeal and then passed resolutions which
complimented him for his honesty but censored him for his judgment.
106They would canvass for Cass.
Meeting again in Montgomery toward the end of June, Alabama Demo-
crats condemned Yancey's course. John Cochrane of Eufaula, an "old
hunker of the first water" (who would become a southern-rights member
of the "Eufaula Regency" in 1851) told the audience that popular sover-
eignty "provides the South with a solution to her rights in the Mexican
cessation." F. S. Jackson, a party regular, attacked Yancey for his
inconsistency in not assailing the Baltimore Convention and Cass until
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"his own pet resolutions were rejected by that body..
.at would be better
for the democratic party if all such disaffected, inconsistent, imprac-
ticable factionalists as Mr. Yancey and the few who adhere to him, could
go over to the camp of the enemy."107
Yancey was almost alone, for only a few members of the Chivalry
identified with his position. Ostensibly this meant that they could
not vote for Cass and that they too had shed their Taylorism a few months
. - 108before. Dixon Hall Lewis made himself unavailable; not a word, either
of encouragement or disapproval, came from him. Thus, William L. Yancey's
plot to play Democratic "kingmaker" had failed, and he was deemed anta-
thema by Alabama Democrats-
-both Hunkers and most Chivalry.
The state of the Whig party was significant especially to some
of those Alabama Whigs who were disaffected by the results of Whig reso-
lution meetings in Alabama. Pre
-convent ion Whig meetings in Alabama
had errupted into struggles over the Wilmot Proviso and over Taylor's
candidacy. For example, at a Whig meeting in Athens, Alabama, a "small
fight over the Wilmot Proviso erupted."109 Whigs held meetings through-
out the state to appoint delegates to district meetings to choose a slate
for the Philadelphia Whig Convention. In late May Alabama Whigs prepared
to embark for Philadelphia to join in naming the "sphinx like" Zachary
Taylor.
With the Whig choice made, some southern members, including a
contingent of nullifying Whigs from east-central Alabama, looked to Yancey.
These Whigs said they were estranged because of Whig Vice Presidential
nominee Millard Fillmore's Congressional votes of 1838-1839 in favor of
anti-slavery petitions. Former Alabama Democrat James Belser told a
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Montgomery Whig audience 'W are free to admit that he [Fillmore] is
not exactly the 'right stripe' for Southern Whigs." 110
Encouraged by these Whig defections, Yancey began to organize
a third party based on the "Alabama Platform." He wanted to hold a
Convention in Montgomery to pick "true Southrons." "We have at last
started," Yancey buoyantly announced to Calhoun: "Taylor's position
in the late Whig Convention has thrown into our arms all those Whigs
who were for him.
. . .Belser resigns his place on the Taylor electoral
ticket. Campbell of Mobile quits his Taylor ground and is with us."
Yancey speculated as to who "shall we rally for President? Tazewell
and Jeff Davis are suggested here. Will they do? I was despondent a
week ago, I am now hopeful."111
As more Democrats fell into line behind Cass, Dixon Hall Lewis
came under constant pressure, from Hunkers and Chivalry alike, to make
a public statement. Finally Lewis broke his silence with a letter to
Yancey. He urged Yancey to drop all plans for a third party. "Outside
of South Carolina an independent nominee has no chance." If Yancey could
not vote for Cass, Lewis wrote, then he "should remain neutral and await
the reformation of the state party." Concluding, Lewis recalled his
obligation "to the party which required him to support its nominees";
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and a few days later he came out publicly for Cass. For himself,
Yancey replied to Lewis, there was no thought of personal advancement;
only "the best for my country... I was striking for rights and purposes
far above the lure of party." Nevertheless, he wrote bitterly and sar-
castically, the "power of party ... could drive men so completely from
their position and cause them to curse a friend." Yancey asked whether
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his cause at Baltimore and his subsequent speeches justified "the de-
struction of the present organization" which Lewis' pro-Cass position
would bring about. Lewis had approved the "Alabama Platform" and Yancey
felt that he was under obligation to support it. Lewis, however, was
under a new obligation to his "political friends." "This," Yancey as-
serted, "is extraordinary." Lewis had been his mentor in exposing "that
system of party organisations.
..in the hands of. ..drill sergeants."
Finally, "in great sorrow," Yancey wondered, "will we ever gain strength
by yielding to the north and by submitting to encroachments and by break-
113ing our pledges?"
The "Chivalry," then, was splintered. Lewis led one faction for
Cass; another under Yancey dedicated itself to the defeat of the Demo-
cratic ticket. Only two Democratic newspapers, the Montgomery State
Sentinal, suspected of being financed by Yancey, and the Eufaula Democrat,
organ of the recently formed Eufaula "Regency", upheld Yancey. The iso-
lation of this Yancey bloc is fundamental in understanding the emergence
of secession sentiment. It is only when the extremists found themselves
outside the Chivalry, their "southern-rights home," that some members
turned to dissolution of the Union as the southern solution. Consequently,
as a result of this split, those who supported the national Democratic
ticket joined forces with the Hunkers. Henceforth, the Montgomery Chi-
valry ceased to exist. It became known as the Montgomery "Regency" and
emerged as the leading regular Democratic, organization in the state.
On July 5 Joseph Lesesne, a Mobile ally of Yancey, argued that
the. south must soon "be prepared to say whether we will withdraw from
the Union, or purchase a further fraternity in it by giving up our slaves
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and consenting to social ruin and disgrace." 114 Later in the month
Sampson W. Harris, an Alabama Congressman and Yancey's law partner,
warned the House of Representatives that "the wrongs already threatened
have weakened, in many a patriotic bosum the sentiment of attachment
to the Union of the States. Men now use familiar words which twenty
years ago would have been deemed treasonable."'115
At this time Yancey himself had not yet considered secession.
In August, he published a seventy nine page polemic that defended the
Alabama Platform and his course at Baltimore; and, shocking his readers,
he also recommended that Alabama Democrats vote for Taylor as the lesser
1 16
of two evils. Alabama Whigs were delighted. Democrats lashed out
at yet another example of his insubordination. John A. Winston accused
Yancey of trying to destroy the Party, while editor Thaddeus Sanford
charged Yancey with a "ruling appetite--a thirst for notoriety n117
Yancey's influence on the presidential election is difficult to
determine. Regular Democrats minimized the import of his advice to party
members. C. C. Clay, Jr., a perennial office seeker, told George S.
Houston, "I do not know of a single democrat who will support Taylor
or Fillmore ... in north Alabama. I do not believe Yancey can reduce the
118democratic margin one hundred votes in the whole state." Montgomery's
foremost "Hunker" newspaper expressed elation at Yancey's defection: "We
would rather see him going over bag and baggage along with other oppor-
tunists to the Whigs. Yancey has done Cass and Butler all the harm he
can.**." Editor John Cragin predicted "that [Yancey and his collabor-
ators] will be trying to sneak back into the democratic ranks soon enough.
As the campaign progressed, some former bolters and neutrals re-
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turned to their old parties. Former Democrat James Belser joined the
Whigs and later came out against Millard Fillmore whom he characterized
as an abolitionist. Still later he changed his mind about Fillmore again
noting that "now there is much in his character to commend him to th £
favorable consideration of his fellow citizens." 120 m August Willi,
R. King, who was silent previously, threw his support to the Democrat!,
nominees: "Every Southern man who loves his country, should give a de-
cided support to Cass and Butler." Their election, he hoped, would force
a compromise on the troublesome question of slavery in the territories."
Felix G. Norman, a confidant of George S. Houston, shrewedly commented
upon some fellow Democrats: "Leroy Pope Walker cannot be trusted. He
is too much on the... Elmore and Yancey string I can never forgive
hira for the manner in which he palmed Yancey on us as a delegate to
Baltimore." Although Walker came out for Cass, Norman found that "he
can't be trusted," and he further suggested that Yancey be thrown out
of the party along with other Democrats "who are out for Taylor." Nor-
man also predicted that the dangerously overweight Lewis would die in
office opening the way for a north Alabamian to fill his senate seat.
However, he would have preferred a south Alabamian in the Seante to
"opportunists like L. P. Walker or David Hubbard." Norman further cau-
tioned, that if the Senate vacancy were to occur soon that Reuben Chap-
man would probably seek the position for himself. Most of all, Norman
warned against Walker getting the senatorial seat for "his ambition is
121
too much." Norman's prophecy about Dixon Hall Lewis proved correct,
and his death in October had important consequences. It opened up another
Senate appointment, thereby placing Governor Chapman in a very sensitive
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position. It exacerbated antagonisms between north and south Alabama.
In November the Whigs nearly accomplished the impossible. Cass
carried Alabama by only 881 votes out of a total of 61,000 ballots.
Only five counties in south Alabama went for Cass, almost causing the
Democrats to lose the state. That they did not was due to the majori-
ties Cass ran up in the "Avalanche" counties of north Alabama. 122 Many
Democrats stayed home in November. They did not trust Cass, and Taylor
never took a specific stand on the Proviso. William Dickson, from
Buzzards Roost, a traditional "Hunker" stronghold, asserted, "not a single
Democrat that voted here, voted for Taylor they done [sic] the mischief
by not voting at all. I believe Alabama is as democratic as she ever
was, but there was so many misrepusentations of Cass, being a northern
man and would turn out like Van Buren, was what done the business."123
What effect Yancey had on the outcome cannot be determined. Clearly,
his support for Taylor did not bring massive numbers of Democrats out
for the Lousianian. As noted above by William Dickson, more Democrats
stayed home than crossed party lines.
Governor Reuben Chapman, after the election, selected former
Governor Benjamin Fitzpatrick to fill the Senate post of the late Dixon
Hall Lewis. A wealthy planter-lawyer from Autauga county in central
Alabama, Fitzpatrick was the second south Alabamian in the Senate. Up-
state Democrats expressed irritation. Clement C. Clay, Sr., demanded
1 2 Athat Reuben Chapman ,fbe denied the nomination again [for Governor]."
"I have this week seen men from all northern counties," Joseph Acklen
stated: "the dissatisfaction of the appointment is universal, not against
the man, but as slighting the upcountry." He heard rumors of a deal
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whereby metric* would
-resign in two years and give chapman a chance.
As to the future of the Governor, "Pope Walker and [je re] Clemens will
give it to him smartly from the stump... but it is now my best informa-
tion he will be killed off by a convention and pass into a state of
'reticancy' without knowing how he got there." 125 state senator Daniel
Coggin discovered a conspiracy between Chapman, a north Alabamian, and
the "Montgomery clique"; all he declared should "be turned out of office.
"Gov. C. chooses Fitzpatrick," the sagacious upstate Hunker James E.
Saunders stated, "because he did not want to offend all those from North
Alabama who wanted the seat. The Montgomery Regency was instrumental
in getting B. F. the post."127
Controversy over the Fitzpatrick appointment persisted into 1849.
The specter of conspiracy continued to hover over Chapman's decision.
"Chapman is in league with the Montgomery Regency which is becoming as
odious as the Albany Regency which for years has dominated New York,"
wrote highland Democrat R. C. Brickell. He continued, Fitzpatrick had
been a long-time member of the Chivalry which explained his elevation. 128
One upcountry Whig claimed that Chapman told him there were "Twenty-five
direct and indirect applicants in north Alabama for the appointment."
Fitzpatrick was chosen because of his central location and because of
Chapman's desire not to alienate these twenty-five contenders. The same
Whig noted Chapman's unpopularity upstate and "judging from some Demo-
cratic papers in south Alabama it seems that his support there will be
lukewarm. ,|12 ^
The charge that Fitzpatrick received a Senate seat because both
he and Chapman belonged to the "Chivalry " is not easily disposed of. The
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"Chivalry" or Montgomery Regency had always contained two segment,
southern-rights extremists and moderates~and an Alabama Governor would
have to be sensitive to their pressures if only because they, too, were
at the state capital. Chapman, furthermore, rarely stood with the ex-
tremist faction. Indeed, his "Southern credentials" had come under at-
tack by a radical Black Belt journal which suggested "it would be as
veil for him to retire and for the people to elevate some of our dis-
contented patriots."130
Benjamin Fitzpatrick, brother-in-law of the late Dixon Hall Lewis,
Was considered a Montgomery Regency leader by Alabamians, but he was
no Calhoun ideologue. He was circumspect and seldom made his views
public. During the dispute over his Senatorial selection, Fitzpatrick
Stepped out of character and published an explanation of his designation
in several highland Democratic newspapers to placate upcountry hostility.
He recognized the claim of hill-county Democrats to one of the Senate
posts, but William R. King, although from southern Alabama, had had
northern support in getting elected. The north then, if they were not
satisfied with King, should fill his seat with a northerner. 131 Thus,
Fitzpatrick was trying to shift public criticism from himself to his
fellow Black Belt Democratic colleague.
John C. Calhoun also contributed to the fracturing of Alabama's
party structure. In December 1848 he began a last effort to smash the
traditional party system and fashion souTb°rn unity. Inspired by the
growth of free-soilism and driven by presidential ambitions, he issued
"The Southern Address." It pictured the horrors of Black domination,
which would befall the South unless the section was united and firmly
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opposed to abolitionism. The two races, he warned, could not "live to-
gether in peace and co-operation.
. .except in their present relation."
If the northern anti-slavery cabal gained ascendancy, then emancipation
would take place and the south would become the permanent home of "dis-
order, anarchy, poverty, misery, and wretchedness." The south had to
unite, if not, the people must prepare their defenses and use all means
"without looking to consequences" to protect "their property, prosperity,
equality, liberty, and safety."132 Calhoun's appeal of negrophobia was
an attempt not only to stir secessionist sentiment among white Alabamians
but, more importantly, to erode southern loyalty to the national Whig
Party.
Calhoun's polemic went before the entire southern Congressional
delegation for endorsement. Four of Alabama's seven representatives
signed it: Sampson W. Harris, S. W. Inge, Franklin Bowden, all Democrats,
and John Gayle, a Mobile Whig. All came from areas of dense slave popu-
lations. Three were holdouts: Two Democrats from north Alabama dis-
tricts of slight to moderate slave concentration, and Whig Henry Hilliard
from the Montgomery second district in the heart of the Black Belt.
Both Senators Fitzpatrick and King assented. 133
This Address rekindled the hopes of Alabama's ultras and indeed
of all politicians who saw it as the issue that produced votes and victory.
The most favorable reaction came from the eastern Black Belt. Those
who attended a Montgomery mass meeting e.:~ressed a willingness to co-
operate with all Southerners "in open and manly resistance." One group
of citizens in Russell County resolved: "There are evils far greater
than that of a dissolution of the Union; and among these are submission
135
ma-
e re-
to wrong, to injustice, and the degrading ter™ which a tyrannical
Jority My seek to force upon us." Another gathering in ttobil
affirmed the "conduct of the Southern delegation in the adoption of
the Southern Address." 134
Governor Chapman, sensing that support of Calhoun's Address might
salvage another term for himself, recommended to the legislature that
a convention of the people of the State be called and provision be made
for a general Southern convention, in the event Congress passed any mea-
sure "having to exclude slavery from the territories. Alabama ardently
desires to perpetuate the Union but not at the expense of the rights
of her people." State Representative John A. Winston, once an ardent
enemy of the ultra doctrines of Calhoun, caught the fever and introduced
a resolution in the lower House: "That in the event of the passage by
Congress of any act contemplated by the Congress against the institutions
of Alabama, Alabama's Representatives should not participate in the
135action of that body." Meanwhile, Robert T. Scott, an upcountry Hunker
and confidant of Governor Chapman, expressed dismay at Calhoun's Address.
"I fear that it [the Southern Address] will injure our party. I have
already heard it assimilated to the Hartford Convention When politi-
cal leaders undertake to lead the masses to disunion they will find them-
selves mistaken, the people love the Union It is best to let the Lion
sleep. Scott s evaluation of Alabama sentiment would prove correct.
For example, many planter Whigs in west-central and south Alabama who
remained silent during the agitation over the "Southern Address" would
vote overwhelmingly for restraint in the Congressional elections of 1849.
Moreover, Hunker Democrats made their Unionism known, forcing some out-
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spoken southern-rights candidates to moderate their Calhounis.. But
before the elections, other Alabarca politicians began exploiting the
Southern Address
.
Congressman George Smith Houston of the upstate fifth district,
as previously noted, had a constituency inclined toward Jacksonian na-
tionalism. Thus, Houston's highland yeomanry living in counties of low
slave density, were fervid national Democrats. Moreover, they had always
resented the control Black Belt Democrats exerted over the state party.
Houston, furthermore, always voted with northern and western Democrats
on land and debtor measures which directly involved the self-interest
of his upcountry supporters. Now in 1849, Houston eyed a Senate seat
—both of Alabama's Senate posts were up for renewal in the fall—and
he tried to use his refusal to sign the "Southern Address" for politi-
cal advantage.
Consequently, he fueled the ready made resentment of his consti-
tuents against south Alabama and ultra southern rights by espousing the
cause of north Alabama and the Union. This tactic would divide the state
137
and hopefully win the Senate. However, upon returning to his baili-
wick, Houston found a disenchanted electorate. "I find very general
discontent amongst my friends for not signing the Address," he confided
to Howell Cobb. He successfully fought off an attempt by a local Demo-
cratic bloc to pass resolutions in favor of Calhoun's Appeal. The slavery
issue was continually being stirred for selfish ends, Houston asserted.
Calhoun, he claimed, had revealed to Stephen A. Douglas that continued
agitation over the slavery question was necessary to the success of the
Democratic party in the South. Houston, however, was unable to carry
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out his strategy: The fifth district seemed persuaded by the "Southern
Address."138 He then dropped out of his Congressional re-election at-
tempt and devoted his time to behind-the-scenes activity for his Sena-
torial bid. But Alabama was momentarily drawn to Calhoun's latest
maneuver; and Houston consequently did not have a chance for election
to the upper House. Feeling isolated, Houston reproached Governor Chap-
man and Senator King. The former, he charged, played a perfidious game
by spreading "Calhoun fever" into north Alabama. And the latter, with
the help of some of his Hunker allies, had a "childish overweening desire"
to stay in the Senate. That is why King "signed the address; and his
friends taking their cue from it, are pressing the address with more vigor
and zeal than even the Calhoun men, if possible. They are .. .determined
to get him back into the Senate. 139 With Houston out of the Congressional
race, David Hubbard, a perennial antagonist and a radical Calhounite,
filled the vacuum. Hubbard won election to Houston's post by default.
In the late spring this call for southern unity struck a respon-
sive chord in other parts of Alabama. "The soundest minds in the Southern
States are forced to the conclusion that either slavery or the union
must give way," announced the Montgomery Flag and Advertiser, a Democra-
tic organ whose bent had been moderation. 1 ^ 0 Typically, the most vehe-
ment advocates of Calhoun's "Address" were in the eastern Black Belt.
The ultra clusters in Montgomery and Barbour counties had set their hopes
on defeating second district Whig Congressman Henry Hilliard, who did
not endorse the Calhoun statement. In the spring radical southern-rights
Democrats and Whigs joined with second district moderate southern-rights
Democrats for the sole purpose of defeating the common enemy-national
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Whig Henry ttiUtar*. HIUW, opponents were led by the ex trem ist s;
namely, Yancey, his l(w partner John A . ^^ ^^
Williams--all lawyers. 141
These ultras villified Hilliard: his motives, in not joining
his Alabama colleagues who supported Calhoun's protest, "must be seen
as his anxiety to occupy a 'National position'..."; by his action he
deserted his homeland. 142 Henry Hilliard was a national Whig on most
issues, and his chief support came from the Whig planter conservatives
in the west-central counties of his district. These wealthy planters
considered any agitation of the slavery issue harmful to their interests.
They believed the national ferment over slavery could produce a consensus
that would eventually destroy slavery in the South. But Hilliard's
refusal to sign the "Address" was motivated by more than conservative
Whig principle. He desired a federal foreign assignment and wanted to
stay in the "good graces" of the Taylor administration. John M. Clayton,
Zachary Taylor's Secretary of State, advised Hilliard to run for re-elec-
tion on Taylor's policy that a territory could choose its own position
on slavery as it achieved statehood. If successful with Taylor's policy,
Hilliard would have a good chance for an overseas appointment. 143
In their assault on Hilliard, the Montgomery radicals found a
group of allies. These were disaffected Whigs in nearby Barbour County.
John C. Calhoun's nephew John A. Calhoun accepted responsibility for
breaking up the County's Whig party. "I declined a seat in the Senate
of this state," he told his uncle, "in order to effect a certain end,
the amalgamation of the old parties with a view to the formation of a
new one," based upon the "Appeal." John A. Calhoun turned his Assembly
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seat over to Jefferson Buford "a Carolinian, a nullifier, a whig" who
aided in bringing likeminded Barbour County Whigs into the Calhoun catnp.^
Many of these southern-rights Whigs lived in or near the town of Eufaula
and became part of the "Eufaula Regency. " Jefferson Buford, at 42, was
the oldest; most of the Eufaula nullifiers were in their thirties. They
were attorneys, small planters, and owned under fifty slaves. They all
came to political maturity in the crucible of Alabama politics. Few
of them considered party loyalty paramount. Some of them, like a number
of their Montgomery counterparts, were consistent in their pro-slavery
and secessionist ideology; 145 others, however, mainly saw the territorial
clash as a means of "feathering their own nest." The latter were not
ideologues but would compromise whenever the political winds shifted.
In May Yancey and the Montgomery extremists held a nonpartisan
anti-Hilliard meeting. They issued statements denouncing the Wilmot
Proviso, demanded federal protection of slavery in the territories, and
called upon Reuben Chapman to convene the General Assembly if the slave
restriction clause should pass Congress. These measures were seen as
an attempt by the "hotspurs," along with some radical Whigs, to embarrass
Hilliard. John Cochrane, Cass elector in 1848 and now part of the Eufaula
clique, said of Hilliard: "sooner than go out of the Union, he would
surrender our dear rights to the anti-slavery armies." 146
Hilliard, however, won the approval of the regular Whigs who were
controlled by the conservative planter-Whigs from the west-central cotton
counties of the second district. After gaining the district Whig nomina-
tion, Hilliard asked Senator John M. Berrien of Georgia for an endorse-
ment. Berrien, a Whig, had written a much milder criticism of the slave
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restriction clause which was addressed to the whole nation. Milliard
wanted to publicize his ratification of Senator Berrien's address and
obtain the Senator's support. "The Democrats," Milliard uneasily com-
mented, "are about to make a desperate effort to defeat me."147
Montgomery southern-rights radicals organized another assembly
in Montgomery before the end of May. Yancey took the occasion to lash
out at Billiard as a traitor to the south. According to a Montgomery
reporter, a great number of yeomen farmers were present and heard Yancey,
and they proclaimed their fidelity to "southern rights." 148 Yancey,
however, was not above attempts to compromise. Even before the May
meeting, he made overtures to party regulars by attending "a supper for
Mr. Polk" and made favorable remarks about the President's term in
149
office
.
Hilliard still lacked an opponent when the state Democratic Con-
vention convened in Montgomery on June 11 to select a gubernatorial can-
didate. Governor Chapman knew that most of north Alabama was arrayed
against him because of the Fitzpatrick nomination and because of his
suspected collaboration with the Montgomery Regency. Yancey endorsed
him; so did other southern-rights cohorts. But Chapman, to avoid yet
another inner party collision, dropped out of the running. Alabama's
Chief Justice, Henry W. Collier of Tuscaloosa, emerged as a compromise
candidate and south Alabama Democrats agreed to support William R. King
in the November Senatorial election. Presumably, King agreed to co-
operate more fully with the Montgomery Regency. The Convention then
passed a series of resolutions directed at Henry Hilliard, denouncing
those Alabama Congressmen who did not sign Calhoun's Address. Word came
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out of the gathering that a fusion candidate would challenge Milliard;
and his close friend, Jama a L. Pugh, was chosen. Pugh, a nullifying
Whig member of the Eufaula faction, was a Taylor elector only the year
before and he had campaigned vigorously for the Whig ticket. 150
Yancey, the obvious choice to contest Hilliard, a Whig Unionist,
did not want to run. He was probably aware of Milliard's popularity in
most of the plantation precincts of his district. The district's plan-
tation regions had been Whig turf since the late thirties, and Hilliard
'
s
strength posed too formidable an obstacle for Yancey. Yancey then did
not take a very active part in the second district campaign, although
Pugh's advisers called him back from South Carolina (where he was settling
a family dispute) to debate Hi!.Hard—who declined to meet him. 151
Alabama newspapers labeled the Pugh-Hil 1 iard confrontation "The
War of the Roses/' and like the dynastic struggles of fifteenth-century
England, it was a Whig family brawl. Pugh and his spokesmen condemned
Hilliard for his opposition to the southern unity movement and for his
initial refusal to sign the "Clayton resolutions." Clayton Whig! in
"hotspur" Barbour County, issued a series of resolutions sustaining
Calhoun's position and asking Alabama Whigs to get "behind the Southern
Address." They also accused Hilliard of opportunism, bargaining slave-
holders rights for the promise of a foreign mission. As election day
neared, Hilliard's Methodism became an issue when Pugh inveighed against
152the pro-abolitionist position of the northern Methodists.
Hilliard, after hesitating, publicly ratified the Clayton platform
insisting upon his loyalty to the south. But later he rejected it again,
noting that the pre-requisite for southern unity was imperiled by the
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dismantling of southern Whiggery implied in CaXhoun's Address. He also
charged Pugh with being a chronic office seeker who had made a deal with
the "Montgomery clique" in yet another attempt to destroy Black Belt
Whiggery . "*
When the election results were tabulated, Hilliard had carried
his district by 795 votes. He won by getting large majorities in tra-
ditional Whig strongholds in the west-central and upper part of his
district. 154 Hilliard «s victory reflected the strength of conservative
Black Belt Whiggery. As noted earlier, many central Alabama planter
Whigs had almost as much scorn for the extreme southern-rights men as
for the Abolitionists. Hilliard's supporters wished to conserve the
Union and viewed themselves as moderate southernists
. Although they
were seldom outspoken, they were vehement in their accusation that Cal-
houn's tactics were merely a device to destroy their Party and get him-
self elected to the Presidency. 155 They had remained quiet during the
turmoil over Calhoun's "Southern Address," but they made their sentiments
known by rejecting the "crisis mongering" of the Montgomery and Eufaula
ultras
.
In the Mobile district the Administration's territorial policy
was a major issue. Whig Congressional nominee Judge W. J. Alston defended
Taylor's territorial policy and accused his Democratic adversary, planter-
lawyer C. C. Sellers,, of duplicity. On the one hand, Sellers had defended
Polk's Oregon position outlawing slavery there, and on the other, he
had demanded slavery protection in the newly acquired Mexican territory.
Alston defeated Sellers by a 231 majority, and moderation triumphed in
another Whig stronghold. 15^
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The Democrats took the refining f ive districts with only two
Pf the successful candidates maintaining their Calhounism throughout
the campaign: Sampson W. Harris from the upper-central Black Belt third
district and incumbent Franklin Bowden from the seventh district, an
original signer of the "Southern Address." The other candidates, like
W. R. W. Cobb from the upstate sixth district, either attacked Calhoun'sWeal or remained curiously silent about southern unity. For example,
David Hubbard, who replaced George Houston in the fifth district, observed
his constituents moved from support to opposition of the "Southern Ad-
dress." By election day the hill country yeomenry returned to their
traditional Jacksonian nationalism faith. Thus Hubbard kept his "ulta-
ism" at "low profile" during the campaign.
Unionist George Smith Houston writing Howell Cobb of the defeat
of "Calhounism" in the August elections, declared
David Hubbard is my successor, an old nullifier
tho' [he] had nothing to say about Calhoun's ad-
dress.* I once during the canvass heard he did,
but when I asked him about it he denied it; he
however is of that stripe
. The Address men ran
at Cobb very hard, with a talented man... and yet
he has triumphed by about 1000 majority .. .all of
the anti-Calhoun Address men have triumphed in
these parts or hereabouts.... 157
Regardless of the nationalist turn in the elections, some Alabama
politicians still talked of the necessity of radical resistance to "nor-
thern aggression." The November legislative session reflected these
divisions over "southern resistance." The Mobile Register noted, as
the Assembly got under way that, "the issue will be nothing short of
ultimate emancipation and only immediate united action could preserve
1 S8the rights which are dearer still than the Union." Lame duck Governor
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Reuben Chapman, who had been in touch with John C. Calhoun, sent
sage to the House recommending that it make provision at once for
vening a state convention if Congress should pass the Wilmot Proviso
or any law excluding slavery from the territories. 159 John A. Winston,
Yancey's implacable foe, also struck an ultra note when he urged south-
erners to unify "regardless of all party consideration..
. .at all hazards
to secure our rights of property in the African Race."160 Democratic
conservative Henry Collier, upon taking up his gubernatorial duties,
asked the Assembly to formulate a position on slavery extension. The
Senate responded boldly: "Alabama would never submit to any act of the
United States government which prevents her from taking Slaves into the
territories. If federal restriction is passed then the people of the
slave states should call a convention to defend their common rights." 161
That a group of moderates were now so aggressive is a reflection
of important national developments. In mid-November Alabama newspapers
reported California's constitutional Convention had barred slavery; here
was yet another free-soil state. On the heels of this event, the Missis-
sippi legislature issued a call for a southern convention. It would
convene in Nashville, Tennessee, and would determine a slave state reply
162to California's constitution. Though most of Alabama's legislators
had either campaigned against Calhoun's "Southern Address" or had re-
mained silent on the issue, none desired to have their "southernism"
questioned. Events and public opinion could nudge a southern-rights
moderate or even a Unionist into the Calhoun camp, especially if he was
concerned about his political future.
While the Assembly debated the territorial issue, the scheduled
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Senatorial election intruded. Some Democratic newspapers had been
dieting that because of a Whig resurgence "a dee* and wen piaced con-
were suspected of making agreements with Democrats "whom they suppose
to possess higher political aspirations than love of principle or party..
The two incumbents, central Alabama party regulars William R, King and
Benjamin Fitzpatrick, were up for renewal. Upcountry Democrats displayed
strong resistance to Fitzpatrick and a number of them sought Fitzpatrick'
post; chief among them were Jere Clemens, David Hubbard, and Leroy Pope
Walker. Former Governor Reuben Chapman and Whig Arthur F. Hopkins con-
tested for King's job. "The Whigs are in high spirits," reported an ob-
server, "and hope to profit largely by the dissensions in the opposition
party."
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On November 30, 1849, the General Assembly halted its legislature
proceedings and commenced balloting for the two Senatorial posts. King
easily won election after a second ballot. 165 Fitzpatrick, however, was
seriously challenged, especially by Jere Clemens who stopped him on the
fifth ballot. Ironically, lawyer Clemens, a perennial upstate office
seeker, had written George S. Houston several months earlier denying he
had formed a "cabal with...L. P. Walker to. . .make .. .both Senators."
Furthermore, "so far as I am concerned I am no candidate for anything 1
Clemens said he would vote for a north Alabama man "but who I don't know";
possibly L. P. Walker, "if he wanted the nomination." Walker did indeed
1 (if.
want the post, but was eliminated in the early voting.
The session adjourned after the fifth ballot. Then the Whigs
caucused. Rumors circulated that Clemens had contacted Whig managers
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and consulted a deal. Events supported this talk, for the next day
the Whigs withdrew^ their candidate and voted with highland Demo-
crats for Cleans. 167 South Alabama Democrats, angry over Fitzpatrick's
defeat, charged Cleans with making a bargain with the Whigs. Low coun-
try Democrats clawed that Clemens, in exchange for Whig votes, proved
to support the Taylor Administration. North Alabama Democrats were also
arraigned for championing a candidate who "colored his water a little
too deeply and had numerous other unsavory habits."168
Eighteen forty-nine ended with the Democratic party in its "natural
condition," namely, fragmented. I„ upstate Alabama, an area of low slave
density, the vast majority of voters were Unionists or southern-rights
moderates with a very small bloc of ultras. In south Alabama, home of
the slave-dense cotton kingdom, radical southernists, were a significant
segment in the Montgomery and Mobile districts. Black Belt Democratic
party regulars found it difficult to sustain their control of the south
Alabama Democracy after the elections of 1849. These were years of in-
tense slavery-territorial agitation and the Democratic regulars fought
off attempts by the ultras to displace them as party managers. However,
in the early fifties pro-Union sentiment continued to predominate in
Alabama, and many Calhounites were forced to veer to moderation.
The Whigs were also splintered. Planter Whigs in central and
west -central Alabama stood with Zachary Taylor and the Union. They felt
that continual agitation of the territorial slavery issue could endanger
the existence of slavery at home would would not only spell economic ruin
for them but a racial calamity for the entire South. There were Whigs
in the far east-central counties, small planters and lawyers, however,
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who held extreme southern nationalist views which included an insist
on federal protection of slavery in the territories, m col laceration
with like-minded east-central Democrats, these Whigs formed a new com-
bination, the Eufaula Regency, and hegan co-operating with Montgomery
Democratic ultras. Eighteen-f ifty, therefore, promised to be a water-
shed year, the building of separate southern-rights and Unionists par-
ties as Alabama confronted the Nashville Convention and Henry clay's
Omnibus Compromise bill.
ence
CHAPTER IV
SECESSION OR SUBMISSION: ALABAMA AND THE COMPROMISE OF 1850
The end of the Mexican War presented the United States with a
dire proposition. Would the territory gained fro. Mexico enter the
Union slave or free? By 1850 some of these new territories affirmed
their status. Not only would California enter the Union as a free state
but New Mexico would as well. Southerners were aware this would destroy
the Senate balance of fifteen free and fifteen slave states. To south-
em leaders this balance was their last bulwark in Congress, for their
strength had already ebbed in the House. The South's political means
of protecting slavery from northern encroachment was collapsing. Be-
hind California and New Mexico, stood Utah, Oregon, and perhaps Minne-
sota in line for statehood. Since most southerners conceded that any
State could control its own position on slavery, they could not oppose
the admission of a state merely because it was free. Some southern
politicians—many of them political * ,outsiders ,,
-opportunistically fixed
upon the issue of slavery in the territories and used it to assault na-
tional party loyalists in the south by accusing them of compromising
southern interest for party unity, patronage, and spoils.
From 1850 to 1852 ultra southern rights men in Alabama
capitalized on the question of slavery in the territories. Most of them
Were Democrats, living in the Montgomery and Mobile districts who desired
the districts' Whig controlled Congressional seats. If successful, they
then hoped to divest the Democratic regulars who controlled the Montgomery
Regency of their power in the state. The pro-Union Whigs of Alabama
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also tried to profit by the events of 1850. They attempted to make a
political comeback by forming a coalition with north Alabama Union Demo-
crats. Consequently, Alabama's brittle party system experienced another
searing struggle which would leave the Whigs prostrate and the national
Democratic Party loyalists supreme.
Through January 1850 the Alabama legislature debated what kind
of action to take to meet the territorial crisis brought on by California
free soil constitution. The lower House urged a state convention to
discuss "appropriate measures": the Senate wanted to follow Mississippi
to a slave state convention in Nashville, Tennessee. Governor Henry
Collier informed the General Assembly that most southern states had
agreed to convene in Nashville to determine a proper response to "free
soilism." Collier also asked the lawmakers to decide upon a method of
selecting delegates to the forthcoming convention. 1 Senator William
R. King typified the anxiety of many Alabamians when he lamented that
•'the slavery question is the all absorbing subject .. .and how it is to
terminate God only knows." While in Washington, all his efforts would
be exerted, as they had been in the past, to winning a compromise on
"the dangerous question"--an outcome eastern Black Belt ultras would
consider treasonable. King insisted upon his devotion to the Union.
The present difficulties must be ironed out, King asserted, so that the
country could reach its "high destinies." King warned, however, that
the south would have to stand together as one if the fanatics and "un-
principled aspirants for political power of the north were to be stopped."
tn early February state representative L. P. Walker presented
a measure in the Alabama House sanctioning the Nashville meeting and
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suggesting a method of selecting the delegates: four at iarge were to
be chosen by the General Assembly, two from each Congressional district
to be elected by the voters. 3 The delegate selection proposal was re-
ferred to a special committee, chaired by Thomas H. Watts, a Whig planter,
lawyer from Montgomery County. Watt's group had a Whig plurality on it
and they adopted delaying tactics. They reported back that no conven-
tion should be held unless and until Congress adopted the hated Wilmot
Proviso, and a state convention rather than a convention of all the slave
states would suffice. The tactics of Alabama Whiggery was to take the
pressure of the territorial slavery agitation off the Whig Administration
in Washington and keep the slavery restriction onus on the Democrats.
Disregarding Walker's bill, the House adopted thc Whig sponsored alter-
4
native. Two weeks later, state lawmakers met in an unofficial session
and selected eight delegates to represent the state at large and four
to represent each Congressional district. 5 Whigs attacked the Assembly's
methods in choosing delegates. "If it were necessary to hold the con-
vention," William Figures declared, "the Alabama delegation should be
"clothed with power by the people"; and he predicted electorate indig-
nation. The Macon Republican, a planter Whig journal, insisted that the
Convention delegates should be elected by the people even though those
selected were overwhelmingly moderate and conservative.
6
One Democratic
paper could not understand why the people were denied a "hand in the
outcome .
"
To add to the growing controversy, Henry Clay, on January 20,
1850, introduced in the Senate a series of resolutions with all tht
major questions at issue: admit California as a free state; establish
territorial governments in the remainder of the Mexican cession without
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any restriction on slaverv P«f-Ahit.*hvery, establis a reasonable western boundary for
Texas; assume the part of Texas' public debt contracted prior to annex-
ation, provided Texas give up her claim to part of New Mexico; abolish
slavery in the District of Columbia only if the people of both Maryland
and the District consent, and then only with condensation to slaveholders;
prohibit the slave trade in the District of Columbia; enact a new and
effective fugitive slave law; affirm that Congress has not the power to
deal with the interstate slave trade.
The Alabama press became a source of polemics triggered by Henry
Clay's compromise measures and the upcoming Nashville convention. Demo-
crat Thaddeus Sanford of the Mobile Register proclaimed, "the compromise
resolutions just introduced into the Senate are precisely what we anti-
cipated ... .They call on the South to concede everything ... leaving us
the shadow of what We are contending for."8 After surveying national
developments, a Eufaula Whig ultra said, "if I were certain it was not
an infringement of the constitutional rights of the South to admit Cali-
fornia into the Union, at this session; yet I would not volunteer such
an opinion." Continuing, he cautioned, "who does not know that the North
will go just as far as she may count on our submission. .. the north de-
clared war against our institutions, we are demented, and bent upon
Buicide> if we submissively allow her to go on "9 The Whig-Unionist
Macon Republican answered those who demanded disunion: "In the substan-
tial assertion and maintenance of southern rights we will go as far as
he who goes farthest; but we are only less attracted to the Union... and
we will not give it up, we will not aid in dismembering it and breaking
it into fragments until the South's position in it is absolutely unten-
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able...." The Republican, speaking for the conservative planters of
central Alabama, further cautioned "the people against the designs of
demagogues, alarmists and agitators" whose only ambition "is to
office. „10
The Macon Republican's assessment of the motivations of "agitators"
who glibly talked of disunion is « perception not to be ignored. Clearly,
Clay's bill provided Alabama's political outsiders-the Calhounites-
with yet another issue in their onslaught upon the state's national party
faithful. If all national party men could be shown to be untrustworthy
because of their desire to compromise the territorial imbroglio, then
their accusers could replace them as the chief "wirepullers" in the state.
The south Alabama extremists, however, found public sentiment unwilling
to rubber-stamp the dismantling of the Democratic stewardship in Alabama.
As a result of Clay's recommended resolution of the territorial
muddle, Nashville convention ratification meetings convened throughout
the state. Most of these meetings, with national Whigs in charge, showed
a conservative bent. A volatile nonpartisan gathering was held in Greene
County, a Whig -planter stronghold. It passed a resolution demanding
that the delegates to Nashville be instructed by the people before making
any drastic resolutions even in Congress should pass anti-slavery mea-
sures. In upstate Limestone county a group of citizens said "we cherish
...our federal union; and we are wholly opposed to a dissolution of the
present federal union." But, they forewarned, "as patriotic Southerners,
we should look upon such a calamity as second only—but still second --
12to the ruin of Southern institutions." ~ In Mobile, Whigs and Democrats
resolved in favor of the Nashville meeting and disclaimed any purpose
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of disrupting the Union. 13
While Unionist sympathies predated throughout most of the
state, the eastern Blac k Belt became the center for
-Wspur" agitation.
Extremism became the hallmark of the Montgomery Advertiser
, edited by
the inscrutable Colonel J. J. Seibels. Seibels, from South Carolina,
was vying with William L. Yancey for the leadership of the Montgomery
firebrands. Both men had, as well,
. transcending ambition to become
"king-maker" within the state Democratic party. Each would endeavor
to fuel public opinion against Alabama Democrats who would compromise
slavery's rights in the new territories. For example, Seibels publicly
accused Alabama politicians who cooperated with "northern party men"
in seeking a solution to the expansion issue of being traitors to the
South. The Tuscaloosa Monitor, a Union-Whig organ, replied to Seibels
by noting that the editor of the Advertiser seemed to regard "every man
as an enemy to the South, who has not got his coat off and his sleeves
rolled up for a fight; or in other words, every man is a traitor who
thinks that this great sectional struggle may yet be amicably and honor-
ably adjusted. w
Talk of secession, as the test of "manly southern resistance,"
became common among east-central Alabama Calhounites. In their attempts
to incite public opinion, they were led by the "Eufaula Regency" and not
by Yancey who was momentarily preoccupied with his law practice. They
tried to commit the Alabama delegates go?rg to Nashville to disruption,
circulating a pamphlet which maintained that compromise could not recon-
cile the differences between the north and south. 16
In May, Yancey took part in a Montgomery nonpartisan ratification
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meeting. He served on the resolution committee, and authored a rela-
tively mi ld resolution: ^he .. .agitation of anti-slavery doctrines...
has had the effect of disquieting the public mind of the South/' and
"has engrafted the doctrine of the WiW Proviso upon the California
constitution." The federal government is bound by the constitution to
protect property. Thus Congress "should excise the slave restriction
clause from the California constitution and resolve slavery in the terri-
tory in favor of the South."17 Yancey made no call for "manly resistance"
against "northern aggression." Because the vast majority of Alabama
voters had refused to follow his lead, Yancey in the late forties,
was cautiously "feeling his way."
Ralph Draughon, Jr., observed that "secession sentiment was strong
in the Spring of 1850 in Alabama,"18 but the secessionist!) of some chronic
"crisis mongers" was not to be taken as general state-wide opinion. The
evidence presented here— the conservatism of those delegates chosen for
the Nashville Convention, the Unionist-to-moderate tenor of the ratifi-
cation meetings, Yancey's bland protest at the May Montgomery gathering,
the persistence of Whig-Unionism--all of these factors testify to the
political moderation of pre-Nashville Alabama.
The state's attention shifted to Congress, where Alabama's repre-
sentatives were taking an active part in debates on Clay's compromise.
Calhounite David Hubbard from the upstate fifth district was an excep-
tion. His only action was to send a lef-^r to his constituents warning
of the dangers to the south and to the country if the free-soilers tri-
umphed. Hubbard's address suggested a massive abolitionist conspiracy.
Northerners were uncanny; they "would use every weapon at their disposal
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to obtain their objectives...." The North would "deceive, coax and
threaten." He admonished his readers not to be hoodwinked by ^pro-
mise, for the northern strategy was to "divide and conquer" by producing
party unrest in the south.
19
Conspiratorial appeals became the stock-
in-trade of most ultras whenever the territorial issue gained prominence.
For example, Sampson W. Inge of the fourth Congressional district, in
upper west-central Alabama (a region that overlapped into the Black Belt)
condemned the "California Proviso" and complained that the north was
intent on subjugating the south. California would be one more abolition
State for the south to contend with; therefore he would oppose the "ad-
mission of California under the present plan."20
It should be noted that most southern Democrats were constantly
under pressure in Washington to follow the lead of John C. Calhoun, recog-
nized as the spokesman Of southern-rights Democrats. However, there
were southern Democratic representatives who endeavored to steer clear
6f "Calhounism.
" Those who did usually represented districts which were
yeOman in character, where the soil was not conducive to a plantation
ecO'nOmy
>
and where Jacksonian nationalism prevailed. Congressman W. R.
Wv Cobb, from Alabama's upcountry sixth district, an area of few cotton
plantations, clearly typified the southern Democrat Unionist. During
the California debates, Cobb introduced a resolution that called on all
parties to settle their differences. Cobb wanted this "bone of conten-
tion" quickly resolved. He recommended the formation of a joint committee
of six Senators--three of them from each section--and twenty House, members
with ten from each section. Their task would be to work out a compro-
2]
raise. The Cobb measure was tabled.
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Senator Clemens called for equal treatment of the south in the
territories, attacked northerners as despoilers of the Union and of
southern institutions. 22 Clemens' belligerance won admiration from the
ultra press in Alabama. J. J. Seibels hyperbolically wrote, "what Murat
was to Napoleon's Grand Army, Clemens is to the Southern host."23 Ironi-
cally, King initially denounced all compromises and then voted for the
Gott resolution which would abolish the slave trade in the District of
24Columbia.
Whig Henry Hilliard, from the Montgomery district, spoke on both
sides of the issue. Seibels also praised him for his condemnation of
"Northern aggression." But Hilliard in a letter to the National In -
teJJJ^ejncer, the journal read by his conservative planter
-Whig consti-
tuency, maintained "if there be within the United States a class of
[those] who aim to desire to break up the Union... I wish it to be under-
stood that I do not belong to that class."
26
Whig Congressman William
J. Alston from the Mobile district was less equivocal. He discoursed
on the economic and social benefits of slavery, and concluded that the
north had just as much to fear from the Abolitionists as the south:
"Awake I" he warned, "Or the Philistines will be upon you."27 Regardless
of these doomsday predictions, Alston joined his Whig colleagues in
voting for all the measures in the Omnibus compromise bill.
The speeches of Alabama's Congressional delegation were widely
reported to the state press, but newspaper attention as June approached
centered on the coming Nashville convention. Misgivings still persisted
about its necessity. Two leading Whigs, C. C. Langdon and Congressman
Henry Hilliard, argued that no convention should be held prior to an
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act of aggression by the federal government
. Hilliard, thinking the
meeting unnecessary, feared it might frustrate efforts to save the Union. 28
In Madison County a nonpartisan meeting was divided between southern
nationalists and unionists. The former, led by C. C. Clay, Jr., urged
resistance of "every invasion of southern rights short of secession,"
while the unionist forces, led by Whig George B. Beirne, came out against
the southern convention and succeeded in getting their resolutions adopted
by a two to one margin. Not intimidated, Clay harangued his listerners:
the only salvation for the south was a unity movement like that promised
by Nashville. Most of the Unionist
-Whigs and Democrats had departed
by the time he introduced a pro-convention motion. Overriding the pre-
vious resolution of the unionist camp, the pro-convention measure was
carried unanimously. 29 Thus, the Madison county meeting was no barometer
of upstate sentiment.
A further indication of Alabama's conservative mood on the eve
of the Tennessee gathering was the outspoken position of some of the
delegates. For example, before leaving for Nashville, delegate John
Erwin, from slave-dense Perry County, declared "that a dissolution of
the Union, or a desire to dissolve it did not once enter the minds or
the heards of the upright men" representing Alabama.
But apprehension concerning the Nashville meeting persisted.
These fears were especially pronounced among first and second district
planters who were among the most consistent Union advocates in Alabama.
The editor of the Alabama Whig
, located in the heart of planter central
Alabama, asked whether all those who had been selected for Nashville
would in fact go. William H. Murphy, a Whig delegate from the west-
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central counties, said he would attend and urged other appointees to
aid him there if the Convention's purpose was dissolution of the Union.
He hoped the delegates would elaborate ways to protect southern rights
and property. 31 whig editor William Figures estimated "if the people
of the state would speak out, we believe four fifths would be found in
favor of the Compromise and thus settle the vexed slavery dispute."32
The apprehension of these planter-Whigs was based on the convic-
tion that continued irritation of the territorial issues could build
a broad consensus in the north and west that would eventually lead to
the demand for extinction of slavery in the south. However, in the 1850's,
some of these great planters came to support slavery expansion when they
saw that their slave population was increasing at a massive rate. A
safety valve, in the form of more slave territory, would have to be pro-
vided in order to maintain racial control at home. On the other hand,
by the late fifties, the smaller planters all over south Alabama were
the most strident among the slaveholders demanding more slave territory.
They were just then beginning to see that their hopes of acquiring more
cotton land in Alabama was hindered by the land monopolizing tendencies
of the greater planters.
Inevitably, the Nashville Convention and Clay's Compromise became
Strict party issues. Whig politicians were opposed to the Convention
and Democrats assaulted the Omnibus measures, though upstate Democrats
were more temperate: They considered the Tennessee meeting a gathering
Of ''southern minds," no more. In June, William L. Yancey and southern-
rights radicals were restrained, sensing the voter reticence. Ultras,
moreover, suffered a bss of leadership: John C. Calhoun died on the
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eve of Nashville.
Only twenty-one of the thirty-six Alabama delegates went to Nash-
ville. Of these fourteen were Democrats and seven Whigs. Six came from
north Alabama, and three resided in the Mobile district. 34
John A. Campbell, who captained the delegation, led no secession
revolt at Nashville and the conservative element carried the day. The
convention contented itself with harmless resolutions, chief of which
was the extension of the Missouri line (36-30) westward to the Pacific.
Sounding the only radical note, Robert Barnwell Rhett attacked Henry
Clay's Compromise bill, pleaded for southern unity, and criticized the
delegates for not speaking out against submission. A resolution was
passed condemning the Omnibus measures pending before Congress. But
the vote on this was clearly partisan with Democrats voting in favor
of the resolve and Whigs against. 35
Seven Whigs and one Democrat in the Alabama delegation voted
against the Nashville resolutions because of their anti-Compromise po-
36
sition. Whigs considered the Democratic maneuver directed against the
Omnibus measures as one not wholly based on principle. It was part of
Democratic Party strategy against their traditional opponents in the
White House and in Congress. Significantly, southern Democratic ultras
and moderates joined together, for the time being, in their opposition
to the proposed Congressional Compromise.
When news of the Nashville resolutions reached Alabama, ratifi-
cation meetings were organized across the state. Thomas H. Watts, in-
fluential Montgomery Whig, chaired one "nonpartisan" gathering in the
state capitol. He urged support for Clay's measures. Yancey, who shared
160
jec-
Less
the platform, demanded ratIflcatlon of Rhett , s Nashvine ^^^^ ^
the meting broke up everyone agreed, however, that extension of the
Missouri line to the Pacific was acceptable. But nobody, Yancey in-
cluded, could suggest what kind of action to take if "southern rights
were not protected. m37
Like the Omnibus bill, as noted above, the acceptance or rej,
tion of the Nashville Platform became a partisan question. Regard!,
of the noncontroversial aspects of the results of the Tennessee meeting,
Alabama politicians, especially the eager office-seeking southern-rights
ultras, tried to stir public sentiment on the Nashville resolutions.
Thereby they hoped that heightened voter concern for slavery's rights
in the territories could bring electoral success in the 1851 state elec-
tions. For example, the north Alabama Clay family, through their family
newspaper the Huntsville Democrat, had been particularly emphatic in
demanding southern resistance to all compromising schemes. Although a
Democrat, Clement Clay, Jr., had his sights set on running against sixth
district Democratic-Unionist Congressman W. R. W. Cobb in 1851. Clement
Clay, Sr., chaired a Huntsville assembly that endorsed the Convention's
Work, especially the resolution condemning Henry Clay's compromise scheme. 38
Later When the Compromise bill passed Congress, the Clays urged opposi-
tion* Whig editor William B. Figures clearly saw the motivations behind
the Huntsville meeting when he commented, "the whole gathering was just
a maneuver to make political capital at Whig and Democratic unionist
„39
expense .
"
Significantly, some Democrats had misgivings about the events
that transpired in Nashville. Although the Mobile Register sanctioned
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the Nashville Platform, its astute editor Thaddeus Sanford, a party
regular, privately disapproved of the resolutions and Wd not say
it in the paper." The essence of his charge dealt with the Platforms
denial of California's right to exclude slavery: "If there is any poli-
tical proposition to which the Southern Democracy i s committed, it is
to the doctrine that slavery is exclusively a state institution, and
that the people of a state have a right to institute it or to abolish
it, at their discretion."40 Sanford was speaking for Democratic party
loyalists and not for the extreme southernist wing in the party. A group
of these southernists gathered together in Barbour County and paid no
attention to constitutional subtleties. They asserted that the south
Should insist upon "a constitutional guarantee or an undoubted equivalent,
that the subject of slavery will not be again interfered with by the
Federal Government in any manner whatever."41 Conversely, in neighbor-
ing Macon County, planter-Whigs met and voiced loyalty to the Union while
condemning the Nashville proposal to stretch the Missouri line westward.
They endorsed the Compromise bills pending before Congress and condemned
"agitators at home who would rupture the tranquility of the Union."
In late August, eastern Black Belt ultras began to bestire them-
selves as they saw that political capital might be gained out of fermen-
ting opposition to the Omnibus bill. Montgomery and Barbour County
'^hotspurs," meeting at an all-day barbecue in Montgomery, heard speeches
pledging resistance if Congress passed the Clay ordinance. This gather-
ing, Yancey wrote, "took moderate yet firm ground." The Whig Alabama
Journal correctly ascribed the small attendance to "a want of sympathy
44in the agitation of this moment." Not even the eastern Black Belt,
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an area known for its ultraism, could be provoked into Wy southern
resistance" in the summer of 1850. Before the meeting was over, Yancey
was nominated by the gathering to represent Alabama extremists at a
southern-rights assembly to be held in Macon, Georgia, at the end of
August. Robert Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina would give a major ad-
dress and Georgia radicals were to make known their readiness for seces-
sion if the Compromise bills became law. 45 This meeting was significant
in other respects. With John C. Calhoun dead, Rhett and Yancey would
try to fill the leadership void in the southern nationalist movement.
Nearly 2000 attended the Macon meeting. Rhett urged Georgia to
secede pending Congress's recognition of slavery's rights in the terri-
tories. Yancey also called for disunion, asserting that "the argument
is exhausted and we must stand to our arms." No doubt Yancey was caught
up in the emotionalism of the moment. This was one of the rare public
occasions in which William L. Yancey openly advocated secession. His
overture had a great deal to do with the temper of his audience, the
majority of whom were predisposed to disunionism. It was at this meet-
ing that Whig James A. Meriwether reported to Howell Cobb that the "god-
like Rhett and his adjutant Yancey preached most eloquently in behalf
of treason...." Although this first convention of southern-rights
agitators was so highly charged as to earn its members the title "fire-
eaters," it failed to stir Georgia or any other slave state. 46 William
R. King best represented Alabama feeling, as well as that of most of
the south, when he declared, "one thing is certain, I am no disunionlst
nor am I prepared to sustain the extremism of the hotheads." King would
consent to secession only when all hope for safeguarding the "southern
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states of their essential rights is gone... God forbid that such a neces-
sity should ever be forced upon us."47 King was fundaraentally a moder-
ate on southern rights and would remain so until his death in 1853.
After all, for King, secession would mean forfeiting all political po-
sitions in the Union: personally it would mean beginning an uncertain
political career under a new government controlled by possibly unreli-
able politicians. Furthermore, as noted above, King was expressing the
sentiments of the vast majority of southerners as Congress prepared to
vote on the Omnibus bills.
In Congress, as the summer wore on, the polemics over the Compro-
mise measures once again engulfed the Alabama delegation. Senator King,
who had been appointed to the Foote Committee of thirteen to work on
the Clay measure, continued to display constraint in all his remarks. 48
Others, like David Hubbard, accused the north of pretending love for
southern Negroes; Just so they could cheat their "own white working men.'
Sampson W. Harris denounced all the Compromise bills and declared the
south could not accept them. Reserving his most bitter invective for
the fugitive slave law, he charged the north with disregarding the old
one and predicted it would do the same with the new measure. 50
Reacting against such tirades, Democrat W. R. W. Cobb admonished
his partisans to accept the compromise, "In times like these there is
no New York, no South, no West--just the United States. What is the
union of these states without communion of the people."51 It should
be emphasized that ultra Alabama Democrats were ignorant of public sen-
timent at home which was not susceptible to "hotspur" rhetoric.
During the senatorial debates, Senator Jere Clemens was all sound
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and fury. He censured northerners for "circulating Incendiary publica-
tions among our slaves...." During a night session Clemens announced,
"I do not know what Alabama may do but If she determines to resist this
[Compromise bill] by force, by secession, by any means, I am at her ser-
vice.... If this be treason, I am a traitor-a traitor who glories in
52the name." The loquacious Clemens soon found himself involved with
South Carolina "fire-eater" Robert Barnwell Rhett. Clemens was critical
of "Southrons" who could compromise with northerners. He accused Rhett
of having too many Unionist companions. Rhett responded by observing
that Clemens' real motives in defending southern rights was a desire to
be re-elected. 53 Significantly, when Clemens finally found out the true
opinion of the majority of his constituents he voted for the Compromise
items and wrote his supporters that the final draft would strengthen the
south. 54 Furthermore, two days before the bills had passed, Jere Clemens
presented to the Senate a set of resolutions drawn up by Montgomery fire-
eaters. These pronouncements predicted civil war if the territorial
issues were not settled to the satisfaction of the south. But Clemens
admitted, these resolutions did not represent over one-tenth of the
people of Alabama. He said that he wanted southerners to resist incur-
sions on their rights but wasn't willing to light the torch of civil
war.
55
Clearly, Clemens was now more in line with public feeling in
his section.
Clemens' colleague Senator William R. King, by mid-September,
was yearning for a settlement. He stated that he would support the bill
calling for the abolition of the District of Columbia slave trade on the
grounds that the public sale of slaves in the capitol, violated every-
165
one's good taste. Furthers, a fugitive slave ordinance, he claimed,
would be advantageous to both sections. 56 Quite obviously by September
1850 most moderate southern Democrats had dropped their opposition to
the Whig sponsored settlement of the territorial impasse. Without ques-
tion, the general conservative-to-moderate tenor of their partisans
back home was a major factor in determining their acquiescence.
By the end of September, the Compromise measures had passed.
As signed by President Fillmore, the final version had the following
provisions: New Mexico was created a territory without the Wilmot Pro-
viso, and Texas' claim to part of New Mexico was vacated for an indemnity
of $10,000,000; California was admitted as a free state; Utah was cre-
ated a territory without the Wilmot Proviso; a more stringent slave law
was enacted; the slave trade was abolished in the District of Columbia. 57
Both Alabama Senators voted for the Omnibus acts along with Con-
gressmen Cobb (D), Alston (W), and Hilliard (W). Voting against the
measures were Franklin Bowden (D), Sampson W. Harris (D), S. W. Inge
(D), and David Hubbard (D). All those who voted against the compromise
acts had built their political careers on southern militancy and probably
thought that massive radical pro-slavery sentiment would peak when news
Of the passage of the Congressional Compromise reached their constituents.
However, when the four Democrats returned to their districts--upper-
eentral and northwest Alabama--they found the franchised either apathetic
or backing the Congressional settlement.
But opposition to the Compromise appeared significantly in the
two districts represented by the Whigs. As noted previously, Henry
Hilliard of the Montgomery district and W. J. Alston of the Mobile
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district had voted for the Omnibus measures. This inspired opportunis-
tic Democratic ultras in the first and second districts, with their sight!
set on the Congressional elections of 1851, to hold public actings and
and compose petitions rejecting the Compromise in an attempt to create
a public mood favorable to secession.
In Lowndes County in the heart of Hilliard's bailiwick, protests
against the Compromise began to take place. Southern nationalists called
an anti-Compromise meeting and invited William L. Yancey to make an ad-
dress. Yancey could not attend but sent a letter decrying "this great
fraud on the South... the issue then is before us. Congress has boldly
tended it-submission or secession."58 Anticipating another southern
Convention that would recommend "manly resistance," he advised the Lowndes
ultras to petition Governor Collier toward preparation for Alabama's
participation in a slave state Assembly. Yancey also urged those gathered
to construct "Southern Rights Clubs" wherever 100 men could be gotten
together: "We shall know each other and we shall know, too, our foes."
He concluded by emphasizing that Alabama had been disgraced "by a base
submission to the unconstitutional act of a free soil Congress."59 Thus,
through the creation of Southern Rights Clubs, Yancey was attempting,
as he did in the late forties, to build a movement to propel himself
into the position of power broker in both state and national politics.
On the heels of the Lowndes meeting, the Eufaula Regency met and
drew up a request to Governor Collier. It stated that a special legis-
lative session should be called that would take steps to protect Alabama
from Congressional assaults. 60 Ultra editor J. J. Seibels wrote Governor
James Hammond of South Carolina asking him what his state would do with
16 7
respect to secession if Georgia backed out of supporting secession.
Georgia legislators, however, meeting at the end of October declined
to lead any disunion movement. 6
1
er sanc-
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Governor Henry Collier cautiously remained neutral, neith
tioning nor rejecting the Congressional Compromise. The Governor'
office was in Montgomery where the "fire-eaters" were most active in
trying to build a consensus for resistance. Thus, Collier was und
pressure from ultras to make a pronouncement against the Omnibus ordi-
nance and issue a call for a "Southern Convention." He was opposed to
calling a southern meeting unless the people demanded one. Alabama's
Nashville Convention delegates decided to gather again to discuss the
present crisis and Collier did not want to move until they, as well as
Other southern states, had acted. While Collier watched and waited,
the Atlas, Montgomery's most radical newspaper, did not. The paper,
Which was allegedly financed by Yancey, rhetorically asked, "Why should
6 2
we not secede?" J. J. Seibels, vying with Yancey for control of the
Montgomery firebrands, pronounced in his Montgomery Advertiser : "Sub-
mission or resistance are now the only alternatives .. .we shall not hesi-
6 3tAte to use the latter." John A. Campbell, meanwhile, pressured Go-
vernor Collier to announce a state convention or publicly announce his
refusal to do so.^
In the east-central counties of the Montgomery district pockets
of secessionist feeling were on the rise. John Cochrane of the Eufaula
eiique did not think there could be immediate secession, but rejoiced
that Alabama "hotspurs" engineered a gradual increase in disunionism
which by a "more or less rapid, but perfectly certain process would leaven
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the whole lump."65 One Barbour County southern-rights gathering peti-
tioned the Governor for an Alabama Convention to decide upon secession.
Russell and Macon Counties formed southern-rights clubs and sent unsigned
petitions demanding that the state take action against the recently
passed Compromise measures. 66 It is significant that no figures were
published as to how many people attended these meetings.
The Mobile district, home of another Whig representative, also
Witnessed a rise in ultraism. A fire-brand newspaper appeared in first
district Dallas county and declared: "We believe the late compromise
measures will warrant the secession of all slave holding states from
the union.,..We believe it the duty of every Southern State, collectively
or alone to secede from the union." ' 68 in early November 1850, Go-
vernor Collier received a disunion petition from forty-two Dallas County
extremists. Frustrated in efforts to take over a local Whig-Union meet-
ing, they had formed a southern-rights organization. They passed reso-
lutions prescribing secession as the "ultimate remedy" for the south.
George W. Gayle, a state legislator and former United States District
Attorney appointed by Van Buren, was one of the leaders of these Dallas
fire'eaters
.
Under pressure from these firebrand cliques, Governor Henry Collier
finally answered that public opinion had not agreed on what measures to
take and that he would not impulsively decide because the consequences
69
might be "irreparably disastrous." The Governor had taken an accurate
reading of the public pulse. Unionism and southern-rights moderation
dominated Alabama. For example, C. C. Langdon, Connect icut -born Whig
editor of the popular Mobile Advertiser, was a strong Unionist, and his
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stents were shared by the vast majority of Whigs in the Mobile dig .
trict. He told his readers that Hn comparison with the African Union,
the institution of slavery is not worth a groat- and "all other objects
Sink into insignificance."70 A niassive meeting of Monfcgomery^
led by lawyer-planter Ja.es Abercrombie and Howell Rose, insisted that
the co.pro.ise had to have a chance to work. 71 In early November, in
Marengo County, one of Henry Hilliard's important Whig-planter fiefs,
a ratification meeting was held in which Whig planters predominated,
and bitter debates ensued. John Wittenley, a Whig lawyer-planter, intro-
duced a motion sustaining Congress. It carried, and Marengo was in the
Union camp. 72 Senators William R. King and Jere Clemens returned from
Washington to drum up further support for the Congressional settlement.
After arriving in Montgomery, King commended the Whig meeting in Marengo,
the Whig Macon Republican praised Alabama's two Democratic Senators for
Voting for the Compromise and said that the issue "is not a party ques-
tion but of national loyalty."73 Unionist meetings under Whig leader-
ship were organized in Macon, Mobile, and Pickens Counties in mid-October;
and all claimed hundreds attended. 74 Nearly 2000 flocked to a nonpartisan
Union assembly in Mobile in late October. 75
Moderate southern-rights or Unionist Democrats from south Alabama,
politicians like Benjamin Fitzpatrick and Thaddeus Sanford, did net par-
ticipate in the Union movement because of its decidedly Whiggish char-
acter. With the Congressional elections a year off, the ultras in the
south Alabama Democracy were stirring up support in the lowland Democracy.
They had hopes of replacing the two Whig Congressmen representing the
Montgomery and Mobile districts. Meanwhile, Sanford' s Mobile Register,
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a Democratic moderate southern-rights Journal, steered a middle course
between approval of the Compromise and disunion. By October 15, however,
Sanford could "see in secession nothing that will add one iota of addi-
tional security to our property in slaves. He who advocates disunion
should be prepared to show some stronger reason for it than the abstract
right to resist wrong. He should be ready to show, firstly that it
be made effective, and secondly that it gives reasonable promose of
remedy...."76 Except for pockets Qf secessionist sentiment ^ Madis<
County, bailiwick of the Clay family, the overwhelming majority of north
Alabama Democrats were against "Rhettism. » Through the upcountry, Demo-
crats and Whigs held Union meetings which sustained the Compromise. 77
By October, Senator Jere Clemens came under attack by the radical
south Alabama press for his "newly found unionism." Whig editor William
B. Figures could not understand the controversy over Clemens when Col.
King "is permitted to pass unquestioned." King published letters in news-
papers contending that the Compromise did nothing to dampen the "honor
of the South" which stands in all its "original purity." The Constitu-
tion, he claimed, "has not been violated." Why, Figures asked, is Clemens
attacked? The answer "is because Mr. C.'s term expires first and there
will be a chance sooner for somebody to fill it. Does this prompt the
attack on the one, and the sparing of the other?" King voted for the
Compromise measures, Figures noted, and was a member of the Foote Committee
of thirteen which drew up the final draft. "His role must be embarrassing
to the Democratic agitators in south Alabama." The attacks on Clemens
like the stirring of extremist sentiment in south-central Alabama were
being done to build a movement that would topple the state's political
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insiders-both Whigs and Democrats-especially those of a moderate or
Unionist cast. Former Governor John Gayle believed that secession was
being mandated by "the madness of fanaticism in Alabama, by those
office-seekers who are practiced political Demagogues."78
Both Figures and Gayle correctly saw that many in the south Ala-
bama Democracy were using extreme rhetoric for political gain. But by
November, because of the strong sentiment in the state for the Compro-
mise, the Democratic Congressmen who voted against the Compromise were
wavering. Figures assessed this shift of position on the part of Alabama
Democratic southern-rights Congressmen who voted against the Omnibus
bill but after arriving home and testing public opinion now had second
thoughts
:
Harris and Inge are restrained by a wholesome
fear of the ballot box and are thus openly fear-
ful of confessing treason. Bowden ind ividually
is for secession, but goes with his district which
is not. Hubbard was a rank Rhettite while in
Washington; but during his stay among his consti-
tuents, he was mute as an oyster--he is an old
fox and knows the political currents too well not
to see nullification, disguised under the sooth-
ing name of secession, will not go down with his
people. He has, however, sinned enough to secure
his defeat by some good old Andrew Jackson Union
Democrat in his district. 79
George Smith Houston, aware of Hubbard's difficulty, made a strong Union
speech in the yeoman fifth district at the end of November. He asserted
that Alabama "should hold herself amenable to the laws of the Union how-
ever trying the circumstances or delicate the duty to perform."80 Houston
would have no trouble unseating Hubbard in the forthcoming Congressional
race.
While Unionism reigned supreme in north Alabama, the second session
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of the Nashville Convention got under way. Only five delegates from
Alabama attended: Reuben Chapman (D); George Williams (D); C. C. Clay,
Sr. (D); John A. Calhoun (D); Jefferson Buford (nullifying Whig). The
Alabama delegates who did not attend may have agreed with Whig William
M. Byrd of Marengo County who announced, "I am against all unnecessary
agitation-the country wants peace and quiet and cannot hope for such
a result by reassembly of the same delegates."81 The southern Conven-
tion adjourned after condemning the Compromise and reaffirming southern
resistance to aggression. It was a dismal affair. To further deflate
secessionist*, the Georgia legislature (in December 1850) approved the
Georgia Platform: "The state would abide by the Compromise but would
resist—even to a disruption of the Union—any more assaults upon the
82
South. During the Alabama state elections of 1851, this Platform be-
came a rallying device for southern-rights Democrats who were still equi-
vocal on the Congressional settlement. Also some ultras supported the
Georgia Platform and posed as conditional Unionists in order to appease
public sentiment.
There were fundamental economic causes for the lack of secession
sentiment in 1850. Cotton profits made a comeback in 1850. Its price
had risen from a low in 1848-1849 of 7.5 a pound to a profitable 12.3
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cents a pound in 1850. In September 1850 at the height of the turmoil
over the Compromise, a Sumter County planter wrote Governor Henry Collier
that "some of us here have good crops some of the best ever... how grand
84
the crop is...." This prosperity, remarked the fire-eating Spirit
of the South, explained the reluctance to undertake resistance "because
there is plenty to live on, because we are out of debt, and cotton brings
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to shut their eyes.. .in the consoling reflection that the future cannot
hurt the.."85 The Whig Alabama j^nal implored secessionists to ponder
whether "disunion will not give us a better price for cotton-will not
increase the value of slave property-will not render them more secure
-will not diminish taxation but will be likely under the best.
..state
of affairs to double taxation, diminish the price of our staples and
reduce the value of slaves and land fifty percent."86 Former Governor
James Hammond of South Carolina, visiting Mobile in the fall of 1850,
noted that disunionism had little chance against the high price of cotton
Thus, south Alabamians living in the cotton regions of the state, pleased
with high cotton prices, were not ready for disruption in 1850. Through-
out the turmoil over the Omnibus bills, north Alabama especially reaf-
firmed its traditional loyalty to the Union.
As a result of the pro-Union sentiments of the vast majority of
the electorate, few Democratic party regulars-the Montgomery Regency-
in south Alabama took part in the disunion gatherings organized by Mont-
gomery, Barbour, and Dallas county ultras. Most of those who did were
relatively young status-seeking lawyers and small planters. Montgomery
Regency party loyalists, except for Senator William R. King, generally
remained quiet and allowed the "hotspurs" to agitate the secession issue.
The Whigs of south Alabama claimed the Union issue for themselves. Thus
they left conservative-to-moderate lowland Democrats isolated while
"firebrand" Democrats tried to provoke secessionism among the voters.
Some of these Democratic ultras knew by the end of November that the
electorate could not be moved; nevertheless, they continued to call for
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the manipulation of the disunion issue> ^ perry ^
blyman and future secession of ^ ^^ ^
fided, before the common people will be prepared to resist insults and
injustices, in the proper manner, they must be made to know and feel
that they have been thus treated and this can only be done by the press,
and public description...."88 As noted earlier
, ^ motivations q£ J
east-central Alabama ultras was not based on southern principle exclu-
sively: The firebrand definition of southern rights in the fall of 1850
meant not only noninterference with white racial domination at home but
secession unless Congress abrogated the Compromise of 1850 and replaced
it with federal protection of slavery in the territories. Many of these
crisis mongers were agitating southern rights for the purpose of unseat-
ing the two Whig Congressmen in the Montgomery and Mobile districts whose
terms expired in August 1851. Since both Whig representatives had voted
for the Congressional settlement, the Democratic ultras of the first
and second Congressional districts were trying to fashion enough seces-
sion sentiment to topple the Whig mastery of the two lowland regions.
If the radical southern-rights men could achieve this political goal,
they could then possibly replace the Democratic party regulars in south
Alabama—men like King, Benjamin Fitzpatrick and Thaddeus Sanford--as
the power brokers in the Alabama Democracy.
Union Whigs saw the dilemma of Democratic conservatives and viewed
the Union issue as a means of making a political comeback in the state.
They could gain control of the. state, by aligning with Union Democrats
in north Alabama, and possibly win over Democratic regulars in south
Alabama.
175
The Democratic firebrands in the Montgomery and Mobile districts
were paying little heed to the public mood of their regions in their
use of disunion rhetoric to discredit the Whigs. At a January 7 meeting
of ultras from Henry and Barbour Counties, resolutions were passed con-
demning the Omnibus bills, which "ultimately could force the South to
secession, we believe the public mind and resources of the South should
be prepared for that alternative."89 These radical opportunists had
almost a total misunderstanding of the disposition of the citizens they
addressed their appeal to. For example, W. H. Crenshaw, a Butler County
planter, declared that, "I am not with the ultras....My doctrine is to
fight the issue in the Union and under the Constitution...."90 By the
end of January, some radicals finally began to see the necessity of
tempering their message. These ultras began broadening their appeal by
insisting the southern rights clubs were not designed to destroy the
Union, but to save it by thwarting abolitionism. They were, to be sure,
looking toward the August elections. Consequently, Eufaula firebrand
Jefferson Buford assured an audience that rather than dissolve the Union
they intended to maintain it "by putting an end to this war upon the
Constitution and upon our rights We do not declare an intention to
dissolve; we make no threat that we will secede in any contingency. 1,91
While some eastern Black Belt ultras began shifting ground, Whig-
Unionists began to organize. Some of the foremost Whig leaders in south
Alabama gathered in Montgomery on January 19. The vast majority from
west and south-central Alabama were lawyers, doctors and smal 1 planters,
and there were also prominent slaveholders: Robert Jemison from Tusca-
loosa; Thomas H. Watts from Montgomery; R. M. Patton from Lauderdale,
176
all of whom owned over 100 slave* 92 ni s
-
The Convention sustained the Con-
gressional Compromise and denied the right of secession, with their
sights set on the August elections, they endorsed the following slate
for Congress: editor C. C. Langdon in the Mobile district, rather than
W. J. Alston; and James Abercrombie of Russell County, who took Henry
Hilliard's place in the Montgomery district when the latter decided not
to run. The campaigns in the Montgomery-Mobile districts promised to
be bitter, and quite possibly Hilliard and Alston did not want to go
through distressing canvasses. Hilliard did agree to stump for Aber-
crombie. Judge William Mudd was selected to run in the third district;
William R. Smith ("little Billy"), a former Whig editor who became a
Democratic legislator in 1843 and a Unionist in 1850 to 1851, was selected
for the fourth Tuscaloosa district; George Smith Houston and W. R. W.
Cobb in the upstate fifth and sixth districts were endorsed-their selec-
tion represented a fusion effort with upstate Democrats. Significantly,
neither Houston nor Cobb rejected the Whig endorsement. Alexander White,
erstwhile Democrat who became a Union Whig in 1851, was selected for
the seventh Talladega district. 93
The Whig slate was formidable causing more Democratic Southern
Rights Clubs to temper their plea. Furthermore, additional ultras began
to recognize the moderation of the vast majority of south Alabama voters.
Thus the Lowndes County Southern Rights Association maintained that seces-
sion Was onlv the last resort and offered to cooperate with those favor-
* i 94ing other means of resistance.
A convention of Southern Rights Clubs opened in Montgomery on
February 10th. Only eleven counties sent delegates, ninety-seven in all.
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Almost all of the. were Democrats from the Montgomery and Mobile dis-
tricts, again indicating the relative weakness of secessionist senti-
ment. Willi** L. Yancey, who wrote the Convention resolutions, defended
the right of disruption by any state. However, he modified a call fox-
Alabama secession and in so many words said that Alabama should take
this step only if another slave state seceded. The resolution in its
final form read: "the question of the secession of Alabama is reduced
to that of time and policy only." m a dramatic mood, confirmed "hot-
spur" delegates went beyond Yancey and amended his plank, to read, that
Alabama secession "is only a question of time."95 Yancey obviously was
aware of the popular disposition in the state for tranquility but he
was out "Yancied" by southern nationalists who wanted to go beyond his
equivocal stand.
The secession resolution that emanated from the Montgomery meet-
ing splintered Alabama's southern-rights movement. Three Democratic
newspapers, all claiming to be resistance organs, asserted that the term
"time" (in the modified Yancey resolution) was too extreme. If "time
only" would determine Alabama action, Thaddeus Sanford declared, then
he did not believe in the right of secession. Sanford, essentially a
southern-rights moderate and party regular, insisted that Southern Rights
Clubs must repudiate the recommendations of the Montgomery convention:
"Let Us reject such ultra and quixotic schemes." The Mobile Calhounite
John A* Campbell agreed and opposed single state secession, advising
instead a boycott of northern goods. The Mobile Southern Rights Asso-
ciation under John A. Campbell later affirmed the right of disunion but
considered it "unwise for any state to secede by itself." Its meeting
178
was the scene of a violent dispute between fire
-eater Percy Waltcer and
Party-regular Thaddeus Sanford, editor of the Mobile Register, who wanted
an outright denial of the right of disunion. 96
Reflecting the Democratic rift, party newspapers in north Ala-
bama wanted to purge "stright outs" from the party: 'Wey and Co. are
now known-their purposes are revealed. Nothing but disunion will satisfy
them. Nothing but rebellion by Alabama. We accept the issue. This
Union is yet precious to us."97 Yancey's reputation as a consistent
secessionist partly resulted fro. this press characterization, clearly,
his behavior at the late southern-rights convention in Montgomery re-
flected more caution than "fire." Contributing to the internecine Demo-
cratic party conflict, Senator William R. King added an element of con-
spiracy. He saw a plot being hatched and told friends that his eyes
had been opened to the objects of the "self styled Southern Rights men"
whose real goal was to carry out "their disunion project" after promoting
themselves "as the bold defenders of Southern Rights. Good and true
men will abandon them to the fate that awaits them-the condemnation
of every patriot in the land."98 King's observations were politically
inspired; he had his hopes on the 1852 Democratic vice-presidential
nomination.
Understandably, the Whig press in particular presented Yancey
as the chief "secession culprit." The Alabama Journal and the Macon
Republican assigned the final version of the Montgomery southern-rights
resolutions to him, despite the fact that it was extremists who had
amended his resolutions in favor of separate action by Alabama. 99
While Democrats splintered over which "Southern" policy to pursue,
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district leaders in ft, spring of 1851 began selecting their
for the forthcoming state and Congressional elections. Governor Henry
Collier was the unchallenged nominee for a second term of the party
regulars. However, throughout the spring, Union Democrats confronted
challenges from southern-rights Democrats; in some instances southern
rights or secession Democrats disregarded the Congressional nominations
of district party men and contested the regular selections. For example,
Democratic-Unionist George Smith Houston wrested the fifth district nomi-
nation from incumbent ultra David Hubbard who persisted in running against
Houston as a secessionist Democrat. Williamson Cobb, another upstate
Democrat-Unionist, had no trouble in retaining support from district
party men in the sixth district but confronted Robert Murphy, a southern-
rights Democrat who stopped short of advocating secession. Significantly,
C. C. Clay, Jr., who had planned to run against Cobb, declined to con-
test giving up the challenge to Murphy. In the fourth Tuscaloosa dis-
trict, incumbent S. W. Inge, who refused to vote for the Compromise,
declined to run. He was replaced by planter John Erwin, a former Whig,
who stood as a southern-rights Democrat but was "utterly hostile to dis-
unionism in any of its phases." In the Montgomery district, east-cen-
tral "hotspurs" were able to nominate John Cochrane, a Democratic legis-
lator from Barbour County, who had been a state elector for Lewis Cass
and advocate of squatter sovereignty in 1848. Now in 1851 Cochrane
adopted the mantle of Democratic secessionist. In the third district
Sampson W. Harris ran for a third Congressional term as a southern-rights
Democrat. He stood on the Georgia Platform even though it sustained the
Compromise which Harris had voted against. In the seventh district
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rank opportunist Samuel F. Rice thought that he could gain a Congressional
seat by campaigning as a secessionist Democrat. He was defeated for
Congress as a regular Democrat in 1845, became a ^i8 in 1848, and once
.gain a Democrat in 1851. John Bragg, a moderate southern-rights Demo-
crat, gained the Mobile Democratic Congressional nomination. 100
Before the Congressional campaigns got under way, news reached
Montgomery in mid-Hay that South Carolina southern-rights organi 2ation S
had gathered to consider forcing their state into disunion as the only
means of combatting the Congressional Compromise. Palmetto state radicals
maintained that with California and New Mexico accepted as free states,
the political doom of the south had been determined. Hence, at the end
Of May 1851 Montgomery southern-rights members also convened. Yancey
again wrote resolutions encouraging South Carolina secession and stated
that all slave states had a duty to come to her aid if the federal govern-
ment Used force to prevent it. If "South Carolina should fail to secede,
euch failure will be the death knell of all hope of resistance to federal
Oppression... it will crush the spirit of the South and tend to consoli-
date this government upon the ruins of States Rights."101 Significantly,
Yancey did not propose intervention by Alabama on behalf of South Caro-
lina but cooperative defiance by the entire south.
Editor J. J. Seibels, meanwhile, had reached the end of his pa-
tience with Yancey. He had contended that sectional unity was a pre-
requisite to secession, and urged another southern convention. His
proposals were tabled by the Yancey-led assembly, whereas all of Yancey's
were adopted. Seibels then condemned Yancey and "his group of extremists."
He also attacked them for not fraternizing "with any man or set of men
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who will not now advocate a secession of Alabama fro, the Union." All
who suggested a course short of secession of AlabamaW to all intent,
and purposes submissionists or in other words, there could be but two
positions secession or .submission."102 This was an unfair reading of
Yancey's resolutions. He was not proposing Alabama secession but co-
operative action by all slave states if South Carolina should secede
and if the federal government should use force to prevent it. Hence-
forth Yancey's and Seibels' violent enmity became notorious.
The actions of the Montgomery southern-rights men did little to
resolve the stance of south-central Alabama Southern Rights Clubs; es-
pecially with the summer campaigns underway. Should Alabama ultras in-
sist that all radical candidates for office take a disunionist stance
or a more moderate position? To resolve this predicament, ninety repre-
sentatives from nineteen Clubs attended a June state-wide Southern Rights
Convention in Montgomery. As they had four months earlier, south-central
and east-central counties dominated. The Mobile organization under John
A. Campbell ran the meeting, and Yancey authored a set of moderate reso-
lutions. All were now well aware of the temper of public opinion in
the state. Consequently, they did not advocate the secession of South
Carolina. Alabama, like all southern states, should defend the right
of any slave state to secede and if the federal government acted coer-
cively, then force should be employed by her sister states.
Yancey's and Campbell's moderation extended to the gubernatorial
candidate. Although critical of the Compromise, Governor Henry Collier
had maintained a conservative position. He never endorsed South Caro-
lina's position, did not speak in disunionist terms, and refused to call
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a state convention to deal with the tectorial crisis. Therefore
,
_y
Democratic ultras opposed him. Under CarapbeU , s ^ ^
ever, and Yancey's compliance, the Convention came out for Collier.
One reason for the endorsement was the position of Benjamin Shields,
Collier's opponent. A Marengo County Democrat and a planter-lawyer,
Shields was running with Whig support. He began his campaign with the
motto,
-Union right or wrong, at all hazards, and to the last extremity."
Campbell's strategy rested on the assumption that an outright secessionist
would have no chance against a party regular like Collier or against
an avowed Unionist like Shields who had Whig support. 104
Campbell's stewardship of the Convention, it should be noted,
was a fascinating contrast to the erratic, demagogic, and discordant
guidance of Yancey's at past Southern Rights Club meetings. Unlike
Yancey, he tried to improve the prospects of ultra southern-rights can-
didates. Because of the prudent guidance of John A. Campbell, Alabama's
Southern Rights Clubs rejected the radical scheme of separate state
secession proposed by South Carolina Rhettites. Rather they proposed
a united action of all cotton states only if the federal government were
to use force on a seceding state.
Despite Campbell's attempts to improve the position of ultra
southern-rights candidates, they were in political trouble as the Con-
gressional campaigns heated up in July. The most bitter campaign occurred
in the Montgomery district, where ultra John Cochrane contested Whig-
Unionist James Abercrombie. (Abercrombie had replaced incumbent Henry
Milliard who had refused his party's re -nomination.
)
In the early spring Cochrane had come out for secession. He "prayed
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God that the South may tear her<?Plf fmm i-v,y n se ro the power of the Monster which
does not conceal its purpose."10 * John ^ ^ ^^^
cal Barbour County hotspurs" who had been agitating the disunion issue
since the fall of 1850 while aiming at the Congressional seat of Henry
Milliard. However, after the June Southern Rights Convention, Cochrane
"stopped breathing fire" and was circumspect on secession.
Second district Whigs desperately wanted to retain their hold on
the Montgomery district Congressional seat, and they prevailed upon Hill
iard, an outstanding debater, to take the stump for Abercrombie. Mont-
gomery district Democrats confronted with the prespect of answering one
of the state's most outstanding polemicists turned to William L. Yancey
whose reputation as a stump speaker was renowned. Thus, Cochrane and
Abercrombie had little chance to debate.
In the first clash between Hilliard and Yancey, the former tried
to put the secession onus on Yancey and his "client" Cochrane. Hilliard
maintained that no state had a lawful right to secede. 106 In a debate
at Union Spring, outside of Montgomery, Yancey scrupulously avoided the
Secession question and railed against Hilliard 's vote for the Compromise
bills- He also noted that his opponent had "too friendly an attitude
towards leaders of the North." 107 Hilliard replied by reminding his
audience that Yancey, while a Congressman, had voted for the Oregon bill
With its slavery exclusion amendment. He also cited "Yancey ' s .. .des ire
to dissolve the union" announced at the Macon, Georgia, fire-eaters
assembly in 1850» Both Unionists and southern-r ighists in attendance
agreed that Yancey had failed to deal with the real issue, namely seces-
108
s ion.
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In their next encounter, Yancey confronted the disunion issue,
following a long-winded, three-hour, account of the constitutional
lationship between federal and state government. "Action must be taken,"
he declared, "to reduce the power of the central government which pre-
vents the spread of slavery into the territories, and if that action
failed Alabama would have a constitutional right to secede." 109 Hilliard
responded that secession was revolutionary and not constitutional. Seces-
sion "was the best way to destroy slavery. If the South left the Union
all remaining options of slave migration in the United States would close." 11
In their last clash, Yancey returned to Hilliard 's southernism. He charged
the former Congressman with making speeches to "Abolitionists and Negro
thieves" in Boston and "wondered where Hilliard's true sympathies lie."111
Yancey's ad hominem tactics caused the remaining debates to be canceled.
He had not addressed himself to the question of single state secession,
but had only insisted on the theoretical right of secession.
When the election results were tabulated in the Montgomery district
run-off, Abercrombie triumphed by a 1600 margin. 112 These results con-
firmed the moderate-to-conservative mood of second district voters.
The election outcome, to some degree, was a triumph for Whig-planter con-
servatism.
However, in the Mobile district Democrats won a Congressional
victory only because of the sagacity of their standard bearer. John
Bragg, following the lead of the June resolutions of the Alabama Southern
Rights Convention, recognized the right of secession but opposed separate
state action. He also claimed to be a better "Southron" than his Whig
adversary, editor C. C. Langdon (who was born and reared in Connecticut).
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Bragg was able to unite all factions hostile to Langdon and he won by
1523 votes.
In the upper-central third district incumbent Sampson W. Harris,
a rabid southern-rights advocate who had voted against the Congressional
Compromise, restrained his ultra impulses. He was criticized for his
moderation by local fire-eaters who refused to go along with the June
resolutions of the Southern Rights Convention. They condemned Harris
as "one of the most dangerous conciliators of the South because he opposes
separate state secession." Harris' tactics worked, however; he stood
on the Georgia Platform—conditional Unionism--and defeated Whig William
Mudd by 538 votes. 114
Two former Whigs and sometime Democrats squared off in the fourth
(Tuscaloosa) district: John Erwin, a wealthy planter with 169 slaves,
and Judge "little Billy" Smith. Both opposed secession and sustained
the Compromise of 1850. Smith took only two of the five counties but
won by a slim edge--fifty ballots. 115
Southern-rights ultra Democrat David Hubbard in the upcountry
fifth district was silent on the disunion issue and had to defend his
vote against the Compromise. George Smith Houston had the support of
regular Democrats as well as Whigs and beat Hubbard in a landslide vic-
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tory.
Democrat Unionist W. R. W. Cobb in the sixth district had a vic-
tory over Robert Murphy his Democratic southern-rights challenger by
a majority of 3605 votes. 11
Samuel F. Rice, the ultra southern-rights standard bearer in the
seventh district, shifted to endorsement of the Georgia Platform when
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voters did not respond to his radical secession plank; he lost to Alex-
ander White, his Whig-unionist opponent, by a 373 plurality. 118
Thus the seven elected Congressmen-five Democrats and two Whigs
-campaigned as outright Unionists and conditional Unionists. These
Congressional results, in sum, reflected the Unionism of Alabama voters
regardless of their section, m 1851, cotton prices persisted over
twelve cents a pound. Few Alabamians wanted to jeopardize that.
Governor Henry Collier defeated Benjamin Shields, a Democrat who
was running with Whig support. Shields dropped out of the race because
of poor health in July, but his name remained on the ballot. Stepping
out of character, Collier spoke to the compromise and secession ques-
tions. He did not approve or disapprove of the Compromise. And he as-
serted that no slave state convention would be held unless the southern
people demanded one. He also came out against "all secession schemes."119
A significant feature of the campaign was the fusion of north
Alabama Union Democrats and Whig Unionists. This was part of a Whig
stratagem to gain political ascendancy in the state. Democratic party
regulars understood this Whig ploy. Three regulars, in a letter to the
Huntsville Democrat, rejected this tactic because it not only threatened
Democratic control but also gave credence to Democratic ultras. "The
amalgamation of Whiggery and Democracy we regard entirely unnecessary
as the dissolution of the Union is threatened only by small numbers of
persons in this state." If the firebrands were left "to their own re-
flections without being treated as a party demanding the combined oppo-
sition of Whigs and Democrats they would have to change their tactics
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in order to be elected."
t
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Lon re-
Despite the air of conciliation manifested by the electic
turns, some newspapers continued their attack on those opposed to "straight
out" secession. Foremost among them-all east-central papers-were The
Spirit of the South, journal of the Eufaula clique; the Hayneville
Chronicle
;
and the Dallas Gazette, mouthpiece of the Dallas County ultras.
After the 1851 outcome, they believed "all is lost-life, liberty, lands,
slaves, all is lost
-overwhelmed on the torrent of anarchy, which abo-
lition will pour upon our glorious land."121 Or as another lamented,
"The proposition [election results] then amounts to a total surrender
of ourselves and all we have into the hands of an abolition party."122
The Whig press responded to the ultra journals by accusing eastern
Black Belt southern-rights leaders of disunionism and opportunism. A
Whig paper identified the leaders of "the traitorous bands of Disunion
in the state." Yancey and his law partner John Elmore, both from South
Carolina, led the list followed by "George Goldthwaite an old Cass man;
John Cochrane, also a late Cass man; George Williams, a nullifying Whig;
Jefferson Buford, a nullifying Whig; Mr. James Pugh, a former Taylor
elector and South Carolina nullifier; Col. Seibels and John A. Campbell,
devoted followers of Mr. Calhoun and no one else." The account further
Stated "nine times out of ten they will prove to have come from South
Carolina (whether calling themselves Whigs or Democrats of late) they
are nullifiers." Their all-consuming "wish is to ride both the old parties
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to the devil and to control the Governme^*- for themselves." It is
Interesting to note that the disunionists on the list had all been quiet
on secessionisin during the 1851 election. Seibels parted company with
the Montgomery ultras. Campbell maneuvered himself into a centrist
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southern-rights position. After his defeat, Cochrane tended .ore to
his law practice and suppressed his secessionist sentiments. Yancey
did not come out for immediate secession while stumping for Cochrane.
After the August outcome, Yancey was particularly despondent.
He indicted all traditional party organizations, observing that "the
Southern Rights cause, per se, has no organization here"; and he also
perceived the motives of most southern-rights extremists: "One half
of those who were its advocates in name, are as much submissionists as
the Union men. I look on merely and will take no part in aiding a re-
organization of the old Democratic party. A Presidential election would
effectively kill off all that remains of Southern Rightism if its friends
Were to go into it, under old party colors." 124 Yancey's prediction
would prove correct. In 1852--a Presidential election year--there was
an exodus of southern-rights men back into the Democratic party.
Students of Alabama's secession movement have affirmed the leader-
ship role Yancey played in the events of 1851. Henry Meyer contends
that Yancey led "a strong faction in Alabama, the 'Yanceyites 1 , " which
exhibited a zealous devotion to the idea of secession. Alabama ultras,
according to this interpretation, unwaveringly adhered to principle.
But, as indicated, Yancey's political behavior in 1851 was erratic. At
the February southern-rights meeting in Montgomery his cooperative seces-
sion resolution was amended from the floor by a "hotspur" bloc. In June
he yielded to John A. Campbell and the Mobile Southern Rights Club.
Campbell swung the delegates into line behind a mild resistance resolu-
tion that supported collective southern action. Yancey also joined
the Convention in endorsing conservative Governor Henry Collier for re-
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election. He carefully shunned instant secession while debating Henry
Milliard and talked only of the abstract right of disunion. From the
time of his resignation from Congress, states Ralph Draughon, Jr.,
Yancey usually was consistent in refusing to cooperate with Democrats
unless they lived up to what he regarded as correct principles. 126 But
as noted above, his correct principles included evasion and often a re-
fusal to commit himself to outright secession. Clearly, there were more
consistent southern nationalists. George W. Gayle of the Dallas County
ultras displayed a more determined adherence to unqualified secession
than did Yancey. Yancey's most consistent characteristic was an immo-
deration which alienated those around him. His antagonists were legion.
Bellicose rhetoric, a hot temper, and an overweaning ambition for poli-
tical power and notoriety, seem to have been his most distictive traits.
After the 1851 election, Alabama Democrats began reorganizing
their party with Governor Collier, Senator King, Benjamin Fitzpatrick,
Thaddeus Sanford, and Secretary of State William Garrett among the prime
movers. All of these party regulars came from south-central Alabama
and, as noted earlier, they played a minimal role in the acrimonious
political struggles of their region in the campaign of 1851. Whig edi-
tor William B. Figures remarked that Democratic reorganization means
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"putting the State back under the Montgomery Regency." Editor J. J.
Seibels helped out by boosting the stock of William R. King for the
Vice-presidency in 1852. Admitting that he had formerly been at odds
with King, Seibels now declared that past differences should not fore-
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#3®*e the necessity for party harmony. 128 In addition to being a unity
«a,.ure, reorganization would have other functions; namely, bringing
m Dem°crat^ especially upstate Unionists who collaborated with the
Whigs, into line in time for the forthcoming Presidential campaign.
As to Democrats who by choice remained "outside the pale/' Democratic
loyalist Vhaddeus Sanford felt that it would be "a Godsend to our party
if Yancey and the hotspurs no longer curse our councils by their trai-
129mm* alliance." Similarly, Senator John Slidell of Louisiana praised
Alabama's regular Democrats for their leadership in putting the party
back into the national Democratic ranks and advised, "As to the Rhetts,
Yanceys, and etc., the sooner and more effectively we get rid of them
the better,...."130
On .January 8, 1852, the Democratic party held its state Conven-
tion and adopted a resolution standing on the finality of the Compromise.
"The south Alabama Democrats and their newly found Union allies [upstate
Democrats] met," an observer to the caucus reported, "and the former pushed
the latter forward by giving them the promise of offices." The meeting
unanimously endorsed William R. King for either the presidential or vice-
presidential nomination. Delegates to the national convention in Bal-
131timore were chosen. By early spring the traditional shaky alliance
between Alabama Democrats had been re-established.
With the re-united Democrats controlling the General Assembly, they
turned on their opponents. They pushed *« ordinance through the state
legislature which redistricted Congressional districts in order to give
themselves an advantage. It gerrymandered Black Belt Whigs counties
and, increasing the number of Democratic upcountry counties, gained three
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more legislature seats for the Democrats. 132
Alabama Whigs, besides being electorally crippled in Alabama,
faced another dilemma when they met to select a delegation for their
presidential nominating convention to be held in Philadelphia. Many
believed that Millard Fillmore was the only viable Whig candidate out-
side the south, und instructed delegates to vote for him. The Whig
leaders, Judge Arthur Hopkins of Mobile and Thomas Hill Watts, the rich
planter of Montgomery, deplored the national party schism into cotton
and conscience factions. They felt that the northern wing had been
abolitionized. The fear of Congressmen Alexander White and James Aber-
crombie that abolitionized Whigs could control the convention and that,
therefore, Fillmore did not have a chance, prompted them to decline nomi-
nation as delegates. Both believed that a candidate not committed to
the Compromise would be chosen. Winfield Scott's selection confirmed
their suspicions and they refused to campaign for him. 133
During the presidential contest of 1852 Alabama Democrats went
great lengths to point out to all Unionist s--Whig and Democrat--that
their party nominee, Franklin Pierce, could be depended on to uphold
the 1850 compromise. Meanwhile, Scott was depicted as a tool of the
anti-slavery [Conscience] Whigs of the north. Taking advantage of
the vast pro-Compromise sentiment in Alabama, William R. King, who was
selected as the vice-presidential nominee on the Pierce ticket, publicly
stated, "I was probably the first individual in the slave holding states
who publicly took ground in favor of acquiescence." He made it known
that if he became President he would veto any attempt to repeal the
Fugitive Slave Act. Senator King expressed satisfaction at sharing the
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ticket with Pierce. Though possibly lifted in "information and poli-
tical experience/' Pierce was a "firm and decided supporter of the con-
stitutional rights of the South."135
With the presidential campaign heating up, "last ditch" ultra
southern-rights delegates, sixty-two in all from eight east-central
counties, met in Montgomery on September 13 to decide whom to support
for the Presidency. This was part of a growing movement throughout
Black Belt counties in the Gulf states (particularly Mississippi and
Alabama) to nominate fire-eaters for the 1852 presidential election.
They endorsed two southern-rights extremists, George Troup of Georgia
for President and John A. Quitman of Mississippi as his running mate. 136
Troup was a radical southern nationalist and former legislator from
Georgia, and Quitman was an ex-governor of Mississippi.
Yancey remained silent on the Presidential question. Dallas
County firebrand George W. Gayle asked him to quell the uneasiness of
the ultras, who had heard that he would campaign for Pierce. "If my
vote were at all necessary," Yancey replied, "to give the vote of this
state and to elect General Pierce in order to prevent the election of
13 7General Scott, I should feel it my duty to vote for General Pierce."
Yet he insisted Troup and Quitman were his first choice; but he did not
campaign for them. He did not even cast a ballot in this election, and
justifying it, he claimed that legal business had taken him away and he
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couldn't vote. Since 1846, like his intellectual mentor, John C.
Calhoun, Yancey had condemned national party loyalty for its temporizing
effect; but in 1852 he began a flirtation with the Democratic party
which would ultimately effect his entering its ranks again.
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In Alabama, Pierce and King defeated Scott and Graham, 26,637
to 14,713. The Troup-Quitman ticket received 2175 votes. 139 The turn-
out percentage was 47; that is, less than half of Alabama's eligible
voters, 53 percent, did not vote. 140 The Whigs carried seven counties
—all in south-central Alabama—and four of them had high slave percen-
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tages. Troup took two Black Belt counties-Lowndes and Barbour-home
of the Eufaula Regency. The meager showing of ultra southern rightists
was restricted to the Black Belt: slightly ov^r 200 votes in Autauga
and Dallas Counties and nearly 150 in Wilcox County. They collected
ten votes in north Alabama; and five each in Franklin and Lawrence Coun-
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ties. Significant numbers of east-central Whigs, C. C. Cole affirms,
cast ballots for Troup and Quitman because they felt Pierce and Scott
1A3
were too northern in orientation. Certainly, Barbour County's "nulli-
fying Whigs," led by Jefferson Buford and James Pugh, voted heavily for
Troup. Pierce swept the highland Democracy and twenty-seven counties
in south-central Alabama. The total vote was 23,000 less than the entire
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vote cast in the Congressional elections of 1851.
For a majority of Alabamians, then, the issue had been settled
in 1851. Union sentiment predominated. Pierce? Scott? Troup? All
this was anti-climatic. Of greater importance was that Democratic party
regulars maintained control. And of even greater consequence was that
the Whig party began to disappear after 1852. Thereby the strongest
Union bloc in south-central Alabama was eliminated and new political
opportunities opened up for these aggressive "hotspur" cliques in east-
central Alabama.
CHAPTER V
THE SIMMERING FIFTIES: FACTIONALISM, OPPORTUNISM, AND SOUTHERN RIGHTS
By the eighteen fifties most central and south Alabama Democrats
as well as some Whigs from east-central Alabama referred to themselves
as southern rights advocates. In the fifties southern rights meant main-
taining the economic benefits of slavery along with preserving the only
system of racial adjustment that could effectively keep blacks controlled
and subordinate. Southern Rights also intended the expansion of slavery
westward. The more strident among these Southern extremists, also in-
sisted that Congress pass a federal slave code insuring slavery's exis-
tence in the South and its rights in the territories. This was "The Ala-
bama Platform" first proposed in the late 1840's. Many south Alabama
politicians also considered southern rights challenged by northern cri-
ticism of slavery, and went so far as calling for a halt--by statute--
of all criticism of the south's peculiar institution. Most of these
southern extremists, throughout much of the 1850' s, did not call for
secession. They still saw their political future tied to the national
Democratic party. The vast majority of their constituents did not find
disunion to be a rational solution to the national debate over slavery.
These south Alabama politicians were obsessed with gaining high
office. Consequently, while southern rights advocates, they would often
challenge each other in local and congressional elections, and by acusing
each other of being "soft on southernism", they would manipulate the
southern-rights issue to their own advantage.
However, by 1853 southern-rights agitation had subsided, although
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some residual Black-Belt southern rights associations did continue to
operate. These clubs functioned as pressure groups within the south-
central Alabama Democracy. Leading fire-eaters tended to be inactive
in the mid-fifties and southern rights receded in importance. William
L. Yancey, for example, became a full-time lawyer for three years, sel-
dom taking part in politics.
Another manifestation of waning sectional tensions was Alabama's
initial response to the Kansas-Nebraska Act of May 1854. Illinois Sen-
ator Stephen A. Douglas chairman of the Senate committee on the terri-
tories confronted the territorial question. He had supported the Compro-
mise of 1850, but he reopened the slavery issue in 1854 when he sponsored
the Kansas -Nebraska Act which, superceded the Missouri Compromise. This
act endorsed the popular sovereignty doctrine--all questions pertaining
to slavery in the territories were to be left to the people residing
there. Upstate Alabama, which had areas of lowest slave density, un-
derstandably endorsed the measure with enthusiasm. South-central Alabamians,
who lived in areas densely populated by slaves, first expressed concur-
rence with and only later resentment toward the act. One reason was
simply indifference to matters so remote from the State. Indeed all
of Alabama was preoccupied with such issues as bank reform, temperance,
and state aid for railroads; by 1853 local issues preoccupied Alabamians;
so did Whig attempts to forestall Democratic gerrymandering.
In 1853 Governor Henry Collier selected Benjamin Fitzpatrict to
complete the senatorial term of Vice President-elect William R. King.
King had died in the spring of 1853, and with his death leadership of
the Alabama Democracy passed to Fitzpatrick. King's death not only re-
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moved the leading exponent of unionism in south Alabama's Democracy but
also a party manager whose ability in pulling disparate elements together
was unmatched. When the territorial controversy heated up after 1856,
Fitzpatrick's skill in uniting all factions of the party-ultra, moder-
ate and unionist
--would be severely tested and found lacking.
Eighteen fifty-three also marked the last gubernatorial term of
Governor Henry Collier, and the State confronted congressional, legis-
lative and senatorial elections as well. Temporary silence on the issue
of slavery did not bring to an end the factionalism within the Democratic
Party. Nor did it stifle the opportunistic scheming among southern rights
politicians—and the jockeying for position. Witness, for exanple, the
political opportunism of Democratic State Representative Boiling Hall
from Autauga County in the third Congressional district who sought high
political office.
Hall considered himself a defender of southern rights; so did
Sampson W. Harris, the third district Democratic Congressman. But Hall
began in January 1853 a private campaign to wrest the third district
Congressional nomination from the incumbent Sampson W. Harris. Hall,
a Montgomery Regency political boss from Autauga County, joined his
"advance man" newspaper editor John Hardy, in planning to pave the way
for his own elevation by securing the gubernatorial nomination for Re-
presentative Harris.*
Even though Hardy learned that Harris himself rejected the guber-
2
natorial trade off, there is evidence that most of the Montgomery Regency
3
were also behind Harris' removal from his present post. While in Selma,
in Dallas County, Hardy wrote Hall that "the Democrats I have talked to
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...are disposed to give aid to any respectable man other than Harris-
the Southern Rights men are opposed to his running, to a man, while the
Union portion are disposed to try somebody else." Furthermore, Hardy
confided that a district convention would be forthcoming and "if the
thing is discreetly managed you can be the nominee for Congress...."4
In sum, although Hail like Harris was a Democratic southern rights advo-
cate Hall's appetite for high office did not deter him from contesting
a fellow "Southron."
The Democratic state convention got under way in Montgomery on
May 2, 1853. Only thirty-eight of the fifty-two counties sent delegates
since northern and south-eastern regions of the state failed to do so.
John A. Winston, an opulent and flamboyant planter-lawyer from Sumter
County, was considered the frontrunner for the gubernatorial post. Win-
ston had publically taken a stand against state aid for railroads and
other internal improvements, thus receiving support from anti-internal
improvement Democrats all over the state. Winston had three contenders:
Judge Thomas A. Walker of Benton County, his most serious challenger;
Sampson W. Harris of Coosa, placed in nomination by Boiling Hall's sup-
porters; and J. L. F. Cottrell of Lowndes. By the seventh ballot Winston
became the unanimous choice of those assembled, and Hall's strategy to
get Harris nominated was thwarted.^
After Harris' defeat in the Democrat caucus, John Hardy revealed
to Boiling Hall that he had been unable to get support for Hall in the
various district Democratic meetings, and advised him to try and retain
his Assembly seat. A Montgomery Regency worker told Hall that the Southern
Rights Club of Mulbury in Autauga County was "prepared to nominate a
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southern rights candidate for his seat." Hall's correspondent also said
that he would try and control "the Club at Battville and appoint such
delegates to the proposed County caucus as will certainly attend and
oppose any nomination being made except yours."6
Southern-rights ultra W. D. Smith soon emerged as Hall's chief op-
ponent, and C. M. Jackson, another key Montgomery Regency campaign worker,
sent a party loyalist to see Smith and try to prevent him from challeng-
ing for Hall's seat. Finally, however, Jackson advised Hall not to con-
tinue obstructing Smith's candidacy for, he concluded "it would be more
pleasant for you to meet and contend openly against a tangible opponent,
than to be antagonized.
. .continually by those who are disaffected towards
you." He was sure of Hall's success, he added, despite the fact that
"90 per-cent of the Whig party in this County will vote for your Demo-
catic Southern Rights opponent." 7 This information indicates that even
though many Whigs in Autauga County were vocal unionists they were will-
ing to put principle aside in order to defeat a hated member of the Mont-
gomery Regency.
Seeking help from any and all during the canvass, Hall agreed to
uphold temperance reform if elected and received support from the chair-
man of Alabama's Temperance Society. By July W. D. Smith dropped out
9
of the race, and Hall was informed by a Regency member that "scarcely
any Southern Rights Democrat" would vote against him.^
As to the Whigs, they held their convention in Montgomery--in
order to select a gubernatorial candidate and fashion a party platform.
Alabama Whigs, ever fearful of the growing fragmentation of the national
Whig party--the struggle between Cotton and Conscience Whigs in the North--
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came out against the further annexation of the territories unless the
rights of slave states could be provided for. They chose as their can-
didate Richard W. Walker of upstate Lauderdale County. Referring to
the growing dissent within the national Whig party, he told the dele-
gates that Alabama's politicians should stop trying to manipulate na-
tional issues that really had no effect on the State; and he called in-
stead for a vast program of internal improvements. However, before the
gubernatorial campaign got under way he became^m retired from the race
and was replaced by William S. Earnest of Jefferson County. 11
Democrats nearly swept the congressional and gubernatorial races.
John A. Winston easily defeated his Whig opponent for Governor; and
Boiling Hall succeeded in holding on to his legislative seat.
Other local elections of 1853 illustrate the growing opportunism
exhibited by Alabama's politicians. In Montgomery second district, Whig
Congressman James Abercrombie confronted southern rights Democrat David
Clopton of Tuskegee, Macon County. Abercrombie had been an outspoken
nullifier and states rights Democrat in 1832; by 1844 he was a Whig na-
tionalist. In 1849-1850 he advocated a rigid defense of southern rights,
but was a union Whig again after the Nashville convention. In yet another
switch, in 1852, he rejected the Whig presidential candidate as being
too "northern." This reversal caused the Democratic fire-eating Spirit
of the South to endorse Abercrombie as a more forthright southern na-
tionalist than Clopton and this in turn helped to secure Abercrombie 's
victory.
In the Huntsville sixth district the redoubtable Democrat unionist
W. R. W. Cobb confronted the influential southern rights Democrat C. C.
200
Clay, Jr. In previous challenges Cobb defeated a distinguished array
of fellow Democrats including William Acklin, a north Alabama party
manager, and Senator Jere Clemens. Now in 1853 he won overwhelmingly,
receiving massive unionist support, both Democratic and Whig, and carry-
ing every county in the district except one. After his defeat, Clay
announced: "The time is not far distance when an advocate of southern
rights instead of being reviled as a disunionist, will be respected in
north Alabama as maintaining the Union."13
Democrats won every congressional race except one. Three of the
victors were southern rights Democrats and three were considered pro-
union. James Abercrombie, the only Whig elected, campaigned as a sou-
thern rights Whig. With the exception of William Smith in the fourth
Tuscaloosa district, all those who were victorious in south-central Ala-
bama—a region of dense slave population—campaigned as southern rights
advocates regardless of their party. Such advocacy would presist in
south Alabama and provide a congenial home when secession sentiment re-
turned in the late fifties. However, some conservative Whig-unionist
planters from west-central Alabama would reappear during the presidential
campaign of 1860 and make a last effort to keep the State in the Union.
During the fall of 1853 Boiling Hall served as a clearing house
for political news on the forthcoming senatorial election. Democrat
Jere Clemens was up for reelection, and Benjamin Fitzpatrick, who had
been appointed to William R. King's seat, required legislature confir-
mation. Fitzpatrick ' s election by the Assembly was assured. Clemens,
however, faced certain defeat. All of south Alabama stood against him
since he had antagonized the Democracy by supporting the Taylor-Fillmore
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administration.
C C. Clay, Jr., a keen observer of political maneuvering analyzed
the candidates and left the door open for himself:
Clemens swears he will be elected as he was before
...if he can t be elected by the Dem. party he
will be by the Whigs... I do not think he can be
elected by either party. L. P. Walker will be
urged forward by some friends; but as his Democracy
only dates back to the old men of the party
think his probation not long enough
... .Genl . Hous-
ton[ s] claims are urged by the Union Dem S ...and
favored by the Whigs....And last and perhaps least
of the list of patriots who are willing to serve
their country is your humble servent I confess
to you that I desire an election because I feel
that I have been beaten by an ass for the H. of
Rep. [Cobb] because of my state rights principles
and thro' a combination of Whigs and pseudo Dems.,
who falsely represented me as a Disunionist
. . .
.
It would be best to elect one Senator from this
region. It would tend to harmonize the party, to
remove sectional strife, and if chosen from the
states rights wings, to revive the sinking fortunes
of the party [southern rights segment of the Demo-
cratic party] in this region. You see the Whigs
here are determined to unite with the Union Dems.
...and thus crush the States-rights men who aspire
to any office. Without some help we will be
crushed
.
^
It is unlikely that there was a cabal of upstate union Whigs and Demo-
crats to "crush 11 Democratic southern rights candidates. But Clay pointed
to the 1853 gubernatorial returns in order to show that John A. Winston
had been beaten by A. Q. Nicks--the choice of upstate union Democrats
who had boycotted the 1853 convent ion- -in Dekalb and Marshall Counties,
that Winston had received a slight plurality in Madison and slim margin
in Blount, Jrrkson, and St. Clair Counties. 15 According to Clay, this
meant that unionism was ascendent in the highland counties owing to a
plot between Whig and Democratic unionists. Clay failed to note that
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north Alabama, the region of lowest slave density i„ the state, had b,
strongly pro-union since Andrew Jackson's presidency.
Upstate unionist Nathaniel Davis was, he told Hall, "of the opin-
ion that two Senators cannot be elected from the South or North Alabama
nor can two be elected from the Southern rights Democracy nor two from
the Union Democracy, the only safe plan at this time will be to take one
from north and one from the south and one from the S. R. Dem. and one
from the Union side." He recommended Benjamin Fitzpatrick and George
Smith Houston. 16 However, there were south Alabama southern rights Demo-
crats who, when confronting north Alabama Democratic aspirants for federal
office, would insist upon candidates espousing southern rights principles.
This Democratic party leader agreed upon Fitzpatrick but recommended
L. P. Walker, a sometime southern rights agitator from North Alabama,
for Jere Clemens senatorial seat. A month later, however, George Yel-
verton wrote Hall expressing his support for Eufaula ultra and Democrat
John Cochrane who was seeking the same senatorial post. In support of
his brief for Cochrane, Yelverton cited Cochrane's pro-Buchanan stance
in 1848. 17 In sum, it is difficult to determine ideological consistency
among many southern rights advocates. They praised national party re-
gularity and at the same time embraced "devotion to southern rights."
At the end of November 1853 the General Assembly met to select
two senators. With little opposition Benjamin Fitzpatrick was elected
for the term which was to expire in March 1855. C. C. Clay Jr.'s appeal
to southern rights partisans in south Alabama coupled with upcountry sup-
port gave him enough votes to unseat Jere Clemens and to become senator.
1
8
A Whig paper lamented that two "fire eaters had been elected." This
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is somewhat exaggerated since Fitzpatrick had never identified with the
extreme southern rights faction in south Alabama. Likewise, Clay never
carried his southern rights convictions so far as to mean disunion.
With the territorial question quiescent during this period, the
Democrats again turned to their opposition. Alabama Whig strength was
centered in the east and west-central Black Belt region of massive slave
density. The Whigs tried to repeal the 1843 'white basis "--which abolished
the federal ratio, the three-fifths compromise^ and excluded blacks in
reckoning population in the formation of congressional districts. On
January 20, 1854, the Alabama senate defeated this Whig maneuver in a
strict party-line and sectional vote: The Black Belt Whig counties voted
for it and the Democratic counties of north and south Alabama opposed. 19
The Democrats then took the advice of G. T. Yelverton and gerrymandered
the Whig Black Belt counties. Montgomery, Macon, and Russell Counties,
which were formerly in the second Montgomery district, were placed in
the third district. This district would be carried by the Democrats in
the 1855 congressional election. Lowndes and Butler counties were moved
into the second district which also tipped that traditional Whig enclave
into the Democratic column in 1855. These maneuvers confirmed the Mont-
gomery Regency's control over the Black Belt second and third districts. 20
The elimination of Alabama Whigs had dire consequences for union
sentiment in the State. Most unionists in south Alabama had grouped
around the Whig party. With it gone, the only effective union organi-
zation in south-central Alabama disappeared. The area fell under the
control of a Democratic party dominated by southern rights defenders--
either moderates or radicals. By the late fifties, it was hazardous to
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be an outright unionist in south Alabama. Although, as noted earlier,
during the crisis of 1860 some old conservative planter Whigs tried to
make a comeback with the Constitutional Union Party in order to preserve
the union and slavery.
The 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act compounded the problems of Alabama
Whigs. Whig leaders like Henry Hilliard and Thomas Watts saw the popular
sovereignty doctrine embodied in the Kansas
-Nebraska bill further erode
the principles of the Compromise of 1850--considered a Whig solution.
For conscience Whigs in the North now lined up behind absolute prohibi-
tion of slavery in the territories and began aiding in the construction
of a national party to that end. By 1854 some Alabama Whigs joined the
Democrats, but the majority moved into the Know-Nothing party.
Kansas -Nebraska, which superceded the old 36-30 line established
by the Missouri Compromise, committed the Democratic Party and the exe-
cutive branch to popular sovereignty. To Alabama ultras this measure
meant that, with a preponderance of northern migrants already in Kansas
slavery could not extend westward. But Alabama's congressional delegation,
except for Whig James Abercrombie hewed the party line and voted for the
measure. They did so for a few apparent reasons. Alabama's Congressional
delegation's support for the Kansas-Nebraska bill derived from the belief
that the federal government was legally bound
--what ever the territorial
governments did--to protect property in slaves. The influential Mobile
Register was also willing to endorse the measure; it said both north
and south had mutually agreed to "repeal the unjust restriction of 1820
and to refer the whole subject of slavery in the territories and States
to the people there of, under the controlling restrictions of the
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Constitution."
Another motive was northern anti-slavery opposition to the Kansas
Nebraska Act which inspired Southern congressmen to support the measure.
For example, the Alabama Beacon declared, "in view of the violent oppo-
sition it [the Kanasa bill] encountered from the
. . . .Abol it ionists the
South especially, and the true friends of the country have a cause for
congratulation."22 A Democratic organ noted "that the Southern people
are unanimous in support of the measure."23 A claim that was not as
unequivocally accurate as this paper declared. For example, in the Ala-
bama Assembly firebrand David Hubbard presented a resolution in 1854
which maintained that if the southern interests were jeopardized by fe-
deral anti-slavery acts Alabama would resist these ordinances. State
representative James Belser, occasionally a Whig and a Democrat and some-
time fire-eater and sometime unionist asserted that if the Kansas bill
were passed and if it threatened southern rights he would recommend "re-
sistence to the uttermost." Hubbard's resolution passed 42-14. 2^
Perhaps the state political scene seemingly so contradictory on
this territorial issue is best explained by J. L. M. Curry. Curry in
the late fifties would wear the mantle of southern-rights extremist and
be elected to Congress from the seventh Talladega district. But in 1854
he wrote to Senator Clay and congratulated him for his vote in favor of
the Kansas-Nebraska bill: "Men here universally approve your action
but there is no excitment--no fever, on the subject it is seldom allude'
to in private or public--and so far as the introduction of slavery is
25
concerned, such a consummation is hardly hoped for." " In sum, David
Hubbard's resistance resolution to Kansas-Nebraska apparently reflected
a minority position. Most Alabamians, it seems, approved the Douglas
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ordinance or greeted it with apathy.
Meanwhile, in the summer of 1854 Alabama Democrats began to pre-
pare for the 1855 congressional elections. Writing to Clay, J. L . M.
Curry declared that "the division of our state into North and South Ala-
bama, and the election of candidates according to degrees of latitude
...begin now to work their own cure...." An upcountry Democrat, Curry
informed Clay, that Clay was not the unanimous choice of north Alabama.
But Curry also told his correspondent that the^Senator was considered
an outstanding southern loyalist.
Indeed Clay had earned his "southron" credentials by opposing
the latest Homestead bill which he, along with Black Belt southern na-
tionalists, maintained would draw poor southerners to rich northern lands.
Not only would the south lose a good deal of its population if the bill
were to be enacted but, he added, "it will prove a most efficient ally
for Abolition, by encouraging and stimulating the settlement of free
farms with Yankees and foreigners precommitted to resist the partici-
27pacy of slaveholders in the public domain."
We may speculate as to why Clay opposed the Homestead bill while
two upstate Alabama congressmen favored it. Clay needed the good opinion
of south-central Alabama Democrats, most of whom were southern rights
advocates, since they held the balance in the legislature. Coming from
the highland Democracy, he had to prove his "southron" credentials to
Black Belt southern nationalists. [Later, this collaboration during th»
1860 crisis, was to prove very advantageous for Clay who looked forward
to high office in the southern confederacy.]
As Democrats prepared for the 1855 contest, William L. Yancey saw
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ome
little future for himself in Alabama politics. "Do you not wish to c
to practice law?" he despondently asked his brother, "if 8o I will sell
out my premises to you and my practice at a low price and I will remove
28to California." His depression would disappear as the territorial
question and the end of Alabama's Whig party revived opportunities for
advancement
.
For active politicians, however, the disappearance of the Whigs
and the rise of the American party only created problems. For example,
attorney A. B. Meek, a Mobile Democrat saw the new party thwarting his
return to the legislature. "The Know-Nothings, " he wrote, "are numerous
hereabouts embracing many Democrats ' non plupia ' all our calculations.
They will certainly draw a candidate of their own... and so large a body
would no doubt elect any one man as there will be many candidates in
the f ield. .. .almost our whole Bar are aspirants...." Many south Ala-
bama Democrats, eager for advancement would agree. Impeded by a Demo-
cratic party bulging with incumbents, they joined "homeless" Whigs in
the American party and a new political alliance developed.
Know-Nothing power made itself felt in the fall of 1854 when a
Mobile mob nearly beat a Catholic priest to death. That same autumn
30
"American" mayors were elected in Mobile and Montgomery. Various
prominent Democrats were alleged to have joined the Party which advocated
a policy of "America for the Americans." Among them were John Cochrane
of Eufaula Regency fame, new editor of the Mobile Register, John Forsyt'
and William L. Yancey. The complete list of converts to Know-No thingism
represents a '•who's who" of Democratic outsiders. At least four of the
31
group had held elective office before and had been defeated in elections
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Among them, too were chronic office seekers who felt little loyalty to
the Party. The State political situation, however, was fluid. One
finds important Whig, affiliating with the Democrats after 1854. Among
them was William B. Figures, editor of the Southern Advocate 32
A caucus of Know-Nothings met in January 1855 in Mobile and con-
sidered four candidates to run against John A. Winston for Governor.
All four candidates-J. M. Withers (mayor of Mobile), R. A. Baker, George
D. Shortridge, and James L. Price-were fM«fe~BM»e*«e«
.
33
Since Demo-
cratic Governor Winston was strongly opposed to state aid to railroads,
the Americans took a pro-State-aid position in an attempt to attract Whig
nationalists and upstate Democrats partial to internal improvements.
The Whigs, meanwhile, were hopelessly divided. Some wanted to
maintain the Party and select a Whig candidate for Governor; others talked
of fusion with the Americans. A Whig faction from east-central Alabama
favored Winston's negative stance on internal improvements but could not
vote for a Democrat.
Some dedicated ultras still considered southern rights foremost
among all questions affecting Alabama, and they could be induced to cam-
paign on that issue. However, the rise of the Know-Nothings and the
attendant issues of state aid, temperance reform, and foreign influences
in Alabama sometimes overshadowed Southern nationalism and the growing
controversy over Kansas and popular sovereignty. Governor John A. Winston,
a southern rights extremist in 1850 made only slight reference to squar^r
sovereignty in his first campaign speech. He spent most of his time
34
attacking state aid. Southern rights clubs seldom met. Ultras from
Montgomery, Eufaula and Dallas Counties turned their attention to other
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issues. George W . cayle, leader of the Southern^ ^
Dallas county chaired a Democratic County feting and composed a series
of resolutions sustaining Governor Winston and his antl-state-ald policies.
None of the resolves referred to southern rights or secession. 35
In June 1855 the Know-Nothings gathered In Montgomery. Two-thirds
of the delegates, according to the Montgomery Advertiser, were former
Whigs. They nominated conservative Democrat Judge George D. shortrldge
of Selhy county for Governor. Southern rlghtsT sentiments received pass-
ing notice In a resolution calling for non-intervention by the federal
36government with slavery. Shortridge was selected because he would be
all things to all men for state aid, for railroads in regions that favored
it and critical of it in areas that were opposed. Shortridge also favored
temperance reform and immigration restriction. He rarely mentioned the
"abolitionist menace" and the need to combat it.
The Know-Nothings came to pose a great threat to Democrats. In
fact Black Belt southern-rights Democrats were more concerned with local
defections to the American party than with the struggle for power between
southern moderates and ultras within the Democratic party. For instance,
C. M. Jackson, Montgomery Regency power broker advised Boiling Hall that
Lewis McWhorten, Black Belt Democrat legislator, was ready to bolt to
the Americans. Jackson outlined Regency strategy to forestall desertions
and Know-Nothing endorsements of Democrats: "Our policy it_ appears to_ me
is plainly indicated to be first to prevent through our friends still in
the Order [Know-Nothings] the nomination of a democrat by the K-N's....
If the K-N's nominate him [McWhorten] as a Democrat the defection from
their [Know-Nothing] ranks might not be sufficient to ensure us success."
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However, he continued, "the^ party and the ^^ ^
with the Americans would defeat us."37 „lnnlng local ^ pre _
serving the State's Party organization was clearly m0re important than
proselytising southern rights to many southern rights Dcnocrats in
tral Alabama.
During the summer, charges and countercharges of Know-Nothing
membership reverberated among the candidates. Congressman George Smith
Houston, a union Democrat running for re-election in the highland fifth
district, was accused of joining the American Party. He denied the charge
but did not discourage Know-Nothing support of his candidacy. 38 Democrat
0. H. Bynum, formerly Houston's ally, condemned him as being "neither fish
nor flesh, trying to hold with the hare and run with the hounds ...."
Referring to Houston's refusal to attack the American Party, Bynum main-
tained that "the Democratic party cannot support a man who will take
to his hole in times like the present." He asked Democratic fire-eater
David Hubbard, Houston's perennial antagonist, to oppose the Congressman. 39
In the fourth district congressional race, William R. Smith, a
former Whig and occasional Democratic representative failed to get either
a Democratic or a Know-Nothing endorsement and ran as an independent.
His opposition, southern-rights agitator Sydenham Moore accused him of
being a Know-Nothing and of collaborating with "the order at the North"
which is "thoroughly abolitionised ... .Their [Northern Americans] presses
do not conceal their hatred of slavery and their contempt for the 'slavp
aristocracy'!" This fourth district congressional campaign was acrid
with Moore accusing his opponent of being "soft on southernism, " but in
spite of Moore's accusation he was easily defeated by Smith in a district
that still had a traditional Whig electorate.
Percy Walker, once a Whig then a radical Southern rights Democrat,
now found it expedient to stand as the African party congressional can-
didate in Mobile's first district. His Democratic adversary James Stall-
worth, a planter-lawyer, condemned his apostasy which was attributed to
Walker's "sheer desire for office." Stallworth wondered whether he still
"professes to hold to his states-rights faith or did he give that up as
well as his old party?"40 Walker, in turn, insisted that he had not
parted from his "Calhoun faith" and received the support of a large bloc
of first district southern-rights advocates. Walker also emphasized his
support of state-aid, which was understandable, since the Mobile district
had for years been a stronghold for internal improvements. (He defeated
Stallworth by five hundred votes.)41
The congressional contest in the second district is of particular
interest. Because of the Democratic gerrymandering-
-Montgomery, Macon
and Russell Counties had been taken from the district, and Butler and
Lowndes had been added—regional leadership fell to the Eufaula Regency
in Barbour County. This leadership—composed of Whig nullifiers and
southern rights Democrats—had supported ultra southern rights candidates
with little concern for party loyalty since 1849. They backed Whig con-
gressman James Abercrombie in 1853 when he discovered "southronism"—
after running as a unionist in 1851. Eli S. Shorter, a Eufaula leader,
won the district Democratic nomination and confronted Julius C. Alford,
the American candidate. During the canvass Shorter was accused of being
a Know-Nothing. He admitted having taken some of the initiation rites
but said that he had declined membership upon learning the American's
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position on non-Protestant* Rnt-h i ,c s. Bot men claimed to be of a "pure Southern
rights cast." Alford, a unionlst in^ ^ q{ dlgruption ^ ^
if the federal government did not admit Kansas a, a slave state and re-
peal the Fugitive slave act. Nonetheless, toward the end of the campaign,
he indicted Shorter for being a secessionist, shorter responded by dis-
claiming the disunion label and contending that he stood by the Compro-
mise of 1850. But in the territorial disputes of 1850-51 Shorter had
called for secession at various times. Now in 1855 he maintained that
if he were elected he would sustain the Franklin Pierce administration.
He further deflected interest from the secessionist issue by concentra-
ting on local issues, and was elected with a 1200 vote plurality. 42
The campaign in the Montgomery third district pitted James F.
Dowdell former seventh district congressman, against Thomas H. Watts
Montgomery planter-lawyer. The two major issues were both local: state
aid, and Watt's earlier attempt in the Alabama legislature to block illi-
terates from sitting on juries. Many southern rights Whigs from
the east-central counties voted against Watts because of his new affili-
ation with the Know-Nothing Party which nullifying Whigs thought unsafe
on southern institutions; and Dowdell outdistanced the once powerful
Whig unionist by a majority of 534 votes.
Despite misgivings on the part of some erstwhile allies George
S. Houston was re-elected without opposition in the fifth district. In
the neighboring Huntsville district W. R. W. Cobb was accused of being
a member of the Know-Nothings by his independent challenger James M. Adams.
Cobb denied the charge but said nothing to offend the Americans and de-
44feated Adams by more than 2500 votes.
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In the seventh district, to complete the political picture, In-
cumbent Democrat Sampson W. Harris retained his seat against former Demo-
crat William B. Martin who was running as an independent with Know-Nothing
support
.
The Democrats, then carried five districts and the Americans with
Whig support netted two congressional seats in the Tuscaloosa and Mobile
districts. Democratic Governor Winston outpolled George Shortridge by
12,000 ballots. His party, as usual, controlled the legislature: there
were sixty-one Democrats and thirty-nine Americans seated in the lower
House and twenty Democrats and thirteen Americans in the senate. 45 Most
Whigs had aligned with the new party as they saw their national organi-
zation hopelessly crippled and their local party organization gerryman-
dered into political powerlessness
.
As significant as the emergence of the American party in this
1855 campaign was the manipulation of the southern rights issue. The
habitual tendency of some Alabama politicians to shift from unionism to
southernism and back again reflected their political opportunism--the
desire for office. Many Democrats and Whigs had joined the Know-Nothings
simply because their ambitions had been frustrated in their own parties.
Equally frustrated were the small slaveholding lawyer-politicians--men
who lacked a meaningful economic stake in the status quo. Black silt
lands and slaves were selling at a premium in the mid fifties, and con-
sequently these small slaveholders found their economic advancement blocked,
they turned to politics in their endless quest for status. Cynically
using any and all issues to vault themselves into office, they frequently
became outspoken Southern nationalists. Percy Walker is a prime example.
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A small slaveholder and marginal planter
, Walker had^ ^ reputation
as a radical Whig and Calhounite nullif ier . He served in the General
Assembly but, having ambitions for higher office, he left the Whigs and
aligned himself with the Democrats. But his progress was blocked there,
because the Party had too many aspirants, and he then joined the Ameri-
cans, thereby gaining a congressional seat. 46 There was another group
of chronic Southern chauvinists in the Black Belt who confined their
activities to planting. Some entered politics and continually agitated
for more cotton and slaves. These were the small planters who could
not afford to pay the rising costs of new cotton land in Alabama and
by the late fifties were agitating for the re-opening of the African
slave trade and federal protection of slavery in the territories.
However, the 1855 campaign, to repeat, was marked by an almost
total lack of interest shown in the Kansas question. Local issues and
the scramble for office dominated. After the election, however, C. E.
Haynes of the Dallas Gazette reopened the old wound. He declared that
"the only reliable hope for the Southern people can have of securing
their just rights is to depend and rely upon themselves." Settlement of
the territorial question, he thought, was "impossible.
. .short of a dis-
solution of the Union." He continued: "We are as much as one solitary
individual can be a secessionist of the strictest sect. We can see no
peace—no quiet--no rest to the South short of the adoption of this remedy."
Acknowledging that "a majority of our people are in favor of the Union,"
Haynes nonetheless predicted that "the slave states would not receive the
slightest injury by seceding from the free states."'^ Still like his
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DaHas County fire-eating collaborator, George „. Gayle
, he c00perated
with the local Democrats. Both endorsed and campaigned for regular party
nominees
.
By late 1855 other south Alabama papers also re-discovered the
Kansas question and a menacing new political combination in the north:
free soilers who combined politically in favor of slavery restriction.
What would become the Republican Party prompted the West Alabamian to
proclaim "the object of the coalition is to concentrate all the anti-
slavery strength against the Democratic party ... .They threaten vengence
against the South." This was an "attempt on the part of free soilers
and Abolitionists," the editorial concluded, "to assume the time honored
name of Republicans
.. .to wage a crusade of Abolition fanaticism against
48the Southern.
. .states."
In Barbour County, traditionally a hotbed of southern nationalism,
a Kansas meeting was held in November 1855 and from Eufaula Regency fire-
brands Alpheus Baker, E. C. Bullock, Jefferson Buford, and L. L. Cato
issued a series of resolutions denouncing the Massachusetts Immigrant Aid
societies for "flooding the Kansas territory with settlers hostile to
Southern institutions." The final resolve called upon the Alabama legis-
lature to finance an Alabama slaveholders expedition to Kansas to check
the "Abolitionist menace." Editor C. E. Haynes praised the Eufaula action
and complained that "Dallas County with her twenty odd thousands of slaves
is still silent while this great issue is at stake. We make this state-
ment with a feeling of shame." Haynes called Barbour County "the truest
49
Southern County in the South."
A week later Assemblyman Richard W. Walker offered another set of
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resolutions
--"That no restriction or prohibition of slavery shall he
after, by any act of Congress be extended over any territory of the United
States." Walker recommended that Congress implement the John A. Camp-
bell-William L. Yancey doctrine of federal protection of slavery in the
territories. 50 On November 30, 1855 a bi-partisan petition signed
by Governor Winston, Benjamin Fitzpatrick and seventy-seven other legis-
lators summoned Democrats and Americans to a Montgomery non-partisan
Kansas meeting on January 8, 1856. 51 Jefferson Buford, announced in
mid-December that he would lead a contingent of Alabama slaveholders
to Kansas to help win the territory for slavery. 52
Meanwhile Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick came under attack for his
moderation on the Kansas issue. Eufaula clique radicals and George W.
Gayle of the Dallas County "hotspurs" considered Fitzpatrick too much
the Democratic Party regular. The Spirit of the South, organ of the Bar-
bour County ultras, asserted that "the lines must be put aside, and men
must resist the inclination to vote for party interests and must unite
53in defense of Southern rights and we await Senator Fitzpatrick's views."
Now, unlike before unqualified "southernism" did not confront organized
opposition in south Alabama. The traditional Whig-union party in south-
central Alabama had disintegrated with many Black Belt Whigs joining the
Know-Nothings who labored assiduously to avoid the territorial issue;
and many nullifying Whigs of east-central Alabama had become Democrats.
Significantly, there was also a bloc of Know-Nothing ultras in and around
the Montgomery district. Thus, the major political structure in lower
Alabama was controlled by Democratic southern rights moderates and ex-
tremists. As one political reporter observed in late 1855, "many of the
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states rights Whigs joined the democracy
... .On southern rights they stood
with the democracy in the lowlands."54 From 1855 to the spring of 1860,
therefore, for a union faction to survive in south Alabama it would have
had to recreate itself within the inhospitable south-central Democratic
Party or capture the Know-Nothings whose majority, both nationally and
locally, labored to avoid the issue of sectionalism.
By the mid-fifties south Alabama's newspapers pictured the contest
over Kansas as an anti-slavery revolutionary force working for the vio-
lent overthrow of constitutional government. They claimed that "Black
Republicans" in Congress plotted to expel all slaveholders from Kansas
at whatever cost. The Montgomery Advertiser proclaimed all members of
the Kansas Aid Society swore to violate any law and sacrifice their lives
if necessary in order to maintain the territory as free soil. 55
Often conspiratorial imagery served in lieu of analysis of the
territorial conflict. According to Congressman William R. Smith, the
treason of the emigrant aid societies was "dark and hidden and sly."
People complained of the brutality of the so-called 'border ruffians"
from Missouri but, he declared, at least there was a manly openness in
their violence. '*There is more devil in a sneak," Smith said, "than in
56
a bully." These remarks were published in numerous Alabama newspapers.
Much of the information Alabamians received about events in Kansas
came from reporters on the scene. These journalists as Bernard A. Weis-
berger has observed, helped to make the sectional issue, for many, one
of absolute rights and wrongs. They deliberately invented and embellished
incidents. They made stories of torture, murder, and fire standard copy
in the Alabama press especially in the Black Belt.
57
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A call for moderation and self-restraint came from a most unlikely
source. On January 8, 1856, Democrats held a caucus in Montgomery.
William L. Yancey, who had been in political retirement since 1852, at-
tended the meeting and was called upon to make a speech. A substantial
group of anti-Know-Nothing Whigs were also there. Yancey pleaded for
a permanent union of the anti-Know-Nothing Whigs and Democrats, to be
known as the Democratic and Ant i-Know-Nothing Party, and asked for co-
operation with conservative northern Democrats. The gathering adopted
Yancey's Alabama platform of 1848--federal protection of slavery in the
territories—but so modified, with Yancey's approval, as to enable both
the southern-rights ultras as well as Alabama Democratic moderates to
accept it. The resolution followed the lead of Stephen A. Douglas's
popular sovereignty doctrine. It specified that the people of a terri-
tory could exclude slavery when they met in convention to draft a state
constitution for admission into the union. To retain the allegiance
of slaveocrats, however, one plank reaffirmed property rights protection
in the territories. But east-central Black Belt fire-eaters were not
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pleased, and denounced him for accepting "squatter sovereignity."
Yancey, finally, was willing to co-operate with conservative Democrats
in leaving the question of the authority of a territorial legislature
to the courts.
Alabama's ultras protested. The State ought to resist even if it
meant a disruption of the Union, any action by Congress impairing the
rights of slaveholders. The Montgomery caucus selected a slate of nine
presidential electors with south and north Alabama equally represented.
Eighteen fifty-six was a presidential election year and Alabama Democrats
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were solidifying their ranks before the national convention. The elec-
tors chosen from south Alabama were all southern rights advocates of
varying degrees. Interestingly, two of the upstate electors, Yancey's
brother, Benjamin, recently moved from Georgia, and Leroy Pope Walker
of Madison County were ultras, and they were moderate to minimal slave-
holders."*
William L. Yancey's proposal at Montgomery was, according to some
of his contemporaries motivated by a desire to take over the Democratic
Party. According to James Peebles, political confidant of Senator C. C.
Clay, Jr.,
both electors for the state at large [Yancey and
Walker] are as distasteful to me as they are to
a large majority of the Democracy of Alabama, but
at a time when expediency, rather than acceptabil-
ity, was the controlling power with the nominating
convention, they were obliged to cast about for
those men whose speaking powers alone would be
most effectual in persuading the masses. Neither
of the gentlemen referred to are not popular now;
never have been, and never will be. Both have
occupied positions which usually indicate promo-
tion, both have used these positions to effect
higher preferment, and both have signally failed.
Yancey has always wanted to be the drum master.
...They have been unable to command the popular
approvation, the electorship for the State, with
all its popular and fickle demonstrations, cannot
subserve the aims of a daring ambition....
A recent biographer of the Clay family agrees that Yancey in 1856 was
60
seeking control of Alabama s Democratic party.
Clearly, Yancey's earlier tactics in the late forties and early
f ifties--ref lected overweaning personal ambition. Now in the mid-1850 i
he was using the Party once condemned by him as a traitor to Southern
rights in order to stage a political comeback. By 1856 the political
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situation was propitious for Yancey. The Whigs had disintegrated and
southern rights Democrats reigned supreme in south Alabama. What better
time for the "Young Demosthenes" to make his move:
Meanwhile in February 1856, the Know-Nothings met in Montgomery,
endorsed Millard Fillmore for the presidency, and selected a delegation
to attend their national convention in Philadelphia. The caucus leaders
were all former Whigs; and with three exceptions, 61 all lived in the Black
Belt and all were among Alabama's largest planter-politicians. Signifi-
cantly two of the leaders, Thomas H. Watts and C. C. Langdon had been
Whig-unionists—until 1856 when they followed the leadership of Whig
nullifiers J. J. Hooper and James Belser and adopted a resolution that
firmly approved the extension of slavery in the territories. 62
The Alabama delegation to the Philadelphia convention refused to
approve a Know-Nothing platform which said nothing about extension nor
protection of slavery in the territories. This platform when accepted,
inspired an exodus of Whig
-Americans from south Alabama, especially from
the Mobile district, into the State Democratic organization. Such old-
line Whigs as Alexander White, Arthur Hopkins, and B. F. Porter, all
agreed to stump for the Democratic presidential ticket.
By 1856, therefore, lower Alabama was becoming a bastion of southern
nationalism as disenchanted Know-Nothings and Whigs saw the slavery ex-
tension issue as more consequential to their political futures than alle-
giance to the national Party ticket which ignored it. There is, to be
sure, no conclusive evidence of mass conversions to secessionism at this
time. Most Alabama politicians of Whig -Know-Nothing persuaism walked
that thin line of all measures short of disunion. There was, of course,
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a combination of conservative Whig-planters from west-central Alabama
who were in political retirement through most of the fifties but re-
emerged as Constitutional Unionists in the spring of 1860 and campaigned
for old-line Whig John Bell of Tennessee.
Jefferson Buford one of Alabama's most fanatical fire-eaters,
heaped more fuel on the Kansas fires by persisting in his plans for an
expedition that would affirm the rights of slaveholders. Buford' s quest
soon became a cause, celebre for other fire-eaters. Alpheus Baker, a
Eufaula ultra, crusaded in Georgia and South Carolina in search of funds.
Yancey took the stump in Alabama. So did former Whig
-unionist Henry
Hilliard who castigated the Massachusetts Emigrant Aid Society as a har-
binger of abolition. State Representative F. K. Beck, from slave-dense
Wilcox County, introduced a bill in the legislature to appropriate $25,000
for Buford 's journey. But the measure sobered the law -makers "Kansas
fever" and they referred it to committee where it died.
The legislators did issue a report on Kansas. It called for non-
intervention by Congress, and it demanded that the federal government
recognize Kansas' pro-slavery legislature. "The hope of receiving jus-
tice at the hands of our Northern brethren has long since expired," it
declared "we will meet upon that common territory which shall be dyed
with the gore of thousands of Southern patriots, who are willing to die
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in defense of their rights in the States and territories." Such an
assertion could only intensify Alabama militancy in the lowlands.
Understandably it would sharpen the ultra spirit and power in
east-central Alabama. In Eufaula, for example, on March 31, 1856 Luford
and his adjutant Alpheus Baker, brought about a hundred men together at
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Eufaula and then journeyed to Columbus, Georgia and Nashville, Tennessee
looking for more recruits. They went on to Montgomery and on April 4
Buford counted 350 men of whom one -hundred were from South Carolina,
fifty were Georgians, one each from Illinois and Boston, with the balance
from Alabama. Buford promised these volunteers free land in Kansas.65
On the eve of their departure Judge William P. Chilton, a Whig
from Montgomery, addressed the expeditionary force. He was still a "un-
ion man," he insisted, yet he declared that every Southerner's rights
had to be maintained in the union if possible, if not, then out of it.
'*The South had compromised too long," he asserted, it "had sacrificed
too much for harmony. By this course the North had been encouraged to
new acts of aggression. For the future the South must suffer no infringe-
ment of her Constitutional rights but must assert and maintain equality
with the North." 6 Chilton's remarks represented yet another conversion
in the continuous passage of important Whig-lawyer nationalists to the
southern rights position. These Black Belt Whig power brokers were, at
least in part, responding to the loss of party structure and to the im-
peratives of political survival.
On April 6 the Buford contingent left for Kansas under banners
proclaiming "The Supremacy of the White Race, Kansas The Outpost." Such
publicized objectives notwithstanding, those who joined were clearly as
interested in Buford' s promise of forty acres of Kansas land and support
for a year as his commitment to make Kansas a slave state. To be sure,
Buford himself, as Paul Gates has observed, "seemed as much interested
in his land activities as in the slavery question."
67
A man of modest
circumstances he, too, looked upon the Kansas adventure as a means of
223
personal gain.
To Southern rights extremists the fact that few if any slaves
were being brought in to Kansas made little difference. Senator C. C.
Cltty—With an eye towards his ultra support in central Alabama-addressed
the Senate about the "policy of Black Republicans and Kansas." Referring
to the New England Emigrant Aid Societies, he proclaimed "an army with
banners is preferable to a Trojan horse." And, consonant with this con-
spiracy view, he claimed that all free-soil measures restricting the
expansion of slavery were simply a cloak for total abolition. "Whenever
Black Republicanism shall take possession of this Government..." he pre-
dicted, "the South...will not pause to expostulate but will boldly throw
her sword into the scale and assert her natural privilege of self-defense.'
Similarly, Eli Shorter of the Eufaula ultras told his fellow congressmen
that if Massachusetts did not repeal her personal liberty law, which
offered protection to Negroes seeking to evade or resist slave catchers,
and if the banner of "Black Republicanism triumphs, it will be the signal
for the destruction of the. . .government . " Both speeches were hailed by
southern-rights newspapers, one of which declared that the responsibility
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for disunion would rest with the "abolitionized North."
It should be stressed, however, that when men like Clay and Shorter
indulged in disruption rhetoric they did so in order to retain their
ultra credentials and their ultra constituency. For at this period,
because of the Kansas issue, southern-rights sentiment predominated.
However, Alabama Democrats as a whole still considered national party
loyalty foremost and were wary of accepting the secessionist label.
In May 1856 the Alabama Democrats held a convention for the purpose
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of appointing delegates to the national Party caucus. For the first
time in years old Party leaders such as Benjamin Fitzpatrick and J. j.
Seibels did not attend. Not having to contend with such Montgomery Re-
gency power brokers, Yancey had little trouble gaining the chairmanship
of the resolution committee. Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick before this
convention met, had been proposed as a vice-presidential candidate.
But his moderate southern rights position and his conservative Regency
leadership irritated Party firebrands. Yancey, however, was silent on
his candidacy, seeing his own future as that of a Party regular. The
Democratic delegates adopted the "Alabama Platform"--foderal protection
of slavery in the territories—and instructed their delegates not to vote
for a candidate for president who favored slavery restriction and popular
sovereignty.
However militant these instructions were, they were not followed
by the requirement that Alabama's delegates bolt the national convention
if the caucus failed to endorse the Alabama Platform or an anti-squatter
sovereignty presidential nominee. Thus, the State Democratic organiza-
tion seems to have made a rhetorical gesture to east -central Southern-
rights advocates, no more than indicating that they were not "soft on
southernism. " Moreover, the Democratic convention had met in Montgomery—
the heart of the eastern Black Belt--where extreme southern-rights senti-
ment was still prevalent among vocal blocs like Fufaula and Montgomery
County ultras. The results of the later national meeting, which eotlVtl I
in Cinncinnati, and which did not confirm the Alabama Platform, reflects
the willingness of the Alabama delegation to support the national party
platform and ticket. It confirms the opportunism that motivated the
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earlier resolutions passed by the Montgomery delegates.
On the eve of the Cinncinnatti convention
.est Alabama Democrats
were favorably disposed to the ^nomination of Franklin K. Pierce. Ed-
itor J. F. Grant said Pierce could lead northern Democrats "to yield to
the South.... They ought to meet us in a noble, generous, national spirit,
and say, 'Brethren, we know your all is at peril, but not so with us.
We will not, to appease a fanatical feeling sacrifice those very demo-
cratic principles, we have met here to sustain'. "71 Grant's views-total
northern acquiescence to southern demands-had become the south's version
of compromise.
The national Democratic convention in Cincinnati took a definite
pro-southern stance. The platform stood on the principle of non-inter-
ference by congress with slavery in state and territory. The delegates
rejected Pierce because he proved incapable of bringing together all the
disparate factions in the Democratic party. They also rejected Lewis Cass
and Stephen Douglas and in effect rejected popular sovereignty as the
solution for the problem of slavery in the territories. And Alabama
Democratic delegates in following the national convention thereby eli-
minated Benjamin Fitzpatrick's vice-presidential bid. Alabama's dele-
gates reflected a spirit of conciliation in light of the forthcoming
nomination of James Buchanan. As minister to England from 1853 to 1856,
Buchanan was removed from the increasingly bitter debate over slavery
and thus became an ideal compromise candidate in 1856. James C. Breckin-
ridge of Kentucky was selected as Buchanan's running mate.
Although the convention did not endorse the Alabama Platform,
Democrats in Alabama greeted the Cincinnati platform and ticket with
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enthusiam. "We will support Buchanan, of course, cheerfully, said Z. L.
Nabers of the West Alabamian, "His name is a tower of strength for the
preservation of republican principles." Senator C. C. Clay, Jr., told
his father that "the nomination of Buchanan and Breckinridge will, I
think prove very strong, probably, as any that could be made.... As to
the South it will be a safe ticket on the Slavery issue "72
Probably no Democrat toiled harder for the ticket than William
L. Yancey. Yancey we have seen, had changed his tactics, over a half
dozen years. "I have adjured all sarcasm-invective and all allusions
that will irritate or arouse a partisan feeling," and he declared, and
"I endeavour to be entirely conciliatory." He found the Democratic plat-
form to be a "constitutional one." Moreover, he noted, many Whigs "such
as Col. Durr of Mobile.
. .William G. Jones, Robert Smith--all of that
city--Judge Hopkins too, Judge Ormond, John Whiting...," and they were
"irreconcilable Whigs [and they] are with us." Yancey, it is obvious,
now sought favor with all segments of the Party.
Yancey's analysis of the situation illustrates the transition of
Whig-Americans into Democratic ranks. These converts from south Alabama
held that the American party candidates ignored the slavery question.
The Alabama Know-Nothing electoral ticket was riddled. Five electors-
all from the southern part of the State—had deserted. Luke Pryor, in
breaking with Fillmore, declared that the slavery question was the "par-
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amount cause for my defection."
Yancey now the bell weather of the Party traveled the State. In
north Alabama he pointed out that the Cincinnati platform had been adopted
by all southern parties and should be considered a settlement of the
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slavery issue. Southerners, then, should unite behind the Democratic
party which now endorsed protection for slaveholding whether in the State
or the territories. He avoided ultra phrases and all references to dis-
union. His restraint produced political dividends. William B. Figures,
editor of the upcountry Southern Advocate and a Wit ig
-unionist convert
to the Democrats observed in a letter to Yancey's brother, that "Col.
Yancey is receiving golden opinions from our people which will be useful
to him I hope."76
Yancey's antagonist, Whig
-Unionist
-American Henry Hilliard, gave
an address in Huntsville, while campaigning for Fillmore, that was far
more extreme than anything Yancey said during the campaign. Hilliard
urged southern resistance to further aggression by the north. John C.
Fremont's election by the "Black Republicans," he declared, would ini-
tiate a series of attacks against the south which would have to be op-
posed. 77 Hilliard 's newly-found extremism can be explained by the recent
gerrymandering of his district. Now no Whig-American could ever hope
of winning high State or federal office except by affirming one's sou-
thernism, in alignment with the south-central Alabama Democratic Party.
Percy Walker's tactics also illustrate the political expediency
of conversion to the Democrats. The one time Whig, then Democrat, and
then Know-Nothing, had favored Fillmore until Fillmore accepted the
American platform which Walker considered weak "in its southern rights
expression." This position left him vulnerable vis-a-vis his Know-Notlv'ng
colleagues in Congress and he agreed to resign if sufficient county con-
ventions met and requested him to do so. Walker was hung in effigy in
Mobile and called a vicious traitor by diehard Know-Nothings, but he
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served out his term before joining the Democratic Party. 78
Yancey and Walker were not the only mavericks in the Democratic
Party among southern-rights men to surface in 1856. other anti-regular
Democrats sought admission into Democratic ranks. James L. Pugh of the
Eufaula Regency also stood as a Democratic elector. This inspired a
Know-Nothing newspaper to trace Pugh's rather capricious political career.
This gentleman is quite a young man and yet he
has nearly boxed the political compass. First
he was a Whig, a Taylor and Fillmore Whig elec-
tor.... On the 8th of January 1849 he gave an ex-
pression of his principles in language following
'that I am decidedly opposed to any declared in-
tention to resist this side of the passing of*~a
law restricting slavery.' In the next place we
find him what he was pleased to style a southern
rights Whig, a candidate for Congress declaring
that he was sounder on the Southern question than
the regular nominee of the Whig party... he ran
being supported by the eastern Black Belt Demo-
cracy. Next we find him dead against all National
parties and an out and out southern rights man,
going the rounds with Col. Cochrane who was hard
pressed to defend his disunionism.
. . . In this or-
ganization he had a sort of name and place for a
year or two, but in the meanwhile he showed evi-
dent signs of distress and it was discoverable
that he was inching off towards the Democracy.
And when the Know-Nothing question was gotten up,
his disunion proclivities enabled him to take a
good hearty state at the Union plank in its plat-
form and he never stopped running until he was
completely submerged in the slough of Bogus De-
mocracy [the state Democratic Party] and as a
reward for his chivalric act, they placed about
his neck the Bogus collar [Democrat] and named
him as the candidate for Elector for the second
district. In the face of his former objections
to national parties, he is now a right smart
captain in the Bogus army [Democratic] doing
battle side by side with Martin and John Van Buren,
Thomas Hart Benton, and the balance of the other
national Democratic free soilers.^^
This partisan attack reiterates a central theme: namely the unhesitating
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opportunism of Alabama politicians. There are so many-in addition to
Yancey, Walker, and Pugh-who shifted from one party to another, from
southernism to unionism and to southernism in the course of seeking pub-
lic office. Clearly, such men as Yancey and Pugh, in 1856, bear little
resemblance to the southern-rights anti-party extremists of a half dozen
years earlier.
In November, the Democrats carried Alabama by a vote of 46,000
to 28,000. They won in forty-four to fifty-two counties; and Buchanan
received 62 per-cent of the vote cast in the State. The Democrats made
inroads in traditional south-central Whig enclaves. Mobile and Tusca-
loosa districts went heavily for Buchanan. In Mobile an American majority
of about 500 in 1855 shifted to a Democratic majority of about 1500.
Tuscaloosa's 1700 vote majority for the Know-Nothing's in this same year
became a Democratic majority of about 500 in 1856. Democrats made sig-
nificant gains in the western Black Belt counties--areas of traditional
Whig strength. Only the strenuous efforts of a cadre of old Whig Know-
Nothing managers—Hilliard, Thomas Watts, William P. Chilton, and R. A.
Baker kept the recently gerrymandered Montgomery district in the Fillmore
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column, and just barely. All of north Alabama went for Buchanan.
The Democrats, with one-time Party spoilers Yancey and Pugh doing yeo-
man service, succeeded by urging loyalty to the national party as the
only defense against abolition.
Eighteen fifty-six witnessed the emergence of a new generation
of lawyer-politicians who would play a consequential role in the power
struggle of 1860-1861. Most of these "new Men" identified themselves
as southern nationalists. After 1856 they saw the Democratic Party as
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their chief means for advancement, though some would flirt with small
"opposition" factions before 1860. Most important among these political
novitiates were J. L. M. Curry, David Clopton, Sydenham Moore, John T.
Morgan, Alpheus Baker, Jere N. Williams, and William F. Samford. 81 C .C.
Clay, Jr. who was Senator in 1853, could also be considered one of the
"new men" of the fifties. With only him as the exception, all of them
case from central Alabama; all came to political maturity in the 1840's;
all consequently, were nursed on pro-slavery politics; all were members
of a new generation of pro-slavery zealots. All first ran for local
Offices—from sheriff to Assemblyman. Moore, Clopton, and Curry were
elected to Congress in the late fifties as militant ultras. Clay cam-
paigned for Congress twice and eagerly sought a Senate seat as a southern-
rights Democrat. John T. Morgan sought numerous local offices in Dallas
County while competing with George W. Gayle for the leadership of the
Dallas County ultras in 1860. Alpheus Baker achieved notoriety as Jeffer-
son Buford's lieutenant in the Kansas expedition. William F. Samford
tried to play Black Belt "king-maker" and as a Democratic opposition
candidate for governor in 1859. Furthermore, all were small slaveowners,
except Samford; all fit the model of the frustrated "man on the make" who
found their economic advancement blocked. By the late fifties much of
the best land and slaves were selling at prices that only the most pros-
perous planters could afford, and so these thwarted small slaveowners
turned to politics as a means of upward mobility. Eighteen fifty-seven,
then, would mark their arrival on the national political scene.
After the 1856 election many Alabama Democrats, having been thwarted
in their efforts for higher office, sought federal appointments. Congress-
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man George Smith Houston wrote Clay to see what the Senator could do
to procure a cabinet post for him. Benjamin Fitzpatrick and former con-
gressman John Bragg were also mentioned as possible cabinet appointees. 82
C. M. Jackson of the Montgomery Regency bitterly complained to John W. A.
Sanford, who dispenced patronage to the party faithful that he had not
been rewarded for loyal service to the national Party. 83 Another cen-
tral Alabama southern-rights Democrat Sydenham Moore, asked Senator Clay
to use his influence to procure the Charge d'affaires vacancy to Belgium
for him. Moore, however, learned that a member of the Montgomery Regency
had already been promised the post. Later Moore wrote that although
his "sensitive nature shrinks from the idea of being one of the vast
crowd who will swarm the streets of .. .Washington in pursuit of office,"
he would consider the trip if another "honorable" position were avail-
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able. Moore did not get such a position but was elected to Congress
in 1857.
Yancey was the most intriguing of office seekers. His elevation
to Buchanan's cabinet had been recommended by the Dallas Gazette as well
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as by fellow Democratic electors before the election. Yancey disclosed
that "the college [Alabama electors] unanimously wrote a strong letter
to Mr. Buchanan urging my appointment to a place in his Cabinet." He
also noted that Howell Cobb of Georgia was about to reject a cabinet
post and asked his brother--who could exert considerable political pres-
sure--"^ use his influence with Cobb and other Georgians and the South
Carolina delegation" in order to procure a cabinet job for himself.
"Waste no time in asking where you can use a favor, write Dowdell [Ala-
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bama Representative from Yancey's district] I cannot within propriety.
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In late December Georgia unionist Howell Cobb advised Benjamin
Yancey "with your Brother my acquaintence is more limited but sufficient
to make it with me a most agreeable duty to advance his promotion...."87
But Yancey did not get the post because his past disruptive activities
might be, it was deemed, embarrassing to Buchanan and other Democratic
regulars. Moreover, one can only speculate, J. J. Seibels, whose enmity
for Yancey dated back to 1851 possibly used his influence with Buchanan
and other national party leaders to forestall Yancey * s elevation.
Yancey hiding his disappointment, thanked Clay, for his aid and
told him "let Mr. B. [Buchanan] be disembarrased of all considerations
respecting me," he told Clay. Yancey felt that "I should have prevented
my friends urging my name in connection with a Cabinet appointment."
Finally, as if to confess his own inadequacy as a party loyalist, he
revealed "I feel now, crippled for future usefulness, if ever we shall
go
be forced to act against Mr. B...."
The 1856 outcome reflected the inability of many Whigs and those
Democrats of south-central Alabama who were alienated from their Party
to construct a lasting political organization opposed to the Democrats.
By the end of 1857 a vast exodus of Whig -Americans entered the Alabama
Democratic organization, creating a one-party State. An absence of ac-
tive state-wide organized party resistance meant that disunion would be
fought out within Democratic ranks, which for years had been sectiona-
lized and factionalized between upstate national party loyalists parti' 1
to the union and downstate southern-rights extremists and moderates--
surrounded by a massive slave population--who resisted restrictions upon
slavery and slave holding. By 1860, secession would become a malleable
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issue between these sections and political cliques as they struggled
for ascendancy.
Alabama Democrats began maneuvering as early as the fall of 1856
for the 1857 elections. Ambition for office and a desire to manipulate
took priority over discussion of southern resistance to "Norther aggres-
sion" in Kanasa. William F. Samford is typical of many Alabama Democrats.
A southern-rights man, he was willing to overlook political affiliations
in the candidate he supported. For example, he concluded that southern
rights ultra and former congressman Sampson W. Harris was unfit to be
governor. Rather he preferred James Dowdell, a moderate southern rights
man, or J. J. Seibels, whose pronouncements were placing him in the union
faction of the Democratic party, for the governorship. Before January
1857 Samford was himself mentioned as a replacement for John A. Winston
who was ending his second and final term as Governor. Samford excitedly
informed the Montgomery postmaster that "except for Shorter [John Gill
Shorter] I have the best chances . " But he thought his aspirations might
be frustrated by "the Clique that shoots from behind the stalking horse,
of the Advertiser " [The Montgomery newspaper that was the organ of the
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Montgomery Regency]. Accordingly, he endorsed all the anti-Montgomery
Regency men including Yancey, Clay, Dowdell, and Pugh.
Other Democrats entered the gubernatorial lists while Samford
fretted about his prospects. From upstate Lauderdale County Judge John
E. Moore, a party regular, and Judge A. B. Moore a sometime southern-
rights man from Black Belt Perry County, threw their hats into the ring.
John Cochrane was the Eufaula Regency gubernatorial candidata. Ex-con-
gressman and upstate firebrand David Hubbard was also casting about for
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support. Publishing a letter that announced his candidacy, he insisted
that the South was in a dual war-with the North, which had Great Britain
for an ally, and with its own political leaders who did not put "southernism"
first as a test of party loyalty. 90 Hubbard's strategy for attaining
the Governorship was to appeal to the extreme southern-rights wing of
the Party in east-central Alabama, a course which had proven Bo success-
ful for Senator C. C. Clay, Jr.
Legislative elections also were pending, C. C. Clay began campaign-
ing for re-election to the Senate. From two sources he learned that Leroy
Pope Walker a fellow highland southern rights defender was attempting to
unseat him. "One thing he [Walker] has not forgotten, I am sure," J. H.
Caldwell, editor of the Sunny South, related, "to wit: the plots and
counter plots in Alabama, for your seat in the Senate." North Alabama
party manager 0. H. Bynum also confided to Clay that highland politicians
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were planning to back pro-Walker men for the state legislature.
There were also senatorial stirrings in the Black Belt. William
F. Samford, trying to play "king -maker, " suggested another ultra for
Clay's Senate post. "If we ever intend to make Yancey Senator it will
not do to sacrifice him on the antagonism which his selection for the
92Governorship would excite...." In other words, Samford was trying to
organize a Montgomery district clique of Democratic outsiders hostile
to the control of the Montgomery Regency. Yancey would serve as "drill
master" of this clique in their quest for power and prestige.
Senator Clay, recognizing the need to firm up his support in cen-
tral Alabama, wrote friends in the Eufaula bloc, reminding them of his views
93 o
on southern-rights. Clay received thanks from Eufaula ultra E. C.
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Bullock who told him,
-'you have made hosts of warm friends in this part
of Alabama...by vindicating the claims of cotton against Cod fish."94
One month before the State Democratic nominating caucus John Co-
chrane reassured Clay that a central Alabama rumor "that I had made a
bargain with Judge L. P. Walker by which he was to go for me for Governor
and I was to go for him for your successor in the U.S. Senate" had no
foundation. Clay, increasingly anxious, asked Gabriel DuVal of the Mont-
gomery Regency for information regarding a Black Belt cabal to replace
him. DuVal did not think it possible "that such a combination as that
suggested by you exists Yancey, Cochrane, Winston, and L. P. Walker
can scarcely by any combination of circumstances unite either with the
other, or all together, for any object ... .Yancey at present is in bad
health." DuVal then recommended a source of action which reflected the
art of political management as practiced in ante-Bel lum Alabama. Like
so many other politicians, he wanted to play "king-maker" and increase
his political power and influence in the State. On this occasion, he
suggested to Clay that he unite all supporters for his re-election without
any concern for ideological considerations. "Would it not be well for
you to procure from some friend in the counties the names of six or a
dozen of the leading men in each? I do not mean of those who are known
in their counties as prominent men but of those who at the different
precincts are the working men at elections, and who control their little
centers of county politicians. I will willingly do so in Montgomery
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County." This kind of advice bears witness to the fact that the "chi-
valric" south practiced the same political "arts" as the ward "boss" of
the north.
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While the Democrats prepared for their convention, the Know-No-
things decimated by defections-changed their name to the "Whig-Americans"
with the emphasis on Whig. This remmant of an opposition party suffered
a major loss in April 1857. Henry W. Hilliard, the State's most renowned
Whig-unionist, announced his conversion to the Democrats. The Democrats,
he explained, were the only remaining bulwark against "the freesoil and
Abolitionist combination at the North." Democrats, to be sure, were
wary of their latest disciple. A Black Belt editor warned Hilliard that
"there were Democrats enough to fill all of the state offices Mr. Hill-
iard is thus notified to 'stand aside'." Hilliard, however, did have
plans for running for congress in the second district, which evoked the
following from another editor: "Let it be understood .. .that we are not
in favor of hustling any new adherent into position and office, especially
to the exclusion of old members of the party whose talents and services
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entitle them to preference." Meanwhile, his old Party colleagues attacked
Hilliard. The Whig organ, The Alabama Beacon accused him of helping to
destroy the Whig party and J. J. Hooper of the Montgomery Mail ascribed
Hilliard 's motives to opportunism. "Seeing high office closed to him
under the banner of a wounded party, " Hooper asserted, "he joins the
foe in hopes of winning office." But Gabriel DuVal a chief tactician
of the Montgomery faction was elated by Hilliard 's conversion and main-
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tained that "it will help us wonderfully in this district and County."
DuVal also evaluated the chances of various gubernatorial aspir-
ants: "Judge A. B. Moore has probably more friends than any one else,
but they are by no means zealous. Col. Samford, I think, has no chance.
...Even those who admit his intellection superiority suspect a want of
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administrative capacity in him, and make his occasional hypochondria a
grave political objection.
.. .Cochrane >. votes in the legislature will
beat him. Hubbard is still unsure."98
The Democratic caucus meeting in June 1857 seethed with intrigue.
John A. Winston and John E. Moore a political trimmer-a chief charac-
teristic of Alabama politicians-combined to press the latter for governor,
and thereby reconcile north Alabama to the loss of a senatorship by the
gift of the governorship. Thomas A. Walker, a former Whig and recent
convert to the Democratic Party, revealed that John Moore and Governor
Winston "have of late been as thick as runnaway negroes [sic]." Judge
A. B. Moore of Perry County was selected on the twenty-sixth ballot,
as a result of the efforts of the Montgomery Regency. The Party plat-
form endorsed the national Democratic resolutions passed in Cincinnati
and hailed the Dred Scott decision. No fire-eating speeches were made.
Some newspapers contended that the defeat of Samford and Hubbard was a
victory for conservatism over "uncompromising Southern rights." And
George T. Yelverton, Democratic "king-maker" from west-central Alabama
who worked closely with party regulars in the Montgomery Regency told
Senator Clay, "I have been tried hard at by gentlemen from N. and S.
Alabama to join a war upon you and F. [ Fitzpatrick] . " He claimed that
John Cochrane blocked his endorsement of Clay and confirmed that a deal
had been made between John E. Moore (the defeated gubernatorial nominee)
99
and Winston "to make Moore Gov. and W. Senator." All this was planned
to put lameduck Governor Winston in the United States Seante and elevate
upstate Judge John E. Moore to the Governorship. Winston was from central
Alabama and John Moore from north Alabama thus both sections supposedly
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would be placated by this John Moore-Winston scheme.
John E. Moore, after the convention, complained that his strategy
for the nomination had been undercut by "the factions." In other words,
Moore was attributing his defeat to the clusters of Democratic cliques--
in Barbour, Dallas and Montgomery Counties who disregarded ideological
considerations when it came to supporting someone from their own section.
Selected nominee Judge A. B. Moore was from Perry County in the Black
Belt
.
He received support, in other words, from both extreme southern
rights blocs in Barbour and Dallas Counties and the moderate to conser-
vative southernists in the Montgomery Regency. John Moore said he had
determined "to disappoint the factions who were aiming for a breakup
activated by a rule or ruin principle. I was unwilling to jeopardize
the harmony of our party... so I withdrew after the twenty-fifth ballot."100
He made no mention of his and Winston's alleged deal. Thus, the 1857
Democratic caucus became another example of that factionalism and oppor-
tunism characteristic of Alabama politics.
As the 1857 political campaigns heated up, south Alabamians began
to worry over the Buchanan administration's "southern rights policies."
Inverse causation is involved. Slavery in the territories increasingly
occupied Alabamians as local issue receeded in importance. The latter,
like state aid to railroads, bank and temperance reform, and the anti-
foreign issue generated by the Know-Nothings, no longer inspired concern.
Slaveholders' rights in Kansas provided more excitement. Buchanan ap-
pointed R. J. Walker of Mississippi as Kansas' third governor. During
the 1856 campaign Walker had written a pamphlet predicting Kansas would
surely become a free state; geographical factors and emigration, he thought,
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made it inevitable. "I do not believe Kansas will become a slave state,"
he stated, and his pamphlet, selling a million copies gave such views
national prominance. 101
Some Alabamians feared Walker would oppose a pro-slavery consti-
tution for Kansas. At a Montgomery meeting of June 27, 1857 second dis-
trict Democrats led by William L. Yancey and some "Americans "-what one
observer called "only a slim gathering" debated resolutions on Buchanan's
Kansas policy. Yancey still conciliatory, presented a number of reso-
lutions calling for Party harmony, urging "undiminished confidence" in
Buchanan, at least until it could be proved that Buchanan and Walker
were acting in collusion to undo the pro-slavery constitution in Kansas.
Yancey was criticized from the floor for such moderation and P. H. Brittan,
co-editor of the Montgomery Messenger, offered an amendment condemning
Walker. Brittan 's amendment was eventually tabled. 102
In response to the Montgomery meeting on Kansas, William F. Sam-
ford from his position at Tuskegee complained that "the more I think of
the Montgomery anti-Walker meeting the less I like it, and especially
in the view of its utter disregard of Dowdell's [the district congress-
man who supported Buchanan] position and fortunes." Samford wanted to keep
Buchanan's Kansas policies from becoming a major issue among Alabama
Democrats. The debates at the Montgomery meeting could play into the
hands of the Know-Nothings who then could take advantage of Democratic
differences over the President's Kansas schemes and damage the chances
of Congressional Democrats in the forthcoming elections. Thus, Samford
foresaw problems for the district in the oncoming congressional elections:
'*There was no such exigency in our affaires that our Montgomery friends
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needed to rush into demonstrations that might and may cost us the Dist."103
Party success still motivated William Samford, and like him, other
ultra southern rights demagogues. Buchanan's Kansas policies found their
way into the congressional races. Percy Walker, in the Mobile district,
had little chance for re-election because of his refusal to support the
National Know-Nothings in Congress. When he declined to campaign, Demo-
crat James Stallworth defeated Whig
-American James J. McCaskill by 1000
votes. Mobile Democratic party worker Colin Mcrae confided that "the
course of the Administration in reference to Gov. Walker and Kansas has
also weakened us very much in this Congressional district. If we had
not had a popular candidate
.. .we could not have canvassed the district."
Then he asked Mobile post-master John A. Sanford to let Buchanan know
"the opinion of the people here on this subject and that Walker's course
will not be sustained by them." 104
For Congressman from the Montgomery district, Whig
-Americans
pitted the old Whig attorney Thomas J. Judge against incumbent James F.
Dowdell. Judge, known as a union-Whig in the early fifties, now ran as
a "nullifying-Whig." He attacked Walker's appointment as well as "Bu-
chanan's refusal to sustain slavery in the territories." He pronounced
the national Democratic party soft on southern rights and along with
J. J. Hooper the Whig nullifying editor he denounced the Demoracts.
They were the "free soil Northern Democratic party." Hooper affirmed
"the man whose vote is given to those who stand by the Administration,
repudiates our rights in the territories and consent the restriction
of slavery."
Democrat James Dowdell faced by this strong Whig-American chal-
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lenge, needed help. He got it from William L. Yancey and Henry Hilliard.
Both stuped the district for him
. Howell Cobb and Robert Too.bs fro,
Georgia were imported to lend their support. Central Alabama Democrats
realized that the southern-rights issue was being exploited by a ^on-
grel-faction-Whig-Americans-which had no allegiance to a national party
organization. Toombs declared that Walker's conduct in Kansas was a
lesser evil than an American Party victory. Yancey was worried. He
acknowledged the new turn of events as district Democrats responded fav-
orably to Thomas Judge's criticism of Buchanan's maneuvers in Kansas.
He blamed Walker for the Kansas dilemma but implored third district con-
stituents to temporize their criticism of Buchanan until "all his views
on the territories are made public."106 Dowdell won a narrow 100 vote
victory but a significant shift was in progress. Almost a plurality
of the district which had one of the largest concentration of slaves
in Alabama--perceived Buchanan's Kansas conduct as a threat to the south.
Democrat Eli S. Shorter, backed by the Eufaula clique, won an
easy victory over Whig-American Batt Peterson in the second Eufaula dis-
trict. Again there were straws in the wind. James L. Pugh, John Coch-
rane, and E. C. Bullock, three Eufaula stump speakers, attacked Buchanan's
evasiveness on Kansas. But they nonetheless supported Shorter who avoided
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open criticism of the Administration. They did so because of the old
political criterion of opportunism—of winning an election which still
governed their motivations.
In Tuscaloosa's fourth district Democrat Sydenham Moore having
failed to get a federal appointment, challenged "little Billy" Smith
who had represented the district as a unionist, Whig, and American since
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1851. Moore, a southern ultra campaigned against Smith's congressional
record. Smith, he charged, voted to censure Preston Brooks for canning
Charles Sumner and opposed Jefferson Buford's Kansas scheme. Moore also
questioned Smith's devotion to the South and condemned his erratic poli-
tics citing his many party shifts. Moore, by contrast, campaigned as
a "fire-eater of 1850" who had not compromised his principles and he
defeated Smith by over 1400 votes. 108
Democrat David Hubbard-the enduring upstate ultra contested George
Smith Houston the union
-Democrat Congressman, his old antagonist. Hubbard
attacked his nationalism, at times implied that Houston was a traitor
to southern institutions. The fifth Florence district, however, sent
Houston back to Congress with a majority of 900 votes. 109 Thus, affirm-
ing again the unionism of the fifth highland district.
J. L. M. Curry, also a Democrat, faced no ppposition in the seventh
district because incumbent Sampson W. Harris had died in the spring of
1857. Like Sydenham Moore, Curry prided himself on being both an ultra
and a "new man." Politicians like them would help edge Alabama toward
disunion after 1859.
Nor was A. B. Moore opposed for governor. Democrats, moreover,
elected twenty-eight of the thirty members of the state senate and eighty-
five of the 100 representatives in the lower House. 110 Moreover, for
the first time, they had made a clean sweep of all the congressional
seats. Alabama was becoming a one-party state, a situation which cause
southern nationalists to announce the arrival of the millenium--a southern
party based on southern principles. 111
However, factionalism and intra-state sectionalism combined with
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the ambition of political aspirants still frustrated Party unity. Demo-
cratic hegemony did not imply agreement on purposes. Principles were
inconsequential as a political cement. Party loyalty remained capricious
inspired more by a voracious hunger for office than anything else and
it made for a brittle and capricious unity.
After the dust of the 1857 contest had settled, J. j. Hooper listed
the foremost anti-Administration Democrats. They were State Senator E.
C. Bullock, Jim Pugh "and a few other individuals scattered through Mr.
Shorter's Congressional district/' home of the Eufaula Regency. 112
William F. Samford, acting as Black Belt "king
-maker," appraised
the results of the 1857 Congressional contests and proclaimed he was
"for Clay's re-election to the Senate this winter." Also, he preferred
Yancey to Fitzpatrick as Senator when the latter 's term was up. Samford
himself considered retirement from public life unless "Mr. Buchanan should
send me to Europe as a Minister." Standing in his way were "Seibels and
Fitzpatrick and their Montgomery Regency" who are "my enemies .. .and Yancey's
and everybody else's except a few of their special friends." Samford'
s
antagonism toward the Montgomery Regency had more to do with political
ambition than with differences over Southern Rights. The Fitzpatrick-
Seibels led Montgomery Regency never recognized Samford as a significant
force in the State Democratic party. They never game him patronage and
this disregard irked Samford. Samford 's correspondent William P. Browne,
a Black Belt Democratic ultra, also hostile to the Montgomery group sta. ad,
"In all you [Samford] say regarding the subtle, selfish and monopolizing
policy of the Montgomery clique I heartily concur...." He agreed that
Yancey was preferable to Fitzpatrick for the Senate. But Yancey, he
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warned, "i s not the man to keep always in that position. He is very
ambitious. I could say much .ore but it is needless now. Yancey has
been unstable in some things."113 Browne's doubts obviously were in-
spired by Yancey's opportunist. The politicisn who first sought power
outside the Party (in the late 1840's and early 1850's) who then [in
1856] became a loyal partisan again, the politician who was clearly seek-
ing to manage party policy, was not one to evoke absolute confidence.
Talk of the forthcoming senatorial contest inspired lame-duck
Democratic Governor John A. Winston, who desired to replace C. C. Clay,
Jr., as Senator, to advocate readoption of a reapportionment law having
the Black basis—the federal ratio. Such a measure would return to the
slave counties in the Black Belt of west-central Alabama representation
for their slaves. Winston's Democratic opponents in north Alabama charged
him with trying to build a voting base for the senatorial contest in
this area. This was the region of the great Whig-planters many of whom
had abandoned politics in the fifties as they saw their old party dis-
integrate. Winston, no doubt, was trying to build support with this
quiesient political bloc. Henry D. Clayton of the east-central "hotspur"
Eufaula faction home of the small planters where ultraism always held
sway, relayed to Clay that Winston's suggested change back to the "black
basis got a cold reception in east-central Barbour County." Z. L. Naheny
feared "that a Montgomery [Regency] influence is at work to elect Yancey
in your place [Clay] so as to leave a clear field for Fitzpatrick here-
after.... I told thern [Montgomery Regency leaders] with some feeling that
while I admired Yancey as much as any man, yet I would be d——d if I
114
would sacrifice you for any man in the state." All these feared plots
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dissipated by November. Clay was the only candidate put in notation
and was re-elected to the Senate by acclimation by the legislature. 115
With Clay's re-election confirmed, the Alabama Assembly again
took up the Kansas question. It condemned Kansas governor Robert J.
Walker for being against the introduction of slavery in the territory
and thereby aiding "the cause of free soilism." Both houses passed a
resolution calling on Buchanan to force Walker's resignation. 116
Kansas continued to dominate Alabama politics in late 1857. Con-
gressman James Dowdell, writing from Washington, reported that Douglas
"differs with the President on Kansas affairs and goes the whole length
with Walker. We loose Douglas with all his influence--we hope to be
able to get along without his aid, but it will be by the skin of our
teeth. Douglas will loose forever the confidence of the South." Gabriel
DuVal also concerned by Douglas' conduct, reporting a rumor that Douglas
"was going over to the Republicans if true... it will have one good result
in materially weakening the confidence of the South in Northern politi-
cians and in requiring from them a more consistent adherence to principle 1,1
In December the Alabama senate unanimously passed resolutions requiring
Governor Moore to call an election for delegates to a state convention
which would determine what steps Alabama should take to protect its rights
and honor in the territories; the lower House approved with only two
dissenting votes.
Much of the nation's sectional conflict in 1857 was also animate^
by the depression of that year. Northern businessmen believed that the
depression was the inevitable consequence of low tariff policy sponsored
by the southern-controlled Democratic Party. In the south itself the
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eotton prices were affected and new demands for Southern economic inde-
pendence were heard in Alabama. Calls for direct trade with England
also circulated. Direct trade would permit the South's cotton growers
to bypass "Northern brokers thus relieving both producers and manufac-
turers from three or four extraneous profits and per-centages . » One
Alabama planter declared, "We have already paid humiliating tribute to
others too long, and it is high time we announced ourselves commercially
free and independent and acquire more slaves and cotton territory if we
so desire." By November cotton dropped from fifteen cents to six cents
a pound. In December cotton sold for eight cents a pound in New York
and at six cents per pound in Liverpool. William F. Samford complained
that "the money crisis of the last year came just in time to make my
loos of a crop... so severely felt as to render the sale of my Tuskegee
property [necessary] " The Tuskegee Republican, in the heart of cotton
rich central Alabama, summed up Alabamian reaction to the cotton situa-
tion by reporting that "the low price of cotton has engendered a spirit
119of discontent among many of our planters."
Owing to the panic of 1857 there were renewed demands for reopening
the slave trade which had been prohibited in 1808, and State represen-
tative William Nabers introduced a measure urging as much.
While south Alabamians debated the merits of re-establishing the
slave trade, meetings were held endorsing the attempt of William Walker
to take Nicaragua for slavery. Walker, who was from Tennessee, had ac-
hieved a reputation as a soldier of fortune in the cause of expanding
Southern power into the Carribean. Arrested by Captain Hiram Paulding,
on Buchanan's orders he was later discharged by presidential order.
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Walker made his first public appearance in Alabama. He was welcomed
by the Alabama Assembly which turned the Hall cf the House over to a
public meeting to honor him. After an overflow crowd, had heard him,
it called upon Yancey to assess Buchanan's Latin American policy. 120
Since 1856 Yancey had been a Party loyalist, a Buchanan elector,
and campaigned vigorously for the Democratic ticket. Although his hopes
of obtaining a Buchanan cabinet post had been frustrated, he avoided an
open break with the Party over Kansas. He had" attacked Robert L. Walker's
published anti-slavery position, but that had been the extent of his
anti-administration position. Now, with the growing ultra sentiment
in south-central Alabama, Yancey opened "fire." He denounced the "course
of our government " He criticized the conduct of Paulding as "tyrani-
cal and unjustifiable and the old woman policy of the Administration."
Walker's Nicaragua enterprise was, in Yancey's words, "the cause of the
South." Yancey doubted that the south could ever again depend upon the
national Democratic Party. A familiar theme crept back into Yancey's
rhetoric: Northern Democrats could not be trusted to protect southern
institutions. Not all Alabama Democrats reacted favorably to Yancey's
revived ultra position. J. J. Seibels, editor of a new Democratic Party
organ, the Montgomery Confederation, heaped scorn on Yancey for being in
league with free-soilers and Americans in trying to destroy the adminis-
121
tration and the Democratic party.
During 1857 the struggle for control of Kansas intensified with
the controversy over the Lecompton constitution esacerbating matters.
The constitutional convention held at Lecompton had been chosen by less
than a fourth of those listed as entitled to vote; and the free-state
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element refrained from participating in what they regarded as a pro-
slavery maneuver. After a struggle within the convention it was decided
not to submit the constitution to an untrammeled popular vote: the people
were merely permitted to vote for the "constitution with slavery," or
for the "constitution with no slavery." If the free-state clause was
approved, slavery would not exist in Kansas "except that the right of
property in slaves in this territory shall [in] no measure be interfered
with." It is obvious that only the pro-slavery element dominated the
voting and, predictably, 6000 favored slavery and 600 opposed it. Free
state men as well as all those who opposed the constitution boycotted
the ballotting. But Buchanan recommended that Congress admit Kansas
with the Lecompton constitution. Douglas then broke with Buchanan and
was read out of the Party by Administration supporters. 1 All Southern
Democrats considered the Lecompton constitution a matter of Party loyalty
and none of them could now fault Buchanan.
In Alabama J. J. Seibels in January 1858 issued a call for a public
meeting of Montgomery Democrats "to sustain the Administration and the
Lecompton Kansas constitution." Henry Hilliard, the Whig-American who
recently joined the Democratic Party, was the chief orator. Those as-
sembled heard him defend Buchanan's present Kansas policy. Yancey, who
was in the audience was asked by spectators to respond to Hilliard. He
had not originally been invited to speak and now, "flushed with temper,"
he alluded to "the singular fact that Mr. Hilliard preceded me in address-
ing a Democratic meet ing--that a yearling should take precedence of a
Democrat of forty years." Yancey insisted that he had always upheld
"that great principle of popular sovereignty in the territories." His
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candor or memory can be questioned. Ke had refused to support Lewis
Cass in 1848 because, among other things, Cass had come out for squatter
sovereignty, and Yancey; with John A. Campbell, had favored federal pro-
tection of slavery in the territories. Yancey concluded by demanding
that a Southern man replace Robert J. Walker in Kansas, "Mr. Yancey,"
Hilliard responded, "might be an older soldier in the cause of Democracy
than myself, but it remained for the future to disclose which [sic] was
the better one." In sum, Yancey served notice, like the Yancey of
old, that party loyalty would not guide his actions.
Apparently Yancey's tirade was inspired less by Buchanan's Kansas
policy than by the personal affront of Seibels, who had ignored him in
organizing the meeting; and by Hilliard, who was selected by Seibles as
chief speaker and who was one of Yancey's bitterest foes.
State senator E. C. Bullock thought "the speech of William Yancey
was a most magnificent exhibition of his intellectual and combative powers,
but as a matter of discretion, there are variant opinions. I am sure
that he inflicted wounds, which even time the great comforter, cannot heal."
There are now evidently two sections of the democracy in Montgomery,"
the Tuskegee Republican reported. "One may be called the Yancey section
and the other the Seibels-Fitzpatrick. The former is represented by
the Montgomery Advertiser and the latter by the Montgomery Confederation
[J. J. Seibels newspaper]. Neither I suppose has any love for the
other...." "A bitter feud has arisen," the Pickens Republican pronounc
"between the party regulars [Fitzpatrick and Seibels] and the per se,
Southern rights schools, or factions of the Alabama Democracy." Accord-
ing to this account "the gut of this feud is the merit or demerit of
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James Buchanan." William L . Yancey
, in othgr ^ ^ ^^
the conservative pro-Administration leadership of the Montgomery Regency.
The conflict was not only a struggle between Alabama's national party
loyalists and Yancey's ultra southernism but it was a personality clash
as well. As noted earlier Yancey and Seibels had an abiding enmity for
each other dating back to 1850-51. It was almost inconceivable that
these two enemies could long co-operate together in the same party.
The Kansas issue continued to agitate south Alabama Democrats.
In late January 1858 the lower House passed a resolution which provided
for a convention to be called by the governor, which would "take proper
action" if congress refused to admit Kansas into the union with the Le-
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compton constitution. Responding to the possibility that Congress
would not approve this constitution, the Clarke County Democrat warned
that "the South should at once put her house in order and prepare for
the worse; for come what may we cannot see how we are much longer to
remain in this union as equals...." Allen Henry, editor of the West
Alabamian advised that "Southern men should reflect... if the Democracy
is overthrown, we shall be in the power of Black Republicans."
The divisive oratory employed by Alabama newspapers and politicians
played a pivotal role in providing the psychological climate for consider-
ing secession as a rational option by 1860. Analysis of the slavery CY*-°.n~
sion issue by ante-bellum Alabamians reflects what Richard hofstadter and David
Brion Davis have called the "paranoid style." Davis contends that pro-
slavery rhetoric was generated by conspiratorial delusions that bore
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little resemblance to reality. In this respect J. L . M. Curry, in hi;
maiden congressional speech, evoked conspiratorial demons as the cau,
for sectional tensions. Admission of Kansas as a slave state, he insisted,
was "prevented by a abolition menace of cunning mammoth proportions."
This meance also involved "mobocratic misrule and plunder, manifested
in Millerism, Mormonism, spirit rappings, and socialism: Secret watch-
words pass readily from mouth to mouth; organized bands wait but for an
occasion to despoil and divide; burglaries and" garroting and assassina-
tions fill the columns of the newspapers." Similarly, firebrand Repre-
sentative Sydenham Moore said "the thirst for power of those Black Repub-
licans leaders, in whose hearts, as I believe, there lurks treason as
dark as ever activated the blood-hound associates of cateline's conspiracy."
Black Republicans, Moore asserted, like the ancient Roman cabal seek
"an insurrection of the slaves to despoil and destroy the South." To
Alabamians living in slave-dense counties such conspiratorial rhetoric
struck a responsive chord conditioned as they were by a chronic fear
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of slave rebellions.
There were, however, Alabamians who did not see the Kansas struggle
as Armageddon. In a letter to the Tuskegee Republican, an anonymous
writer observed that if "Kansas be rejected now, it would simply be a
triumph of the advocates of the partly Northern and Southern construc-
tion of the Kansas -Nebraska act, over the advocates of either of which
would result in no real benefit to the South, since slavery can not pos-
sibly exist in Kansas." William F. Samford privately confided that "the
Lecompton prohibition was not Republican and the Senate I think has done
well to provide for its abrogation. It was just nonsense for the South
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to insist on it." samford announced, »I am a Buchanan
.nan! As to du_
union, I have done with tt....lf I fight ! „m flght hence£orth ln ^
Union if I can." 128
Others viewed the Kansas debate as an issue contrived for poli-
tical gain. John Sanford, a planter expressed unconcern with Kansas.
The cause of the turmoil, according to him, rested with politicians.
He characterized them as "designing knaves" who "rave and rant about
ideal rights and abstractions...." And, he added, the idea of Kansas
"remaining a slave state with few slaves is too ridiculously absurd to
be entertained for a moment.... Is it not an outrage upon common sense
ever to think about breaking up the Union" over the Kansas question?
Southern politicians have kept the "country in a perpetual ferment and
excitment upon the subject of slavery and appears to have been their
chief employment until they have worried their constituency into a com-
pliance with their designs which some of them long entertained-—that of
breaking up the Confederacy in order to project themselves into power."
Sandord's view on Kansas was confirmed by the 1860 census which showed
1 29
only two slaves residing in Kansas.
In the United States Senate Lecompton passed by eight votes. It
then went to the House, where an amendment providing for resubmission
of the constitution to the people of Kansas passed 120 to 112. Congress
now moved toward compromise. Under the adrcit management of Alexander
H. Stephens, an accomodation was struck in the "English bill" (after
William H. English, an anti-Lecompton Democratic representative from In-
diana), which received the support of both Houses and became law on May
A, 1858. Under its terms, the Lecompton constitution was to be resub-
mitted as a whole and connected with a federal land grant, contingent
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upon its adoption. Alabama opposition to the Conference decision came
from the east-central agitators, while the overwhelming majority of high-
land Alabamians sustained the decision. Many southerners who were at
first recalcitrant fell into line after unrelenting Administration pres-
sure. Alabama congressman James Dowdell found that the English compro-
mise "is acceptable to the great body of southern-rights men of the South.
It is in some aspects better than the original Senate Bill and there is
no doubt of its passage and a quieting to the liansas agitation at least
for the present. 1 '1
Compromise critics were initially led by J. j. Hooper, the whig-
American ultra who called for resistance and condemned the Alabama dele-
gation for selling out the "South's interests." Yancey, now in full
revolt from the Democratic Party asserted that all southern congressmen
except for two who had voted against the measure, were either traitors
to their section or incapable of understanding the principles of the
"English bill."131
Senators Fiztpatrick and Clay wrote long public letters explaining
their support of the Conference compromise. Concerned for his south
Alabama southern-rights allies, Clay addressed a letter to the citizens
of Mobile. He argued that if Kansas rejected the terms of admission,
the south would lose nothing, because as long as Kansas remained a terri-
tory, federal law would protect slavery; whereas, if Kansas became a
state, she would send two Black Republicans to the senate and another
to the House and soon exclude "slavery and slaveholders by law from her
132
limits."
Eli Shorter, from extremely pro-southern Barbour County, came
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con-
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under severe attack by the Eufaula Regency and by the radical press in
the eastern Black Belt for supporting the comprise bill. Defending
his vote, Shorter stated,
-every Abolitionist and Black Republican in
both houses of Congress voted against and fought the Conference bill
to the last." James Dowdell, attacked by ultras in his Black Belt
stituency, also defended himself by saying "I am satisfied that the
elusion at which we arrived in the Kansas question is correct
... .Our
honor is saved... no ground has been abandoned,""™ principle conceded to
133in the Bill." Shorter and Dowdel l--both claiming to be southern right
advocates-destroyed their reputations by voting for the Lecompton com-
promise and gave office-seeking ultras in their districts enough 'evidence
to successfully challenge their congressional seats in 1859.
At this time, when contravery over the compromise bill was raging,
Yancey was preparing for his attempt to dismember the State's Democratic
Party organization. The Southern Commercial convention, to meet in
May 1858 at Montgomery was announced. A series of these conventions,
under the leadership of southern nationalist James DeBow had been meeting
since 1837 to discuss common Southern economic problems. By the 1850 's
they had become forums for southern independence and helped to widen the
gulf between the sections. The May 1858 meeting which would convene in
Montgomery, was Yancey's opportunity to agitate the slavery issue. His
assault would focus on the re-opening of the African slave trade. In
general his argument went as follows: non-slaveholders and small slave-
owners, frustrated in their attempt to buy slaves, had to be tied more
firmly to southern institutions. Consequently, importations were needed
in order to bring down the price of slaves. It was clear that no future
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slave states could be created without the slave trade. For Yancey and
other political aspirants, this issue was a symbol of southern loyalty.
Significantly, Alabama planting interests were divided on it. Those in
opposition, usually the major planter from the west-central counties,
felt that any increase in slaves would lower prices and thus depreciate
the value of their own slave holdings. Some cotton capitalists, further-
more, feared that, new acres meant a larger crop and lower cotton prices.
Others contended, using a familiar argument as old as slavery itself,
that importations were dangerous because new slaves would be savage,
hard to handle, and likely to spread discontent among those already in
bondage. However, the small planters of the eastern Black Belt knew
their position rested on cotton and slavery. The great landowners steadily
encroached on the lands of the less wealthy. Thus, the small operators,
desperately trying to edge their way up the social ladder sought relief,
by the late fifties, in demanding the re-opening of the African slave
trade and suppression of anti-slavery sentiment everywhere. Their situ-
13 5
at ion by 1858 was becoming desperate.
Interestingly, not all southern radicals were favorably disposed
toward rescinding the 1808 prohibition, and even some of its advocates
admitted that chances of success were remote. There was virtually no
support for it in congress. Of the fifteen Alabama delegates to the
Southern Commercial convention Yancey could carry only Percy Walker and
F. B. Shepard, two Mobile extremists.
Yancey, a month later, claimed that he was misinterpreted on tht
African slave trade question. A reading of his remarks, he explained,
would show that he did not call for re-opening the trade. Despite such
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denials and equivocation, political observers reported that Yancey "as
the Yancey of old" had also hoisted the disunion flag at the convention
in preparation for destroying the Democratic party. This charge is cre-
dible in the light of Edmund Ruffin's private conversation with Yancey
toward the end of May in which both agreed that diminished loyalty to
the Democratic Party was needed before the South could strike for in-
dependence. Ruffin also talked to Percy Walker's close friend, attorney
F. B. Shepard of Mobile, "who was equally zealous for separation...."
He wrote a declaration for a "League of United Southerners," and showed
it to Yancey, Shepard and Judge George W. Stone-associate justice of
the Alabama Supreme Court; and, he reported, they "all seemed to approve
the plan." Thus was born an organization which, according to its founder,
would "endanger the national Democracy, to undermine the South' s loyalty
to the party."
William L. Yancey published Ruffin's proposal in the Montgomery
Advertiser, which was under a new editorship, one hostile to the conser-
vative and pro-Buchanan Montgomery Regency leadership controlled by Yancey's
old antagonists J. J. Seibles and Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick.
League members, according to this proposal, would combat all fur-
ther compromises of southern rights in either party platforms or national
legislation. The League would not run candidates for any office but
would demand that members use all honorable means to secure the nomination
of only southern rights men. In other words, the League intended to
purge the parties of all those who were "soft on southernism. " But its
real aim--which was disunion- -was not revealed until the unauthorized
publication of Yancey's June 15, 1858 letter to James H. Slaughter of
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Atlanta, Georgia. Therein Yancey confided
-no national party can save
us," he continued, "no sectional party can do it. But if we could do
as our fathers did, organize Wttees of Safety' all over the Cotton
States (and it is only in them that we can hope for any effective move-
ment), we shali fire the Southern heart-instruct the Southern mind-
give courage to each other, and at the proper moment, by one organized
concerted action, we can precipitate the Cotton states into a revolu-
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_tion."
In speeches during July at Benton Bethel Church and in Montgomery,
Yancey and Percy Walker, the Mobile ultra, urged their listeners to or-
ganize leagues, William F. Samford was convinced and returned to his
fire-eating ways. He wrote three articles entitled, "Leaguers against
the Intriguers," in which he attacked party loyalty, in general, and the
Party bosses of the Montgomery Regency, in particular. Samford playing
the idologue, clearly advocated disruption of the national Democratic
Party: "The League will unite all those who are willing to fight for the
South. The South will then be the league!"138
Democratic Party newspapers responded with the charge that the
League was merely a combination of former Whig-Know-Nothings and disaf-
fected Democrats whose purpose was to topple the traditional Party leader-
ship and to take power for themselves. The Clarke County Democrat noted
this fusion of political outsiders and opportunists in an editorial en-
titled, "The Fire-Eaters of 1858."
In 1855 the know nothings gloried in the doctrine
that the Union was the 'paramount political good.'
Now in 1858 they are 'terrible fire-eaters' and
can with difficulty be persuaded to remain in the
Union. Democrats of the Dowdell, Shorter, Stall-
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worth type [all south-central Democratic Congress-men]^6 tame submissionists compared with them.
...They are strong for Southern Rights only solong as the Democratic Party i s in power.
William F. Samford, in a most revealing letter, countered charges
made against the League by questioning Senator Clay's failure to support
.. 140
„,it. I never doubted your sincerity/' Samford wrote, "and did not
much regret your failure to connect me officially with this Administra-
tion....! am free to do what I should have done in any situation, cri-
ticize it.... It does not come up to my idea of a Southern Rights Admin-
istration." From the beginning, Samford claimed, he had approved of
the Lecompton constitution. He had long called for a Southern rights
party and he now proclaimed, "You know I am for Yancey for Senator...
I now think we shall have to make Yancey take the field as an independent
democrat candidate to the Senate."141 A scheme was set in motion that
would topple the Montgomery Regency leadership by having Yancey challenge
incumbent Benjamin Fitzpatrick for the Senate.
Fitzpatrick's term did not expire until March 4, 1861, but Yancey's
supporters began organizing in the spring of 1858. 142 Their first efforts
became apparent with an editorial on "The Treachery of Douglas," in the
Montgomery Advertiser
. Condemning Senator Fitzpatrick's support of Douglas
it declared "Alabama required a more forthright defender of Southern
143institutions than Senator Fitzpatrick." The Montgomery Confederation,
the Regency newspaper, alleged that the Advertiser had been purchased
by G. H. S. Shorter and N. B. Cloud to prevent "a certain man [Benjamin
Fitzpatrick] from being re-elected United States Senator." Another paper,
the Gainsville Independent
,
claimed that the Advertiser had zealously
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championed <*r. Y[ 's] Senatorial ambitions with the purpose of dividing
the Democratic party- The Dallas Gazette hoped to see Mr. Yancey in
the Senate but thought his position on the slave trade and Walker's fili-
bustering would "seal his political doom..' By the end of December the
AdV6rtiSer Ceased backinS Yanc*y and gave as a reason his "connection
with the League of United Southerners. With this association we have
nothing in common....We are Democratic from principle
.. .but we deny that
Mr. Fitzpatrick has any better title to the office of Senator than any
other Democratic leader."144 Yancey did not take an active part in the
initial scheme to make him senator. He suffered from "weakness, conse-
quent want of energy.../' he wrote his brother referring to his chronic
back trouble which he believed had worsened
. Moreover, he
believed that the national elections were "disasterous to the South."145
Yancey's estimate, however, was not shared by Democratic Party organs
in south Alabama.
Some Democratic papers, rather than endorsing Yancey and his views
lamented the growing sectional strife and made thinly veiled allusions
to who and what was responsible for party and state turbulence. For
example, the Montgomery Confederation pointed out in July 1858 that sec-
tional tensions were being manipulated by "self seeking factionalists .
"
Alabamians were not "going to be precipitated into secession for past
aggressions. .. .Some might have been driven to believe the two great sec-
tions of the Union were divided beyond reconciliation..." but, and it
continued, this government "if rightly administered .. .was the noblest
government ever devised by the wit of man." Its citizens would tell
the world "that the day had not yet come" when this Union could be dis-
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solved
-upon the frivolous matter of the rejection of the Lecompton Con-
stitution." The Dallas Gazette found that most of the grievances of
the factionalism were imaginary. The South had not as yet suffered
any very serious injury. Alabamians, if the truth were told still en-
joyed their lands and their slaves. Party journals, then hoped that
Alabama voters would have little enthusiasm for struggle against anti-
cipated evils, or that they would be "in favor of a string of abstrac-
tions so contradictory and impractical that it~would puzzle the shrew-
dest metaphysicians of the age to expound them."146
Senator C. C, Clay, Jr., however, was less sanguine about the
future of the south. He excoriated Stephen A. Douglas for opposing South-
em rights in the territories. "The enterprising and acquisitive Yankees
will flock... there, with their notions," he grimly forecast, and "buy
lands and silver mines and prepare" these lands "for non-slaveholding
states before Southern men" could arrive with their slaves. The North
was already too strong for "the South in the Union." Indeed, he con-
cluded, "the South has no slaves to spare for acquired territories, unless
the foreign slave trade can be re-opened."147 But Benjamin Fitzpatrick,
always the moderate, did not share his colleague's apprehensions when
he reported from Washington that "Kansas has hardly been mentioned, it
148has had its day, I suppose."
Clay sought the re-opening of the African slave trade, something
he shared with Yancey. As the Kansas question receded in importance ir
early 1858, Yancey and other southern ultras renewed their agitation of
this issue. Yancey wrote another series of pro-slave trade letters to
various ultra newspapers in Alabama.
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The African slave trade controversy kept the "pot boiling" into
1859. With congressional and local elections imminent and a variety
of opportunists vying for political office, the southern-rights issue
heated up. Congressman James Dowdell, an Administration Democrat, from
the third Montgomery district, believed the Yancey-Samford opposition
forces were too well organized 149 for him to win and decided not to run
again. After disclosing his decision, Dowdell commented on the ease
with which Black Belt voters could be stirred by sectional polemics.
Events like the north's denunciation of Dred Scott and William Seward's
declaration of an "irrepressible conflict" readily angered these southern
voters who lived in the slave-dense cotton counties. Dowdell noted that
many old local questions, such as bank and temperance reform and state-
aid, no longer inspired much interest: "I fully agree... that southern
rights principles are in the ascendent in this District and all that
is necessary to success is the consolidation of the Democratic party's
full strength It should take the highest Southern Rights position..."150
Dowdell 's perception of heightened Black Belt concern with southern rights
was valid. Sectional defiance peaked in early 1859, and with it came
aspiring politicians willing to exploit such sentiments for political
gain. Samuel Rice was one. Whig, southern-rights Democrat, and then
Know-Nothing he announced his availability for the first district con-
gressional seat. Rice maintained the union stood on the verge of immediate
dissolution
. He denounced both the Democratic Party, for bargaining avv
slaveholders' security, and Buchanan as the unwitting tool of the "free-
soilers.
William F. Saraford also moved toward the extreme position. He had
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as a
lis cam-
:ern
Planned to run for Congress fro™ the third distrlct> but change<J ^
mind and instead announced his candidacy for Governor. Running
"Democratic opposition Southern Rights Patriot," he inaugurated h
paign by taking over the editorship of the Auburn signal and coupled
his name for Governor of Alabama with that of Governor Henry wise of
Virginia for the presidency in I860. 152 In concert Kith other east
Black Belt anti-Administration Democrats of the Yancey-Samford clique,
Samford charged that Governor A. B. Moore had fleeted Southern interests
when he failed to call a state convention after Congress refused to admit
1 CO
Kansas under Lecompton.
Governor Moore defended himself against Samford
»
a allegation that
he was "soft on southernism" by asserting that Southerners should do
everything possible to secure their rights in the Union, and should not
submit to any more compromises. The fate of the South and the Union
would probably depend on the next presidential election, he believed, and
it would probably be between a "Black Republican" and a Democrat. The
Democrats, Moore continued, would not nominate anyone not sound on Southern
Rights, and Southerners must support the candidate in order to prevent
the election of a Republican. He believed that a divided Democratic
party in 1860 would be a calamity nationally. Moore triumphed by almost
an 18,000 majority over his eccentric challenger. Samford's 2500 votes
came from the ultras of Alabama's eastern Black Belt counties. 154
Moore's pleas for remaining in the union had brought him victory
at the pools, but anti-union feelings were growing nonetheless in the
spring of 1859. Congressman J. L. M. Curry was,
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amazed to find the growth of the disunion senti-
ent among our people. Many in south Alabama
'
absolute y desire such an event,
.any would notresist it, while nearly all seem to regard it buta question of time. [Stephen] Douglas's disaf-fection has demoralized us and we cannot persuadethe South to confide in any Northern Democrat.
Stephen Douglas had, in the minds of many Alabamians, tied the national
Democratic party to Squatter Sovereignty. The identification of Squatter
Sovereignty, embodied by Stephen Douglas, with the national Democratic
party, caused the Mobile Mercury to advocate a "Gulf confederacy «-
1 5 5
d lately."
Administration Democrats had to beat back challenges from Sou-
thern ultras as well as maintain their "Southron" credentials. In the
first Mobile district Representative James A. Stallworth confronted Mobile
fire-eater F. B. Shepard, 156 who labeled himself a "secession Democrat
and a denouncer of national Democracy." The Mobile Register, now under
the editorship and ownership of John Forsyth the former minister to Mexico
was behind Stallworth' s attempt to retain his Congressional post. For-
syth believed that only through a strengthened Democratic party could
the South be assured of its rights. He led a district convention of
regular Democrats which selected Stallworth and which passed resolutions
157sustaining the Buchanan Administration. F. B. Shepard 's support came
from firebrands led by George W. Gayle, John T. Morgan, and erstwhile
Democratic-unionist Judge George Stallworth--all part of a revived clique
of Dallas County ultras. This clique was characterized by the Clarke
County Democrat as follows: "Two or three years ago the Union with some
of them was the greatest good.... Now their greatest desire is to dissolve
the Union. .. .They are actually uproarious and defiant and will do anything
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shortly unless paid (with elected office) to hold."158
F. B. Shepard attacked Stallworth for his vote on the conference
(English) compromise bill and promised not to "vote for any man North
of the Mason-Dixon line in I860." Jame s Stallworth, in turn, accused
the Shepard/Gayle combination of being revolutionaries by insisting on
secession, and he won by 3,094 votes. 159
But moderates did not always carry the day. With James Dowdell
out of the second district Congressional racef other Democratic leaders
began maneuvering to gain the nomination. The former Whig-unionist Henry
Hilliard, made his bid at a Democratic Montgomery caucus. Though he
had the backing of J. J. Seibels and some other Montgomery Regency con-
servatives, Hilliard failed, which was a defeat for Montgomery's old
party regulars. Another district caucus was announced. It would convene
in Auburn, in Macon County, away from Montgomery control. Montgomery
Regency party worker W. H. Northington wrote John Sanford that "Hilliard
may receive the nomination at Auburn. I concluded I would test the feel-
ing of the democracy here abouts. I found the opposition in our ranks
against him intense ... some saying they will not vote at all if he is
the candidate. Others say they will vote for his opponent [Thomas Judge,
Southern Rights Whig-American candidate]." Should Hilliard receive the
nomination Northington warned, "I am fearful that old Autauga [a third
district County] will be lost to the democracy in this canvass. I think
therefore it will be the part of wisdom as well as prudence to use all
honorable means to defeat him in the caucus... for the good of the party." 1
Many Montgomery region Democrats opposed Hil liard--and he did not win
at Auburn either. Democrats there selected attorney David Clopton a
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Macon County resident who owned seventeen slaves and who was known for
his strident Southern Rights sentiments. The Auburn caucus, however,
also adopted resolutions supporting Buchanan and cautioned:
That the only general party organization whichprofesses to respect the rights of the South in
negro [sic] property is the Democratic party
that the overthrow of that time honored party
Will ensure the triumph of Black Republicans
under whose rule it is impossible for the Sou-
thern people to live without moral degradation
and imminent peril to social order; and that
therefore, we believe it is the imperative duty
of every patriot to labor zealously for the suc-
cess of Democratic nominees, and the carrying
out of Democratic principles in the administra-
tion of the Federal Government. 161
Consequently, Seibels and other Patty conservatives may not have been able
to nominate Milliard, but the Auburn resolutions reflected their control.
Party regulars still exerted great power within the third district Demo-
cracy.
David Clopton confronted the ultra, Thomas J. Judge, who was run-
ning for a second time for the Montgomery district congressional post.
Judge, a former Whig-unionist, in the early fifties, now told east-central
voters that Alabama's Democrats could not be relied upon to "take the
state out of the Confederacy if a Black Republican was elected in 1860."
Clopton, conversely, insisted "that only the Democracy affords Southern
institutions the hope of protection and deserved support of all Alabam-
ians." But he conceded, "if a Black Republican were elevated to the
Presidency then Alabama should consider disruption." Little different-.
therefore, existed between the candidates on steps to be taken in event
162
of a Republican victory in 1860.
In the third district contest the tactics of Yancey's friends
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were significant. They tried to pressure David Clopton into an endorse-
ment of Yancey for Benjamin Fitzpatrick
-
s senatorial seat. j. j. Hooper,
in his columns in the Montgomery MaU, demanded that Clopton take a de-
'
finite stand with Yancey or Fitzpatrick. Moreover, two Democrats in the
district opposed each other for the state senate and their differences
rested upon the forthcoming senatorial clash between Yancey and Fitz-
patrick. The Montgomery Confederation, a Fitzpatrick journal, found
the pro-Yancey candidate for Assemblyman guilty of factionalism and
wondered if Yancey would vote for Clopton, the district's Democratic
,
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nominee.
Blocs of radical Whig
-Americans and anti-Montgomery Regency Demo-
crats in Montgomery, Lowndes, and Dallas Counties running for the legis-
lature announced their support for Yancey in mid-July. Thereupon, Yancey
wrote a public letter in support of Thomas Judge the Whig-American ultra
Southern Rights candidate. This action, according to J. J. Seibels, was
another example of Yancey's traitorous activities, dating back to 1846,
"He [Yancey] will use any and all factions—even the Know-Nothings to
defeat the Democracy and break down its organization: All for his own
ambition.
During the summer, Yancey accepted an invitation from Robert Barn-
well Rhett to speak at Columbia, South Carolina and present a program
which all southern-rights men could agree upon at the forthcoming national
Democratic convention scheduled for Charleston, South Carolina. Yancey
recommended that if the convention failed to uphold the slaveholders'
rights in the territories, southern-rights delegates should withdraw and
organize a new convention that would select southern candidates. If
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the Republicans won at the polls the southern bloc was to secede before
the inauguration. Both Yancey and Rhett~who also spoke-carefully avoided
the question of separate state secession, since 1850 secessionists had
debated this issue of a single state going its own way. It was a paten-
tially dangerous tactic, since there was no guarantee that the rest of
the south would follow. The alternative was co-operative action by all
southern states Meeting together in convention. Southern legislatures,
Yancey suggested, should instruct their governors to call state conven-
tions in event of a Republican victory. 165 Yancey's strategy was now
twofold: (1) to gain control of the Alabama state Democratic organiza-
tion by forcing a showdown with Party chief Benjamin Fitzpatrick over
the latter's senate seat and (2) to destroy any vestiges of southern-loyalty
for the national Democratic Party by making impossible demands upon
northern and western Democrats convened at Charleston; namely, constitu-
tional guarantees for slavery in the territories. Yancey hoped that
if Charleston delegates failed to comply, then all southerners would
bolt the convention and form a southern-rights Democratic presidential
ticket. A Southern candidate might garner enough votes to prevent a
majority for any candidate thus throwing the election into Congress where
southern nationalists would bargain their votes for a territorial slave
code
.
Secession was now the foremost issue in the congressional campaigns.
Incumbent Eli Shorter of the second Eufaula district, home of the most
radical ultras in Alabama had been much criticized for his vote in favor
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of the Kansas conference bill. Barbour County ultras, in particular,
tirelessly assailed hi. and Shorter wisely declined to seek re-election.
His place was taken by James L. Pugh, a former Southern-rights Whig,
then Democratic Party regular. Pugh campaigned as a regular: the na-
tional party was the only hope of southerners. His position split
Eufaula Regency ultras, some of whom endorsed Pugh's opponent J. E .
Sappington a union Democrat in the early fifties who now ran as southern-
rights Democrat, who urged a federal law outlawing all anti-slavery agi-
tation. The Democratic Party, he argued, was no longer a bulwark upon
which southerners could depend. His campaign used the masthead epitith
of the Eufaula clique's organ: The Spirit of the Sou th. "Southern Rights
in the Union or Independence out of it." With a nod toward William F.
Samford, Sappington proclaimed "I protest, like Samford, against any
national party affiliation." When the ballots were counted, James Pugh
had 500 votes, and won the office he had sought since 1849. 166
Southern rights dominated elsewhere. Sydenham Moore in the fourth
district and J. L. M. Curry in the seventh, both of whom voted for the
Kansas Conference bill, told the voters that that was the last compro-
mise they would make with "free soilism, " and faced only slight compe-
tition, and were easily re-elected to Congress. North Alabama's two
persistent Union Democrats, George Smith Houston and W. R. W. Cobb were
returned to Washington, thereby going against the trend. Both confronted
ultras at the polls, but were confirmed by secure pluralities in districts
that had long histories of party regularity and Unionism.
167
According to Lewy Dorman, the results of the 1859 election indi-
cate that Alabamians accepted the national Democratic party as the defender
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of Southern rights and rejected the ultraism of the Yancey and Samford
adherents. This evaluation is doubtful. A further assessment is in
order. The Congressmen elected from south-central Alabama were all rela-
tively young men; all under forty-five. Except for Pugh, they were all
small slave-owners as well, and none were planters. Thus their stake
in Southern Rights were political rather than economic. They were all
eager to "get ahead" politically and they utilized politics as their
means of mobility. Moore, Curry and Pugh ' have al ready been discussed.
Ambition for office-elective or appoint ive-they had tied their fortunes
to the South 's "Hennenvolk" Democratic ethos-one white man is the equal
of every other white man-regardless of status. 168 Pro-slavery politics
was then, fundamental to their future advancement. South Alabama Con-
gressmen, regardless of their committment to the Party, were potential
fire-eaters in 1859: they could afford to endorse the moderate National
Democratic party at this time, since John Brown's raid and Lincoln's
election were yet to come and since a pro-Yancey position was not to
their political advantage.
Suggestive of the search for status in politics was the Mobile
organization "Young Man's Southern Rights Democratic Association," a club
committed to the preservation of slavery. It claimed a membership in
the first Mobile district of "260 young men—mostly lawyers," which in-
spired a critic to observe "that the continued growth of lawyerism in
Alabama had produced a class of demagogues always on the scent for office^
In 1859, in south-central Alabama, we have seen, Party regulars
were being pressured by political outsiders who talked freely of seces-
sion. Governor Moore was attacked by firebrand William F. Samford; David
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Clopton had to modify his statements of national party loyalty under
Thomas Judge's disunionist assault. F. B. Shepard and F. S. Sappington
campaigned as ultras and forced their rivals, who were Party regulars,
to concede that secession could become a reality if a Republican were
elected in 1860. Meanwhile George W. Gayle founded a rabid secessionist
journal-The^Slaveholder, which attacked Democrats who remained loyal
to the national Party. In sum, these were outsiders and malcontents.
They were frustrated in their desire for power^and prestigue by, in part,
the conservative leadership of Benjamin Fitzpatrict and the Montgomery
Regency which controlled much of the federal patronage and spoils coming
into Alabama.
In the fall of 1859 William L. Yancey and his south-Alabama col-
leagues-William F. Samford, F. B. Shepard, J. E. Sappington, George W.
Gayle along with Barbour County ultras led by State Senator E. C. Bullock,
continued their assault on Fitzpatric and the Montgomery Regency which
he controlled. Their object was to push Fitzpatrick out of the United
States Senate, replacing him with Yancey. Toward this end they were
aided by the Montgomery Advertiser which, reversing its stand, again
came out for Yancey as Senator. The Eufaula clique's Spirit of the South
and J. J. Hooper's Montgomery Mail also provided editorial support.
Fitzpatrick was not a loyal "Southron," these newspapers insisted. He
coveted the vice-presidency and would even serve with "the enemy of the
South, Stephen A. Douglas."
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Fitzpatrick's high standing among national
Democrats and his support for Douglas assisted the ultras who had gathered
around Yancey. It furnished them with ammunition in their offensive
against the Montgomery Regency and its Party chieftan. Fitzpatrick, under
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pressure, wrote C. C. Clay, Jr., that »I am as much opposed to Squatter
Sovereignty [the Douglas doctrine] as you or anybody else." He believed
that former Governor John Winston would be his most serious competition
for the Senate, obviously minimizing Yancey and his faction. m a news-
paper interview Fitzpatrick denied that he favored Douglas as the Demo-
cratic nominee, but said he would vote for the Convention choice. He
emphasized further his refusal to sanction any platform that did not
secure "our rights and equal justice to all sections of the Union." 171
In 1859, then, Alabama Democrats were on the verge of one of their
classic "blood letting" feuds-reminiscent of the earlier struggles be-
tween Dixon Hall Lewis and his south Alabama "Chivalry" and William R.
King and his north Alabama "Hunkers." The hostility between Yancey and
Fitzpatrick soon pulled their sons into conflict. The Tuskegee Republican
reported that the young men had gone to South Caroline to fight a duel
over charges which had been printed regarding the Senatorial election. 172
Yancey's grab for power was opposed not only by Fitzpatrick and
Seibels. John Forsyth, editor of the Mobile Register and a newly elected
representative to the Alabama House, was an outspoken Douglas Democrat.
He delivered no less than fifteen speeches against Yancey's attempt to
gain the Senatorial candidacy. Calling it a "disorganizing plot," he
rhetorically asked: "what Democrat wishes to play into the hands of
Yancey who is trying to bring ruin... on the organization for his own
173
ambition?"
In early December 1859 Alabama lawmakers debated a resolution
to hold the senatorial election. State Senator E. C. Bullock, Yancey
stalwart and Eufaula clique manager, described what would be the abortive
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effort to topple Benjamin Fitzpatrick. 1 do not think therg ^ ^
probability that any further effort will be made to bring it [the el,
tion] on this winter." Fr iend s of Senator Fitzpatrick resignedly to 1
Bullock they too would not renew their attempt. Yancey, desparate to
force a decision, was checked by new developments which frustrated be-
yond question his election attempt. Montgomery fire-eater M. J. Safford
was the immediate cause of this frustration. The Montgomery Regency
had used its patronage power to procure a political job for Safford.
Returning the favor, he came out for Fitzpatrick. Safford "was put down
on our list as certain," stated E . C. Bullock, "and the fact that two
members from Dale County could not be induced to go for Y. One of them
came out at one time for Yancey, but had not the backbone enough to
resist the local [Montgomery Regency] pressure."174 No Senatorial elec-
tion, therefore, took place. Both factions knew they did not have the
necessary majority for a victory.
Yancey's bid, then, was stalled, but the overriding significance
of the aborted senatorial contest was the failure of the Montgomery Regency
to re-elect Fitzpatrick. The Regency simply did not have enough legis-
lative votes to return him to Washington. A special session of the le-
gislature would have to be held before March 1861, when Fitzpatrick's
term expired, in order to determine his fate; none was convened, a rebuff
that can be attributed to the heightened opposition in south Alabama
to national Democratic Party loyalists, which in effect meant to the
Montgomery faction, increasing antagonism toward this clique was trig-
gered by John Brown's raid. Harper's Ferry was ascribed not only to
Abolitionists and "Black Republicans," but also to northern Democrats
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vho were not sufficiently
"southernized . " Democratic Party ioyalists
throughout the South came under attack. Consequent!^ the Fitzpatrick-
Selbels faction was on the defensive.
The failure to have a "showdown" did not deter Yancey and his
managers in their quest to take over the State Democratic organization.
The events of I860, as the subsequent chapter will show, would offer
new opportunities to these Black Belt agitators.
One view, that of Charles Denman, of Yancey's political behavior
in 1858 had it that he realized the Democratic Party under Northern con-
trol would not protect Southern Rights. His actions, according to this
interpretation, were determined by consistent adherence to principle
as opposed to politics. 175 But we have also shown that his political
course can be attributed to personal ambition and pique as well. Yancey's
dioenchantment with the national Party, after stumping and serving as
Democratic elector in 1856 and after sustaining Buchanan's Kansas policy,
wao caused by his failure to obtain a federal cabinet post and, later,
a Senate seat. These frustrations, coupled with insults from old anta-
gonists like J. J. Seibels and Henry Hilliard, heightened his alienation.
Furthermore, Yancey's hostility toward the Fitzpatrick-Seibels-dominated
Democratic leadership in Alabama was intensified when this bloc welcomed
Hilliard. Frustrated and bitter toward those who he felt had prevented
hie deserved elevation to the Senate, Yancey co-operated with Ruffin and
Rhctt in the formation of "Leagues of United Southerners." And then ho
tried to smash the State's Democratic party organization and its loyalty
to the national Party. In point of fact, Southern Rights agitation be-
came the means by which Yancey sought the fulfillment of his political
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aspirations-which was to lead the Alabama Democracy.
South Carolina Governor James Hammond, commenting upon such ambi-
tions, enjoined, "We must be guarded and warned of the impracticable,
radical and provincial partisanship of such schemers and ambitious dema-
gogues as...Yancey and Co. or the country will drift into either ruin
or disgrace or both."176 But Governor Hammond described only half of the
equation: Yancey's actions can best be characterized by dedication to
Southern principle as well as by self-aggrandizement.
CHAPTER VI
NEGROPHOBIA AND POLITICS: ALABAMA SECEDES
The sectional trumoil that inspired Alabama's decision to secede
is clear enough. The existence of slavery, the rise of abolition!™ in
the north, agrarianisra versus industrialism, and differences in consti-
tutional interpretation all contributed by I860 to an explosive situation
in which war between the sections might breakout at any moment. What
this explanation lacks, however, is an appreciation of the multitude of
local factors which animated individual slave states to disunion.
In Alabama, as we have seen, many internal forces were at work
which contributed to secession. For example, intrastate sectionalism
between north and south Alabama dominated the State's ante-bellum poli-
tical history. Upstate, where the soil was not conducive to cotton
cultivation, slavery never took hold. Therefore, the region's yeomen
farmers supported the national Democratic Party and the union. South
Alabama
--especially its Black Belt--contained the richest cotton lands
and highest slave concentration in the State. And here southern nation-
alism predominated. Both sections, we have seen, fought to control the
governorship and United States Senate seats.
In addition to the chronic factionalism based on the State's
north-south division, there was also severe fragmentation among Democrats
in central and south Alabama. Those in central Alabama were controlled
by the Montgomery Regency which dispensed the State's federal patron
age. By the late eighteen forties the Montgomery clique was factional ized
between extreme southern-rights advocates led by Dixon Hall Lewis, and
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national Party regulars under Senator William Refus King. These two
sections of the Alabama Democracy bitterly contested Senate seats and
federal patronage.
After the death of Lewis and King, conservative Senator Benjamin
Fitzpatrick managed the Montgomery organization. However, the searing
territorial disputes of the late forties and early fifties produced new
Black Belt ultra blocs-the Eufaula Regency and the Dallas County "hot-
spurs "-which challenged the moderate leadership of the Montgomery Regency.
The Whig Party throughout Alabama's Cotton lands was also frag-
mented. Whig-Unionists, composed of conservative Whig planters, held
sway in many west-central counties and in the Mobile district. Until
their end in 1853 these Whigs provided the major structure for unionist
sentiment in south-central Alabama. But, there was also a southern-rights
Whig element in east-central Alabama which challenged the Whig planters
of the Black Belt.
By 1858 the Whig
-American party structure disappeared. Vast num-
bers of ex-Whigs and former Democrats -turned
-Know-Nothings entered the
Democratic Party. What all these factions shared in common was a desire
for office. This political migration, however, created the problem of
too many candidates for a limited number of offices, which in turn in-
creased Democratic factionalism. In the eighteen fifties a new gener-
ation of lawyer-politicians emerged. They consisted of men of modest
economic circumstances--small to moderate slaveowners--whose economic
mobility was blocked because quality cotton lands had become monopolized
by the major planters and the lands available were selling at astronomical
prices. Thus, politics became their vehicle for social mobility. From
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the Wilmot Proviso through the Kansas disputes, these lawyer
-politicians
used the southern-rights issue for their own ends. Most were political
outsiders, men on the make. They sought power by attacking the national
Democratic regulars who controlled the Party machinery. Moreover, they
habitually shifted from extreme to moderate southernism. They also
changed party allegiance with regularity. At times they tried to mani-
pulate public opinion; on other occasions they followed the general con-
sensus. By the mid-eighteen fifties most south Alabama Democrats con-
sidered themselves southern-rights men. In fact they ran against each
other for state and national office, questioning their rival's dedica-
tion to the "southern way of life."
Compounding Democratic difficulties was William L. Yancey of Mont-
gomery. Although returning to the national Democratic fold in 1856,
he had declared war against Party leadership after he failed to acquire
a post in President Buchanan's cabinet. He turned against the Montgomery
Regency when they welcomed two of his bitterest enemies--ex-Whig-Unionist
Henry Hilliard and editor J. J. Seibels.
The radical southern rights platform again became Yancey's modus
operandi in his assault on Democratic Party loyalists. In 1858 he col-
laborated with Edmund Ruffin in organizing the League of United South-
erners "to fire the South to Secession." Although Yancey had co-operated
with Robert Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina in recommending disunionism,
he soon backed off from advocacy of secession. His disunionist views,
it seems, were, more a reaction to frustrated ambition than any systematic
plot to dismanLle the Nation. Nevertheless, opportunist that he was,
Yancey persisted in agitating the Southern-rights issue by demanding a
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federal slave code for the territories. On this issue he was joined
by ex-Whig-Americans from east-central Alabama who, Ufa, himself, had
never been part of any political inner circle. Divisive sectional sen-
timents popular with Black Belt and south Alabama voters could concei-
vably enhance their own careers.
In 1859 William L. Yancey ran for Benjamin Fitzpatrick's Senate
seat. Clearly, this was an attempt to dislodge the Montgomery Regency
which had been loyal to the national Democratic Party. Outstanding among
Yancey stalwarts was the Eufaula Regency, under the tutelege of state
Senator E. C. Bullock and the erratic planter-editor William F. Samford.
Also supporting Yancey were erstwhile Whig-American nullifying editors
like J. J. Hooper of the Montgomery Mail
. Hooper, an extreme Southern
chauvinist, was one of the State's most consistent and outspoken advo-
cates of secession.
William L. Yancey's 1859 attempt to obtain a Senatorial post and
to topple the Montgomery Regency failed, in part, because some southern-
rights legislators pledged to him changed their votes with the promise
of political jobs from the Montgomery Regency.
It was the lack of a specific issue that really blocked anti-Party
cliques from taking over the Alabama Democracy in 1859. An issue was
needed that could be dramatized and politicized as an immediate threat
to the stability of Alabama's slave owning counties. Such an issue would
demonstrate that a Democratic Party controlled by northerners was not
capable of protecting Southern institutions.
Almost from the moment that black bondsmen were introduced into
Alabama there was a pervasive fear of slave uprisings. Any act of re-
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sistance on the slaves' part was met with immediate retribution. At
times whites panicked as rumors of slave rebellions spread through Black
Belt communities. Alabama passed a host of slave codes that attempted
to govern both slave and free black behavior. Nat Turner's rebellion
in Virginia traumatized white Alabamians, causing them to tighten their
already stringent slave ordinances.
With the rise of immediatists in the ranks of Northern abolition-
ists, white Alabama confronted a new senfcitrfent^hich called for something
other than colonization or gradual emancipation. From the eighteen thirties
through the eighteen fifties Alabama southern-rights agitators played
on the racial fears of the State's white population by maintaining that
the northern wing of both the Democratic and Whig had become abolitionized
.
On the eve of the national debate over the Wilmot Proviso, a move-
ment to halt the domestic slave trade began in central Alabama. This
campaign was an indication of white apprehension about the uncontrolled
growth of the black population. While Alabamians fretted over the merits
of the 1850 Compromise, an African Colonization society was organized
to rid the State of its freedmen.
The Republican Party emerged in 1854. It drew together many di-
verse elements, all of them being cemented by a common opposition to
the further extension of slavery in the territories. Taking a contrary
view, rising Alabama politicians like Congressmen C. C. Clay, Jr., J.
L. M. Curry, and Sydenham Moore were thereby able to gain office. The)
insisted upon the south 's determination to acquire more slave territory
for slavery and pictured the Republican Party as central to a vast nor-
thern conspiracy dedicated to abolitionism and to the destruction of
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southern society.
Alabama's political opportunists who capitalized on the int,
lated issues of southern rights and the Republican threat to their sec-
tion appealed to a very susceptible electorate. Southerners had lived
with slave insurrection anxieties for generations. Now they feared that
abolitionists would either subject the south to a bloodbath by forcing
the violent overthrow of slavery or would precipitate a race war by
denying slavery room to expand, m spite of these fears, however, sou-
thern-rights agitators still lacked a single dramatic event that would
point up the danger of southern Democrats compromising with the northern
Democratic political establishment. On the night of October 16, 1859,
they had that event. John Brown, on that date, led a determined hand
of black and white abolitionists in an attack upon Harpers Ferry, Virginia
Their purpose was to incite rebellion among Virginia slaves which then
hopefully would catalyze slave upheavals throughout the cotton states.
When news of Brown's abortive raid reached south Alabama, its white popu-
lation reacted hysterically. Alabama's southern-rights factions, to
repeat, now had their long-desired incident.
No issue galvanized white fears or engendered such blind hatred
for the north as did John Brown's aborted insurrection attempt. Terrible
visions of Alabama slaves murdering and plundering their masters became
standard fare in the State's Black Belt press. Newspapers recalled the
1792 Santo Domingo slave revolt. Editors reported that John Henry Kagi,
one of Brown's confederates, had marked out a chain of Alabama Black
Belt counties where he had traveled and where bondsmen were expected
to rise. Allegedly, Russell, Macon, Lowndes, Autauga, Dallas, Wilcox,
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and Monroe counties were marked on his map. 1 One lesson drawn from John
Brown's raid was that newcomers were suspect. Community hostility was
directed against all outsiders, especially those who deviated in any way
from southern custom.
"Places on Brown's map designated the points of insurrection,"
revealed the Clarke County Democrat . C. E. Haynes editor of the Clarke
Democrat claimed that abolition emissaries had been at work, "if the
citizens living about the points designated on Brown's map have noticed
any suspicious character and would make them known... much light might
be thrown on this dark nefarious plot."2 No central Alabama journal was
as obsessed with detailing suspected incendiary activity as the Montgomery
Mail.
Fire-eating editor J. J. Hooper, who drew no distinction between
Republicans and abolitionists, recommended that all those living in or
near the areas specified on Kagi's map should interrogate all slaves to
determine "what communications had been held with slaves by Republican-
free soil emissaries." Those who acted suspicious or those who professed
"unsouthern" opinions were arrested and forced to leave Alabama. Hooper
chided Mobile officials for being too lenient with suspected incendaries.
"They should have been whipped, ducked, tarred, feathered, ridden upon
3
a rail and then hanged to a tree."
Such pronouncements contributed to the crisis mood in central
Alabama. For instance, Loachapoka, in Tallapoosa County, concerned citi-
zens gathered in order to adopt measures for the "protection of our citi-
zens and property against the evil and mischievous designs of Republican
abolitionists and other characters dangerous to the interests of our
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community." They passed a resolution recording that R. w. Inman,
a hardware dealer fro. New York and ft suspicious character/' be returned
to the north. Macon County organized a vigilance committee "to guard
against strolling Osawatamies [John Brown type incendiaries] and preserve
a strict police in the neighboring towns and their vicinity." Hooper
again warned: "never before is it so necessary for us to sleep with
one eye out at the window. Patrol! Patrol!! Patrol!!!" Autauga County
residents created a vigilence committee to keep a watchful eye over all
transients. The Southern Era confidently asserted that "the anti-slavery
movement ramifies the entire south/ and that "there are agents and emis-
saries of the Black Republican Party scattered throughout Alabama,"4
What made Alabama newspapers so sure that abolitionists Republicans
were traversing Alabama was the northern response to John Brown's raid.
The activities of the "Secret six/' highly respected New England Brahmans
who financed Brown's raid, were widely reported. Moreover, the Alabama
press quoted Joshua Giddings of Ohio, who said that he looked forward
to the day "when the torch of incendiary agents shall light up the towns
and cities of the South and blot out the last vestiges of slavery."
Northerners who condemned Brown's execution encouraged the Eorence
Gazette to proclaim, "The Brown sympathizers, the north and the Repub-
lican Party are full of treason and blasphemy! John Brown the murderer
and assassin is held up as a saint, an apostle of liberty."5
George W. Gayle, editor of the Cahaba Slaveholde r, announced that
it would be fatal to place any hope in the conservatism of any northern
class. "On our own arms must we rely to preserve slavery secure and pro-
fitable." Upstate firebrand David Hubbard claimed that the entire north
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had been abolitionized. Montgomery district congressman David clopton
claimed the "Black Republican Party is steadily advancing to power and
in the event of success, the Union cannot be maintained." Representa-
tive Sydenham Moore of the Tuscaloosa district knew that the north had
become subverted by anti-slavery radicals and that they had silenced con-
servatives in this section. He deplored a sectional fanatical party
like the Republicans who could gain power by deluding and manipulating
the voters.
John Brown's raid, then, was exploited by Alabama's southern-rights
factionalists. Northern Democrats as well as Republicans could be no
longer trusted unless they were firmly under southern control. "Union
demonstrations by our Northern brethren are grand humbugs," observed
Congressman J. L. M. Curry. Union meetings in the north are "participated
in by many men who will turn around tomorrow and vote for Republicans." 7
Through December 1859 Alabama's press fueled the panic of whites
living in the slave-dense Black Belt. An "unsound traveler" was caught
bearing a letter from "old Ossawatamie, " and there were demands that
he be lynched. Anyone connected in any manner with plots to burn and mur-
der, the Eutaw Whig suggested, should be sent to 'V;here they would be
burried." A suspect was arrested in Autauga County for "having in his
possession several letters from some of Brown's men in the North... he
was bound over in the sum of $10,000." Barbour County officials charged
a new resident, Josiah Bass, with making abolit ion statements and tarrc '
and feathered him and "rode him out on a rail." A peddler, one Albertson,
was incarcerated in Cahaba, Dallas County for being "an abolition emissary."
A crowd gathered outside the jail, and a lynching was barely averted.
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In Tuskegee, Macon County, a stable was burned (and eighteen horse
lost), allegedly the work of an "incendiary." Alabamians were told to
be on the lookout for Frederick Carstacke's Wil d Sports in the Wfrgt,
"a viler, more abominable, lying, abolition publication was never printed,"
declared the Southern Advocate, "surely our booksellers can find some
way to prevent such books from being foisted on them... they can let it
be understood that they will destroy and not pay for them."8
Few Alabama newspapers raised questions about the reliability of
these incendiary stories. To be sure, John Forsyth, editor of the Mobile
£ggiste
.
r
.
and Parr- of the conservative Democratic inner circle, protested
against "such dangerous teachings—behind every bush a slave rebellion
9leader." But Forsyth's call for reason was disregarded.
Meanwhile, goaded by the terrifying thought of losing racial con-
trol, Alabama's legislature turned its attention to strengthening domi-
nation over the slaves. The General Assembly heard demands to halt the
emancipation of bondsmen by owners, since White Alabamians had always
viewed free blacks as a potential "spark" for slave rebellion. John
Brown's raid brought renewed pressure to completely remove the freedman
from Alabama. The legislature passed restrictions on free-blacks. One
measure declared void all wills which emancipated slaves, either directly
or indirectly; prohibited the authorization of the removal of slaves,
directly or indirectly, from the State; for the purpose of freeing them.
Another act provided that any freedman might voluntarily select a mastc"
and return to the status of slave. State Senator E. C. Bullock also
presented a petition from the Marengo County grand jury asking that a
bill be passed that would prohibit all commercial activities between
ence
cre-
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blacks and whites.
The Committee on the Judiciary in the lower House was instructed
to inquire into the expediency of changing the law of evidence in order
"to meet the insidious designs of the Abolitionists." Any white
.an
suspected of "encouraging or promoting sedition among our negroes, shall
be liable to conviction upon, ne^ro evidence, provided that such evid
does not contradict the testimony of white persons the Jury deems
dible."11
A bill introduced in the Senate, and later passed, imposed a tax
on "book peddlers." The^J^ej?^^ commented that "Yankee book and
periodical agents inflict injuries on Southern institutions. Tens of
thousands of books, pamphlets and papers are annually printed and dis-
tributed to empoison the Southern mind." Its editor called for the
passage of a book-salesman tax which could put the focus on abolitionist
literature and the traveling sellers who "often are tampers of slaves
and the insidious mouth vendors of northern fanaticism." The lawmakers
in the course of their deliberations on this "salesman act," also de-
nounced Hinton Rowen Helper's The Impending Crisis and called upon consti-
tuents to suppress the anti-slavery tract. 12
The lower House passed a resolution eighty-seven to one, which
condemned northerners when, "their leaders have been preaching a crusade
against our institutions, which in their estimations justifies and sanc-
tifies murder, arson and rebellion; a state of feeling which wholly
unfits them for political brotherhood." Stephen A. Douglas was also
denounced as an enemy of the south, and Douglas' squatter sovereignty
doctrines were pronounced subversive of the rights and property of
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southerners. Editor and state representative John Forsyth, a Douglas
partisan, responded by noting that northern Democrats were of a conser-
vative temper and were friends of the south. 13 The vast majority of
Alabama's Democratic inner circle, being pro-Douglas, would support him
for the presidency.
The Black Belt press did its part in influencing legislative opin-
ion. It called upon the lawmakers to prepare for the "irrepressible con-
flict." For example, the Gainsville Independent in slave-dense Sumter
County insisted "the Militia system of our state must be revised and
improved," and asked furthermore that the State's slave patrol system
be improved. It further urged the legislature to establish a regular
police patrol unit vhich would make "a servile insurrection impossible."14
Reacting to white apprehensions, the General Assembly provided for the
organization of volunteer corps in each county, not to exceed 8,000 men.
In order to equip these forces, it budgeted $200,000, a sum larger than
that appropriated by any other slave state, after John Brown's raid,
for equipping the militia. It would raise this sum by levying a surtax
of 5 percent on all State taxes and a poll tax of 25 cents on each white
man between 18 and 45. It also provided for the State-supported edu-
cation of two young men from each Alabama County in the privately-owned
military academies at LaGrange and Glenville. The cadets would be under
obligation to return to their respective counties and drill the militia.
A charter was also granted to the Southern Fire Arms Company to manufac-
ture fire-arms within the State.
^
Significantly, those legislators who favored passage of the mill'
tia measures were part of Alabama's anti-Montgomery Regency forces.
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Some Montgomery Regency men, unmoved by this panicked anti-abolitionist
sentient, saw other implications in the military measures. State sena.
tor William Garrett wrote to fellow conservative Lewis Parsons that the
militia ordinance was designed "to aid the Southern movement" in south
Alabama. Garrett demanded "at the outset a clear and official expl;
tion of the amounts expended and contracted," and he urged that the.
sums "be brought before the people." Don't let these "schemers keep
it a secret." The people ought to know the cost of every aspect of this
militia program, including "commissions to communities to purchase mus-
kets." Under the "specious cry of Southern Rights they have been fattening
upon the people of Alabama." 16 William Garrett's advice went unheeded:
Alabama taxpayers were never informed about the costs of their new mili-
tary program.
Another indication of public anxiety was the passage of a legis-
lative resolution directing the Governor, in event of a Republican victory
in November, 1860 to call a convention to determine state action. The
resolution passed seventy-five to two in the lower House and unanimously
in the Senate.
17
Upstate representatives voted for the measure because
they were no doubt intimidated by the mood of belligerance, particularly
in the state capital, that followed Brown's raid.
Given these sweeping and extreme actions by the lawmakers some
qualification is in order; otherwise the climate of opinion governing
Alabama might be misread. Not unexpectedly secession sentiment was high
in central and south Alabama, regions of massive slave concentration
and a traditional hotbed of southern chauvinism. These were the areas
rife with daily insurrectionary scares. But in north Alabama, where
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slavery was not a dominant feature, there was a general tendency towards
moderation. According to Joseph Hodgson, many upcountrymen "were ready
to deny that occasion existed for extreme action, and in the event of
the meeting of a convention, would be ready to resort to any delay by
which the passions of the hour could be assuaged and the dreaded spectre
of disunion be exorcised."18
It is difficult to determine the motives of many southern rights
advocates at this stage. Some like George W. Gayle were ideologues who
would brook no compromise over slave protection. Others like William
L. Yancey functioned on two levels-a desire to maintain southernism
and an interest in using the issue to gain power. Then there were the
rank opportunists that William Garrett alludes to. Outstanding among
them was Judge Samuel Rice who served in every party in pre-Civil War
Alabama and finally became a Republican in 1870. However they all shared
one objective—the dismantling of the conservative Montgomery Regency.
Alabama's warring Democrats were scheduled to meet in Montgomery
in early January 1860 to select delegates to the national Democratic
convention scheduled for Charleston, South Carolina. On the eve of the
State's caucus the anti-Montgomery Regency cliques were in the ascendent
for weeks prior to this caucus. William L. Yancey and the other factions
hostile to the national Democratic party had been working to block Ala-
bama's endorsement of Douglas at Charleston. They were insisting that
all presidential aspirants among the national Democrats would have to
endorse a resolution calling for a federal slave code for the territories.
But Douglas, a leading contender for the nomination, had since
1854 upheld the principle of popular sovereignty (whereby the people of
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a territory, either through a territorial legislature or a constitutional
convention, could accept or reject slavery). By blocking Douglas, Yancey
and his collaborators were also striking a blow at two of his Alabama
supporters, Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick and J. j. Seibels of the Mont-
gomery faction. The anti-Douglas movement in Alabama was initiated by
William M. Brooks, a Yancey man who chaired the Perry County Democratic
meeting which rejected Douglas or any other candidate who did not affirm
constitutional protection of slavery. Eighteen other Democratic county
meetings were held after Harper's Ferry, and the shock waves it evoked,
and all confirmed the Perry County resolution. A few gatherings even
adopted resolutions maintaining that "the election of a Black Republican
to the Presidency would be sufficient cause for secession. 1,19
The most divisive pre-convention caucus was held in Montgomery.
William L. Yancey and other Montgomery agitators prepared to dislodge
the pro-Douglas Montgomery Regency by having Montgomery Democrats com-
mit themselves to the federal slave code proposition. The conservative
Montgomery leadership knew the forcing of the slave-protection issue
would further fragment Alabama's Democrats and might result in the sena-
torial defeat of Benjamin Fitzpatrick at the March 1861 session of the
legislature. Such a possibility notwithstanding, Fitzpatrick and the
conservatives around him still supported the Democratic Party's 1856
Cincinnati platform--the doctrine of federal nonintervention in the ter-
ritories. These Party regulars felt that Douglas would campaign on that
plank and that he had the best chance of winning nationwide. Further-
more, Alabama's national party regulars were convinced of the impracti-
cality of any Democrat being selected who favored congressional protec-
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tion of slavery in the territories-vhich Benjamin Fit Zpatrick even
called a baneful abstraction.
There had been two meetings of Montgomery County Democrats to
select delegates to the State Convention. The first on November 12,
1859. The November 12 gathering at the height of the post-Harper's
Ferry panic found the anti-Montgomery Regency Democrats in control.
They elected Samuel Arrington as chairman and James T. Holtzclav, a
Yancey law apprentice, and George W. Whitman as acting secretaries.
The caucus proceeded to the matter of federal protection of slavery In
the territories. It approved resolutions that would commit Alabama's
delegation to Charleston to this position. The caucus then debated the
logic of a Douglas endorsement. Yanceymen noted Douglas' position that
the people of a territory could exclude slavery prior to the formation
of a state constitution, finding it evidence that he was an unsound
candidate. Almost redundantly, the caucus advised southerners to demand
20federal protection.
William L. Yancey, to no one's surprise, was named to lead the
Montgomery County delegation to the state caucus. His faction's stra-
tegy at this caucus was evident. They would topple the Montgomery Regency
by a direct assault on Douglas, thereby forcing a split among state Demo-
crats. They would themselves then replace the discredited pro-Douglas
bloc as the party "wirepullers" in Alabama, and Yancey would become United
States Senator and State party chieftain.
The national party regulars stormed out of the county caucus, and J.J.
Seibels cal led for a second caucus of Montgomery Democrats to meet in December
and select a contesting slate of delegates to the state convention. He asked that
291
those not in agreement with the pro-Douglas conservatives abstain from
u 21attending.
But Yancey and Thomas L. Arrington among other anti-Douglas Demo-
crats did attend the Montgomery caucus. When a committee was appointed
to draft resolutions and appoint delegates to the state convention,
Arrington condemned the motion, arguing that delegates had already been
appointed by the earlier Montgomery meeting. Yancey holding the floor,
refused to recognize pro-Douglas Regency men and also appropriated the
Democratic label for the southern-rights bloc. He accused the national
party loyalists of trying to destroy Alabama's Democratic organization. 22
This intra-party struggle recalls the clashes of the late 1840 's between
the pro-Union faction led by Senator William R. King and the Alabama
Calhounites under Senator Dixon Hall Lewis. The issue then as well as
in 1860 was not only southern rights but who was going to direct the
fortunes of Alabama Democrats.
After the Yancey-led clique left the hall, Party regulars reor-
ganized themselves and appointed their own delegates to the State con-
vention. The delegation was made up of leading Montgomery Regency men:
J. J. Seibels, Henry C. Semple, Henry Hilliard, George Goldthwaite, and
John D. Phelan. All of them were elderly lawyers, judges, and planters
who had been fighting party battles since the 1840 's, and who feared
a divided national and local Democrat Party. Schism could mean the end
of their power in Alabama--as well as the election of a Republican Presi-
dent. They did not want the State's Democrats to demand a platform un-
acceptable to northern Democrats. The Dred Scott decision, they reasoned,
gave constitutional sanction to slaveowners to take their slaves wherever
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they wanted, and it could be endorsed by "true Democrats/' both north
and south, and it could serve as a point of concensus for the party.
They hoped that by standing firm they could thwart the opportunists
grouped around William L. Yancey. 23
National Democratic loyalists, however, faced an insurmountable
obstacle. Alabamians-especially in slave-populated central and southern
regions were, after Harper's Ferry, more than ever opposed to popular
sovereignty and to its author, Stephen Douglas. Responsibility for their
fears, rested with the "abolitionized North." Alabama Congressman J.
L. M. Curry wrote Governor A. B. Moore, who stood close to the southern-
rights wing of the Democratic Party, "Our Convention can hardly hesitate
upon our right to the Federal protection of our property in the Terri-
0 /
tories...the people of the South are with us now." After noting the
defensive mood of his fellow Mobilians, Democrat Levi Lawler wrote, "I
am willing to see one more effort to save the Union; but I should regard
the nomination of Judge Douglas, or the election of a Black Republican
as fatal to its perpetuity. If the northern Democracy force their man
upon the party, the harmony and unity of the party will be broken and
25defeat certain." Thus, with significant public opinion arrayed against
them, Alabama's pro-national Party managers confronted a severe test
to their authority as the state convention began on January 11, I860.
The vast majority of delegates were not the Democrats of the
eighteen forties and early fifties. Most were ambitious young men who
were just beginning their political careers as southern-rights advocates.
Among the most prominent were several youthful lawyers who were sponsored
26
by older Black Belt southern-rights factionalists
.
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The convention was embroiled in factional conflict fro. the out-
set, with leadership of Alabama Democrat's at issue. The southern-rights
malcontents deeded federal protection of slavery in the territories
and thereby blocked an endorsement of Douglas. Montgomery Regency Demo-
crats, however, were willing to leave the question of popular sovereignty
to any future decision of the Supreme Court. Their avowed object was
to secure Douglas' nomination and thereby preserving the power of their
leader, Benjamin Fitzpatrick.
The first struggle was over the seating of contested delegations
from Montgomery County-the Yancey-led faction and those selected by
Montgomery Regency's rump caucus. The extremists succeeded in appointing
John T. Morgan, Dallas County firebrand, to head a committee of six to
pass upon the two contested delegations. Morgan reported in favor of
the Yancey bloc and claimed that Montgomery Regency leaders were dis-
rupters who refused to abide by Democratic Party practices. The conven-
tion concurred with the Morgan committee, by a vote of 211 to 110, and
the Yanceyites were seated. 27 But even before the delegation issue was
settled, the southern-rights faction won an important victory which
sealed the fate of the national party regulars.
William L. Yancey, William F. Samford, and E. C. Bullock had care-
fully planned their tactics toward the end of controlling the meeting.
Yancey moved for the selection of a temporary chairman early on the first
day, and nominated H. D. Smith a southern ultra from Lauderdale County.
Trying to out maneuver Yancey, conservative Nicholas Davis placed Unionist
J. M. Bulger in nomination. Bedlam broke loose. When the shouting sub-
sided, Leroy Pope Walker nominated another southern-rights man Francis
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S. Lyon, who was confined by the delegates, thereby placing the anti-
Montgo.ery Regency forces In control. Lyon's acceptance speech was no-
thing less than a slave-protection code for the territories that would
28satisfy the south. m sunken the issues of electing a chairman and
the seating of contested delegations, the anti-Fitzpatrick and anti-
Douglas forces could claim victories.
The delegates next turned their attention to the platform they
would recommend to the national Democratic party at Charleston. Yancey
was selected to head the platform committee. His committee instructed
Alabama's Charleston delegation to offer as a plank in the national party
platform a federal slave code for the territories. If the national Demo-
crats at Charleston did not approve the Alabama resolution, then Alabama's
delegation was instructed to withdraw. A second measure offered by Yancey's
committee declared opposition to the nomination of any candidate for
President who did not abide by the Alabama platform. Of 445 delegates,
seventy-one mostly from north Alabama, opposed the withdrawal instruc-
tions, but only twelve voted against the one binding a presidential
nominee. Leroy Pope Walker was chosen to lead the Alabama delegation
29
at Charleston.
William L. Yancey, ending the convention's deliberations, main-
tained that every state Democratic faction was represented on the reso-
lutions committee and that the platform was framed as a guide for the
30
national Party. Clearly, this was a dl. ingenuous assessment. Mont-
gomery Regency Douglas supporters had been denied a voice on the reso-
lution committee, and the Yancey bloc of firebrands actually sought a
southern-controlled national Democratic party. This objective could
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only be achieved by putting a southerner in the tfnite House. If the
ultras could help bring it about, then they would control the Alabama
Democrats and Yancey would be senator and patronage dispenser in the
state. John Brown's raid had given them, political outsiders up to now,
the opportunity they long Bought
-in order to divest Alabama's Democratic
inner circle of its authority. Because of the actions of the State con-
vention, the national Democratic Party faced its severest test since
the 1848 squatter sovereignty convention.
John Forsyth, in the General Assembly, complained that instruc-
tions to Alabama's Charleston delegation were in effect an ultimatum
that would split the national party and bring on a Republican victory.
Forsyth, J. J. Seibels, and highland Douglasite Joseph Bradley told
Douglas that the actions of the Alabama Convention reflected the poli-
ticians' will rather than the peoples'. 31
It is questionable, however, that all southern-rights politicians
were of one mind. Some of the moderates among them voted for the reso-
lution to withdraw at Charleston simply as a threat, believing that fear
of Democratic schism would force the Douglas men to make concessions
to southern demands. If the threat failed, the delegates might disre-
gard its instructions to withdraw. Other Alabama delegates confided
that even if the Alabama delegation did bolt at Charleston, this would
not break up the Party or the Union: in some fashion or other the Demo-
32crats would reunite before the 1860 campaign got under-way. Therefore
not all the southern-rights men were determined disrupters. Many looked
upon their instructions as just one option among others.
Charleston was buzzing with rumors about the intentions of the
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Alabama delegation. Few of the Alabama delegates could be described
as absolute disunionists
.
William L. Yancey, John T. Morgan, and L. P.
Walker at best could be designated as conditional unionists. Although
they came to the Convention pledged to withdraw if they didn't get a
Platform endorsing a slave code and a pro-southern president, they still
never threatened disunion. Significantly, they were considered disunion-
ists in Alabama where their reputations as "uncompromising Southrons"
were at stake. According to Allen Nevins, Yancey and his followers came
to Charleston to dissolve everything-the Party, then the Union. 33 How-
ever, their strategy was simply to maintain their new mastery of the State
party and to secure southern domination among national Democrats. There
was no plot to use the convention as a test run for secession.
Yancey, moreover, was as mild as a windless May morning. From
first to last, the reputed fire-eater went about Charleston listening
intently and with utmost courtesy to every faction. Neither his words
nor actions demonstrated the confirmed disunionist. Northwest delegates
at Charleston said that he was the father of the "Alabama Platform "--the
federal slave code--that would guarantee the dissolution of the Conven-
tion. Yancey retorted that he had done no more than an honorable man
had to do, and that he would go in all good will, only where duty led
him. An Alabama delegate, following Yancey's course, asked newspaper
columnist Murat Halstead "what was the Democratic platform for if it
was not for the vindication of the great constitutional principles."
Halstead wryly countered, "The Democratic party is an organization for
the purpose of obtaining Federal offices or in other words a political
34
Corporation like a great lottery Co. for the distribution of spoils."
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And indeed the slavery irabro8lio was
, in^ , device ^^^
ship positions in the State and nation so that old malcontents and
political aspirants could dispense and receive patronage.
Douglas Democrats came to Charleston to gain the nomination fc
the little giant and frame a popular sovereignty plank. John Forsyth
wrote Douglas that his supporters from the north and west should "stand
firm and insist on your nomination as indispensible to Democratic seces-
sion and a break will be made in the phalanx of Southern opposition."
The thinking of the Douglas men was obvious. They knew that the Alabama
delegation had instructions to withdraw if their resolutions were not
adopted. Only the Mississippi delegation had agreed before the Conven-
tion to join in walking out. Douglas' advisors said that he could not
ask for anything better. It would rid the Convention of his most hostile
opponents and win the nomination and platform for them. Douglas had
thought for some time that southern radicals represented a minority posi-
tion in that section. Thus, he had made his appeals to Alabama moderates
like Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick and John Forsyth. After observing
Yancey's concilliatory manner in Charleston Forsyth wrote Douglas: "My
fear is that Yancey
.. .will not... stand up to the instructions and leave
the convention." Upstate unionist Joseph Bradley also told Douglas that
he was "now afraid the fire-eaters will not bolt." By the second day's
proceedings, however, six other slave states agreed to follow Alabama
out of the Convention if their sectional demands were rejected. Their
decision came after the resolution committee adopted Douglas' federal
nonintervention position.
By these developments the pro-Buchanan faction were jockeyed into
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prominence. Their twin objectives were to stop Douglas and gloss over
the divisive slave code issue. Buchanan wanted a second ten,, „hlch
vas almost an ^possibility and, hating Douglas, he worked to prevent
the letter's nomination. Buchanan's chief "wire puller" at charl,
was Senator John slidell of Louisiana. He had helped make chariest,
the convention site since South Carolina was anti-Douglas territory,
and he made promises of patronage to any and all delegates who could
be pledged to stop Douglas.
On the evening before the convention debate over the platform,
the pro-Buchanan clique of Senators--Slidell, James A. Bayard of Dela-
ware, and Jesse D. Bright of Indiana-sent for Yancey. They prevailed
upon him to recognize the implications of the Alabama instructions.
If the slave-state delegations bolted, it would ensure a Douglas vic-
tory with a nonintervention platform. The Buchanan Democrats knew that
Douglas could never be nominated by a two-thirds majority as long as
the south stayed in the Convention. 36
Yancey agreed to remain in Charleston. Richard Taylor, son of
the former President Zachary Taylor and a delegate from Louisiana, was
present at the meeting and revealed that Yancey "undertook to call his
people together at that late hour, and secure their consent to disregard
37their instructions." Ironically, these were the same directions
William L. Yancey himself had imposed on the Alabama delegation.
"We waited until near dawn for Yancey's return," Taylor recalled,
"but his efforts failed of success." Ex-Alabama Governor John A. Winston,
a Douglas man, insisted that "they should be obeyed to the letter and
carried the majority of the Alabama delegates with him." Probably Winston
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sought to wrest the leadership of the Alabama delegation from Yancey
by making it adhere to the Yancey-inspired withdrawal resolutions and
thereby to secure Stephen A. Douglas' nomination.
The next day the convention began to debate the Yancey and Douglas
Platform reports. The former had been drawn up by fifteen southerners
and their California and Oregon supporters. It denied the right of any
territorial legislature to abolish slavery, to prohibit its introduction,
or to destroy or impair slaveholders rights; and declared it the duty
of the federal government to protect the rights of persons and property
in the territories. It was in substance the condition of Alabama dele-
gates for remaining in the Convention. And it was totally unacceptable
38to Douglas.
The Douglas plank which was accepted by the Douglas-controlled
resolutions committee was basically the same as that included in the
1856 Democratic platform; namely, federal non-interference with slavery
in the territories. This time the platform contained the added state-
ment that questions regarding the rights of property in states and ter-
ritories, arising under the Constitution, were judicial in character
and that the Democratic Party was pledged to abide by and faithfully
carry out such determination of these questions as the Supreme Court
39had made or might make.
Reflecting his ambiguous behavior of the previous night, V/illiam
L. Yancey's address to the Convention was a combination of vague concili-
ation and southern nationalism. After reviewing the history of the issues
dividing the north and south he asked that the Democratic party rcdedicate
itself to "the high principles of constitutional government and act ac-
300
cordingly." He denied that either he or t-h* ai %n ne Alabama delegates were dis-
unionists-nonetheless he declared that the Union would be broken up,
if constitutional principles did not prevail. He pleaded with southern
delegates to present a united front in favor of a platform that recog-
nized their rights and guaranteed their honor, and he concluded by turn-
ing on Douglas. Both reports were presented to the Convention which
adopted the Douglas plank by a vote of 165 to 138.
When the Douglas platform was accepted, Leroy Pope Walker of Ala-
bama enumerated the reasons why his delegation could not endorse it.
Then the delegates left the hall, followed by those from Mississippi,
Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, and Texas. After the
walkout Douglas was unable to secure the necessary two-thirds majority
for the nomination. This was because of a resolution offered by John
R. Howard of Tennessee demanding that any candidate must receive two-
thirds of all the votes originally represented at the convention in order
to be nominated. The Douglas men had based their whole strategy upon
the assumption that only two-thirds of the votes remaining in the con-
vention after the bolt would be necessary. When the Howard resolution
passed 141 to 112, even the most optimistic among them began to lose
hope. With 202 of only 254 remaining votes needed to nominate, Douglas
would now have to carry every free state delegation plus 19 votes from
among the seven full slave-state delegations remaining in the convention.
That was impossible. The Convention adjourned after fifty-seven ballots,
to meet in Baltimore June 18, 1860. The bolting delegates, meanwhile,
organized a meeting a day after their departure. Yancey spoke in favor
of moderation. Many of the bolters, meanwhile, had second thoughts.
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They began to seek a way back into the national Party by dragging^
feet on the issue of a separate southern political organization and they
refused to endorse a southerner for the presidency. The bolters then
adjourned, to convene again in June at Richmond, Virginia. 40
It is difficult to access the behavior of Yancey and other sou-
thern nationalists at Charleston. Ex-Governor James Hammond of South
Carolina viewed the performance of Alabama's delegates as rank expediency.
In Yancey's ambition to be a senator, to replace Benjamin Fitzpatrick
as Alabama's party chief, he had persuaded the Alabama Convention to
bind the state's delegation to "that slave code po Sition-a stance that
was intended to discredit all Douglas Democrats in Alabama."41 Congress-
man Martin J. Crawford of Georgia concurred with this judgment: "In
reference to the difficulties at Charleston it all grew out of the Sena-
torial race in Alabama. The platform that came out of the state's Demo-
cratic convention was made for the purpose of electing its author [William
L. Yancey] to the Senate of the United States."42
Yancey and other Alabama ultras, as indicated above, tried to
present themselves in Charleston as southern moderates. Yancey's main
political target was Alabama itself. When the pro-Buchanan's bloc brought
their proposal to stop Douglas, he readily agreed. There was a politi-
cal advantage in not bolting, and it may have been a factor in Yancey's
decision. Anti-Douglas Buchanan Democrats might be useful in obtaining
Administration support for his move to replace Fitzpatrick whose sena-
torial term expired in March 1861. In other words, Yancey could not
appear as fire-eater par excellance to those Democratic insiders he
deemed important in furthering his political ambition. After Yancey
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failed to keep the Alabama delegation at Charleston, ex-Governor Hammond
said that he "lost control of the movement . "43 Even at the southern
meeting after the bolt, as noted above, Yancey stressed caution and
restraint, advice that many ultras thought uncharacteristic of a man
who built a reputation on agitating sectional differences.
At Charleston, moreover, Yancey's position on the slavery questio
did not differ from southern-rights moderates like Mississippi's Jeffer-
son Davis. Both x,ere conditional Unionists. Yancey believed that both
the Union and slavery could be preserved so long as the Democratic Party
controlled the federal government and the south directed the Party.
Such had been the intent of most southern Democrats since the ISAO's.
This purpose was in jeopardy in 1860 because leaders of all shades of
opinion believed the balance of sectional power was shifting away from
them.
Much has been written about Yancey's secession schemes tracing
his role back to the formation of the League of United Southerners; his
1858 Slaughter letter, in which he suggested using the Leagues to "fire
the southern heart to secession"; his co-operation with Robert Barnwell
Rhet in 1858, when both spoke in South Carolina about the feasibility
of separate state secession. However, much of Yancey's disunionism was
only rhetoric for home consumption. He lived in an area of Alabama and
in an age which considered such oratory to be "manly." Yancey used fire-
eating demagoguery as a weapon in the campaign against conservative
Alabama Democrats. He invariably retreated when accused of preaching
outright secession; witness, for example, his denial of the implications
of his disunionist remarks to James Slaughter, or his claim to being
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minted at the 1858 Southern Co^ercial Convention in Mont8o,oery when
he had taiked openly of secession if the African slave restriction were
not lifted.
Few southern nationalists at Charleston demanded secession. The
panic and hysteria triggered by John Brown's raid had momentarily sub-
sided. Murat Halstead rejectes the theory that the southern bolters
were trying to split the Party, thereby ensuring the election of a Re-
publican president, and precipitate secession. Both Democratic wings
would later nominate their own presidential candidates, and the south
would seek to throw the election into the House, where it hoped to elect
a president favorable to the slave states. 44
There were also many southern Democrats who longed to get back
into the good graces of the national Democracy before the June Conven-
tion. Radical secessionist Robert Barnwell Rhett from South Carolina
judged the Charleston withdrawal as a mere tactic. After Charleston,
Rhett ridiculed those southern Democrats who departed hastily to mend
fences at home and then to seek readmission into the national party. 45
To be sure there was also an ideological minority, men such as Alabama
editor George W. Gayle, who insisted upon secession as the south 's only
option.
William L. Yancey, immediately after Charleston, appeared weary
and frightened. How would the people of Alabama view events at Charles-
ton? In a letter to Senator C. C. Clay, Jr., he shows the strains pro-
duced by recent events:
You have doubtless seen that both conventions
have ad journed--making no nominat ions--The Nat 1 1
was demoralised--fact ious and adjourned to save
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an open disruption. Ours had timid and perhapswise men in our councils, who were unanimous ato the platform and as to the holding anotherConvention in Richmond
... .You and our delegation
each and all must take an early occasion fnyour places, to speak of our action here and
must susjtain us... call for aid of every man. I
send... large numbers of my speeches and our pro-test Give them circulation.
. .where it will
tell on our cause. Do it at once-so as to bear
on the election of delegates to the coming state
convention—prompt and efficient action is the
order of the day.... An early occasion and a de-
cided stand by you, Curry, Pugh, Clopton, Moore
...will nave vast influence not only in Alabamabut over the whole South 1 write in great
haste--amidst such noise and confusion.... 46
Yancey, no doubt, feared also that his actions at Charleston would be
interpreted as a failure of nerve and of leadership. Certainly Robert
Barnwell Rhett believed as much: there was obviously "some want of
nerve in the management of the bolters ... and an evident want of steward-
ship. Yancey is not capable in that way, however great an orator and
47debater .
"
As far back as the factional struggles of the late forties and
early fifties in Alabama, Yancey repeatedly showed an inability to lead
and often followed the more astute guidance of Dixon Hall Lewis and John
A. Campbell. He failed to direct effectively Alabama's Southern Rights
Associations (of 1351-1852) formed at his behest. They became merely
vehicles for other Black Belt politicians who wished to manipulate the
southern-rights issues for their own advancement. Yancey's ineffectual
attempt of 1853 to perpetuate Alabama's Leagues of United Southerners
helped finish them off in late 1853. All these developments, as well
as Yancey's dismal performance at Charleston, bear out Rhett's evalua-
tion. Clearly, he lacked the intuitive touch of leadership.
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Alabama's bolting delegation returned home to a greeting of cri-
ticism and praise. The Montgomery Advertiser spoke of the delegates
talking firmly out of the Convention in the path of duty and honor...
bearing with them the respect and admiration of a Nation." Interestingly,
this newspaper which was being financed by Yancey categorically denied
that the walkout was "a disunion movement. It was a movement to uphold
the constitution. It is not even a movement to form a Southern sectional
48
organization." Yancey, in a two-hour Montgomery speech to an ultra
audience, tried to maintain his extremist reputation. He said that Ala-
bama would lose her self respect and honor if she sent delegates to the
National Democratic Convention at Baltimore in June. 49 As in the past,
such pronouncements helped to enhance his image among national party
Democrats as a dlsunionist. Some Alabama southern-rights newspapers
blamed the collapse of the Charleston convention on the Douglas faction.
Pro-Douglas men, they alleged, demonstrated that a determination to rule
or ruin the party: "It seems strange to us that when the Northern Demo-
crats found the South so united and determined against Douglas they still
remained unwilling to make any concessions and still refused to unite with
use in presenting to the country some candidate whom both sections of
the union could have supported. ""^
The pro-Douglas press was convinced that the crisis was part of
a carefully engineered plot to destroy thf Union by disrupting the Demo-
cratic Party and thereby assuring a Republican victory, which would be
used as a pretext for secession. The Southern Advocate, still under
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the editorship of William B. Figures, the former Whig-Unionist and now
a Douglas Democrat, objected strongly to the "Yancey group prating of
southern-rights as if they were the whole South," talking of "Southern
interests as if they owned all the negroes in the South," clamoring about
"Southern honor as if they were the only people in the South!" The ma-
jority in the South could not be didicated to nor led by the "nose...
and they didn't like.
. .Yancey .
"
51
Pro-Douglas papers attempted to brand Yancey a radical disunionist
by publishing his 1858 James Slaughter letter which recommended using
the Leagues of United Southerners to raise secession consciousness among
southerners. Thus, Yancey and his supporters, these papers concluded,
had a "grand design" which was put into operation with the Charleston
walkout. Significantly, none of the Alabama newspapers published accounts
of Yancey's attempt to keep the State's delegation at Charleston. Pre-
sumably the purpose of Alabama's Douglasites in putting the secessionist
label on Yancey was to keep him on the periphery of national Party poli-
tics. No sober-minded party regular would allow an irresponsible fire-
brand to replace Benjamin Fitzpatrick.
John T. Morgan also came under attack. He was villified by both
Montgomery Regency Democrats and the State's most consistent secessionist
George W. Gayle, Morgan's Dallas County neighbor. The Montgomery Con-
federation claimed Morgan had a most checkered political career: "He
commenced his political career as an old line Whig"; then, during the
1850 Compromise debates he became a southern-rights man; he was part
of the Know-Nothing leadership in Dallas County in 1855; Eighteen fifty-
six he supported James Buchanan and he became a "disrupting Democrat"
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again in 1859; and later, with Yancey . s aid
, hg^ ^ credentiais
chairman at the State Democratic Convention and helped lead Alabama
delegates out of the Charleston Convention. The Confederation '., ex-
clusion: "A most consistent cleaving to principle !
"
52
Confirming the charges of opportunism leveled at him by the Con-
federation, Morgan upon returning to Alabama began to equivocate in his
support of the Democratic rump meeting of Southern-rights delegates at
Richmond, charging him with a lack of sincerity and a failure of nerve
because Morgan would not declare his honest intentions for secession,
George W. Gayle claimed that Morgan "is so afraid of the charge of dis-
union, for fear of his personal political fortunes" as the secessionist
tide seems "to have receded somewhat in south Alabama...." Gayle con-
cluded, Morgan and his "kind were after a little petty County supremacy.
I will wash my hands of any such fizzling crowd, and for my part, they
all might all go to h-11."53
The possibility of being cut off from national Party spoils and
patronage for an uncertain future must have given ambitious office seekers
like John T. Morgan second thoughts. Even Congressman James Pugh, an
ultra from Alabama's extremist Eufaula district in the heart of the Black
Belt, believed (in May 1860) that fire-eaters like Robert Barnwell Rhett
were advising action too extreme. Pugh had been "cursing Rhett loud
and deep," reported South Carolinian John E. Ashmore : "I have never
54heard more earnest denounciations .
"
Meanwhile, at a May 5th Democratic meeting in Montgomery, ex-Governor
John A. Winston, a pro-Douglas man, denounced the defeated slave code
platform of the Charleston convention. The disharmony between the national
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Party loyalists and the anti .Montgomery Re^y facti„n ^^
and Morgan-was still pronounced. At stake was not only ^
of the national Party's position on slavery in the territories but who
was going to control the State organization.
On May 7, at the urging of John Forsyth, Montgomery Regency stal-
warts led by J. J. seibels along with north Alabama Unionists-all pro-
Douglas men and Party regulars met in Mobile and decided to organize the
"National Democracy of Alabama." They agreed to run county meetings
that would elect representatives to a convention scheduled for Montgomery
on June 4. This convention would select delegates to the national Demo-
cratic Convention in Baltimore. 55 On the same date of June 4, the anti-
Douglas factionalists who had control of the State meeting of January
1860 were to hold their own caucus to choose delegates to the Richmond
rump session.
Montgomery then, was a city in political turmoil on June 4. The
two state Democratic factions met to elect delegations to the Baltimore
national Democratic Convention and to the Richmond rump convention. The
national Democrats surprised their opponents by assembling a relatively
imposing body of delegates. All the counties, except Morgan, of the
Tennessee Valley sent delegations. So did half of the Black Belt coun-
ties and five counties in south-west Alabama.
56
The pro-Douglas men in Montgomery reaffirmed the 1856 Democratic
plank of federal nonintervention in the territories, and approved the
Douglas platform of the Charleston Convention which endorsed the Dred
Scott decision. They then elected delegates to the Baltimore Convention.
J. J. Seibels was chosen as delegation leader. The vast majority of
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those selected were from nerth Aiabama. Joh„ A. Winston ended the pro-
ceedings by excoriating the Richmond Convention "as calcuiated to pre-
cipitate the south into a secession fro. the Democratic Party and from
the Union itself-for which there is now no good cause, and for which
the South is wholly unprepared...."57
The ex-Governor failed to mention a prime motive of Alabama's
regular Democrats-to regain mastery of the State Democratic organiza-
tion. In June, momentum was again with them. No new "outrage" to the
"Southern way of life" had occurred. John Brown's raid might be only
an aberration it was thought. The ultras had been wavering since Char-
leston. Many had second toughts about cutting themselves off completely
from the national Democratic party.
The southern-rights caucus in Montgomery did pass a resolution
upholding in principle the platform passed by the state convention in
January 1860. It also vindicated the action of Alabama's delegates at
Charleston. However, reflecting the changed mood, William L. Yancey
made a plea for restraint. He personally wanted to see the Richmond
Convention nominate a candidate and then adjourn. But to pursue such
a course, he admitted, would not be advisable since Mississippi and
Louisiana had already accredited delegates to both Richmond and Balti-
more, and four other states were likely to follow the same policy. Yancey
stressed the twin need for Southern unity and for moderation as well as
conciliation. He urged the Montgomery caucus to accredit delegates to
both Richmond and Baltimore. He read a statement which, he thought, should
be made to the national Democratic Party in order to dispel the charges
that Southerners favored disunion. It read: "We come once again to you,
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as brethren, offering you the olive branch of peace. Do us sittply
,
U8.
tice-protect us, when necessary to our safety, and we will once again
be a united as well as a constitutional party." The caucus acted
Yancey's suggestions for conciliation and directed the former Chariest
delegates to attend both the Richmond and Baltimore conventions. None
of the bolters protested this bitter prescription-that directed them
to Baltimore, hat in hand, seeking forgiveness and readmittance into the
national councils of the Democratic Party. L. P. Walker was chosen for
a New York mission to get support from New York Democrats for Alabama's
seceding delegation at Baltimore. 58
Clearly, then, southern nationalists from Alabama were not inter-
ested in June 1860 in leading any disunion movement, especially when the
public mind was not receptive
-nor was it in the late spring-to such
a prospect. It is more difficult to determine, however, if these southern
rights advocates were willing to compromise on their demand for a con-
gressional slave code for the territories. Certainly, Douglas and his
supporters would brook no compromise on federal protection for slavery
—they stood absolutely opposed to it.
J. J. Seibels immediately accused "Yancey Democrats" of going
to Baltimore in order to disrupt the national Convention again. He also
charged Yancey with "manifest inconsistency," since he had stated earlier
that it would be dishonorable for any Alabamian to attend the Baltimore
59
Convention.
Seibels and John Forsyth were confident that their wing of the
Alabama Democracy would be seated at Baltimore. They had a strategy
to defeat once and for all the Yancey faction. They had, in a letter
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to Douglas recorded Benjamin Fitzpatrick for the vice-presidency,
insisting that such a development would defeat and enable national Party
Democrats to carry Alabama. Seibels had sounded out Fitzpatrick and
had received what he thought was a positive response. 60
Meanwhile, Alabama bolters arrived in Richmond. There the newly
formed Constitutional Democratic Convention was at a standstill. No
platform was adopted or nominations made, and after a two-day session
the remaining delegates left for the Baltimore meeting.
Before continuing to Baltimore, Yancey stopped in Washington where
a significant event took place. Douglas' east coast manager George Sanders
of New York visited Yancey and said he was authorized to offer him second
place on the ticket. Sanders added, in order to persuade Yancey, that
Douglas would probably be dead within six months of the election anyway.
Yancey scorned the offer, possibly recognizing that it would be impossible
for him to stand next to the hated Douglas in Alabama—and on noninter-
vention platform no less! Interestingly, however, Edmund Ruff in, the
Virginian secessionist went to see Yancey about this time at the excited
request of Alabama Congressman James L. Pugh, a friend of Yancey's.
Ruffin said Yancey "received me very politely—but he did not seem dis-
posed to converse freely and I inferred, as I had heard intimated, that
he was fearful of saying something to commit himself."61 The possibility
exists that Yancey hadn't entirely rejected the Sanders' bid at the
time of Ruffin's visit. In any case, he did refuse to make any disunion
committment to the Virginia ultra.
The Douglas Democrats were well organized at Baltimore. They
went into the Convention with a firm base of northern strength and took
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the nomination by force
. Yet they du nothing wouid unnecessariiy
antagonize the south. Douglas had aimed his recent senate speeches at
isolating southern extremists fro, the south and had not tried to mate
a frontal assault on the section as a whole.
On the seating of delegates, the Douglas-controlled credential
committee called for seating all the southern Douglas delegates who
challenging the Charleston bolters. Yancey argued the claims of Alabama'
holters, but their credentials were challenged and only the Seibels-led
faction was seated. 62 This caused South Carolinian James Hammond to ob-
serve that "it was silly enough to secede at Charleston on a very distant
and improbable issue, it would have been amusing if it had not been so
mortifying to see Yancey and the other leaders of this great splurge...
stand amazed and bewildered at their own success, with their fingers
in their mouths utterly unable to lead an inch further; but then to
see them sneak back to Baltimore, humbly entreat to be re-admitted into
the same convention with platform unchanged and to be so scronfully re-
63jected." This refusal to seat the Alabama delegates, as well as the
other bolting delegations, irreparably divided the Party.
The Douglas men now began a frenzied and belated effort to re-
establish their candidate's credentials as a nationalist and as a willing
arbitrater of sectional differences. They did indeed offer the vice-
presidency to Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick, who was immediately deluged
with telegrams from constituents demanding that he decline. President
Buchanan and Alabama Democrats convinced Mrs. Fitzpatrick that the Sena-
tor would be "eternally ruined if he accepted" and asked her to inter-
cede. Smarting from the rebuff at the hands of the Douglas Democrats,
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Yancey visited Fitzpatrick and appealed to the southern patriotism of
his old political enemy
,
urglng him to reject ^ ^ ^^^^
however, counseled Fitzpatrict otherwise: "To refuse now would be to
'
cower before your enemies disgrace your best friends and place yourself
in a most unenviable position." But Fitzpatrick withdrew, explaining
that Seibels had misunderstood their conversation in Washington; and
he declared: "to accept a place on the ticket with Douglas whose views
are entirely opposite to my own would compromise my political integrity.-64
One suspects, however, that Fitzpatrick would have welcomed the oppor-
tunity to run with Douglas. He had never identified with the extreme
southern-rights wing of the Democracy, neither in Congress nor in Ala-
bama. On southern rights he differed with the fire-eating C. C. Clay,
Jr., his senatorial colleague from Alabama. Indicative of his ambivalence,
when he turned down the offer, Fitzpatrick denounced the "distracting
differences at present in the ranks of the Democracy." He further implied
that these differences were engendered by extremists, such as Clay, who
heated the passions. This produced the final break between Fitzpatrick
and Clay; henceforth they would have neither social nor political asso-
ciations .
The vice-presidential nomination went then to Hershal V. Johnson
of Georgia. Johnson's willingness to accept it and Fitzpatrick
' s in-
ability may reflect the degree of control that the southern-rights cliques
in Alabama had over the State Party, espp^ially in Fitzpatrick 1 s excessively
"southern conscious" region of central Alabama. Fitzpatrick refused to
join the campaign against Douglas in Alabama and was thought to be friendly
to the national Party nominee. 6 "*
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The seven bolting Charleston delegations and other state delega-
tions north and west mt in Richmond , s Maryland ^
June 23, I860 and adopted federal protection of slavery in the territories
as its major plank of whit they called the "National Democratic Party"
-just to confuse the nomenclature even more. Incumbent vice-president
John C. Breckenridge was unanimously nominated for President and Oregon
Senator Joseph Lane for vice-president.
Even a casual look at Breckenridge
' s record discloses that he did
not represent the interests of southern chauvinism. Far from being iden-
tified with the slave-code extremists, he had made a speech in 1856 that
distinctly favored federal nonintervention in the territories. He refused
to join either side in the Lecompton debates and absented himself from
the Senate rather than break the deadlocked vote over the Kansas Consti-
tution. The Kentuckian, moreover, was known to be on friendly terms
with Douglas. Actually, the Breckenridge-Lane tickets had been devised
by the Buchanan bloc—Representatives John Slidell of Louisiana, Howell
Cobb of Georgia, and the President himself. The ticket was put together
in order to destroy Douglas and hopefully quiet the Party rebels.
With the Democratic Party hopelessly divided, giving a decided
edge to the Republicans, Edmund Ruff in conversed with various Alabama
delegates. He learned that they would chose secession "as soon as a
Black Republican shall be elected President which we suppose will occur
next November." He talked with Governor A . B . Moore and he "intimated
very clearly that he thought the southern states ought to secede before
Lincoln is inaugurated as President . "^
Much of Ruffin's report of secession sentiment among Alabama dele-
gate. was probably id* talk on thelr paft^ thaa ^
viction. Many Alabama ultras, Joseph Hodgson wisely argues, believed
that with three or £our parties In the field no one could obtain an elec-
toral majority, the House of Representatives would choose a president,
and the slave states by adroit trading could achieve Its goals-a federal
slave^code in the territories and a Democratic Party under southern con-
trol. The only impediment to this plan would be a Lincoln victory
in November. Then southern extremists would be forced to turn to a
southern Confederacy.
In addition to the two contesting groups of Alabama Democrats,
there were two other parties that sought the presidency: the Constitu-
tional Union Party and the States Rights Opposition Party. Both were
composed of former Whig
-Americans
. The Constitutional Union Party, took
national shape in the spring I860, and was especially strong in Alabama's
western counties of the Black Belt. Its state power rested with old
Whig-Union planters of west-central and south Alabama as well as with
pockets of Whig-Unionism in north Alabama.
Constitutional Union followers traced their Whigism back to the
late eighteen thirties and early forties. They prided themselves on a
conservative faith in orderly progress--internal improvements, protec-
tive tariffs, stable currency fixed by the federal government. They
equally scorned fire-eaters and abolitionists. They believed that seces-
ion would destroy their economic and social domination at home as well
produce racial havoc throughout the South. They looked with disdain
on the strident younger Whig ultras of east-central Alabama with their
pro-slavery agitation. Interestingly these Whigs were lawyers and editors,
s
as
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not major planters. The Constitutional Unionists, then, wished to con-
serve the nation, though
.any of the. believed in states rights. Unfor
tunately, these .en were as old as John Bell, their candidate. The
young southerners had other loyalties. 68
The Constitutional Unionists identified Yancey and Alabama's ult
as outright secessionists. On the question of slavery rights in th
territories, however, Bell himself took evasive middle ground. He ignored
the slavery issue and party platforms, and made the sole issue the con-
stitution, the Union, and the laws.
Bell's Party had newspaper support throughout the State. In north
Alabama, the Athens Union Banner rallied upcountry voters to the ticket.
So did the Montgomery Post in central Alabama. C. C. Langdon of the
Mobile Advertiser, an old Whig chieftain, turned his columns over to
Bell's cause. In late May, the Constitutional Unionists issued the fol-
lowing call:
We honestly believe that today there are over
30,000 conservative voters in Alabama who do
not sympathize with or wish to vote for either
wing of the Democracy of Alabama ... .That the
disunion wing of the Alabama Democracy has con-
trol of the party in Alabama Yancey and his
ilk have control and unless conservative men
rally around some sound National men, such as
Bell and Everett [Edward Everett of Massachusetts,
Bell's running mate] and put both wings down,
Alabama will be lost. 69
The fourth and smaller party, the States Rights Oppositionists,
was a makeshift organization containing radical Whig -Americans . Most
had co-operated with Democratic ultras in their assault on Democratic
Party regulars in south Alabama during the local elections of 1859.
They refused to join the Constitutional Unionists or initially either
segment of the Democratic Party. Among them were some of Alabama's most
strident fire-eaters: Thomas Judge, the Whig who campaigned
for Congress in the Montgomery district in 1857 and 1859 as a disunionist
George Shortridge and Judge Samuel Rice, both of whom moved from party
to party and from unionism to secessionist!, as they sought office; and
J. J. Hooper, editor of the Montgomery mil who competed with George W.
Gayle editor of the Cahaba ^holder for the mantle of Alabama's most
extreme southern nationalist. Among the State's most volatile southern
chauvinists, these Whigs were, according to the Constitutional Unionists,
always stirring up passions with their secessionist threats.
An Opposition convention was held in Montgomery on July 2, I860.
In attendance, too, were some old-line Whigs, men who had played a key
role in managing the fortunes of the now-defunct central Alabama Whig
Party. There was William P. Chilton, a law partner of William L. Yancey;
attorney James Gilchrist; and Montgomery planter- lawyer Thomas H. Watts
led the old "wirepullers." The convention was composed of seventy-eight
delegates from seven east-central counties. These extremists advocated
a new party based on the principles of the disbanded League of United
Southerners. They passed resolutions supporting slavery extension in
the territories but split over a resolution introduced by Thomas Watts
that declared the views of Bell and Everett on slavery extension to be
satisfactory. Watts was trying to bring the Oppositionists into Bell's
camp and thus become the "boss" of a revived Whig Party in central Ala-
bama. But the Whig ultras led by Hooper and Judge defeated him, and the
Watts bloc left the Convention.
^
The Oppositionists finally decided to support Breckenridge . During
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the campaign Itself, they advocated secession more consistent ly than
did the Democratic ultras. J. J. Hooper, for example, used his paper
to organize "Minute Men" clubs in the Black Belt to prepare Alabama for
secession.
Although these Whig
-American ultras joined with Breckenridge Demo-
crats, they were not deterred from contesting their allies for local
offices. They ran candidates for tax assessor and county commissioner
in the Montgomery district. This inspired the pro-Douglas Autauga Citiz
to gloat, "Great Yancey men-truly glad to learn it. Wonder how many of
them would vote for Yancey if the contest should be between him and Thoma
Judge for Congress in this district. These are only Yancey men between
Yancey and Fitzpatrick.
» Editor William C. Howell asked Montgomery Brecken
ridge Democrats "if they intend to stand by and see their party beaten
by Whig-American fire-eaters" who ostensibly supported their presidential
candidate? 71
Both wings of the Democratic Party as well as the Constitutional
Unionists professed to be pro-Union. Each claimed that it alone could
defeat the Republicans and avert disunion. However, the southern-rights
moderates who arranged the Breckenridge ticket could not prevent ultras
among Breckenridge partisans, such as J. J. Hooper from increasing racial
tensions and secession fervor as Lincoln's election became imminent.
Since all of the parties equated Republicanism with black equality
and abolition, none of them paid much attention to the Republican Party
platform. Had they done so they would have found that it reaffirmed
the equality doctrine of the declaration of independence without defining
it in terms of Negro citizenship. The Republican platform deplored dis-
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union just as the Bel!, Douglas, and Breckenridge platforms had done.
It recognized the power of each state to control Its own domestic In-
stitutions. But then the Republicans had upheld the HUM Proviso-
denying the authority of Congress or of a territorial legislature,
of any other power, to legalize slavery In the territories. They
.1,
rebuked efforts to reopen the African slave trade. On these two points,
which rankled southern ultras, the Republican position was clear: slave
should be confined to its present territorial limits but that It should
not be abolished entirely.
In a speech on February 27, 1860, and never reported in Alabama,
Lincoln carefully avoided all excess. He repudiated Hinton Rowen Helper
anti-slavery tract, condemned John Brown's raid, and spoke in terms of
sectional conciliation and broad nationalism. He shared some of the
south 's attitudes toward the Negro. For example, he praised the Dred
Scott decision for its doctrine that a black could not be a citizen,
and candidly declared, "I am not in favor of Negro citizenship." He
emphatically disclaimed the doctrine of social equality for the races;
he refused to press the repeal of the fugitive slave law; he took no
stand against the admission of further slave states. 72 But these non-
threatening views of the Republican candidate were not reported in Ala-
bama's press during the campaign.
In Alabama, then, three well organized parties confronted each
other as the great contest got under way. The Douglas forces contained
the Montgomery Regency leadership and north Alabama conservatives. These
national party regulars were older and had held positions of power in
the state. Though having the fewest papers in their cause, they were
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sustained by three influential newspapers located i„ three strategic
locations. John Forsyth's Mobile Resistor aided Douglas in south A.a-
bama. The Montgomery Confederation of J. j. Selbele fought fQr ^
"Uttle giant" in the Black Belt. Upstate William B. Figures' Southern
Advocate vigorously canvassed for Douglas and the Union, m central
Alabama the Gainsville Independent and the Autauga Citizen came out for
Douglas.
The southern ticket of Breckenridge and Lane had .ore Alabama press
support than their opponents. It was endorsed by all extremist papers
in central and south Alabama. In Montgomery, the Advertiser and j. j.
Hooper's Montgomery Mail, claiming the largest circulation in the city
enthusiastically backed Breckenridge. Other ultra journals in his camp
were the Eufaula clique's The Spirit of the South and George W. Gayle's
Cahaba Slaveholder and the Mobile Mercury
. In north Alabama two influ-
ential papers came out for Breckenridge: C. C. Clay's Huntsville Democrat
and the Florence Gazette. About fifty-four journals in all hoisted the
Breckenridge and Lane banner on their mastheads. More than a third of
them, as early as June 1860, approved the "right of secession." 73
Clearly, the Breckenridge faction included Alabama's major pro-southern
agitators which compromised Breckenridge
' s Union pronouncements.
The Bell and Douglas parties shared a similar strategy. Although
having no formal agreement, they seldom attacked each other. And they
both attacked the past positions of Breckenridge and Lane on slavery.
The Montgomery Post, Alabama's leading Bell paper, quoted Joseph Lane
as saying he was against territorial legislatures exercising power to
prohibit slavery; and editor Daniel Sayre also charged that Lane believed
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they could not even establish it. 74
Some Bell supporters in the Black Belt were more militantly pro-
southern than were his followers in more southern counties. For example,
they focused critically on Lane's claim that all Americans should sub-
mit to a Republican victory, "contrary to the South's attitude." They
also condemned Breckenridge
• s approval of squatter sovereignty in a July
1856 speech. Thomas Watts, a Bell supporter aware of the militancy of
his eastern Black Belt district, ascribed the Breckenridge doctrine of
federal slave code in the territories to Bell, though the latter had not
taken that position. 75 Both Watts and Sayre, editor of the pro-Bell
Montgomery Post, came out for congressional protection of slavery in
the territories. Both had visions of organizing a new opposition party
to last beyond the November outcome. They took liberties with Bell's
position on slavery in making their pitch to an east-central Alabama
constituency which had always been predisposed to pro-slavery agitation.
Meanwhile, Bell supporters in Mobile desired to leave the question of
slavery protection in the territories to the courts. Many of these
Mobile district Bell men were still pro-Union Whigs. 76 It seems safe
to conclude that in lower Alabama, then, there was a sharp difference
among Constitutional Unionists on the issue of congressional protection
of slaves in the territories.
The vast majority of Bell men in north Alabama were Unionists.
Ex-Senator Jere Clemens was uncompromising. In a Huntsville speech he
assailed legislative resolutions pledging the State for forceful resis-
tance in the event of Lincoln's election. This was a bad principle,
by which a minority dictated to a majority. Republicanism might be the
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cause of resistance in i860, but lt mlght be „a tarl£f> g^ ^ ^
other cause tomorrow. Once in our history a tariff „as invested with
this importance, it may again. Go out of the Union because a Republican
is elected President? Good God! where is this to end?" elevens also
objected to the grant of so much power to the "secession" Governor as
to enable him to "railroad" Alabama out of the Union. "If yo„ are pre-
pared to exchange all this for the horrors of civil war," he declared,
"posterity can only say such madness came as a result of excess of hap-
77piness."
Clemens later made a detailed report of the campaign in Alabama.
He referred to "our Douglas cousin./ ' described a vote for Douglas as
"half a vote for us," and attributed much of the danger confronting the
union to Buchanan: "I believe the old scoundrel would rather burst this
government into pieces than see either Bell or Douglas in the White House." 78
Meanwhile, the campaign progressed, Thomas Watts failed to establish an
effective organization for Bell in the eastern Black Belt; and, with
a Republican victory almost assured, he announced that it would be cause
tor secession.
Contesting Watt's secession assertion was Henry Clanton, another
old-line Montgomery planter-Whig. If Lincoln were elected, he stated,
the south should submit until the new President committed some unconsti-
tutional act. Clanton noted both the Senate and Supreme Court were de-
cidedly against Lincoln and that in all probability the House would be
too. With both Congress and the Supreme Court hostile to Lincoln, if elected, he
would be utterly powerless. Not to secede would not be submission to
Black Republicanism but rather obedience to the Constitution and respect
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for law and government. 80
Late in the campaign, „hen it became evident that Breckenridge
was the leading candidate in A .abaM
, supporters o£ John „„
to unite the Bell-Douglas parties. Bell manager, met in selma on October
10 and passed resolntions instructing their electors to vote in the elec-
toral college for any candidate who might be able to defeat Lincoln,
providing the party of this candidate should have passed similar resolu-
• 81
trons. Alabama's Douglas men, however, refused to join with the Con-
stitutional Unionists.
Douglas' own views on secession and popular sovereignty were often
ignored or de-emphasized by his Alabama backers. Their campaign strategy
was to expose the secessionists sentiment of Alabama's Breckenridge sup-
porters. They proclaimed Douglas as the nominee of the official national
Democratic Party, and the candidate for Union and equality. The pro-
Douglas press devoted most of its columns to denouncing Yancey and the
southern-rights ultras who sustained Breckenridge. Yancey was stigmatized
as a secessionist. Southern Democrats, Douglas papers argued, were
splintered and consequently could never halt the "free sellers 11 and,
therefore, Yancey and his extremist followers had concocted a disunionist
plot. Breckenridge was being used by them to divide the Democrats and
to ensure Lincoln's election.
According to the Mobile Register, the south should compromise with
northern Democratic leaders rather than reject them. Southerners, John
Forsyth argued, could rely on northern conservatives like Douglas in the
coming struggle. Like Jere Clemens, Forsyth could not see how principle
or constitutional right might be vindicated or secured if the national
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government became Lincoln's for four years. AUW
. Dernocrats^
join northern Democrats to beat back the Republican threat. The terri-
torial question was unimportant to J. J. seibels and William B. Figures,
and they were willing to await a Court decision as to an exact definition
of slavery's status in the territories. 82
Most of the propaganda of the pro-Douglas men was directed toward
Yancey. Former Governor John A. Winston charged that the "Alabama Platform"
-the slave code-was but a scheme to precipitate revolution. He asserted
that "gentlemen might not admit it here, they might talk gingerly about
it, but it was talked plainly in Charleston, and meant dissolution of the
Union and nothing less." When the bolt had occurred, Winston stated
that a number of Alabama delegates exclaimed, "thank God, the National
Party is broken at last." The ex-Governor said that twenty years in
politics enabled him "to smell several rats," and he noted that Yancey
"strutted" in Charleston as a man who had accomplished his purpose. 83
Winston obviously was misrepresenting Yancey's behavior at Charleston.
If anything, we have observed Yancey displayed a lack of conviction as
spokesman for the extremist wing of the Alabama Democratic Party. Through-
out the presidential campaign neither Winston nor any of the Party regulars
who supported Douglas mentioned Yancey's co-operation with Buchanan Demo-
crats in trying to hold Alabama delegates at Charleston.
All pro-Douglas and pro-Bell papers focused on Yancey's past seces-
sionist statements. They claimed that he had single handedly initiated
the 1848 Alabama slave protection plank, though John A. Campbell clearly
shared responsibility. They pointed to Yancey's attempt to disrupt the
Democratic Party at the 1848 convention in Baltimore. They again seized
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upon Yancey's dames slaughter let£er as damnl„g evldence ^ %
to "precipitate the South into revolution." Some Douglas papers ran
it daily as a reminder of Yancey's "treason."84
Yancey himself denied all the secessionist charges leveled against
him, heightening the controversy, there was even a dramatic clash between
J. J. Seibels and Yancey's oldest son in a Montgomery saloon-„ith Seibels
wielding an umbrella and young Yancey a cane. Uter Yancey wrote friends
that to say "I favored the nomination of Breckenridge with no hope or
belief of his election... thereby assuring the election of Lincoln....!
pronounce it an infamous calunmy." The accusations urged against him,
he declared, "are part of a grand conspiracy entered into to destroy my
character-in order to destroy.
.
.the cause I advocate-the election of
a Southern President."85
As the campaign progressed Yancey toured north and south alike
speaking in behalf of Breckenridge. He invariably emphasized two themes:
The Republicans posed a great threat to racial control in the South and
he himself was not a secessionist. On September 27 Yancey spoke in Wil-
mington, Delaware. The issue of the campaign, he proclaimed, was the
preservation of the Constitution-the constitution as defined by Yancey
and by his South. He designated the Republican Party the "mulatto party"
—which favored freedom for the slaves and universal amalgamation. Douglas
was with them on that issue, Yancey maintained. He concluded with an
allusion to himself as a "disunionist, twenty-seven feet high, weighing
three-hundred pounds and eating a little nigger broiled every morning
for breakfast, and a roasted Union man for dinner." In October at
Cincinnati, Ohio, he told a crowd that no part of the South would resist
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If the Constitution were preserved through the election of Breckenridge,
Bell, or Douglas. 0nly a Republican could, he asserted, force secession. 87
In late October 1860 Edmund Ruffin, the Virginian disunionist,
expressed dissatisfaction with Yancey's avoidance of secessionist rhe-
toric. He implored him "to assume the position in regard to secession
that Patrick Henry did for the rights of the colonies in the time of the
stamp act." Ruffin predicted political rewards if Yancey took the "high
ground" of secession: "I earnestly desire that you may have assigned to
you the best and most honored positions in the public councils.
.. .But
not wait
.... I entreat you to assemble and address your fellow citizens
....Call upon Alabama to act forthwith to lead the movement
.. .of seces-
, ,,88
sion. That Ruffin should make such a plea suggests the absence of
a disunionist'
s cabal of fire-eaters before Lincoln's election.
Yancey, in his northern travels stressed the racial theme. The
north and the south had a stake in preserving the superiority of the
"white race" which could only be retained by federal protection of sla-
very in the territories and the defeat of Lincoln. That northerners
discriminated against free blacks was probably the basis of Yancey's
expectation that the doctrine of slave protection would find favor with
them. Feeding the fears of a Baltimore audience, he warned them that,
with Lincoln's victory another John Brown with 5,000 men, would invade
south; poison all the wells; set fire to all the houses, cities, and
towns; murder and ravage all the women and children; set free all the
negroes; drive out all the whites; and take possession of all the land. 89
In Boston he declared,
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There isn't a man among you who is not welcomein the South] if he doesn't come to steal our
niggers. We have plenty of northern men in ourcities; they do not try to steal our property
or to incite rebellion, and they stay. But letany one come with a lighted torch to this maga-
zine under us-our slave populat ion--to blow us
up and to destroy our society, we would be lessthan men if we did not hang him to the highest
tree.-7 '-'
In New York City, again seeking to explain the South 's plight
and evoke the sympathy of northern listeners, Yancey emphasieed the
impending threat to slavery as well as its racial consequences:
Suppose the Republican party gets into power,
suppose another John Brown raid takes place...
and that Lincoln... is in power, where will there
be a force... to check that band? Our towns are
burned.
. .poison is found secreted throughout the
South in order that it may be placed in our
springs and in our wells; with arms and ammuni-
tion placed in the hands of this semi-barbarous
people, what will be our fate?
.. .Where then will
be our peace, where our safety, when these people
are instigated to insurrection when men are prowl-
ing about the South, knowing they are protected
by an Administration that says that by Constitu-
tional freedom is guaranteed to every individual
on the face of the earth? Can you expect the people
of the South to give such a government their assent? 91
Yancey's racial appeal was utilized to convince northerners of
the need of a southern president. To him Loncoln's election spelled
race doom for the south. White northerners, those who shared with white
southerners the same anti-Negro bias, would be held responsible if "Black
Republicanism" came to power. Should it occur, Yancey claimed, the slave
states had no alternative but to separate from a federal government con-
trolled by "higher law fanatics." Before returning to Alabama, Yancey
spoke in New Orleans and told his audience that Lincoln intended to re-
duce the south to another Santo Domingo
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While Yancey campaigned in the north, Breckenridge supporters in
Alabama presented a divided front. Their Unionist speeches in the high-
lands, where Unionist sentiment prevailed, was often printed and praised
by upstate Breckenridge organs like the Florence Gazette. But in central
and south Alabama the overwhelming majority of Breckenridge newspapers
and orators were fire-eaters. It followed that they condemned the timid
and submissive attitude of the south. Yancey's "southron" rhetoric pales
in comparison with the stridency of eastern Black Belt ultras-like edi-
tors J. J. Hooper and George W. Gayle. Gayle proclaimed, even before
Lincoln's election was assured, "Give us that Gulf Confederacy. It is
the only hope for the South.... We have unwaveringly contended for the
last ten years, that it would be better for all concerned to make two
...distinct governments of all the territory comprising the United states.
J. J. Hooper announced that even the victory of Bell, Breckenridge, or
Douglas would not avert post-election difficulty: ••There is no arbiter
but the Sword, these fanatics-Republican Aolitionists-will respect
the steel whips which tyrants have to be scourged."93
The Black Belt press that stood with these Breckenridge ultras
persistently warned whites of the threat of racial amalgamation if their
candidate were not elected. As the campaign heated up, another wave
of insurrectionary fear struck central and south Alabama. No other jour-
nal was more zealous in reporting it than J. J. Hooper's Mail, thereby
appealing to white racial anxieties and helping to harden the lowland
concensus for secession.
At times these fears were based upon actual incidents of bondsmen
retaliating against their owners. For example, two slaves were tried
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and found guilty of killing *heit master on .
_
dudgo Joh
„ G111 shorter re_ded that their execution take place at
the site of the murder as an object lesson to would-be slave rebels. 94
J. J. Hooper inflamed the prevailing uneasiness in Montgomery County
by telling his readers that Edward Everett, John Bell's running mate,
endorsed the amalgamation of whites and blacks. That Everett's children
went to school with blacks in Massachusetts was sufficient basis for
the charge. 95 The Democratic Watchman, published in the heart of the
Black Belt, alerted all slaveowners to the fact that southern Douglas
Democrats were really the vanguard for northern Republicanism and that
Douglas' doctrine of popular sovereignty was "Red Republicanism" in
disguise.
^
Fueling white Alabama's fears even more J. J. Hooper announced
(on July 11) that "Texas is now aflame, abolitionist emissaries sent into
Texas by Republicans and popular sovereignty Democrats have incited Texas
slaves into firing white homes. He cautioned Alabamians to be on their
guard. If an organized band of abolitionists were bold enough to fire
southern towns before Lincoln's election, Hooper reasoned, what "may
we expect from them afterwards?" White men had to vote for Breckenridge
if only to "keep the abolitionists from getting control of the government."
Hooper also alleged that an organized anti-slavery company were active
in the south-western Alabama counties of Choctaw and Washington. 97 He
condemned the Bell papers for sneering at the accounts of Texas fire
scares and insisted that all whites adhere to Southern "principles."98
The pro-Bell Montgomery Post under constant pressure from nearby Brecken-
ridge papers, believed the stories of the Texas "uprisings" to be exag-
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gerated but seemed to feel that where there wa, cn » icn s so much reportorial smoke
there must be at least a little abolitionist fire."
Pressures mounted on Black Belt editors whom Breckenridge partisans
considered unsound on slavery or on secession. John Hardy, editor of
the pro-Douglas Selma State. Sentinel
,
told of efforts by ultras to drive
him out of business. They first tried to buy him out, he stated and;
failing to meet his selling price of $10,000 they attempted to ruin him
by spreading the rumor that he had been "bought" with Douglas money.
When this tactic failed, Hardy's enemies allegedly procured the names
of the Sentinel 's subscribers from post offices and then hired agents
who attempted, unsuccessfully, to persuade them to drop their subscrip-
tions. Then Yancey brought a libel suit against him. Finally, said
Hardy, the ultras sponsored a public meeting in order to spread anti-
Hardy sentiments. The beleaguered editor was particularly critical of
J. J. Hooper's Montgomery Mail, which he labelled the "Negro insurrection
daily." Hardy asserted that "we would not be surprised if Hooper did
actually get up a second edition of John Brown's raid... to keep up the
excitment for Breckenridge in the South."100
During the course of the election campaign some of central Ala-
bama's pro-Douglas newspapers shifted in their political loyalties and
endorsed Breckenridge. The Prattville Autauga Citizen dodged criticism
that it was "soft on southernism" by declaring that either Breckenridge
or Douglas would do. The Greensboro Alabama Beacon in Greene County
switched from Douglas to Breckenridge in July. 101
Stories of northern-inspired conspiracies continued to dominate
the Black Belt press. An "old abolitionist" who was "caught and whipped"
in Pine Uvel, Montgomery County, get away, it was reported, and J, j
Hooper admonished his readers to »lp9k out £or him .„ The Montgomery
Advertiser demanded that Whigs and Democrats put aside differences to
comhat the "Goths and Vandels of fanaticism who riot in our sanctuaries." 102
John T. Morgan contributed to the mood of fear and belligerancy when he
called both Bell and Dougias 'Wlaeto Republicans." He also re_ded
that "Irish and Germans were ail inclined to be Republicans" and shouid
be removed from Alabama. 103
In Choctaw and Washington counties of south west Alabama, a meeting
convened to determine the character "of a new secret association formed
in their counties~"the Friends of % society." Two of the association's
organizers allegedly were abolitionists and, a witness testified someone
said that if everybody in Alabama thought as he did slavery would not
exist in the state in "three years." A resolution was passed to "drive
these men from the County." The Clarke County Democrat advised that
such abolitionists, when discovered, should be hanged, or not touched.
After a while when the Texas tricks shall have been practiced here, our
people will see the widdora of the rope."104
Whites in Talledega County in upper central Alabama were panicked
when "four strange white men and eight negroes," all well armed were
found within fifteen miles of the town. A "negro boy," upon being arrested
and whipped, revealed "a most diabolical plot...with our negro population
contemplating the destruction of Talledega, the massacre of the citizens,
and ravaging of the surrounding counties." A vigilance committee was
formed and two newly arrived white men were arrested along with eight
wandering blacks. The Talledega Reporter cautioned slaveowners to "keep
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your slaves at home, and worthless traveling white men off your premies
Don't talk politics in their presence and hearing. We learn that the
idea prevails among the, that a blaclc Republican i s . Negro
, and that
if a black Republican is elected President, he will set the, all free."
One day after his arrest, a %hite incendiary" was wrenched from his
cell by a mob and hanged. The Reporter's editor noted that "the evidence
against him, though not legal," was sufficient to prove his guilt. 105
Governor A. B. Moore wrote a constituent in Talledega informing
him that fifty pistols were en route to the militia: "The reason I send
them is that there is quite an excitment in the neighborhood
... in regard
to the slaves. A Negro had made some disclosures which has alarmed the
citizens-they yesterday purchased all the guns and pistols in Fayett-
ville, and have begged me to order more pistols immediately." Moore ob-
served that "these occurrences are becoming common throughout the slave
states." He blamed Alabama's "treasonable demagoguery-the Unionists
-for opposing the Military bill, the object of which is to make the
people of Alabama, secure against Northern fanatics and the poor misguided
and deluded Negroes."
10^
Governor Moore's indirect observation about the ease with which
slaves could be manipulated into violence typified white attitudes toward
black resistance. They desparately wanted to believe that their slaves
were truly content, for the psychological burden of admitting to the
existence of alienated, savage, and vengeful black men surrounding them
would have been crushing. The fantasy could be maintained, and the danger
somewhat abated, if outsiders could be blaimed for disturbing a naturally
well-ordered and safe society. Since public safety was of vital concern
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to every white roan
, all could^ ^
The fear of insurrection was such that it even bridged the gap between
the classes.
The shock waves produced by Talledgega's
"uprising scare" spread
across the slave counties. Too .any local Negroes, the Autauga Citizen
contained, "are allowed to have [church] stings. We suggest to this
community the propriety of putting out patrol companies, and would ad-
vise slave owners to keep their Negroes at home after dark." Apprehen-
siveness also reached into some north Alabama slave precincts. "Citizens
of northern Alabama," the m^Al^a^ of Limestone County, exclaimed,
"read a warning of dark suspicions. Who knows but what some deep-eyed
villian under the guise of friendship may be at this time tampering with
our slaves, and furnishing them with arms and poisons to accomplish their
hellish designs." Later Talledega was warned from another source that
"we are in imminent danger of the most revolting character." The south
"is over-run with... low lived hypocritical scoundrels accomplished in
the arts of "negro stealing and of underground railroad management.
All Northerners should be suspect as agents of insurrection."107
If proof of these threats were needed, "recent" cases might be
cited. At Coffeeville, Clarke County, for instance, some gypsies asked
a planter to lend them some slaves to assist at a burial. The next day
it was discovered that the casket contained ammunition and arms. Then,
too, poison had been found on slaves in different part of Alabama, and
in some cases angry whites had taken their revenge. The instigators,
108
of course, were northern abolitionists, and they inspired conspiracies
of "Black Republicanism" which has "become so strong and so bold as to
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attack our institutions on our own soil and wage a servile war upon **.«™
in September
.ore incendiary activities were
-uncovered/, together
with instances of actual slave resistance. A free blade bag8a8e .aster
on the Alabama-Mississippi railroad 'was arrested for complicity in the
nefarious plot recently discovered in Talledega County." A Barbour County
vigilance committee tarred and feathered several men who were alleged
to be abolitionists and drove them from Alabama. 110 Macon County whites
formed posses to hunt down a Negro "who killed his overseer." The bonds-
tnan made his escape and "at last accounts had not been captured." Later
a mob of whites of Tuskegee thought they had captured "the culprit" and
"before the sun set he was burned to ashes." One Montgomery County slave
was found guilty of inciting black bondsmen against the 'white people
of Alabama."111
The Black Belt Breckenridge press not only focused its attention
upon lurking emissaries from the north who inspired slave conspiracies,
it also kept the threat of racial amalgamation alive. An anonymous writer
using the pseudonym "Cotton" in the West Alabamian. claimed that the
Republicans "have two methods" to destroy slavery: to precipitate a
slave rebellion and then force southern whites to "amalgamate with their
former slaves." J. J. Hooper told his readers that "amalgamation at
the South, as well the North, is the programme and hope of Seward and
Greely." Their aim, he warned, in an obvious appeal to the nonslaveholder,
"is to free the negroes and force amalgamation between them and the chil-
dren of the poor men of the South. The rich will be able to keep out
of the way of the contamination. But the poor white man of the South
will not consent to the Seward plan; they will fight to death, first."112
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Another unsettling event occurred during the sunder and fall of
I860 and it engendered further anxiety in the cotton belt. By late June
it was evident that the corn crop of Alabama was an absolute failure
because of the worst drought in decades. "The yield can not be equal
to local needs." Staple fanners maintained that "Within the next
or eight months there will be much suffering for bread." Cotton,
well, "ha. been failing rapidly
.. .the long continued drought is beginning
to produce its effect even on the sun loving plant." Black Belt planters
abandoned their expectation of a minimum five-million bales. By mid-
August reports from Coffee County, one of the chief staple-producing
counties in south Alabama indicated "that there is not a sufficiency
of corn made for the general consumption of bread, saying nothing in re-
gard to feeding the stock." Cotton "is very inferior, not making near
half a crop, and rain is yet needed." South Alabamians talked of peti-
tioning the Governor "to call the legislature together for the protec-
tion of property from levy and sale by execution until another crop...
for under the present crop no man can buy a support for the next year
ill
and pay any debts."
Cotton prices fell to eleven cents a pound, the lowest since 1855.
On the Liverpool market cotton dropped below six cents a pound, the lowest
since 1854. The lifeblood of Alabama was the credit that cotton could
secure. When dought reduced the expected crop by more than a third,
lines of credit contracted and money grew scarce. The credit pinch pro-
vided Alabama ultras with further evidence of northern conspiracy. George
W. Gayle insisted that if Alabaroians would quit trading with the north,
they would cease giving "their dollars and cotton to a set of fanatics
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whoso so!e alm and chief delists ls ... t0^ upon
and rights." SoutllGrn^ and^^ ^
Sharped rifles, hlrcd the abolltlon ^ ^ ^ ^^
that have...MorUed ** tho overthro„ of ... theM„ ^
secession as a solution, it wonld end northern commercial and political
domination of the south. 114
As Lincoln's election neared, cotton prices in the north depressed
further and markets shut down. Cotton piled up in commercial centers,
some banks suspended specie payments, and much credit was shut off.
Now more than ever the north became the scapegoat. Southern nationalists
argued that the crisis was just the latest manifestation of Alabama's
colonial bondage, that every tremor in the northern economy sent shock
waves throughout the south. Alabamians, radicals proclaimed, had to
control their own affairs.
Thus economic insecurity coupled with incendiary slave uprising
scares did much to build a groundswell for secession in central and south
Alabama—especially as Lincoln's election became certain.
There was, in addition to the current cotton crisis, another less
dramatic but no less important economic factor—the condition of Ala-
bama's small farmers. Small planters from the Black Belt, particularly
east-central Alabama—knew that their position rested on cotton and sla-
very. The large planters owned the best lands, and by the late fifties
had encroached on the lands of the less wealthy. 115 The aspiring plan-
tation owner who sought mobility through the combination of slaves and
cotton sought relief by demanding the reopening of the African slave
trade, suppression of northern anti-slavery attacks, and the passage
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ess to se-
een
of a congressional slave code £or the terrl£orles
_ with impendins
election of Lincoln ana his po iicy of slave vestriccioa> ^
of the small planter seemed desparate.
Nor should „e neglect the aspirations of Alabama political lead
from the factors contributing to the State's growing willingn
eede from the Union, ultras, many of them small slaveholders, had b
political outsiders for most of their public lives. Their presidential
eampaign strategy had failed and a Republican's about to become Presi-
dent. Men like Yancey, who had never obtained high place or preferment
in the Union conceivably might have their ambitions realized in a sou-
them nation.
Toward the end of October firebrands shifted their attack from
Douglas and Bell to Lincoln. They now called for disunion. L. P. Walker
stated that a Republican victory would necessitate immediate secession. 116
"If secession were contemplated/' the Florence Gazette advised, "would
it not be better to secede immediately after the result of the election
is known, while Buchanan and his cabinet who are friendly to the South
have power than to wait till Lincoln and his wide awakes get possession
of the purse and sword?" Others contended that Europe would never allow
a civil war in the United States. Because slavery was essential to cheap
cotton production and because western Europe depended on southern cotton,
it was generally believed that Europe (specifically England) would not
permit the north to upset the south "s "peculiar institution." Neither
would northern capitalists. They also depended on cheap cotton produced
by slave labor. Alabama, therefore, would have nothing to fear by se-
parate state secession. 117 "Within one month from this time," the Mont-
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gomery Advertise, predicted "the South will be called upon to choose
between submission to the rule of a party whose avowed purpose is the
abol ition, not the restriction of slavery
... .We are defeated in the
Union, but out of it we are still masters of the world-cotton is king." 118
By November 1, I860 south Alabama had turned to military defense,
excessively so. J. j. Hooper urged the arming of every county, vile
abolitionism, he warned, was at the threshold, 'with torch and knife-
in hand. This mood of belligerency prevailed.^ So wrote a Mobile corres-
pondent to President Buchanan. He found public opinion "much excited"
at the prospect of a Republican victory and forecasted that the Alabama
Convention, which was to be called following Lincoln's election, would
not be controlled by Unionists. A Virginia school teacher in Clayton,
Barbour County, wrote of the situation there: "They are all violent
fire eaters, are for disunion to a man, and speak of any one, who pro-
fesses the smallest love of the Union, as a traitor to his country, namely
the South...." He also noted that much of County's ultra sentiment could
be attributed to the provincialism of central Alabama and the insularity
of Black Belt whites: "The cause of half of the violence in public opin-
ion here is their ignorance of politics; they never see any papers except
local papers, and the Charleston Mercury .
"
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Some central Alabamians, particularly those in east-central coun-
ties—organized themselves into "Minuete Men" clubs pledged to carry
out secession. J. J. Hooper provided editorial leadership in the for-
mation of these 'hotspur" organizations. On the eve of the election, Hooper
printed Robert Barnwell Rhett's false allegation that Lincoln's running
mate, Hannibal Hamlin, was a Negro or a Mulatto. "White men of Alabama
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are you ready for the doctrine of Negro-e quality ? " ashed Hooper. "Do
you believe in .ending your sons and daughters-aye, your daughters to
school with negroes and in asserting that the negro U their intellec-
tual e quaH A free nigger to preside in the Senate... the smell would
be awful." senator C. C. Clay, dr., who had long ago tied his fortunes
to south Alabama ultras said that he Vould probably resign" if Uucoln
120
were elected. clay, like other extremists, would take his chances
for preferment in a southern Confederacy.
Lincoln's impending victory signalled the implementation of the
Alabama legislature's ordinance which provided for a caucus which would
determine State action. Governor A. B. Moore, however, was in a quandary
and looked to the fire-eaters for assistance. State law specified that
forty days should elapse between elections. He asked state Senator E.
C. Bullock of the Eufaula clique for advicse about designating a day
for the election of delegates to a State convention that would determine
Alabama's response to the Republican victory. The Governor, moreover,
wanted to forestall Alabama Unionists from blocking secession. "It is
...important that the election should not be ordered in advance... as
the submissionists [Unionists] would no doubt, take advantage of it both
in the election, and in the Convention to thwart the objects of those
who will be for resistance in some form." E. C. Bullock, in reply, noted
that Moore had the constitutional power to shorten the time between elec-
tions. He wanted it as short as possible, fearing that secessionist
feeling would dissipate if voters had more time to consider "resistance." 121
In spite of mounting pressure for secession, some Alabamians con-
tinued to argue against leaving the union. The few Douglas and Bell
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newspapers in the lowlands presented the case against disunion by clu-
ing that secession would be economically damaging to southern interests
especially in the territories and, far from ending violations of the
fugitive slave act, would make such violations more numerous and more
flagrant. J. j. seibels inquired, "Suppose Lincoln should carry all
the Northern states and be elected, what then?" „e optimistically con-
cluded that 'Ve will have the Senate and perhaps the House....We will
still have the Supreme Court and thus Lincoln will be powerless for
,.122
evil."
Less
rn
issee
North Alabama indicated growing opposition to secession un
future developments warranted it or unless a convention of souther;
states formulated a common policy in the crisis. Many in the Tenne!
valley maintained that it was unthinkable to sever their relations with
the Union when Tennessee, to the north had no intention of seceding.
S. D. Cabaniss of Kuntsville assessed upcountry political sentiment for
Governor Moore. His intent was to provide guidelines which might insure
unity of all factions after the Republican victory. The Bell-Douglas
parties, he thought, had a majority in each of the upstate counties,
excepting Jackson and perhaps Morgan. Emphasizing a "very cordial sym-
pathy between the old Whigs and conservative Democrats, " Cabaniss con-
cluded that the bond which united them was a common conviction that the
"settled purpose" of the Breckenridge party was to "precipitate" a revo-
lution. The upcountry believed that lowcountry ultras had concocted
a conspiracy: They noted the walkout at Charleston, the military defense
bill passed at the last secession of the legislature, and the resolution
of February, which called for a "resistance" Convention if the Republicans
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were victorious. Upcountry yconen ^ ^^ ^ ^
foUovers could gal„ control of mg propose<J ConvenUon force
bama into secession and "bloody war." 123
Some days before writing his letter, Cabaniss heard the leading
Douglas man in the area say that "if the people of south Alabama should
succeed in putting the State out of the Union, they favored putting the
Tennessee Valley out of the State, contending that secession would operate
as an utter annihilation of all government within the borders of the
state and that the people in this section could set up a government as
their own." With this in mind Cabaniss doubted if any state-rights men
could be elected to the Convention from the highlands. 124
But the Unionism of some of the Bell men in central and south
Alabama was more fragile than that held in the Tennessee Valley. The
old Whig planters of west-central counties were stubborn Unionists, while
their Montgomery district counterparts, such as Thomas Watts and Judge
Thomas Revis, preferred southern-rights doctrines. J. J. Hooper was
spokesman for Montgomery Whigs-turned-southern-rights men. He declared
it was a great mistake to assume that Bell's supporters in the cotton
counties would accept Lincoln. According to Hooper, the majority of
Bell men in Montgomery favored secession if Lincoln were to become Presi-
dent. "The Southern people were divided as to men," Hooper argued, "but
few will submit to free negro domination."125
The final days of the campaign witnessed the arrival of Douglas
in Alabama. The first presidential candidate to make a tour of the states,
he scheduled Alabama as his last stop. When Douglas arrived in Huntsville,
Baptist Minister Basil Manly observed, "The political excitment is so
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high here as to absorb everything.
. .Bougies has frlends ^ ^ ^ speak
••••is tU. the first time a candidate for the Presidency has tahen the
stump
.
Thls only confirms the opinion
, had of him hefore. If J should
vote at aU it WiH be for Brechenridge-i do not looh to a man nor par-
ties... none can save our count-™ t u~ry... I become quiescent as the crisis ap-
proaches, God help us all! 1,126
When Douglas appeared in Montgomery he was hit by "addled eggs"
from assembled Breckenridge men. He told an assemblage of several hun-
dred, "I believe there is a conspiracy on foot to break up this union.
It is the duty of every good citizen to frustrate this scheme." No one,
he said, was more anxious to see Lincoln defeated than he; but, he in-
sisted, "if Lincoln is elected, he must be inaugurated." He added that
the Constitution provided the means for punishing a president if he at-
tempted to violate any man's rights or if he proved a traitor to the
country. "I hold that the election of any man on earth by the American
people, according to the constitution, is no justification for breaking
up this government," Douglas continued. He ended with a call for Alabama
Union men to rally around the principles of federal nonintervention in
the territories; "we will crush out northern abolitionism and southern
127
secessionism.
"
Douglas spoke in Mobile a day before the election. He was inter-
rupted by two questions from a Breckenridge supporter: If the election
were thrown into the House of Representatives and it came down to either
Lincoln or Breckenridge, who would Douglas support? If Lincoln won would
Douglas accept a seat in his cabinet? Douglas, in reply, would not sup-
port either candidate and, moreover, asserted he would not serve any
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section*! president who advocated ^ doctrlne Qf ^
vention in the territories. The KohUe Ad^tis^ the iocsl Ball paperdesert BonsUs- speech as * Triumphant
rf ^ ^
since 1850." 5
On election eve Douglas accompanied John Forsyth to the offices
of the Mobile Register where the results of the balloting could be had.
Both men knew the outcome beforehand. Dispatcher, fro, the north and east
made it plain that Douglas was overwhelm and Lincoln victorious. It
was no shock. For weeks Douglas had privately conceded defeat. Forsyth
had already prepared an editorial, which was read to Douglas, endorsing
the call for a state convention to debate Alabama's future in the Union.
The wisest policy for Alabama Unionists, Forsyth contended, would be to
yield to the widespread demand among central and south Alabamians for
a convention: to elect as many conservative delegates as possible, and
to try channelling matters into some safe action. Douglas dissented.
If the Union men could not prevent a convention, he argued, they could
not control it when the delegates convened. But Forsyth countered that
the only way to manage the secession current was to appear to go along
with it. His editorial appeared the following day. 129
On November 6, Alabama gave Breckenridge 48,671 votes; Bell 27,834,
and Douglas 13,613. Breckenridge 's plurality in other words was 7,224
against both contenders. Douglas carried five counties: Mobile in
south Alabama and Lauderdale, Lawrence, Madison, and Marshall in north
130
Alabama. In the four upstate counties, Douglas Democrats were better
organized than the supporters of Breckenridge or Bell. Two former Whigs,
William B. Figures, editor of the Southern Advocate and Douglas elector
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Nicholas Davis, both of Huntsville, did yeoman work ln e£fectlng the
Douglas victory in the four Tennessee Valley counties of upstate Ala-
bama. This was also true in Mobile where John Forsyth's Mobile Register
toiled tirelessly for the Illinois Senator.
Significantly, in the nine far northern counties, Douglas and
Bell-the anti-slave code candidates-had a majority in every county
except two, Jackson and Dekalb. The Douglas vote in this region was
high, as indicated below. 131
County
Lauderdale
Limestone
Madison
Jackson
Marshall
Lawrence
Morgan
Franklin
Dekalb
Bell Breckenridge
444 706
368 522
400 591
130 1760
165 441
525 370
144 549
715 902
204 849
3095 6690
Douglas
790
325
1300
565
763
576
545
460
202
5526
Central and south Alabama present a different picture. 132 The
Black Belt, home of the cotton kingdom, had since the 1830's been a hot-
bed of southern chauvinism and negrophobia. Southern-rights ultras
managed the Breckenridge campaign in the lowlands. To them the presi-
dential contest was not only over the future of slavery in the Union
but over control of the Alabama Democratic Party. Extremist support of
Breckenridge was used to discredit the pro-Douglasmen who sustained their
man and who had for years, up until January 1860, provided leadership
for the State Democrats. Throughout the campaign, lowcountry Brecken-
ridge men charged Douglas and Bell supporters with being "soft on sou-
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Lso stressed
thernism." Although emphasizing continuation of „„ion
,
they al .
^ir party's Platf0rm calUng for a ffideral suve cod£ fa territo
—
and an end to northern criticism of alavery. However, with Lincoln's
victory assured by Ute October, these Breckenridge uUras came out for
disunion. Their strategy of throwing the president dection into the
House of Representatives was defeated hy the impending HepuhUcan success,
and working within the "system" was no longer a viabie alternative.
Chronic political outsiders, they had nothing to iose and much to gain
by striking for southern independence. After all, a revolutionary aove-
ment might serve the politically ambitious men who had never achieved
high office in the old Union. The confederacy might gain eminence-if
they helped to build it.
Lincoln's election had a devastating effect upon Union sentiment
in south Alabama. To make matters much worse, it was turning out to be
an extremely harsh year for the State's cotton economy. Crops had been
poor, money was scarce, suspension of specie payments and of banks was
being demanded. Food was selling at inflated prices. In this atmosphere
of economic and political insecurity Yancey made a rousing speech in
Montgomery in favor of immediate secession. He was followed by Governor
Moore who also urged disunion. Mobile's businessmen opposed a separa-
tion, according to reports, but some observers found that nine-tenths
of the lowland counties were secessionists. The Hayneville Chronicle
reported: "There are not a dozen papers in the state, so far as we have
seen, but warmly advocate the policy of withdrawing from the Union."
The Richmond Whig noted that all pro-Douglas papers in central Alabama
"have either had their Union batteries spiked; or else they have turned
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with the tide and are as strong dlsunionIsts ^ ^ their Mntempor_«W The darUe county Democrat declared:
Paper or a Brecfcenridge paper tn these parts ^ ^^ ^ ^
at this time. 11 3
The Democrat reported accurately. The Greeneville Messenger [In
Butler County] for example, had consistently campaigned for Bell. After
November 6, Its editor, even while vowing that 'Ve are no
saw no other possible course but "separation from the Union." The selma
EeEorter of Bellas County, also a Bell paper, joined the secessionist
camp. s. w. C. Watson, editor of Benton Herald, observed that "all the
newspapers in Dallas County support the secession movement except the
Selma Sentinel." > In PiUe County
, m TrQy AdvGrtiser> one Qf ^
few Douglas papers in the lowlands, proclaimed, "we for one throw off
the garb of Democracy and go for secession at once. Before Lincoln's
election we were against disunion.
. .but now the die is cast... our only
salvation is in secession." Rabid secessionist journals like J. J. Hooper's
Montgomery Mail demanded the proscription of Unionist newspapers. "They
ought to be banned from Alabama" because they were published by "aboli-
tionists who hoped insidiously to propagate objections to and arguments
against the institutions of the South."135
Leading political figures in south Alabama, supporters of Bell
and Douglas in the past, now closed ranks with their old enemies. Old
Whig manipulator Thomas Watts published a letter dated November 10, ad-
vocating the immediate secession of Alabama. For him, Lincoln's victory
meant doom for the south. James Webb, an old-line Whig planter from
Greene County and a Bell elector, declared, "that our future career is
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to be o £ eternal discord and o£ angry ^
I conclude that separation, vith all its consciences, is „ot only ln.
evitable but desireable." John A. Winston, who had supported Douglas
and collaborated with the Montgomery Regency, publicly announced,
"I
look upon the position of those who talk about an overt act as a lame
and intent text to avoid the issue...." As for co .operatlon „uh other
slave states, "that is but a device of timidity and cowardice, or a piece
of strategy for delay and postponment. My own views are that we should
go into the Alabama convention and take steps for a separation."136
Whig Joseph Henderson of Camden, Wilcox County boasted to his
brother, are all for secession do™ here. No opposition in this
County, very little in any of the counties down this way." The res-
pected Montgomery Whig planter J. H. Clanton admitted to a Montgomery
audience, that in the election he had declared in favor of waiting for
an overt act before separating. The overwhelming majority which the
north gave Lincoln served as that overt act. Now he, too, advocated
13 7immediate secession.
Lincoln's election split the Montgomery Regency. By the end of
November, J. J. Seibels believed that submission to Lincoln's administra-
tion would be "unconditional surrender. It seems to me we must part."
The key to his conversion was racial fear. Secession, Seibels exclaimed,
was preferable to remaining in the Union and being "stripped of a half
million in slave property and to have turned loose among us thousands
of freed blacks." He had no illusions that disunion could be done peace-
ably, never having believed that "a giant Nation could die without a
giant struggle." But other Montgomery Regency stalwarts, Benjamin Fitz-
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Patrick and State Representative Boiling Hall, refused to come out for
Wdiate secession and called for a Convention of cotton states to de-
termine the course of resistance for the entire south. 138
Liters from Black Belt and lowland planter Whigs calling for
separate state action flooded Alabama newspapers in November. Planter
W. H. Crenshaw insisted on immediate secession before Lincoln's inaugu-
ration. Old-line Whig judge J. K. Henry demanded secession because overt
acts sufficient for dissolution had been committed, and added that Ala-
bama "ought to secede, even if alone." Bell protagonist M. C. Lane of
Greeneville charged that more than sufficient crimes had been committed
against the south to warrant secession. Stephen F. Hale of Eutaw, in
Greene County, was another important Whig who stumped for Bell but who,
after November 6, advised Alabama to take the course of "separate state
secession." The most forthright Bell paper in east-central Alabama,
the. Montgomery Post, now concluded that the south could no longer sub-
mit to northern "aggression."139
Resolutions adopted at various public meetings in the lowcountry
were held in Montgomery, Macon, Greene, Wilcox, Dallas, Choctaw, Pickens,
and Mobile counties. All resolved to secede by separate action; all pro-
claimed the election of Lincoln "as grounds for secession."140
Two weeks after the election, Black Belt disunionists wrote a
public letter to Governor A. B. Moore asking him to set a date for the
election of delegates to a convention that would determine Alabama's
fate. Although an ardent secessionist, Moore still procrastinated--in
the hope that some other slave state would lead the secession movement.
On November 14 he issued an address stating that he could not call a
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Convention until after the electoral votes were counted in Washington.
But he predicted that with the Republicans in power "slavery will be
abolished in the District of Columbia, in the dockyards and arsenals,
and where ever the federal government has jurisdiction. It will be
excluded from the territories, and other free states will in haste be
admitted to the Union, until they have, a majority to alter the Consti-
tution. Then slavery will be abolished by law in the states."141
Finally, one day after the official confirmation of Lincoln's
election, Moore issued a proclamation. On Decet.ber 6, he called for
a state convention to meet a month later-on January 7th in Montgomery.
He designated December 24, I860 as the day for the election of delegates
-for which act he was accused of violating the Alabama Constitution
which provided for a forty day hiatus between all political contests.
But Moore was under intense pressure from the secessionists to call an
early meeting and, as noted above, he himself favored disunion.
Perhaps we should pause in the historical narrative at this point
—and consider the state of mind of white Alabama; why they reacted to
the election results as they did—with passionate and extremist rhetoric.
Underlying the conviction ot those who lived in counties with massive
slave population and who considered Lincoln's election as "the last straw"
was the consensual agreement that racial control was irrevocably threatened
by what they considered an avowed anti-slavery Administration. Few south-
central Alabamians, however, knew Lincoln's actual position on slavery.
Nor did they carefully assess Northern racist sentiments. Directly after
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seces-
c
s an
his
.Uctioa, Lincoln reiterated his fundamental^ ^ ^^ ^
the states to meintain slavery fa^^ ^
interference with that right. Furthermore, he favored ^
the Fugitive slave Act. indeed, though it was . dif£lcult concesslon
for hi. to aake, he was even wiUing to accept a constitutional amend-
ment protecting slavery in the states. 142 Such moderate sentiments,
notwithstanding, white southerners retained their particular image of
Republicans as fanatics and abolitionists bent on freeing all bonds-
people.
Looking to non-slaveholders and poor whites in particular,
sionists intensified their efforts to equate Republicans with black-whit
equality and disseminate reports of insurrectionary plots. There i
element of hysteria in J. J. Hooper's editorial statement:
The recent elections
... show that the North be-
lieves in the doctrine of Negro equality. That
is the expressed doctrine of their leader Lincoln
Here in the South, we believe that the white man
is better than the negro; and the poorest white
man in Alabama would cut the throat of his daughter
before he would marry her to a negro Horace
Greeley, Senator Seward and such representatives
in Northern sentiment, would be proud to have
buck negroes for their sons-in-laws. Hamlin who
is Lincoln's vice-President is a free negro, and
boasts of his African blood.... Let the North...
be the home of the mixed race; and let the South
be the home of the white man, proud of his race
and proud of his race's superiority! Amalgama-
tion at the South, as well as the North is the
program... of Seward, Lincoln and Greeley. Their
aim is to free the negroes and force amalgamation
between them and the children of the poor men of
tne South. The rich will be able to keep out of
the way of the contamination. But the poor white
man of the South will not consent to the Lincoln
plan. They will fight to the death first .. .amal-
gamation is viewed with horror here...with the
South united... aye with a single cotton state to
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shift for itself... Southern men are white menand intend to continue such.l«
1C
"There is but one safety for the South," Hooper insisted, "and that is
to leave a Confederacy now moulded and fashioned for their destruction.
...We are a white neople here; and those whoever they be who advise sub-
mission to a Republican government are our deadly enemies." 144
Many south Alabama political figures and editorial writers affirmed
the impending danger to the "southern way of life." Levi Lawler, Mobile
southern-rights Democrat, expressed anxiety over the reaction of non-
slaveholders to the election results but concluded that "those who do
not own slaves are in the main true to their country [i.e. the South]
and will defend the rights of their neighbors as well as their own. None
of our people are willing to see the Negro and the white man stand upon
a platform of social or political equality. The entent of the whole
South and of the civilized parts is to keep the African in his continual
subjection and it will be done, in my opinion the only effectual way
to do it is to form a Confederacy of slave states." 145
Judge John D. Phelan, a Montgomery fire-eater, claimed to know
the purpose of Lincoln and the north. It was "the essential equality
of the races, that the black is not an inferior race, and entitled to
an equal status with the white man in Church and State, in office and
honor, and in the great and sacred institution of_ marriage
. Let the
non-slaveholders of the South look to it." Phelan forsaw Republican
rule repressing non-slaveholders and forcing "negro amalgamation" upon
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see
con-
the South, m which, he prophesied, a few generations, we 'will
a rnulatto race possess this country as they do in Mexico and Central
America. Let the Southern non-slaveholder awake to their danger and
strike for disunion." The strident editor of the S^th^ab^
curred. With Lincoln in power Alabama "is exposed not only to amalga-
mation but to a servile insurrection." 146
Xenophobia, intensified by real and imagined slave uprisings,
continued to obsess Black Belt whites. A Carnival worker was detected
in overly "familiar conversation with slaves" and was "railroaded out
of town." The Mobile Tribune recommended that "every man or woman, known
to entertain free soil or abolitionist sentiments" be expelled. Mobile
residents were warned to be on the lookout "for dealers in Abolition
books, etc." The Montgomery Mail heard that an Association of freedmen
in Mobile had been discovered. J. j. Hooper asserted that "the time
has come for the South to expel every free negro from its limits. They
and we cannot live together." The Montgomery Advertiser reported that
a vigilante patrol found letters confirming "that there are spies from
the North or traitors among us. This is no time for either spies or
traitors in our midst." In Mobile, a music teacher who "on several oc-
casions had spoken abolition sentiments quite freely defying the citizens
there," was forced to leave the city. 147 By December, then lowland Ala-
bama seemed psychologically ready for unqualified secession. Many in
central and south Alabama were prepared to accept immediate secession
--"straight out "--without waiting for a convention of slave states to
meet and withdraw as a bloc. In other words there was growing sentiment
in lower Alabama for single state secession regardless of what other
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cotton states did.
But not all of the state was o£ one mind. Upcountry counties
in the north-central and Tennessee Valley, regions of low slave and
eotton density-opposed disunion unless a convention of southern states
formulated a common policy. Many i„ the Iennessee VaUey TOlntained
that secession was unthinkable while Tennessee directly to the north
had no intention of seceding. Many highlanders believed that if Ala-
bama seceded then Tennessee would become a staging area for a Union attack
on north Alabama.
Upcountry leadership rested with a combination of Whig and Demo-
cratic Unionists. Two of them, for example, Congressmen George Smith
Houston and W. R. W. Cobb were the only Alabama representatives who re-
fused to sign an address of southern congressmen which was directed to
their constituents and which called for separate state secession. 148
Old Whigs like Robert Jemison and William R. Smith of Tuscaloosa as well
as Nicholas Davis of Madison and Jere Clemens from Lawrence were other
important politicians who counciled moderation. Some of these men were
stubborn Unionists and they would not countenance secession under any
circumstances. Others would accept a Republican administration unless
and until it committed an overt act against the South. If secession
ever became necessary, they favored a co-operative action whereby the
entire south would leave as a unit. At a co-operat ionist caucus in
Leighton (in Lawrence County), those in attendence declared their op-
position to unilateral state secession, but decided that they would ap-
prove any action taken by a Southern convention. Another such meeting
in Tuscaloosa County was made up of "the piney woods Aristocracy- -Robert
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Jemison and William R. Smith and their friends." They also adopted
solutions demanding consultation with other southern states. 149
Nor were these the only meetings in the north-central count:
that rejected independent Southern states' actions. In Limestone County
a resolution was passed stating: %e favor a convention of the fifteen
slaveholding states to consider what is best to be done, trusting that
there is yet a reasonable ground for a peaceful solution." m Tuscaloosa,
the majority wished "first, to use all honorable exertions to secure
our rights in the "Union... and if we should fail in them, we will main-
tain our rights out of the Union." The far northern counties of Lime-
stone, Lauderdale, and Madison strongly advocated co-operation in the
form of an all southern state convention and only en bloc action. For
example, 100 "prominent" Hunstville citizens signed a petition calling
for such a convention. 150
Jere Clemens corresponded with Senator John J. Crittenden of Ken-
tucky, who is best remembered for his attempts to fill Henry Clay's place
and save the Union by compromise in 1861. Clemens revealed that "the
Union men of Alabama have a difficult and dangerous part to play Our
hands are in the lion's mouth it is more serious than I feared. I
believed that the Bell and Douglas men combined would have a majority
in the State... this expectation has been disappointed. Too many Union
men in south Alabama had defected to the "fireeaters.
. .If the election
was held tomorrow two-thirds of the members elected would be for immedl rc
secession." Clemens said that he differed with Yancey in believing
"redress" could be obtained in the Union, and that Alabama Unionists
only needed time. He predicted that in the forthcoming election for
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delegates to the January 7 convention "the counties of the Tennessee
valley would give large majorities against secession."
"South of the
mountains," however, 'Ve shall be badly beaten and there is no con-
cealing the fact that we are in great danger of being hurried into dis-
union before the month of January is passed."151
Clemens' point about the Unionists needing time to marshall their
forces is crucial. Governor Moore, it will be recalled, had provided
only three weeks for campaigning before the December 24 election for
delegates. Moore and the disunionists knew that although secessionist
sentiment dominated most of central and south Alabama, a more moderate
temper might prevail by early January. Clearly, therefore, they opposed
giving Unionists and co-operationists much time to present their case to
the voters. Clemens' letter to the Florence Gazette, reflected the fears
of most of north Alabama: "I know there is not in the whole of the
Tennessee valley, arms and ammunition enough to resist the incursion
of a band of five-thousand marauders.
.. .A state so situated absolutely
requires time Talking of peaceable secession will not make it peace-
able."152
There were also a few pockets of cooperation and Unionism in the
lowcountry. Four former Bell and Douglas newspapers opposed unilateral
state action for secession. The Gainsville Independent in Sumter County
pleaded for a convention of all the cotton states before "resistance is
determined." The Autauga Citizen, the mouthpiece for Senator Benjamin
Fitzpatrick and Regency ally Boiling Hall, advised Black Belt voters to
exercise restraint. The Alabama State Sentinel of Dallas County warned
its readers that there was a movement for disunion, and it urged the
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blends „ the Unlon t0^ ^^ ^ ^
secessions. John c. Harvey, editor of the old . llne ftlg^
scoffed at the notion that lincoln . s election Kas adequate cause ^
"immediate secession."^ 0nly the Au tauga citi^ of the four Joarnal.
was not located in the Khig-pianter region of west-central Alabama.
There were even a few prominent men fro. the cotton slave counties
who favored cooperation with the Union. Both Senator Fitzpatrick and
Supreme Court Justice John A. Campbell were keenly aware that secession
would mean the loss of high federal positions. Fitzpatrick had been
elected President pro-tern of the Senate, and this honor would go by the
boards if Alabama seceded. Fitzpatrick's Montgomery Regency was divided.
His enemies controlled south Alabama. The only way to thwart old oppo-
nents who now saw their political careers tied to a Southern Confederacy
was to buy time-in the hope that disunionist feeling would diminish as
the weeks passed. Consequently, Fitzpatrick's tactic for salvaging power
was to adopt cooperation. "The Southern states should go out together,"
he insisted, or at least, "a sufficient number.
. .should go out to insure
a new Confederacy."1
For John A. Campbell of Mobile, a Calhoun man before his appoint-
ment to the high court in 1853, the thought of surrendering his judi-
cial posr was both depressing and frustrating: "I do not regard the
election of Lincoln as a sufficient cause for dissolution of the Union,"
Campbell observed. 'The circumstances of his election impose the duty
of moderation on his part There is a radical division in his own party,
and he was chosen because he was more conservative and constitutional in
his opinions and ideas." He further asserted that the loss from fugitive
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slaves was not materlal; „not Qne Southerner ^ tm thouMnd ever^
a .an who had lost a slave by northern rescue." ^ ^^^
wanted, Campbell stated, 'tas „ cessation of the agitation against
slavery." 55
To turn back to the politicai narrative, and to the contest for
delegates to the state convention, it became evident that two parties
had emerged. One bloc of voters favored separate state secession-that
is unilateral state action-and the other endorsed cooperative action,
with the slave states seceding en bloc. There were different shades of
opinion among the cooperationists, varying from unconditional Unionism
to support of secession only if the rest of the south would join Alabama
in this final step.
The campaign for delegates began in late November. Secessionists
from the Black Belt and southern counties enjoyed advantages that up-
country moderates and conservatives could not overcome. For example,
Governor Moore was a "straight out" seceder and he used the powers of
his office toward such ends. Indeed, he had set the state convention
date well in advance of Lincoln's inauguration.
Radical control of most Alabama newspapers was another handicap
of upstate conservatives. The Breckenridge press had been stumping for
secession since late October when Lincoln's election seemed assured.
With wide newspaper coverage, the disunionists could mobilize the social
unrest brought on by the Republican victory and bring Alabama's cotton
kingdom behind their program of immediate secession.
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As was to be expected secessionist in the Black Belt also orga-
nised vigilance committees. Such groups as "the Minute Men" enforced
the orthodox view of secession and suppressed anything that appeared to
be "northern." *^ central and southern counties only the "straight
outs" were sufficiently organized to prepare an electoral ticket, although
contentious and close elections ensued between the. and
Witness for instance, Autauga County where Boiling Hall, supported
by Senator Fitzpatrick, ran as a cooperationist
. Significantly, this
was the last clash between the refining leaders of the Montgomery Regency
and Montgomery's ultras, to defeat their old conservative opponents and
it would help to determine what faction would manage Black Belt politics.
The ultras worked energetically to defeat their old conservative enemies.
Boiling Hall warned of the horrors of disunion and of the military weak-
ness of Alabama-of anything that would deter the voters from secession.
He was defeated by twenty-three votes (603 to 626), by an opponent who
enlisted Yancey's support. But in one central Alabama county bordering
on the Black Belt, Tallaposa County, secessionists received a setback
in the election for delegates; and it made "committed" Tallaposa dis-
unionists to proclaim their devotion to the Union. 156
Cooperationists dominated in the north-central counties. Upcountry
Alabama had always differed from the southern part of the state. Except
for two counties, its soil and topography were not conducive to cotton
and slavery. This region, lying partly in the Tennessee Valley, sold
much of its production across the state line in Tennessee. In other words,
the upcountry possibly had greater economic and political ties to the
north than in Alabama itself. Furthermore there was no railroad connecting
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north and so,lth Alabama
, for th£ lowUnds aiways £ought^ ^
broad-based interstate transportation system. North Alabama, conse-
gently, did not share the intense fire-eater views of the more isolated
plantation communities of the Black Belt.
The tactics of Madison County secessionists, led by L. p. Walker,
suggests the weakness of upcountry "straight outs." They offered to
form a coalition ticket with cooperationists
. The latter, led by Jure
Clemens and Nicholas Davis, suspected that this concession was an ultra
trick-by which their delegates would agree to vote with the cooperationists
majority and then switch once inside the Convention. In any case, the
cooperationists rejected their bid. 157
During the brief campaign, the most common argument of both co-
operationists and Unionists forces was that secession would not cure any
of the evils of which the south complained. Cooperationists maintained
that a convention of southern states might be able to secure redress of
their grievances and press the enactment of some kind of federal slave
code. Hasty action by the South they warned might turn the border states
against secession and prompt them to form a third confederacy. Jere
Clemens in numerous addresses asked a fundamental question: How would
secession preserve slavery? With their section out of the Union, new
slave territories would forever be closed to the South by a stronger
and hostile north. Lincoln, moreover, would never allow the South to
secede peacefully. There would be civil war and Alabama would be invaded
and occupied by Union armies pouring through the Tennessee Valley. Con-
servatives also argued that Governor Moore's proclamation established
convention election procedures was illegal because it allowed only
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eighteen days between the dates of issuance and ejection, and Alabama
law required a period of forty days. This unlawful act Inspired many
cooperatlonists to talk angrily of a conspiracy: and to find proof of
It In earlier events-the legislature's provision for a convention in
event of a Republican victory and the bolt of the Alabama delegation
at Charleston. The State, they claimed, was being railroaded into seces-
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sion.
Secessionists avoided responding to the charge of election mani-
pulation by the Governor. They attempted to divert attention to the
idea that the two-week period between the delegates' election and the
January 7 meeting of the State convention allowed time for adequate con-
sultations with other states. The issues, they asserted, were more than
a decade old and fully understood by the voters. These secessionists
invoked their old image of a vast northern cabal dedicated to the over-
throw of slavery. Lincoln, they argued, would tamper with the Court's
membership and obtain a majority favorable to the exclusion of slavery
from the territories, thereby reversing Dred Scott. According to this
sinister line, Republicans were also plotting to abolish slavery in
Washington, D.C. Indeed, no slave would be safe in the Union as long
as Personal Liberty laws remained on the books of Northern states and
the kidnapping of bondsmen continued. "Straight Outs" also warned that
enough free states could be carved out of the territories to give Nor-
therners the three-fourths majority needed to amend the Constitution and
abolish slavery. These ultras insisted that, constitutionally, Alabama
was within her rights in leaving the Union. In ratifying the federal
Constitution, Alabama entered the Union by separate action: it should
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leave by the saTO .ethod. The North
,
moreov^ 4„ ^^ ^
would do nothing to prevent southerners fro. exercising their constl-
tutional rights. 159
Of great concern to upstate secessionists was the vast non-slave-
holding population of their region. The last census had shown eight
northern counties in which the slaves were fewer than 13 percent of
the population. Small wonder that cooperationists were in a majority,
and that outright Unionists controlled some Valley counties. Predictably,
the most consistent argument used by secessionists to arouse non-slave-
holders was the equation of Republicanism with black-white equality.
Even without slaves most Alabama whites were responsive to a racial appeal.
When Senator C. C. Clay, Jr., threatened to resign if Alabama did not
secede before Lincoln's inauguration, he told the non-slaverholder that
Republicans intended to make the Negro "his equal in political and social
privileges." The slave would be the peer of the white man and would
claim his "daughter in marriage."160
L. P. Walker also attempted to arouse the fears of non-slaveholders
by evoking the image of servile insurrection. Speaking at a north Ala-
bama meeting he admonished the politician who sought "to array the rich
against the poor, or the poor against the rich." Those who taught non-
slaveholders to believe that they had no interest in the preservation
of slavery should be condemned, he continued: The yeomanry were as re-
liable as the slaveholder in this crisis. He asserted that "this whole
subject has reached this simple proposition—shall Negroes govern white
men, or white men govern Negroes: Remember now, that universal emanci-
pation and universal suffrage, go together. When this point is reached,
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and the ballot is free alt*. to black a„d vhlte .„ny God , The^ o£
such a possibility Submlt then> „ youdarej £or a singu day; ^
Administration of a «n who proclaim this doctrine of universal eman-
cipation, and.
..all that the freeman holds dear is soon ended.
...The
whole social fabric of Southern civilization-the highest best ordered,
and most perfect embodiment of human government the world has ever seen
will pass away forever...." He cautioned that "in all great political
crisis, delays are always dangerous. Delay now is destruction."161
Another upstate ultra told the readers of the Huntsville Southern
Advocate that
the nonslaveholders are even more greatly inter-
ested than the slaveholders: for upon the suc-
cessful spread of Republican doctrines, carried
to their legitimate results, the non-slaveholders
are the ones who will suffer most. The slave-
holders as a class are rich, and therefore would
be enabled speedily to take themselves and their
fortunes out of a country once more delivered
over to barbarism and the besotted ignorance of
central Africa. But the non-slaveholders, what
an appalling fate would be theirs? I shudder to
contemplate! What social monstrosities, what de-
solated fields, what civil broils, what robberies,
rapes, and murders of the poorer whites by the
emancipated blacks would then disfigure the whole
fair face of this prosperous, smiling, happy Sou-
thern land. 1°2
These immediate secessionists, the "straight outers," continued
to play on white fears of slave revolt. After Lincoln's election the
tactic was employed in order to build unity for separate state secession.
J. J. Hooper was again prominent in reporting servile plots. In early
December he revealed a massive insurrectionary conspiracy in the Black
Belt--Pine Level, Autauga, Prattville, and Hayneville. "We have found
a deep laid plan among negroes." The Montgomery Advertiser stated, "it
363
is general all over the country
...
.
We hear some startling facts. They
have gone far enough in the plot to divide our estates, mules, lands,
and household furniture...... ^ty^ slaveg ^ ^^ ^^
to the region were arrested. The authorities Shipped the Negroes" who
confessed that slaves were "to Mke . general rise^ ^
holidays. They are to kill the families on a certain night and then
get together and take the County-Montgomery County. They look for aid
from Lincoln and the Northern people. We cannot find out the exact time,
but they generally pitched on.. .the 26th of December. No humbug in this!" 163
In an editorial J. J. Hooper instructed Black Belt planters to keep "non-
resident vagrants away from their plantations. "Slaves are generally
loyal but too many have the impression that Lincoln's election has made,
or will make them free.... Let close, rigid discipline and the omission
of the usual Christmas holiday festivities, mark the year 1860 and the
election of Lincoln as a black epoch with the Southern slave."164
Dallas County was also struck with slave revolt "fever" on elec-
tion eve. The Dallas Gazette reminded County slaveowners to be on the
alert. "Remember that fire, poison and the knife are supplied to bad
negroes by our pious brethren of the North-let no stray vagrants remain
about your premises—jail every suspicious character Christmas week
has been appointed by the Abolitionists and their Republican allies for
a servile movement .. .dire circumspection should be exercised everywhere
in the cotton region." Meanwhile Clarke and Macon counties expressed
similar anxieties as the election and Christmas holidays approached.
It was recommended that Clarke County slaves be prevented from "going
to town" for Christmas day in light of the alleged uprising plot scheduled
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en-
1 re -
among
one
for Cristas week. However, Issac Grant
,
editor ,f ^ clarke^
Jtecr^ dissented: If the slaves kept ^^ ^
they may think the white folks are uneasy, and such a thought might
courage notions that would not otherwise have entered their heads....
But at the same time, keep up the patrols." The Macon Republic
ported that vigilance patrols had been organized to enforce order
the slaves during the holidays "to guard against strolling Osawatamie,
[John Brown raiders]." Praising such action of Macon's planters, the
editor warned "never before was it so necessary for us to sleep with
eye out at the window. Patrol! Patrol!! Patrol!!!" 165 A friend of
Senator C. C. Clay, Jr., stated that south Alabama's "negroes threatened
to poison the water here.... Some seem to think there is a great deal
of rebellious feeling amongst the negroes.
...I would not be surprised
...they are so imitative, ignorant and undisciplined
--in fact unfit
for freedom 1,166
The heavily-populated slave counties were united in the be l ie I
that racial authority must be maintained. Supreme Court Justice Camp-
bell (who was from Mobile) admitted as much in confiding to ex-Prosldent
Pierce that "many of these rumors of slave insurrections have no foun-
dation at all and... all the facts of any must be exaggerated. But no
community can exist or prosper when this sense of insecurity prevails.
""' 1
It was precisely this "sense of insecurity" that Alabama ultras politi-
cized in order to sustain the secessionist- impulse prevalent in the low-
country. By late December whites in the cotton counties wtVfl m ar-un-
animous in the conviction that Lincoln and his Party would wreck racial
havoc on the south.
As election day, December 27, 1860, neared the straight outs--
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con-
conven-
those favoring independent state acWon toward secesslon..strengthened
their position. Governor Moore appointed sixteen commissioners to
fer with leaders in other slave states whose legislatures and
tions were to meet prior to Alabama. Among those selected as "ambas-
sadors" were some o£ the State's most ardent secessionists: E. C. Bullock
and John Gill shorter of the Eufaula clique; Edmund w. Pectus, brother
of the Governor of Mississippi, was sent to Mississippi; John A. EWe,
born and educated in South Carolina, was assigned to the Palmetto state;
and L. P. Walker traveled to Tennessee. 168 it was the responsibility
of these men to act as committees of correspondence, keeping Alabama
officials informed of activities in the other slave states, and to stir
up secession sentiment in these states. Thus, while sponsoring seces-
sion abroad, the straight outs were also promoting the cause of separate
state action at home.
John A. Elmore addressed the Convention of South Carolina and
advised its delegates to take immediate and unilateral action. Such
action would exacerbate matters, and Alabama as well as the other sou-
thern states would speedily follow. 169 On December 20, four days before
the Alabama election for delegates to its January 7, 1861 Convention,
South Carolina did indeed secede. Alabama immediatists promptly chal-
lenged the cooperationists to "co-operate with South Carolina." The
latters action, only a few days before the election gave Alabama seces-
sionists an obvious propaganda advantage.
On the heels of South Carolina's secession, Alabama's congress-
ional representatives—except for upcountry unionists George Smith Hous-
ton and W. R. W. Cobb--signed a public statement asserting that Repub-
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lican leaders were detprm-fno^ t-~ iermi ed to make no concessions to the south, and
that the^sections only hope lay in immediate secession by separate state
action. All of AlaWg Congressmen from centrai ^ gouthern
districts were intent upon pushing through secession before the excit-
ment over Lincoln's election subsided.
Representative David clopton from the Montgomery district, in a
letter of December 13th to Senator C. C. Clay, Jr., strongly opposed
compromise: "Many and various efforts are being made to compromise
existing difficulties and patch up the rotton concern. They will all
be futile." He was among several Alabama colleagues who had declined
to vote on certain issues, "believing that we ought to keep ourselves
clean of all compromises." Clopton conveying the general impression
in Congress, asserted that, regardless of party, lawmakers believed dis-
solution of the Union was inevitable. Clopton himself, expressed a de-
termination to die free rather than live a slave to Black Republicanism.
"I would be an equal, or a corpse," he declared. "The argument is ex-
hausted, further remonstrance is dishonorable, hesitation is dangerous,
delay is submission. .. let the God of battles decide the issue." 171
Obviously, Alabama cooperationists labored under great handicaps.
Their best argument—namely, the need for concerted action among the
slave states—was robbed of its force by South Carolina secession and
the determination of most of Alabama's political leaders to follow suit.
On December 24 voters went to the polls to decide upon delegates
to the January 7th Convention and in effect to determine Alabama's fate
within the Union. The returns came in slowly, and it was not known for
certain which side had a majority until the delegates themselves convened
36 7
two weeks ut.r . ^e returns have^ so
Fitspatrick reported from Washington, "that we don't know now, which
Party has a majority In our convention." 1" „ouever
, Jere clemens^
confidence when he told Senator John J. Crittenden that "the nine coun-
ties of the Tennessee vailey have given in a solid body for the Union.
My own majority in this County [Madison]
.. . is 1039. ... No returns have
yet been received from the other parts of the state." cleans adamently
predicted that "the six mountain counties, adjoining us, will certainly
vote as the Valley has done, for the Union." 173 Clemens left the mis-
taken impression that all cooperationists were Unionists. Although most
upstate cooperationists were inclined toward the Union, many still re-
garded secession as constitutional, especially if a national compromise
could not be achieved.
Confusion reigned across Alabama. For example, the Montgomery
Advertiser, an ultra organ, computed the vote at 36,000 for secession
and 27,000 for co-operation (an estimate which later proved correct),
while a cooperationist journal said its cause was victorious by 33,000
to 24, 000.
174
Part of the confusion may be attributed to the difficulty
in learning the precise views of a number of candidates. In some coun-
ties the cooperationists wished to unite all factions opposed to separate
state action, and it was desirable that they conceal their views, espe-
cially if they were more pro-Union than pro-secession: Otherwise some
of the cooperationists might vote with the straight outs. It is even
difficult to tell whether some of the defeated candidates were coopera-
tionists or secessionists. In some counties both winner and loser were
from the same party. This was the case in Henry, Limestone, Montgomery,
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and Morgan counties. In Lauderdale County one of the defeated candidat
was a cooperationist and the other loser was a straight out. It is al
difficult to classify the candidates according to former political affil
ation. Some had been prominent in the 1860 presidential campaign, but
most were comparatively unknown. 175
When the election results became known, the secessionists in cen-
tral and south Alabama were in a majority. They won in twenty-nine coun-
ties for an approximate vote of 36,000. The cooperationists were vic-
torious in twenty-two counties, collecting 28,000 votes. One County
in north Alabama, Calhoun, elected secessionists, while one in south
Alabama, Conecuh, gave a plurality for co-operation. In eight counties
in the Black Belt the immediatists had no opposition, and the coopera-
tionists went unchallenged in three upcountry counties. The total vote
was about 65,000, 25,000 less than the total vote in the presidential
, 176
election.
A recent analysis of the Convention election by Thomas B. Alexander
argues that approximately 75 percent of the Breckenridge voters in Ala-
bama voted for secessionists candidates and that the remainder stayed
v, 177 „nome. But this evaluation does not explain the thirteen counties
just above the Black Belt that voted for cooperationists delegates.
All thirteen--areas of low slave density-had been in the Breckenridge
column, except two of these counties, Coosa and Tallaposa, voted
heavily for Bell and Douglas. Significant numbers of Breckenridge votc-T
in these upper-central counties voted for cooperation. This section of
Alabama showed a marked increase in the number of voters over those who
1 78
cast ballots in November. The graph below bears out this point.
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These Breckenridge counties were populated with yeoman farmers
who owned few or no bondsmen, and economic independence made them less
susceptible to racist anxieties or rumors of slave plots than the poorer
whites of the low country. To the latter, emancipation would bring a
direct confrontation with blacks in the labor market. Although the up-
country yeoman farmers were also racists, they were not as negrophobic
as whites further to the south. They witnessed bitter election campaigns
and they gave their votes to the cooperationists candidates. Certainly,
this was true in Tallapoosa and Coosa, two counties which formed a wedge
that drove deep into the immediate secession region below.
In the Tennessee Valley, upcountry, where the combined Bell-Douglas
vote exceeded the Breckenridge vote, 90 percent of the former Bell-Douglas
voters cast their ballots for co-operation and the remainder did not go
to the polls. In south Alabama, however, only a little over a third of
the Bell-Douglas men voted for co-operation somewhat less chose imme-
diatist candidates, and the remaining third did not vote--mostly in those
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counties where no cooperation^ candidate announced. A11 five former
Bell counties in south Alabama elected straight out delegates. In Bald-
win, Butler, and Macon, the vote for immediatists was in excess of 80
Percent of the total and there had been no effective opposition, m
Greene County, where a contest did take place, one of the straight out
candidates, James Webb, had been a Bell elector, and he rallied
.any of
his old Whig-planter neighbors to the immediatist banner. 179
Slaveholding density determined the vote. Counties with a heavy
slave population in 1860 were secessionist, and usually by a wide margin;
whereas those with a small proportion of slaves were cooperationists
.
Half of the cooperationist counties had less than 25 percent slaves in
1860, while less than one-seventh of the immediatist counties were popu-
lated by over 50 percent slaves. Seventeen straight out counties were
predominantly black, and nine of them were 62.5 percent so; no coopera-
tionist counties had so high a percentage. The State's cotton-producing
region were dominated by immediatists. They were a majority in counties
that produced 25,000 bales of cotton or more in 1859: only one co-opera-
tion county grew that much. The immediatist counties, home of Alabama's
large plantations, also had a higher per capita wealth than did the co-
operationist counties. Fourteen of the latter had less than $1000 per
capita wealth in 1860, but only nine immediatist counties were that poor.
On the other hand, only two co-operation counties (Madison and Morgan)
had a per capita wealth of $2000 or more in 1860; and ten secessionist
counties ranked that high, with three above $5000. 180
In the Black Belt, where the plantation predominated, the wealth
obviously was concentrated in the hands of the planters. Many of them
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Joined the immediatists as a result of economic distress-depleted cotton
prices brought on by drought~and Lincoln's election. As to small plantcr
(those Who owned 20-50 slaves) of east-central Alabama, they
.new that
status and place rested upon slavery and cotton. They were desperately
trying to be upwardly mobil e at a time when both slaves and good soil
were held by the big operator and selling at a premie They, above
all others were demanding more slave territory and federal protection of
slavery in this territory. These small planters viewed Lincoln's victory
as a threat to their economic and racial security. Small wonder, then,
that regions with dense slave population desired secession. Furthermore,
they were goaded by demagogues who, after Lincoln's election, sought
a southern confederacy where they believed, honor, white supremacy, and
high office awaited them.
Before the January Convention met, Governor Moore took possession
of Forts Morgan and Gains on Mobile Bay and the Federal Arsenal at Mount
Vernon. These acts, and the dispatches of radical commissioners to the
other slave state meetings, was done to pressure convention delegates
into secession. Governor Moore informed lameduck President Buchanan of
his actions and Buchanan did nothing, prefering to leave Lincoln with
the crisis.
The Convention met on January 7, 1861. Immediate secessionists
among the delegates advocated prompt and separate state secession: the
cooperationists favored an all Southern Convention to consider a redress
of grievances or secession. Actually, in the latter group there were
many different shades of opinion, varying from unqualified Unionism to
advocacy of secession with the condition that other southern states would
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support «.b.M should she secede
. In thelr to0; were ^^^^^
secessionists who wanted to .ahe one last plea for southern rights in
the Union and await an overt act against the south bv Lincoln's adral„-
istration.
There is an interesting correlation to be made between net worth
and political views. (The Appendix provides a graph which gives a break-
down as to age, birthplace, occupation, slave ownership, and net property
worth of each delegate.) The immediatists, holding an average of $26,270
(Median $20,000) in real property, were considerably wealthier than the
cooperatives with $10,388 (median $5000). They were also wealthier
in personal property, having an average of $60,523 (median $37,913) as
against only $26,304 (median $11,400) for their opponents. Averaging
32.5 slaves each (median 19), the immediatists held twice as many as
did their adversaries, whose average was only 15.9 (median 12). Thus
the backbone of the secessionist drive was provided by the striving
planter-lawyer who owned 20 to 50 slaves. The wealthier favored straight
out state withdrawal from the Union: lawyers and slaveholders comprised
the bulk of this bloc; and there was a high correlation between individual
position, property and immediate secession. 182
Jere Clemens, the cooperationist delegate from Madison County
knew that his faction had a slim chance of "carrying a majority of the
Convention." He hoped that "we may be strong enough to refer the ques-
tion of secession to the people." Clemens wanted "to gain time" so th.
the forces of compromise in the north would hopefully settle the issue. 183
But with the Convention being held in Montgomery where di.sunionism
and hostility to compromise prevailed, the moderates were at a distinct
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disadvantage. Cooperationist Thomas McClelland described the martial
spirit that greeted the delegates upon their arrival:
"state troops
are parading in the streets here day and night and they have guards
stationed nightly at the Capital, even this Sunday morning the first
thing that saluted my ears was the drum and fife of the Minute Men."
Moreover, the spirit of belligerency was evident throughout Montgomery
all during the proceedings. "The troops and the People are very rabid,"
McClellan observed. »J frequently hear it said that the State must be
taken out, or there will be a hanging "184
Clemens, and ex-Whigs Nicholas Davis of Madison County and Robert
Jemison from Tuscaloosa led the moderates. The straight outs were cap-
tained by ex-Whig Thomas Watts; ex-Know-Nothing John T. Morgan as well
as Yancey, who characteristically alienated both friend and foe before
the meeting was over.
On the eve of the first meeting, the cooperationists knew that
they did not have the votes and conceded the contest for temporary chair-
man. William S. Phillips of Dallas County, an immediate secessionist
candidate, was elected. On the vote for permanent chairman, immediatist
William M. Brooks received 53 votes and cooperationist Robert Jemison,
garnered A5 votes. Since neither Brooks nor Jemison voted, the voting
strength was 54 for separate state secession and 46 for cooperation.
This same breakdown of votes was displayed on all major issues until
the secession ordinance was voted upon. On the first day of the Conven-
tion Yancey and Watts, who were old political antagonists, walked to
the platform arm in arm "a token of unity against Northern oppression. 1,185
Following the election of a permanent chairman, secessionist G. C.
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Whatley introduced a resolution denouncing the United States Governs
and the HUA Republican." It also insisted that the people of Alabama
would not sub.it to the "inauguration and administration of Abraham
Lincoln." This was a maneuver by the straight outs to test the cohesive-
ness of the cooperationists
.
Heated debate ensued. The resolution im-
plied, cooperationists William R. Smith and Sydney C. Posey claimed,
that force would be used to prevent Lincoln from being inaugurated.
This matter was settled by an amendment which read that Alabama would
not submit to a Republican administration that adhered to slave restric-
tion, in the territories and the watered-down version passed unanimously. 186
The immediatists kept the pressure on the cooperationists with
a propaganda campaign. For example, on the second day of the secession,
A. P. Calhoun, South Carolina commissioner, addressed the delegates.
He invited Alabama to join with South Carolina, which had already seceded,
in the formation of a Southern confederacy. Governor Moore, following
him, transmitted reports from Alabama commissioners to the other slave-
holding states. The delegates learned that secession by the remaining
southern states, including the border, was imminent.
Secession sentiment was frequently stimulated by telegrams from
these Alabama commissioners and from Congressmen. E. C. Bullock reported
that on January 7 the Florida convention had approved immediate secession.
E. W. Pettus telegraphed that Mississippi had drafted a secession ordinance
and would secede n.i the ninth or tenth. Congressmen Sydenham Moore and
David Clopton telegraphed from Washington that House Republicans had re-
fused to consider Crittenden's compromise and had endorsed the actions
187
of the commander of Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor.
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After Co^issioner Calhoun's speech had evoked an outburst of
thunderous applause in the galleries, the delegates decided to bar the
public from Convention proceedine* R(1 fnro mA *a § s
-
Be o e adjourning for the day they
learned that the chairman had selected a thirteen-man committee consis-
ting of seven immediatists and six cooperationists
. This body would
determine what action the convention should take in regard to federal
relations. It would eventually draft the secession ordinance.
The third day produced debate on a proposed resolution to resist
forcefully attempts to coerce any of the seceding states. On this point
Yancey clashed with several cooperationists who insisted that they really
represented the majority of Alabamians. Yancey, flushed with anger, ex-
claimed that any resistance to the will of the convention majority would
be treason against Alabama. His constituents, upcountry Unionist Nicholas
Davis sharply replied, denied the sovereignty of the convention because
of the way it had been called. They would sustain the delegates' work
ly if it reflected the popular will, and the way to ascertain that
s to hold a plebiscite on secession. They would meet Yancey, Davis
concluded, at the foot of their mountains and settle the question of
I QQ
treason with bayonets.
Watts and Morgan admonished Yancey for his intemperate and fire-
eating rhetoric and tried to placate the cooperationists. Apparently,
Yancey had not lost his talent for making enemies even among his own
partisans. After the Convention he was not selected as a delegate to
the Confederate Convention which would meet on February 4, 1861. He
dejectedly wrote his brother, "I have no idea of ever returning to pub-
] 89lie life again," a vow, of course, which he did not keep.
on
wa
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The cooperationists attests to gain time continued to meet de-
termined opposition. On the fourth day these efforts to refer secession
to a general Southern Convention and to have a popular referendum on
disunion were both defeated by the identical votes of 54 to 46. 190 Some
cooperationists, in voting for these measures felt that they had per-
formed their duty to their constituents and prepared to join the straight
outs. This shift of position, they argued, was prompted by a desire
not to give the impression that Alabama was divided on resisting Repub-
lican rule.
Yancey presented an ordinance of secession drawn up by the commit-
tee of thirteen. The measure was accompanied by a resolution inviting
other southern states to meet in convention for consultation at Montgomery
on February 4, 1861. Confident of victory, the immediatists, pending
Yancey's motion, gave the cooperationists an opportunity to speak in
opposition to straight out secession. Several upstate cooperationists
condemned the impending decision, maintaining that many north Alabamians
preferred secession from the state, and annexation to Tennessee, to dis-
union. Others predicted war and disaster for the State. Jere Clemens
affirmed that he would vote for the secession ordinance because it was
certain to pass. He was right, the vote for passage was 61 to 39. Further-
more, fifteen cooperationists who voted against the resolution later
signed it.
After the secession ordinace passed, Chairman Brooks declared
Alabama a free, sovereign, and independent state. Brooks advised the
cooperationists to forget any plans of "reconstruction." Alabamians,
he warned, are now independent: "and sink or swim, live or die, they
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will dismiss tha ldea of . reconstltuUon Q£ oM union nw ^
ever." On the same day that the Convention passed the ordinace of seces-
sion, it also affiled the resolution Siting the delegates of all slave-
holding states to meet on February 4 for the purpose of forcing a Sou-
thern Confederacy. 192
Political edition and economic instability have already been
cited as key factors for secession support. A deeper motive was summed
up by delegate E. S. Dargen of Mobile, one of the straight outs on the
committee of thirteen, m giving his reasons for support of the ordinance,
he told the Convention that he had for years been convinced that the
southern states would be compelled to secede or abolish slavery. The
day had now come, he said, when Alabama must make that choice. Further-
more
:
if pecuniary loss alone were involved in the abo-
lition of slavery, I should hesitate long before
I would give the vote I now intend to give. If
the destruction of slavery entailed on us poverty
alone, I could bear it But poverty .. .would be
one of the least evils that would befall us from
the abolition of African slavery. There are now
in the slaveholding states over four million slaves;
dissolve the relation of master and slave, and
what I ask would become of that race? To remove
them from amongst us is impossible ... .We neither
have a place to which to remove them, nor the means
of such removal. They therefore must remain with
us; and if the relation of master and slave be
dissolvpd, and our slaves turned loose amongst
us without restraint, they would either be des-
troyed by our own hands... or we ourselves would
become demoralized and degraded. 193
With Lhe Convention business completed, the doors of the hall were
thrown open and crowds swarmed onto the floor. Montgomery's residents
had been making their presence felt throughout the proceedings. To some
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degree they acted as an emotional lobby for see****** »y t cession. For example, they
had orsanized a KOck convention in the Senate chamber on January 10,
adopted an ordinate of secession, and appointed a
.essenger to convey
a copy of It to "the iower house"-the real convent ion-and ask its con-
194
currence
.
To the cheering crowd, a State flag made by the ladies of Mont-
gomery was raised over the capital. Upcountry Unionists could not con-
tain their depression and bitterness. A delegate viewed the new flag
against the southern sky and wrote: "Here I sit and from my window see
the nasty little thing flounting in the breeze which has been the pride
of millions of Americans and the boast of freemen the wide world over."195
Another lamented, H have no language to express my feelings when the
new flag unfurled in the capital, to see a large crowd
.. .transported
with joy at such an event...was to me a soul sickening spectacle that
I ever witnessed in all my life."196
The news of secession spread across Alabama. Demonstrations of
support in the Black Belt continued into the night. An exception was
the house of Henry Semple, a Montgomery Regency conservative, which was
kept in darkness when his neighbors dwellings were lighted because, he
said, they would be in mourning before the year was out. 197
Secession produced great bitterness in north Alabama. The Con-
vention was denounced for not referring it to the people for their en-
dorsement. Black Belt and south Alabama straight outs had deliberately
avoided a popular referendum. They feared that it would have been voted
down. The immediatists regarded such a procedure as costly, time con-
suming, and unnecessary. In the Convention they argued that they had
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c«. t*** fra. the people
,
havlng been selected a ^ weks^
and that they knew the popular will.
Nevertheless, bitterness was rife in many mountain communities.
One upcountry County burned Yancey in effigy. The United States
it was reported, continued to fly over the courthouses at Athens and
'
Huntsville after the adoption of the secession ordinance. 198 Lawrence
County Unionist Thomas Peters praised the Union, declaring that outside
of South Carolina "in the cotton states politicians are trying the ex-
periment of getting along without the people. Thus far they have succeeded."
He also predicted a bleak future for masters and slaves: "But in the
end unless we resort to military government there will be a revulsion;
and as the Negro is the sole cause of our present troubles the fury of
the non-slaveholder will be turned against him and his masters and we
will have another tragedy...."199
H. hi Clay believed that a successful attempt would be made to
excite the upcountry to rebellion against Alabama and that there would
be civil war in their midst. A proposal was even made to form a new
state to be called Nickajack—out of the upcountry counties—which might
possibly be joined by counties in northeast Georgie and eastern Tennessee.
But L. P. Walker, Alabama commissioner to Tennessee, reported that Tenne-
ssee would follow her sister states out of the Union. This news exerted
moderation on the highlands. Once the war got under way, however, it
is significant that north Alabama, particularly the nine Tennessee Valley
counties, had the highest desertion rate in Alabama.
On January 21, 1861, Alabama's seven-man Congressional delegation
withdrew from the federal councils. Of this delegation, two of them
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were upstate Unionists, George Smith Houston and W. R. w. Cobb. (Cobb
refused to leave with his colleagues and stayed on for an additional week
in the capital.) The other five were ardent secessionists. James Pugh
of the Eufaula Regency was one of the more vitriolic. In one letter
toward the end of January, he wrote of his fears that upcountry Alabama
and the border states would yet consummate an agreement thus undermining
the seceded states. The only way to avoid the "calamity of reconcilia-
tion is war," he declared and, therefire, South Carolina had "the power
of putting us beyond the reach of compromise by taking Fort Sumter at
any cost." This would put an end to all schemes of reconciliation. 201
Alabama's two Senators, Clay and Fitzpatrick, were divided on
disunion. Clay had accused the "Black Republicans" of plotting to des-
troy the south's domestic tranquility, "imperiling the lives of our wives
and children by their schemes of manumission." Clay and like-minded
southern representatives may have turned to secession out of failure
to win the presidency for the south and thereby manage the political
future of the United States. Shortly after the Republican victory, he
had admitted, "of course, we cannot live under the same government with
these people, unless we control it." And just before he left Washington,
Jefferson Davis told him, "We have piped and they would not dance now
the devil may care.
When the Confederate Convention began its deliberations in Mont-
gomery on February 4, 1861, representatives were present from six sece-
ding states of the lower south. Alabamians selected moderates to repre-
sent her and denied places to most of the ultras. Their thinking was
obvious, many of the state's less extreme straight outs as well as her
381
new
sou-
cooperationists to prove how rationa, and deliberate ^
Sover„me„t would b0
. Jn SQ dolng they thereby ^
the wavering border stat»« . i.es that there was nothing to fear from a
them confederacy under ,hIgglsh » rule
. Turthm> ^^^
apectrUm of southern Politic! opinion couid he won over to secession
only if the hard core radicals were repudiated. Thls cm as . Mo„
to Al.W. ultras who believed high „f„ ce uas thelr due ^^
fired the State to secession.
William L. Yancey, for example, was not chosen as a delegate.
Despite this slight, however, and despite his protestations about ever
seeking office again, he did aspire to the presidency of the Confederacy
There was, in fact, a general impression outside the Gulf states that
either he or Rhett would be chosen. Although always misjudged as a stri
dent disunionist, Yancey over the years alienated many southern conser-
vatives and chauvinists with his extremist invective. Moreover, among
insiders he was known to lack leadership qualities. The time for ultra-
ism had passed; moderation prevailed. The Confederate Constitution,
except for expressed recognition of slavery and prohibition of revenue
tariffs and internal improvements, was like the federal Constitution
that the lower South had just abandoned. Moderation dictated the choice
of a president and vice-president. Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, al-
though an ardent sectional ist, was hardly a radical. Georgia Whig Alex-
ander H. Stephens, a last-minute secessionist and clearly not a fire-
eater, was elected vice-president.
Davis arrived in Montgomery on February 16, 1861. On the night
his arrival, Yancey allegedly greeted him with these words: "The man
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and the hour have «t.« southern society „as about to experience its
-st tragic episode, a civU war brought on Urgel y by the south . s fear
of losing mastery over its slave population. On February 18, 1861,
Davis took the presidential oath of the Confederacy on the portico^
the capitol building at Montgomery.
EPILOGUE
When the war came Mny ln north AlabaM^^
During the course of ho.tilttt.. 2,578 uhlte Alaba„,lans^ ^ ^
Union army
, .
l ar8e number of „hom were from the "seditious" counties
of Winston, «tar
,
Fayette, Morion, and Blount. The MjorUy of these
Unionists joined the first Al.b.M hrigade-one hundred and tUtf from
Winston County alone. 1
A far greater number of Union sympathisers remained J home and
by maintaining the security of the hills, they furnished a refuge for
thousands of deserters and conscription evaders, thus depriving the Con-
federacy of vitally needed manpower. Their hostile presence in the moun-
tains served as a picket line for federal forces in the Tennessee Valley
and a buffer against Confederate attack.
Another segment of the population also manifested disloyalty.
Thousands of Alabama slaves-including once trusted servants- left the
plantations. These massive desertions lead one to question how common
and how real the "bonds of affection" between slaveowner and slave had
ever been. Certaintly, many slaveholders lived in dread that their bonds
men once freed would menace them and their plantations. However, most
blacks had a passionate attachment to freedom and a desire to live as
independently as possible. In all aspects of social existence-whether
in forming churches, seeking employment or education, strengthening their
families, or entering politics—black Alauamians struggled for a way
of life that would provide them with dignity and self respect. 2
Civil War and Reconstruction ended political careers of some and
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conversely opened up new opportunities for others in Alabama: Of those
ambitious politicians who were active in the eighteen fifties, the ca-
pricious Willi*, L . Yancey U most prominen^ ^ fche
derate Presidency and offered the post of Attorney General. He turned
down the nomination and accepted instead Davis' offer of a special diplo-
matic mission to Europe. As was to be expected, he proved to be diplo-
matically inept and was recalled. Upon his return, Yancey represented
Alabama in the Confederate Senate, where he became the leader of the
anti-Davis forces, thereby reverting to his familiar role of outsider
who agitated against the established party system. Among other things,
Yancey wanted to force Davis into a public statement commending him for
helping to bring on southern secession. 3
Benjamin Fitzpatrick, a conservative Democratic Party loyalist,
had a high standing in the Senate as indicated by the fact that he served
as President p^-tempere of that body for the last three years before
Fort Sumter. He opposed secession, but in the end thought opposition
was useless. Secession, we have seen, meant the end of his political
career. He not only lost his high position in the Union but also his
state organization—the Montgomery Regency—for it had finally been smashed
by its foes, the southern rights ultras of the eastern Black Belt. Fitz-
patrick retured quietly to his plantation near Wetumpka and lived there
during the war taking no part in Alabama's Confederate politics. In
1865 he made a brief return upon being elected president of the State
Constitutional Convention, but the Republicans soon disfranchised him.
Williamson R. W. Cobb, Alabama's consistent Upstate Unionist, was
defeated for the Confederate Congress in 1861 but won in a renewed bid
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two years later, when he managed to capitalize on the growing anti-war
sentient. * 1864, shortly after his term began, Cobb was expelled
Horn that body for his pronounced Unionist sympathies. 4
Cobb's unionist ally, Congressman George Smith Houston, refused
to serve in the Confederate army. But he also declined to take the oath
of allegiance to the government of the United States, an act that com-
mended him to white Alabama after Appomattox. He was elected to the
United States Senate in 1865, though he was not permitted to take his
seat. Then, in 1874, he became the redeemer Governor of Alabama-the
first Democrat chosen for that office in the post-bellum years. His
campaign- "the white man's movement "-was directed against the "nigger
domination" of the State under Republican rule. Finally in 1879 Houston
realized his old ambition of taking a seat in the United States Senate. 5
Some of Alabama's old Whigs rode back into power as the State
wearied of the war. Robert Jemison, a leader of the cooperationists,
replaced William L. Yancey in the Confederate Senate. C. C. Clay, Jr.,
also served there until 1863 when he was defeated by Richard Walker,
the former Whig-Unionist, later southern rights oppositionist, and finally
moderate. Thomas Watts, another ex-Whig who joined the secessionist
ranks after Lincoln's election, also took advantage of the growing war-
time discontent and in 1863 defeated Governor John Gill Shorter of
Eufaula clique fame who had replaced Governor A. B. Moore in 1861. 6
Supreme Court Judge John A. Campbell, who began his political
career as a Calhounlte comrade of Dixon Hall Lewis and after his selec-
tion to the High Court in 1853 became a Unionist, was anathema in his
own State after secession. His Unionist sentiments had won him many
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was
L864
powerful ene.ies~the mos t lmplacable belns „„ .„ ^
«.. Yancey. Although Campbell, „ow shed of hl, Judlclal^
to the position of Attorney General, hi. ene.ies blocked htm. After the
war Ca»Pbell la be s t re^bered as an attorney ar8uln8 before the Court
in Slaughter-House, a case which contributed to a relnterpretation of
the fourteenth amendment. 7
Other prominent Alabamians openly collaborated with the Union
armies. Editor J. J. Seibels ran for the Confederate Senate and
defeated. He then took a commission in the Confederate army. By 1
Seibels was part of a "secret treasonable peace society" in Alabama that
sought to "take the state back into the Union on any terms." By 186 5
Seibels was co-operating with federal forces and with the Republican
Party.
8
Ex-United States Senator Jere Clemens, who helped lead the co-
operationists, accepted a commission as a Major General in the Confederate
army at the beginning of the war, but later he defected, went to Phila-
delphia, and made speeches for the Union League. 9
Judge Samuel Rice who was in turn a Democrat, Whig, Know-Nothing
and secessionist, became a "scalawag" after the war and joined the Re-
publican Party in 1870. 10
Several Alabama fire-eaters eventually achieved the high offices
they had been seeking since the late 1850' s. Leroy Pope Walker, the
straight out secessionist from Madison County, was appointed Secretary
of War in Davis 1 first cabinet but proved to be utterly inexperienced
in administration. He resigned, after coming under fire in the Confe-
derate Congress and was offered instead a foreign mission which he de-
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dined. He spent the balance of the war years as a Judge in a military
court. By 1863 he was a!so collaborating with Alabama Unionists, draft-
ing resolutions for the return to the Union. He defended north Alabama
Unionists accused of treason in 1863. Walker In effect had again shifted
position as Alabama sentiment soured against the war. After hostilities
ended, he retired to his law practice and never sought political prefer-
ment again.
Firebrand Congressman J. L. M. Curry fashioned a unique career
in the post-bellum years. A man of distinctive scholarly gifts, Curry
was appointed agent of the Peabody fund in 1881. This grant of George
Peabody, a New England millionaire philanthropist, was created to encourage
state normal schools in the twelve southern states. Curry established,
through the fund, the first segregated normal school system in the south.
He was also placed in charge of a fund set up by Connecticut philanthro-
pist John F. Slater for black schools in the south. Cwing to his repu-
tation as an administrator, he was appointed by Grover Cleveland to be
United States minister to Spain. By the time of his death, in 1903, Curry
was better known for his achievement as an administrator than a secession-
12ist agitator.
Several Black Belt southern-rights opportunists who had yearned
for political elevation in the late 1850's became Democratic machine
politicians in the post-Reconstruction period. These former "outsiders'"
distorted Republican rule and emancipation in Alabama as "nigger domina-
tion" and rode into power on the wave of the "white man's movement."
Thus, they found that appeals to white racial anxieties were still opera-
tive. Former Whig and later southern-rights Democratic Congressman
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L. Pugh helped reorgant2e AUbama , s DemocraUc party ^ i88Qis
He was eiected to the United states Senate in 1880 and served sixteen
consecutive years there. 13
William C. Gates, a protege of Pugh's and
.ember of the Eufaula
clique, gained a reputation as an ultra in 1860 and became a Black Belt
political manager after 1870. He served in the Alabama lower House f
1870 to 1872, and in 1875 was chairman of the Judicial committee at th
State Constitutional Convention. He was elected to Congress from th
Eufaula district in 1880, reelected si. times, and resigned in 1894 when
he became Alabama Governor. This former radical ultra-
-''the one-armed
hero of Henry County "-then fought Populism ln the State. In 1890, when
the Farmers Alliance was strong, he bitterly opposed the Populists' sub-
treasury scheme and led the Alabama hard money men. Interestingly, he
was one of the few men who opposed the soldier and grandfather clauses
of the post Reconstruction Alabama Constitution and demanded an equal
standard of fitness for members of both races at the polls. 14
Probably no Alabama demagogue after the war achieved as much
success and notoriety as John T. Morgan. A man with consuming ambition,
he helped lead the forces of "white supremacy" in overturning Republican
rule in 1874. In 1876 he was elected to the Senate, where he remained
until his death in 1907. Morgan had been a Know-Nothing in the late
fifties and continued after the war to stir racial animosities. He was,
however, a man who when it served his interests, disregarded racial con-
victions and party loyalty. For example, some Senate Republicans made
an attempt to bar him. He soon won their approval by voting to confirm
the appointment of Frederick Douglas as Marshal of the District of Columbia
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While in the Senate He Joined Republican expansionist and came to sym-
bolize the southern push for new markets. He waged a ceaseless struggle
in behalf of United States efforts to penetrate Africa, Latin Amerlca
,
and Asia. Using the states-rights argument, he fought effectively from
1886 to 1888 against the Blair education bill for eradicating southern
illiteracy, m 1900 Morgan led the successful southern attack on the
Force bill~which would have abrogated the grandfather clause in the
constitutions of the southern states-and in both national and Alabama
politics, he became a power that it was not safe to disregard. 15
Edmund Pettus, Dallas County ally of John T. Morgan who had gained
a reputation for his fiery secessionists speeches, also became an impor-
tant political manager in post Reconstruction Alabama. He replaced the
deceased James Pugh in the United States Senate in 1897 and was elected
on his own in 1907.
Two fire-eaters-Thomas H. Herndon and Edward A. 0. O'Neal-who
were frustrated in their attempts at political advancement before the
war-became important Democratic managers during Alabama's Bourbon period.
Herndon served in Congress from 1878 to 1883 and was chairman of the
Mobile Democratic organization. O'Neal played an important role in "the
white man's movement" of 1874, was elected Governor in 1882 and re-elected
in 1884.
17
Two of the State's most outspoken secessionists both Black Belt
newspaper editors—ended their careers obscurely. George W. Gayle of
the Dallas County Slaveholder assisted in prosecuting the war so actively
and expressed his views so freely that, at the close of the war, the federal
authorities arrested him for conspiracy in the assassination of President
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Lincoln. He was L,t„ discharged without a trial and Hved out his last
years as a farmer. 18
J. J. Hooper of the Montgomery Man vas elected secretary of the
Provisional Confederate Congress In Montgomery but lost his post of per-
manent secretary when Jefferson Davis moved his government to Rid ,„„.
He died in Richmond in 1862. 19
One last episode merits attention because it highlights a r,ajor
theme of this study. Several Black Belt slaveholding families found
that the Emancipation of slaves and consequent loss of racial control
was so unbearable that they sought asylum in Latin American countries
that still maintained slavery. Most of those who left accepted the offer
of welcome extended by Brazilian authorities. 20
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